

**THE ROLE OF THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVES OF
THE SECRETARY-GENERAL AND RESIDENT
COORDINATORS**

**A benchmarking framework for coherence and
integration within the United Nations system**

Prepared by

Even Fontaine Ortiz

Joint Inspection Unit

Geneva, 2009



United Nations

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ABBREVIATIONS

| | |
|--------|---|
| ACABQ | Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions |
| ACC | Administrative Committee on Coordination |
| BINUB | United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi |
| CEB | United Nations System Chief Executives Board for Coordination |
| CPC | Committee for Programme and Coordination |
| DDR | disarmament, demobilization and reintegration |
| DFS | Department of Field Support |
| DOCO | Development Operations Coordination Office |
| DPA | Department of Political Affairs |
| DPI | Department of Public Information |
| DPKO | Department of Peacekeeping Operations |
| ECA | Economic Commission for Africa |
| ECE | Economic Commission for Europe |
| EC-ESA | Executive Committee on Economic and Social Affairs |
| ECLAC | Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean |
| ECHA | Executive Committee on Humanitarian Affairs |
| ECPS | Executive Committee on Peace and Security |
| ESCAP | Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific |
| ESCWA | Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia |
| FAO | Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations |
| HACT | harmonized approach to cash transfers to implementing partners |
| HLCM | High-level Committee on Management |
| HLCP | High-level Committee on Programmes |
| HC | humanitarian coordinator |
| IAAP | Inter-Agency Advisory Panel |
| IADGs | internationally agreed development goals |
| IAEA | International Atomic Energy Agency |
| IASC | Inter-Agency Standing Committee |
| ICSC | International Civil Service Commission |
| ILO | International Labour Organization |
| IMF | International Monetary Fund |
| IMPP | Integrated Mission Planning Process |
| IMTF | Integrated Mission Task Force |
| IOT | integrated operational team |
| IPBS | integrated peacebuilding strategy |
| JIU | Joint Inspection Unit |
| MDGs | Millennium Development Goals |
| MONUC | United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo |
| NGO | non-governmental organization |
| OCHA | Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs |
| ODA | official development assistance |
| OHCHR | Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights |
| OIOS | Office of Internal Oversight Services |
| OLA | Office of Legal Affairs |
| PBC | Peacebuilding Commission |
| PBSO | Peacebuilding Support Office |
| PRSP | Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper |
| RC | resident coordinator |

| | |
|--------|--|
| RCM | Regional Coordination Mechanism |
| RDT | Regional Directors' Team |
| SMART | specific, measurable, attainable, relevant and time-bound |
| SRSR | Special Representative of the Secretary-General |
| UNAIDS | Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS |
| UNCT | United Nations country team |
| UNDAF | United Nations Development Assistance Framework |
| UNDG | United Nations Development Group |
| UNDP | United Nations Development Programme |
| UNEG | United Nations Evaluation Group |
| UNEP | United Nations Environment Programme |
| UNFPA | United Nations Population Fund |
| UNHCR | Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees |
| UNICEF | United Nations Children's Fund |
| UNIFEM | United Nations Development Fund for Women |
| UNRWA | United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East |
| UNSSC | United Nations System Staff College |
| WFP | World Food Programme |
| WHO | World Health Organization |

Objective

To examine current barriers to the achievement of coherence and integration of the United Nations system, make recommendations to overcome these barriers and propose a flexible model for coherence and integration that can be adapted to meet the needs and wants of all countries where the United Nations system operates for those on the road to development and those in conflict or post-conflict situations.

INTRODUCTION

1. As part of its 2007 programme of work, the Joint Inspection Unit (JIU) conducted a review in 2007, 2008 and 2009 of the roles of Special Representatives of the Secretary-General (SRSGs)¹ and resident coordinators (RCs) in the context of the coherence and integration process of the United Nations system. The draft report was finalized and sent for comments in May 2009 and reflects the updates provided by participating organizations up to December 2009.

2. Several previous JIU reports have already discussed this issue from different perspectives.² As early as 1995, JIU recommended that SRSGs should provide overall leadership, coordinate and harmonize political, military and humanitarian operations and that the United Nations force commander, the humanitarian coordinator (HC) and the representative of the High Commissioner for Human Rights on the ground should report to the SRSG without prejudice to their respective mandates and internal procedures vis-à-vis their United Nations headquarters. In 1999, JIU completed a review of the Administrative Committee on Coordination (ACC) and its machinery and made recommendations to strengthen the effectiveness and impact of inter-agency coordination. In 2005, the Unit completed another report, on measures to improve overall performance of the United Nations system at the country level. In 2006, the report on the evaluation of results-based budgeting in peacekeeping operations and that on results-based management in the United Nations in the context of the reform process referred to lack of integration as an obstacle for effective delivery of programmes.

3. Likewise, the issue of coherence and integration has been at the heart of the United Nations reform agenda from its inception. In 1996, the then Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, expressed in the annual ACC overview report that “[a] new system-wide culture must emerge, based on systematic policy consultations, effective decentralization, full respect of each other’s mandates and competencies, and a common appreciation of the challenges ahead and of the respective strengths of the various organizations of the system in meeting them”.³ The idea was further developed in his 1997 report entitled, “Renewing the United Nations: a

¹ For the purpose of this report SRSGs also refer to Executive Representatives of the Secretary-General and Representatives of the Secretary-General.

² JIU/REP/95/6 (Investigation of the relationship between humanitarian assistance and peace-keeping operations); JIU/REP/97/1 (Strengthening field representation of the United Nations system); JIU/REP/99/1 (Review of the Administrative Committee on Coordination and its machinery); JIU/REP/2005/2 (Some measures to improve overall performance of the United Nations system at the country level); JIU/REP/2006/1 (Evaluation of results-based budgeting in peacekeeping operations); JIU/REP/2006/6 (Results-based budgeting in the United Nations in the context of the reform process).

³ “Annual overview report of the Administrative Committee on Coordination for 1996” (E/1997/54), p. 5.

programme for reform”⁴ and that of 2005, “In larger freedom: towards development, security and human rights for all”.⁵

4. Two panel reports mandated by the Secretary-General, the 2000 report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations⁶ and the 2006 report of the High-level Panel on United Nations System-wide Coherence, entitled “Delivering as one”, made concrete recommendations for the system to function in a more coherent manner, in the areas of, respectively, peacekeeping, and of development, humanitarian assistance and the environment. The latter report, notably, proposed “a framework for a unified and coherent United Nations structure at the country level”⁷ under the authority of the RC and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) leadership with a so-called “firewall” to facilitate this function. The High-level Panel report was not approved by the General Assembly of the United Nations.

5. On 19 December 2007, the General Assembly adopted resolution 62/208 on the triennial comprehensive policy review of operational activities for development of the United Nations system. It recognized “that development, peace and security and human rights are interlinked and mutually reinforcing”. It also noted that the private sector and civil society, including non-governmental organizations (NGOs), can and should contribute positively to the achievement of the internationally agreed development goals (IADGs), including the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).

6. In that resolution the General Assembly welcomed the efforts, through the United Nations Development Group (UNDG) and the United Nations System Chief Executives Board for Coordination (CEB), to enhance country-level coherence, effectiveness and efficiency of the United Nations development system. It also called for a more inclusive system-wide inter-agency collaboration both at country and headquarter levels for efficient and effective functioning of the United Nations development system through further alignment of the United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) cycle with national processes.

7. While the Inspector appraises CEB to be a well-established body and notes recent improvements, notably the acceptance of UNDG as one of its subsidiary bodies and the adoption of a “firewall” within UNDP as an attempt to ensure transparency, impartiality and fairness in its operations, he nevertheless believes that much more improvement can still be made in CEB to well and truly lead coherence and integration efforts.

8. Yet, the proposed “Delivering as one” framework does not apply to countries in conflict nor to post-conflict situations nor does it address the role of SRSGs in these countries vis-à-vis the reinforced RCs.⁸ In fact, as of November 2009, there were SRSGs in 15 per cent of the countries where RCs had been appointed (21 out of 138). In such instances, according to the Secretary-General’s “Note of guidance on the relations between Representatives of the Secretary-General, Resident Coordinators and Humanitarian Coordinators”, of October 2000,

⁴ A/51/950, para. 49.

⁵ A/59/2005, para. 200.

⁶ A/55/305-S/2000/809 (most commonly known as the “Brahimi report”).

⁷ A/61/583, p. 5.

⁸ It nonetheless indicates that “[s]ince the Brahimi report on peacekeeping operations, integrated United Nations peacekeeping and peacebuilding missions have improved coordination by bringing the development arm of the United Nations under the direct leadership of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General. Better development strategies for post-conflict peacebuilding are needed to guide such missions” (A/61/583, para. 26).

the SRSG is “responsible for giving political guidance to the overall UN presence as well as providing the impetus for a coordinated and coherent approach by all the UN components in the country”.⁹ This Note of guidance was revised in January 2006 stating that in integrated missions, the SRSG has overall authority over the activities of the United Nations, represents the Secretary-General, speaks on behalf of the system, establishes the overall framework that guides the activities of the mission and the United Nations country team (UNCT) and ensures that all pursue a coordinated approach.¹⁰

9. The “Delivering as one” recommendations are being developed within two similar and parallel processes: within the RC system in the eight pilot projects (Albania, Cape Verde, Mozambique, Pakistan, Rwanda, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay and Viet Nam), and within the SRSG system¹¹ (as of November 2009) in the 18 integrated peace missions/offices (Afghanistan, Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, Côte d’Ivoire, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Iraq, Israel/Occupied Palestinian Territory, Kosovo, Lebanon, Liberia, Nepal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan/Darfur and Timor-Leste), while they should be moving towards a common United Nations coherence effort. One key difference between them is that “Delivering as one” under the RC covers only United Nations agencies, funds and programmes while the Secretary-General’s Note of guidance also encompasses the RC interface with the Secretariat entities (i.e. Department of Political Affairs (DPA), Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR)). “Coherence” is the term typically used to apply to the first approach while “integration” applies to the second.

10. To a lesser extent, the HC system present in 27 countries also represents another example of an effort of coherence that also associates non-United Nations actors. The HC, who is in most cases the same person as the RC, is responsible for leading and coordinating humanitarian assistance and protection activities of United Nations country team members, as well as of those NGOs and components of the International Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement that commit to participate in coordination arrangements. The HC is accountable to the Emergency Relief Coordinator.

A. Looking for a common definition

11. Until now, no definition of coherence as such within the United Nations has been adopted. The “Delivering as one” report proposed defining the process as the consolidation of most United Nations country activities under one strategic programme, one budget, one leader and one office. The validity and applicability of this definition have been questioned and the General Assembly did not make a pronouncement on this issue. In general, coherence is a term applicable to developing countries not involved in peace operations whereas integration is related to countries where peace operations are in place.

12. In 2006, the Secretary-General described integration as the guiding principle for the design and implementation of complex UN operations in post-conflict situations and for

⁹ Para. 9.

¹⁰ “Note of guidance on integrated missions: clarifying the role, responsibility and authority of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General/Resident Coordinator/Humanitarian Coordinator” (January 2006), para. 5.

¹¹ While some missions have a head of mission or Executive Special Representative of the Secretary General, this report uses the term SRSG to refer to heads of mission, Executive Special Representatives of the Secretary General and SRSGs.

linking the different dimensions of peacebuilding (political, development, humanitarian, human rights, rule of law, social and security aspects) into a coherent support strategy. An integrated mission is based on a common strategic plan and shared understanding of the priorities and types of programme interventions that need to be undertaken at various stages of the recovery process. Through this integrated process, the UN seeks to maximize its contribution towards countries emerging from conflict by engaging its different capabilities in a coherent and mutually supportive manner.¹²

13. Furthermore, Policy Committee decision No. 2008/24 of 26 June 2008, outlined four elements of integration:

(a) The main purpose of integration is to maximize the individual and collective impact of the United Nations response, concentrating on those activities required to consolidate peace;

(b) To achieve this main purpose at the country level, there should be an effective strategic partnership between the United Nations mission/office and the country team, under the leadership of the SRSG, that ensures that all components of the United Nations mission/office and the country team operate in a coherent and mutually supportive manner, and in close collaboration with other partners;

(c) The country-level requirements should reflect the specific requirements and circumstances and can take different structural forms. In all cases they should include (i) a shared vision of the United Nations strategic objectives; (ii) closely aligned or integrated planning; (iii) a set of agreed results, timelines and responsibilities for the delivery of tasks critical to consolidating peace; and (iv) agreed mechanisms for monitoring and evaluation.

(d) An integrated approach and integration arrangements can yield significant benefits for humanitarian operations. Integration arrangements should take full account of recognized humanitarian principles, allow for the protection of humanitarian space, and facilitate effective humanitarian coordination with all humanitarian actors.

14. The Policy Committee established an Integration Steering Group consisting of representatives of Secretariat entities and United Nations agencies, funds and programmes, and is a standing body with the task of facilitating integration policy and its application. Nevertheless, its decisions are not binding on all actors involved in peacekeeping operations.

15. While the Inspector welcomes these efforts to define integration better and considers that these elements address some of the concerns of stakeholders, he highlights that they are not binding on all the partners involved in the integration process due to the limited authority of the Policy Committee.

16. The guidance document on principles and guidelines for United Nations peacekeeping operations, developed by DPKO/Department of Field Support (DFS), aims to define the nature, scope and core business of contemporary United Nations peacekeeping operations. It characterizes an integrated mission as “one in which there is a shared vision among all United Nations actors as to the strategic objectives of the United Nations presence at the country-level”.¹³ Relatively less attention is often paid to ensuring integration within the DPKO-led

¹² “Note of guidance ...” (see footnote 10 above), para. 4.

¹³ *United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines* (2008), p. 53.

mission responsible for multidimensional peacekeeping, while formally integrated may actually neither be internally integrated (due to civilian, police and military undertaking distinct and specialized roles ranging from human rights to disarmament and demobilization to support for elections) nor integrated with the rest of the United Nations system “in a coherent and mutually supportive manner”.¹⁴ The challenge of internal mission integration is compounded by a second level of integration with the wider United Nations agencies, funds, and programmes, which are increasingly required to deliver programmatic elements of peace dividends in countries affected by conflict to ensure successful peacekeeping.¹⁵ In December 2009, the Integration Steering Group approved the Integrated Mission Planning Process (IMPP) guidelines for the field, which apply to all multidimensional United Nations presences, that is, where there is both a United Nations mission (including those headed by DPKO and DPA) and a UNCT. These guidelines provide minimum standards for (a) integrated field coordination structures to ensure that collaboration is institutionalized from the senior leadership to the working level; and (b) the development and implementation of integrated strategic frameworks establishing common peace consolidation priorities for the United Nations system at country level. Unfortunately, those principles are not binding on all actors involved in peacekeeping operations.

17. Furthermore, ministers from developed and developing countries stated in the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness of March 2005 that the coherence and integration process should involve other important actors such as the Bretton Woods institutions, individual donor countries and groups of donors, regional organizations, civil society, the private sector and all State institutions.

18. All the above-mentioned definitions of coherence and integration apply at the country level. The Inspector is of the view, however, that in order to achieve coherence and integration in the field, coherence and integration at Headquarters are a must and that for them to be effective, they should occur at all levels across the United Nations system and with stakeholders and partners outside the United Nations system. Across the United Nations system, coherence should be realized, in the first instance, between Member States at the national and legislative organ level, and, in the second instance, within and among the Secretariat, the funds and programmes and the specialized agencies. As has been correctly pointed out, the greatest challenge to coherence and integration is the United Nations structure itself, with a highly fragmented and complex bureaucracy, 17 departments and offices, 14 funds and programmes, 16 specialized agencies, all with different mandates, governing structures and procedures.

19. The Inspector suggests defining coherence as the overall strategic process for United Nations system operations to achieve pre-defined objectives, and integration as the operational modality to make that coherence functional. Integrated missions and “Delivering as one” are, therefore, means not only to achieve country needs but also coherence.

B. Member State ownership

20. Last but not least, the cornerstone to bringing coherence and integration into the United Nations system to support peace and development efforts is for all concerned to accept, without further debate, that the process must be driven by the Member States concerned,

¹⁴ See footnote 10 above.

¹⁵ Multidimensional and Integrated Peace Operations: trends and Challenges, Seminar in Addis Ababa, 26-27 April 2007.

based on the needs and wants of each country as defined in partnership with the country concerned, the United Nations system representatives, the donor community and other actors, and in full respect of agreed national priorities and strong State commitment. It is, therefore, important to achieve coherence at the local authority level of each country. Ultimately, achieving coherence and integration is a shared responsibility of Member States and the United Nations system organizations, both individually and collectively.

21. The Inspector wishes to stress that the present proposed model for coherence and integration entails a high degree of flexibility to adapt it to the peculiarities of a case-by-case approach. For example, the needs of post-conflict countries differ from those of developing countries that are not involved in peace operations and they should, therefore, be tailored accordingly. The Inspector notes that the General Assembly in paragraph of its resolution 62/277 of 15 September 2008, decided that system-wide coherence would “focus exclusively and in an integrated manner on ‘Delivering as one’”. Nevertheless, the Inspector is of the opinion that the architecture, as defined and clearly expressed in the present benchmarking framework, supersedes the two main current exercises, namely, “Delivering as one” and integrated peace operations.

22. In view of the complexity of this subject, the Inspector, who had initially envisaged a review of the relationship between SRSGs and RCs from a more restricted angle concerning: (a) the status of implementation of the various guidelines defining their respective responsibilities; (b) headquarters arrangements in support of coherence and coordination at the field level; and (c) the selection, costing, conditions of services, terms of reference, accountability and oversight of SRSGs, has subsequently decided to expand the scope of the report to take into account other issues that influence the coherence and integration process, such as the mandates and concerns of the different actors involved and the funding constraints that hamper the implementation of “Delivering as one”.

23. As a result, the report proposes a benchmarking framework for coherence and integration at all levels across the United Nations system and with its stakeholders/partners, and a model of field presence flexible enough to fit the diverse and changing needs of countries in peaceful, conflict and post-conflict situations. The Inspector invites the legislative organs of the JIU participating organizations to adopt this benchmarking framework as a yardstick to guide and measure efforts towards a more efficient and effective organization, which would better serve the needs of countries.

C. Methodology

24. In accordance with JIU internal standards, guidelines and working procedures, the methodology followed in preparing this report included a preliminary desk review, questionnaires, interviews and in-depth analysis. The Inspector conducted more than 100 interviews with officials of various participating organizations in Geneva, New York and Rome; with SRSGs, RCs and members of UNCTs; and with representatives of host country Governments, donor countries and NGOs in the field. At Headquarters in New York, interviews were held with the Secretary-General, the Deputy-Secretary-General, the Under-Secretary-Generals and the Assistant-Secretary-Generals of DPKO and DPA, the UNDP Administrator, the Emergency Relief Coordinator and the heads of the Executive Office on Peace and Security and of the Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO), among other officials. In Geneva and Rome, interviews included those with officials from the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), the International Labour Organization (ILO), OHCHR, the World Food Programme (WFP) and the World Health Organization (WHO). In addition, confidential electronic questionnaires were sent to a total of 47 SRSGs and Deputy

Special Representatives, who may or may not have combined this function with the RC and HC functions, with a response rate of 57 per cent. Furthermore, the Inspector visited a sample of United Nations countries that were at different stages of a conflict situation: Burundi, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Haiti, Nepal, Somalia (based in Nairobi) and Tajikistan. The Inspector also visited China, as an example of country in a peaceful development situation, and Viet Nam, which was among the eight pilot projects. Comments from participating organizations on the draft report were sought and taken into account in its finalization.

25. Internal brainstorming among the Inspectors and the JIU research staff served as the first test to this report; an enlarged brainstorming session, open to all United Nations system organizations, representatives of Member States and other personalities versed in this matter took place on 30 June 2008. The current text was highly enriched as a result of the session. Most, if not all comments made, have been duly taken into account in the current text. As the analysis in this report is based on the situation prevailing in 2008, the many new developments regarding system-wide coherence and integration since 2009, while mentioned in the report, could not be fully factored into the analysis. However, in the view of the Inspector, the work done in this area fully confirms the validity of the benchmarks and should contribute to better coherence and integration.

26. The Inspector thanks, in particular, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Norway for its support and encouragement during the process of preparation of this review, especially the organization of the enlarged brainstorming session of June 2008.

27. In accordance with article 11, paragraph 2, of the JIU statute, this report has been finalized after consultation among the Inspectors so as to test its benchmarks and recommendations against the collective wisdom of the Unit.

28. The Inspector wishes to express his appreciation to all who assisted in the preparation of this report, and particularly to those who participated in the interviews and so willingly shared their knowledge and expertise. The Inspector expresses his special recognition to former Inspector Juan Luis Larrabure, who not only inspired this report, but was an invaluable source of knowledge and dedication. His ideas and approach have been preserved. At the time of the report's publication, the Inspector also wishes to dedicate it to the memory of the late DSRSR Luiz Carlos da Costa whose commitment to the United Nations and in particular its peace operations, was beyond all expectations. Mr. da Costa's contribution to this report was crucial to its preparation.

29. The Inspector believes that the 18 benchmarks should be considered and implemented for greater progress to be made towards achieving coherence in the United Nations system. The benchmarks are divided between Headquarters and field responsibilities.

RECOMMENDATION

The legislative organs are invited to adopt this benchmarking framework as a yardstick to guide and measure efforts towards a more efficient and effective organization, which would better serve the needs of countries.

I. TOWARDS GREATER COHERENCE AND INTEGRATION OF INTERGOVERNMENTAL MANDATES

A. The driving role of Member States

30. The United Nations system is composed of 30 organizations, each governed by legislative bodies composed of Member States (including employers and workers in the case of ILO). Membership varies from one organization to another in terms of State representatives and expertise. Consequently, the mandates of these legislative bodies may differ or overlap.

31. In terms of peace and development, the mandates generally come from the Security Council, the General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council. A number of subsidiary and advisory bodies with a more limited membership assist in dealing with these issues, such as the Special Committee on Peace-keeping Operations,¹⁶ the Peacebuilding Commission¹⁷ and the Commission on Sustainable Development.¹⁸

32. Other United Nations subsidiary and advisory bodies are involved in financing and programming, such as the Fifth Committee, the Commission for Social Development, the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (ACABQ) and the Committee for Programme and Coordination (CPC). The two latter bodies in particular have a normative role to bring homogeneity to decisions taken at a higher level and they perform this role with dissimilar effectiveness and impact.

33. Composed of 34 member States, the role of CPC is critical in bringing coherence to the system, assisting the Economic and Social Council in the performance of its coordination functions. It should consider on a sector-by-sector basis the activities and programmes of the agencies of the United Nations system and ensure that the work programme of the United Nations and its agencies is compatible and mutually complementary, setting priorities to avoid overlapping and duplication.¹⁹ Since 2004, several General Assembly resolutions have called for improvement in the Committee's working methods and procedures.²⁰ Slow progress has been made, as attested by the report of its substantive session of June-July 2007.²¹

34. In its turn, ACABQ should bring coherence to the system when examining the budget presented by the Secretary-General to the General Assembly, the administrative budgets of the specialized agencies and proposals for financial arrangements with such agencies; and

¹⁶ Established by the General Assembly in its resolution 2006 (XIX) of 18 February 1965, the Special Committee is mandated to conduct a comprehensive review of all issues relating to peacekeeping. It reports to the Assembly, through the Fourth Committee (Special Political and Decolonization), one of the six Main Committees of the Assembly. It is composed of 124 Member States, mostly contributors of peacekeeping personnel, and 17 observers.

¹⁷ Established in 2005 as an intergovernmental advisory body of the General Assembly and the Security Council, to fill a gap in this area by responding to the need for a coordinated, coherent and integrated approach to post-conflict peacebuilding. The Commission brings together all relevant actors to marshal resources and to advise on proposed integrated strategies for post-conflict peacebuilding and recovery, focusing attention on reconstruction and institution-building efforts.

¹⁸ Established as a functional commission of the Economic and Social Council by Council decision 1993/207. Its functions are set out in General Assembly resolution 47/191 of 22 December 1992. It is composed of 53 members and receives substantive and technical services from the Department of Economic and Social Affairs/Division for Sustainable Development. It reports through the Council to the Second Committee of the Assembly.

¹⁹ Economic and Social Council resolutions 920 (XXXIV) of 3 August 1962, 1171 (XLI) of 5 August 1966, and 2008 (LX) of 14 May 1976, and General Assembly resolutions 31/93 of 14 December 1976 and 58/269 of 23 December 2003.

²⁰ Resolutions 58/269, 60/257 of 8 May 2006, and 61/235 of 22 December 2006.

²¹ A/62/16, pp. 34-36.

when considering and reporting to the Assembly on the auditors' reports on the accounts of the United Nations and of the specialized agencies.²² Over the years, however, the Advisory Committee has increasingly focused on the work of the United Nations and its funds and programmes, departing from its oversight responsibilities over the specialized agencies, for reasons sometimes beyond its control.

35. In the view of the Inspector, both CPC and ACABQ should reposition themselves with regard to their responsibilities in bringing coherence to programmatic and budgetary aspects of the system as a whole. Both require revamping to cope with the new trends in United Nations system-wide coherence and integration.

36. The Inspector also notices that Member States have different attitudes towards the coherence and integration process. The report of the High-level Panel on United Nations System-wide Coherence ("Delivering as one" (para. 4 above)) was tabled for consideration by the General Assembly and an agreement on its proposals was not possible. It is evident that the coherence and integration process at the United Nations is driven by Member States and would go as far as Member States are committed to lead it. The legislative bodies at each organization should send clear signals to their respective secretariats on what is expected from them in terms of coherence and integration.

37. It is essential that Member States define coherence and lay out expectations for the United Nations system in achieving it.

Benchmark 1

The coherence and integration process is effectively guided by Member States.

Through:

- (a) Providing clear guidance to the secretariats of all organizations of the United Nations system on what is expected from them in terms of coherence and integration;
- (b) Enhancing the existing coordinating role of CPC to better enable it to bring greater coherence to programmatic aspects of the system as a whole; and
- (c) Operationalizing the role of ACABQ vis-à-vis all agencies of the United Nations system to bring greater coherence to administrative and budgetary questions across the system.

B. Making Security Council mandates specific, measurable, attainable, relevant and time-bound (SMART)

38. In an attempt to address the failure of previous peace operations and the dynamics of post-conflict situations, the Security Council mandates on peace operations have in recent years become more multidimensional, helping to lay down the foundations of sustainable peace. A new concept of peacekeeping has emerged²³ with implications for the work of other

²² Assembly resolutions 14(I) of 13 February 1946 and 32/103 of 14 December 1977, and rules 155-157 of its rules of procedure.

²³ *United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines* (see footnote 13 above).

United Nations organizations that have different stakeholders, mandates and strategic priorities set up by their independent governing bodies over which the Council has in principle no authority.

39. Under Chapter VI and VII of the Charter of the United Nations, the authority of the Security Council is restricted to peace and security. Chapter VI calls for the pacific settlement of disputes through “appropriate procedures or methods of adjustment”.²⁴ Chapter VII calls for “action by air, sea, or land forces ... to maintain or restore international peace and security”.²⁵ Consequently, when the Council decides to mandate activities to lay down the foundations of sustainable peace (in specific areas such as governance, rule of law, human rights, and child protection), it would be important to take into account existing United Nations activities in order to design the mandate according to the actual needs. Otherwise, establishing mission components and hiring staff to deal with the above-mentioned issues may parallel or duplicate the existing structures within UNCTs. However, the mandate would still need to address areas in which peace and security require an additional and specific engagement from the United Nations. Coherent implementation of the concept of an integrated approach is essential to ensure that efforts by the mission and the UNCT are coordinated and complementary.

40. Sometimes, when mission budgets are submitted for approval to the General Assembly, funding gaps occur in the implementation of mandated activities. For instance, peacekeeping missions in Eritrea/Ethiopia and Lebanon were to provide stability while the boundaries were being demarcated, but no funds were allocated to finance the boundary commissions. Similarly, if a peace operation is to hand over its functions to a national authority that requires training and equipment, such as the police, the Assembly normally decides that the activity should be financed by voluntary contributions that “often materialize late or not at all”.²⁶ The Inspector highlights the fact that transition from peace operations to development must be properly financed.

41. Following the Brahimi report,²⁷ which called for realistic Security Council mandates and emphasized the need to enhance the information-gathering and analysis capacity of the Secretariat for this purpose, the Council itself resolved “to give peacekeeping operations clear, credible and achievable mandates”.²⁸ Although some progress has been achieved since then, Council mandates still lack clearness, are unrealistic or overambitious, neither do they have adequate indicators to measure progress²⁹ nor exit strategies³⁰ to transfer responsibilities and end operations. The Inspector therefore reiterates the need to achieve coherence in the United Nations response to conflict and post-conflict situations through SMART Security Council mandates for both peacekeeping and Special Political missions.

42. Furthermore, in the view of the Inspector, if a comprehensive approach is needed to address the root causes of conflicts that today affect the world’s poorest countries, and to prevent their recurrence, the risk of which is admittedly higher during the decade following

²⁴ Article 36, paragraph 1.

²⁵ Article 42.

²⁶ See S/2001/394, para. 32.

²⁷ See footnote 6 above.

²⁸ Council resolution 1327 (2000), annex, part I.

²⁹ See the report on the evaluation of results-based budgeting in peacekeeping operations (JIU/REP/2006/1), paras. 24-35.

³⁰ In the JIU questionnaire 77 per cent of the respondents replied “no” to the question of whether the joint-mission planning document contained an exit strategy.

the conflict, such a comprehensive approach should come from a coherent response of the system as a whole towards reducing poverty and achieving development. The key to the success of these operations is, therefore, to involve all United Nations organizations from the start-up phase in assessment missions and in the preparation of Security Council reports from which mandates emanate. Until now, such reports have not been broad based and UNCTs on the ground are not regularly and actively involved in their drafting. At best, when UNCTs are involved, the feedback received has been qualified as poor. In the Inspector's opinion, DPKO and DFS should systematically build up on the expertise of UNCTs to increase their information-gathering and analysis capacity in order for the Security Council to draw up SMART mandates. Similar dynamics should apply, as appropriate, in the construction of political mission mandates.

Benchmark 2

Security Council mandates are SMART with sufficient resources to match.

Through:

- (a) Strengthening the information-gathering and analysis capacity of the Secretariat;
- (b) Involving UNCTs in assessment missions and specifically making recommendations on actions to support longer-term actions in the peacebuilding process and in providing inputs to reports to the Security Council;
- (c) Establishing commonly agreed indicators to measure progress towards meeting mandated activities;
- (d) Agreeing on an exit strategy for the handover from peacekeeping or political missions to development actors from the outset of operations; and
- (e) Receiving clear programme and budgeting implication statements from the Secretary-General before adopting resolutions and decisions.

C. Aligning complementary, duplicate and conflicting mandates

43. Particularly in humanitarian situations, the operational mandates of OCHA, OHCHR, UNDP, the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), the United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM) and WFP can be complementary or duplicate, particularly in cross-cutting issues such as protection, sustainable development, human rights and gender. In many instances, the comparative advantage of the United Nations system is not in its funding capacity, but rather in its ability to provide reliable technical expertise, to develop norms and standards and help governments face increasingly complex challenges.

44. Since no significant changes to redefine the mandates and governing structures of humanitarian organizations can be expected in the short run, adequate division of labour among them is necessary to ensure the coherent and effective engagement of each individual agency and of the United Nations system collectively, based on their mandates, comparative advantages and actual experience in the field.

45. However, there is currently no binding institutional framework for the United Nations system to define the operational doctrine, division of labour and rules of engagement

of each agency. The Inspector believes that such a binding institutional framework can only be set up at CEB level and should be ratified by the relevant legislative bodies. The Inspector is conscious that such an agreement will take time and, indeed, coherence and integration should progress in parallel without awaiting the conclusion of such an agreement.

46. In the meantime, the cluster approach by sector adopted by development and humanitarian organizations, under the chosen lead agency, represents a remarkable improvement in terms of effectiveness. Several successful examples attest to the benefits of such an approach in working together at Headquarters and at country level, inter alia, in the fight against HIV/AIDS and avian influenza, in polio eradication and reproductive health. Nevertheless, the Inspector believes that there is room for further improvement in terms of cost-effectiveness. The increasing number of coordination meetings raises serious concerns about transaction costs and the lack of dissemination of best practices leads to repeating learning processes and procedures.

47. In the area of peacekeeping, a good example of an agreed division of labour is the Secretary-General's Policy Committee decision on the rule of law whereby lead roles are attributed to various United Nations agencies and offices involved in rule-of-law work so that they may assume clearly defined coordination and other responsibilities, while agencies and offices continue to exercise responsibility for specific rule-of-law activities. Yet, since the decision is not binding, it is not always well known nor implemented at the operational level.

48. The High-level Panel on United Nations System-wide Coherence recommended that the Secretary-General establish an independent task force to eliminate further duplication within the United Nations system and to consolidate United Nations entities where necessary while related efficiency savings are recycled to the "one" country programmes. Since that initiative would basically apply to organizations financed through assessed contributions, innovative ways and means should be found to extend that approach to organizations financed through voluntary contributions.

49. Furthermore, the Inspector found that "conflicting" mandates exist. The dual role of UNDP as broker in operational activities and coordinator/advocate of the United Nations family has the potential for conflict of interests. The role of UNDP as overall coordinator of the United Nations system is perceived as biased by some UNCT members who feel that the coherence process is driven by UNDP to far too great an extent. Also, the newly established UNDP capacity-building mandate in the areas of democratic governance, crisis prevention and recovery, energy and environment, HIV/AIDS and the empowerment of women overlaps with the long-established mandates of other agencies.³¹ In this regard, the High-level Panel on United Nations System-wide Coherence recommended that UNDP withdraw by 2008 from its sector-focused policy and capacity work for which other agencies have competencies and focus "on strengthening the coherence and positioning of the United Nations country team delivering the One Country Programme".³²

50. As its contribution to advancing system-wide coherence, the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) organized a high-level dialogue on the subject on 4-5 March 2008 at its headquarters in Vienna. The main objective of the meeting was to gain a better understanding of the development aspects of system-wide coherence and the "Delivering as one" initiative, to identify the main issues, challenges and ways of moving forward. On the matter of the dual role of UNDP, the conference found that the "firewall",

³¹ See the UNDP website (www.undp.org/about/).

³² A/61/583, p. 24, para. 19.

separating the coordination functions of the RC and the operational activities of UNDP, needed to be developed. Those issues were subsequently addressed in the management and accountability system (2008),³³ the stocktaking reports of 2007 and 2008³⁴ and the statement of outcome of the 2009 Kigali meeting.³⁵

51. Peacekeeping mandates are by definition intrusive, with a short vision, implemented in stages and by a sense of urgency, and may conflict with the development and normative mandates of agencies that have more sense of ownership, longer-term vision, and greater inclination to dialogue with governments. These apparently “opposed” concepts have been a source of disagreement as well, this time between missions and UNCTs. While peacekeeping missions are focused on attaining peace and a secure political environment, they have recently been mandated to carry out peacebuilding activities. As such, there is a greater urgency for peace operations and UNCTs to coordinate the transition from post-conflict scenarios to development.

52. In particular, the mandate of integrated missions with recourse to force under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations³⁶ is perceived differently by humanitarian agencies, which defend the so-called “humanitarian space” for their interventions, based on neutrality, impartiality, needs-based assistance free of discrimination and operational independence. The 2008 DPKO and DFS publication on principles and guidelines of United Nations peacekeeping operations³⁷ notes that the main role of peacekeepers with regard to humanitarian assistance is to provide a secure and stable environment within which humanitarian actors can carry out their activities. It states further that it is essential that the implementation of quick-impact projects, small-scale projects designed to benefit the local population, be coordinated in consultation with humanitarian actors as they are essential to the alleviation of humanitarian concerns regarding the danger of conflating political and military activities with humanitarian operations. The Inspector endorses this approach and hopes it will be implemented without delay.

53. In the Inspector’s opinion, a coherent strategic vision of the United Nations system presence would reconcile all concerned. Until now, such a vision has been provided at country level by the leadership of SRSGs and/or Deputy Special Representatives/RC/HCs. The Inspector believes that beyond the charisma and voluntarism of leaders and individuals who come and go, the system should provide a binding and stable institutional framework to which all actors could easily refer for guidance on their collective and respective responsibilities and roles.

Benchmark 3

A binding institutional framework for the United Nations system defines the operational doctrine, division of labour, rules of engagement, guidelines and procedures, agreed by CEB and approved by relevant legislative organs.

³³ “The management and accountability system of the UN development and resident coordinator system including the ‘functional firewall’ for the RC system” (UNDG, 27 August 2008).

³⁴ “Delivering as one 2007 stocktaking exercise” (UNDG, 27 March 2008) and “Delivering as one 2008 stocktaking synthesis report” (UNDG, 2009).

³⁵ “Statement of outcomes and way forward: intergovernmental meeting of the ‘programme country pilots’ on ‘Delivering as one’” (Kigali, 19-21 October 2009).

³⁶ See footnote 25 above.

Through:

- (a) Promoting a common understanding that achieving coherence and integration is a process whereby every United Nations system organization, at both the field and Headquarters level, finds its comparative advantage to obtain results within the one plan/programme through common objectives and operational independence;
- (b) Assigning clear institutional responsibility for each mandated activity;
- (c) Defining a humanitarian space for humanitarian actors; and
- (d) Repositioning the specialized agencies in line with their equally important development role.

³⁷ See footnote 13 above.

II. ON THE WAY TO ACHIEVING SYSTEM-WIDE COHERENCE AND INTEGRATION

54. With 17 departments and offices, 14 funds and programmes and 16 specialized agencies, coherence and integration of the United Nations family represent a real challenge not only for Member States, as has already been discussed, but also for managers and staff in transforming a culture of decades of fragmentation and competition into one of working together effectively and talking with one voice.

55. The fear of losing operational independence, visibility and ability to mobilize funds explains why not all organizations are equally supportive. This is compounded by the fact that the Secretary-General's authority is limited to the United Nations Secretariat departments and to a certain extent its funds and programmes (but not to the specialized agencies), and by the lack of an overarching body with the authority to push integration and coherence across the system.

A. From ad hoc consultations to more effective Secretariat coordination

56. The three main Secretariat departments involved in policy and support to peacekeeping missions/offices are DPKO, DFS and DPA. The DPKO mandate is to serve as the operational arm of the Secretary-General for all United Nations peacekeeping operations that DPKO is responsible for conducting, managing, directing, planning and preparing.³⁸ DFS is responsible for delivering dedicated support to United Nations field operations, including personnel, finance, field procurement, logistical, communications, information technology, and other administrative and general management issues. DPA oversees and provides political guidance and instructions to special envoys/representatives of the Secretary-General and other field representatives, and directs and manages, on behalf of the Secretary-General, goodwill, fact-finding and other special political missions.³⁹ While there is no legislated definition of these missions, the practice has been that they have a strong peace and security element, but no formed policy or military units. The missions normally refer to mandates provided by the General Assembly or by the Security Council without military contingents, and without or very limited military and/or civilian police personnel, e.g. the United Nations Mission in Nepal (UNMIN) and the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI). The missions can be based at Headquarters (e.g. Myanmar) or field-based.

57. As a general rule, DPA takes the lead in preventive diplomacy and peacemaking, while DPKO leads on situations where peacekeeping, through the use of formed police or military units, is both required and directly mandated by the Security Council. The DPA mandate is strongest at the preventive and peacemaking stage although it also provides political support to DPKO during the peacekeeping phase, sometimes supporting broader regional efforts as well as electoral and mediation support. In addition, DPA generally takes over the lead once the peacekeeping phase has been completed, with a view to consolidating and building the peace and preventing a relapse into a new cycle of conflict.

58. The Inspector was informed that the relationship between DPA and DPKO has improved significantly in recent years. Ad hoc consultations prevail as well as temporary assignments of desk officers from DPA to DPKO when a special mission is converted by a

³⁸ ST/SGB/2000/9, sect. 2.1 (a).

³⁹ ST/SGB/2009/13 on the organization of DPA, para. 3.2.

Security Council decision into a peacekeeping mission or its mandate is changed to include a military or police component, so as to ensure that institutional memory is not lost.⁴⁰

59. According to the Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) in its audit on the management of special missions by DPA of September 2006,⁴¹ the two coordination and cooperation tools that the Secretary-General had established, namely, the physical collocation of the regional divisions of both DPA and DPKO⁴² and the composition of the interdepartmental task forces,⁴³ have not actually worked.

60. OIOS also reported⁴⁴ that the “lead-department policy”⁴⁵ promulgated in 1999 by the Secretary-General lacked clear criteria and had not been consistently applied. That policy aimed at ensuring full support, minimizing duplication and assigning responsibility for coordination with other organizational entities to the lead department. DPA was to take the lead for preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peacebuilding, whereas DPKO was to lead in peacekeeping.⁴⁶ The policy was further refined in 2002.⁴⁷ DPKO is the lead department for the planning and management of all peacekeeping operations in the field. In practice, however, DPKO has been assigned responsibilities for leading field missions that do not clearly involve peacekeeping such as the United Nations Office in Timor-Leste (UNOTIL), the United Nations Integrated Office in Sierra Leone (UNIOSIL), the Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the future status process for Kosovo, and others such as the Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA). Likewise, DPA has led the early negotiation phases of some peacekeeping missions, or worked to resolve conflict where a peacekeeping mission is present. Apparently in the above instances, other elements, not defined in the policy, have apparently been taken into consideration in deciding the lead department, such as whether they are integrated missions with a military component where DPKO is the only department with the logistical capacity to support them. A review of the lead department policy is being undertaken by the Policy Committee secretariat in 2010, as an outcome of the 2009 Secretary-General’s report on peace building in the immediate aftermath of conflict. Moreover, the Inspector hopes that the newly issued ST/SGB(s) on DPKO and DPA bring more clarity than has existed heretofore.

61. In another report, issued in 2006, on the comprehensive management audit of DPKO,⁴⁸ OIOS pointed out that to achieve cooperation and coordination, and to avoid duplication and overlap, some restructuring of both DPA and DPKO was needed, including a full merger or a combination of the planning, political and substantive direction, and a separation of the administrative and logistical support function. OIOS recalled a self-assessment report of DPA to the Deputy Secretary-General in 2002, which proposed a full merger of the departments. However, with the split of DFS from DPKA in 2006, many of these recommendations are now dated.

62. Taking into account that DPKO should benefit from the institutional knowledge of DPA about particular conflicts and countries and should rely on it for advice on the regional

⁴⁰ “Report of the Office of Internal Oversight Services on the audit of the management of special political missions by the Department of Political Affairs” (A/61/357), paras. 52-56.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, para. 52.

⁴² A/55/977, para. 236.

⁴³ See A/55/502, paras. 49-60.

⁴⁴ A/61/357, paras. 9-15.

⁴⁵ A/53/854/Add.1, para. 27.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*

⁴⁷ A/57/387, para. 126.

⁴⁸ A/60/717. See especially paragraphs 66-67 and 88-94.

dimensions of conflicts and their potential impact on the ability of the missions to deliver, the idea of merging the two departments was not without certain logic. They both have political affairs officers and regional divisions; there is no continuum, but an overlapping between peacekeeping and peacebuilding, and 40 per cent of countries emerging from conflict slide back into conflict, a figure that rises to 60 per cent in the case of African countries.⁴⁹ Instead, in February 2007, the Secretary-General proposed⁵⁰ and the General Assembly decided⁵¹ to strengthen the Secretariat's capacity to manage peace operations by restructuring DPKO into two departments and increasing staff resources. Thus, DFS was created.

63. The need for effective coordination mechanisms among the three departments, DFS, DPA and DPKO, remains as pertinent today than ever before so as to enable coherent and effective discharge of their respective roles.

64. Notwithstanding the importance of effective coordination mechanisms in policy guidance among DFS, DPA and DPKO, the joint coordination structures of DPA and DPKO with other Secretariat departments and offices, such as the Department of Public Information (DPI), the Office for Disarmament Affairs, the Division for the Advancement of Women (DAW), the Department of Economic and Social Affairs (DESA)/Division for Sustainable Development (DSD), the Office of Legal Affairs (OLA), OHCHR and OCHA, are also critical for cohesively carrying out their functions, which may encompass a wide range of tasks. In this regard, the Inspector noted that the relationship between DPKO/DPA and those departments/offices is uneven.

65. Finally, a redefinition of the role of DPA in post-conflict peacebuilding, as described in ST/SGB/2000/10, sect. 2.1 (a), and a clarification of the working relationship between DPA and PBSO, the newly created office⁵² of the Peacebuilding Commission, might be necessary, as requested by OIOS that saw a risk of duplication between the two.⁵³

Benchmark 4

Effective DPKO/DPA concerted efforts and coordination mechanisms are in place.

Through:

- (a) Reinforcing day-to-day cooperation between DPKO and DPA;
- (b) Strengthening existing joint coordination mechanisms with other Secretariat departments and offices; establishing new ones only if necessary;
- (c) Clarifying the role of the new PBSO with DPA and other Headquarters departments; and
- (d) Strengthening the strategic analysis and decision-making capacity of DPA to enable the Department to engage more effectively with DPKO and DFS and to improve the United Nations system's effectiveness in preventive action and peacemaking.

⁴⁹ Speech by Minister for Integration and Development Cooperation, Bertel Haarder, at the Conference on Women, Peace and Security in Copenhagen (9 September 2004).

⁵⁰ See A/61/749, annex 1 (Strengthening the capacity of the Organization to manage and sustain peace operations), paras. 15-16 and 22-25.

⁵¹ Resolution 61/279 of 29 June 2007.

⁵² With resource requirements amounting to US\$ 5.6 million for 2006-2007 (A/60/694 of 23 February 2006).

⁵³ A/61/357, para. 57.

B. Some positive steps

66. During the past decade, in an attempt to overcome the fragmentation of the system, the Secretary-General has established, within the framework of United Nations reforms, several committees, management groups and task forces as instruments of policy development and decision-making to facilitate coherence across the system.

67. In January 1997, four executive committees were created in four of the five areas that comprise the core mission of the United Nations: peace and security, economic and social affairs, development cooperation and humanitarian affairs.

68. The Executive Committee on Peace and Security (ECPS) deals with critical cross-cutting issues of peace and security and delineates courses of action in situations of immediate security concern and potential conflict situations.⁵⁴ ECPS is not a standing body; it is convened once a month and sometimes establishes task forces for issues requiring in-depth analysis over an extended period of time (e.g. Afghanistan, human rights, MDGs, peacebuilding, rule of law, the Sudan and terrorism). At first sight, ECPS and its task forces have not, however, been brought up to the level of operational effectiveness of the cluster system established by other executive committees, notably the Inter-Agency Standing Committee's Executive Committee on Humanitarian Affairs (ECHA).

69. The Executive Committee on Economic and Social Affairs (EC-ESA) is an executive committee of the United Nations and aims to bring coherence and common approaches to United Nations entities engaged in normative, analytical and technical work in the economic and social field. ECHA considers humanitarian policy and operational matters.⁵⁵ It meets on a monthly basis and also works through thematic clusters with leading agencies at the global and field levels. UNDG has recently become one of the three pillars of CEB.

70. Later in 1997, the Senior Management Group⁵⁶ was conceived as the Secretary-General's cabinet and a central policy planning unit, considering inputs for the legislative bodies, recommending policies dealing with complex cross-cutting sectoral issues, monitoring the implementation of the reform, guiding the work of the four executive committees, and providing advice on issues regarding the medium-term plan, programme budget submissions and resource mobilization. The Group⁵⁷ used to meet weekly, but with the creation in 2005 of the Policy and Management Committees,⁵⁸ it became a forum for exchange of information and experience among heads of departments, offices, funds and programmes of the United Nations. The proliferation of committees seems to bring more overlapping to the integration process.

⁵⁴ Its members are: DPA (convener), DPKO, OCHA, the Department for Disarmament Affairs (DDA), OLA, UNHCR, OHCHR, the Director-General of the United Nations Office at Geneva (UNOG), UNDP, the SRSG for Children and Armed Conflict, UNICEF and the United Nations Security Coordinator.

⁵⁵ Chaired by the Emergency Relief Coordinator, it is composed of DPA, DPKO, DPI, FAO, OHCHR, the SRSG for Children and Armed Conflict, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), UNDP, the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), UNHCR, UNICEF, the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), WFP and WHO.

⁵⁶ See ST/SGB/1997/3 and ST/SGB/2005/16.

⁵⁷ Composed of the Deputy Secretary-General, the conveners of the four executive committees, the Under-Secretary-Generals for Peacekeeping Operations, for Management, for General Assembly and Conference Management and for Communications and Public Information, the Legal Counsel, the High Commissioners for Human Rights and for Refugees and the Director-Generals of UNOG and the United Nations Office at Vienna.

⁵⁸ See ST/SGB/2005/16 and ST/SGB/2006/14.

71. The Policy Committee deals with issues requiring strategic guidance and policy decisions on thematic and country-specific issues affecting the United Nations, and emerging issues.⁵⁹ The Management Committee considers internal reform and management-related issues requiring strategic direction and ensures that findings of the Board of Auditors, JIU and OIOS are fed into management processes and accepted recommendations are followed up and implemented.⁶⁰ The Policy Committee should be closely coordinated with the CEB machinery on issues of a system-wide nature.

72. The Inspector notes that the members of these committees are basically the same executive managers of the United Nations and its funds and programmes whereas two specialized agencies, FAO and WHO, participate in ECHA and all in UNDG. The Inspector is of the view that, since these committees have a similar composition and similar agendas with a different frequency of meetings, they should be rationalized to reduce transaction costs of coordination; some of them could be merged.

73. In this connection, the High-level Panel on United Nations System-wide Coherence recommended that UNDG and EC-ESA be subsumed into a Development Policy and Operations Group to bring together economic, social and environmental policies and activities into an integrated whole under the UNDP Administrator. The UNDG-ECHA Working Group on Transition Issues has proposed the establishment of a “mechanism comprising the secretariats of UNDG, ECHA and ECPS ... to ensure that headquarters support to UN country teams remains coherent and timely”.⁶¹

74. Another attempt to improve coordination at a more operational level is the Integrated Mission Task Force (IMTF), established in 2001 pursuant to a recommendation of the Brahimi report⁶² on the need for a single working-level focal point at Headquarters that could quickly address the concerns of missions. Integrated operational teams (IOTs) are now operational. The coordination proposed is now starting to improve through IMTFs, which in the case of DPKO-led missions are chaired by the IOT team leader. In practice, few successful IMTF experiences have materialized. However, since the release of the updated IMPP guidelines at Headquarters level, which focus on the establishment and management of IMTFs as well as on the roll-out of an initial IMPP training package, DPKO and DPA, as lead departments, have provided additional dedicated leadership to IMTFs/ITFs. Moreover, United Nations system partners are participating more regularly at the Headquarters and field level. In 2007, 26 additional posts were approved for the IOTs,⁶³ the concept has been fully put to the test. In addition, the Policy Committee, at its meeting on 25 June 2008, adopted a decision on integration, which, inter alia, requires the lead departments to maintain Headquarters-level task forces for each United Nations presence that they support. In the Inspector’s view, IOTs should associate the United Nations system organizations concerned with their activities through the Headquarters liaison offices. The JIU report on liaison offices in the United Nations system provides sufficient information on the role and potentialities of these offices.⁶⁴

⁵⁹ It is chaired by the Secretary-General and composed of the Deputy Secretary-General, the Chef de Cabinet, the Chairpersons of the four Executive Committees, the Under-Secretary-Generals for Peacekeeping Operations and for Communications and Public Information, the High Commissioner for Human Rights, the Legal Counsel and the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on Africa.

⁶⁰ It is composed of the Deputy Secretary-General, the Chef de Cabinet and the Under-Secretary-Generals for Management, for Economic and Social Affairs, for General Assembly and Conference Management and for Peacekeeping Operations.

⁶¹ “Report of the UNDG/ECHA Working Group on Transition Issues” (February 2004), p. 7.

⁶² Paras. 201-202 (see footnote 6 above).

⁶³ General Assembly resolution 61/279, para. 35.

⁶⁴ JIU/REP/2007/10.

C. Working with partners

75. Throughout the whole process of analysis and interviews, the Inspector observed an important aspect related to coherence and integration that has not been sufficiently addressed, namely, the involvement of non-resident organizations in the process. Sometimes these organizations are not properly considered as valid partners with vested interests. They are normally small organizations without sufficient resources to maintain an active regional or field presence, but conversely, carry out field projects and other activities. For the purpose, they have to outsource the services of another field-based organization. The Inspector is of the view that quite frequently the interests of these organizations are not duly protected. He voices this issue as one aspect to be resolved as part of the United Nations process for coherence and integration.

D. Revamping the United Nations System Chief Executives Board for Coordination

76. CEB furthers coordination and cooperation on a whole range of substantive and management issues facing organizations in the United Nations system. CEB is supported by the High-level Committee on Programmes (HLCP), the High-level Committee on Management (HLCM) and UNDG. The division of responsibilities between these three bodies can be summarized as follows:

- HLCP: Promotion of global policy coherence, including the development of common policy tools, including toolkits, in addition to its work on policy and programme issues and the global public good
- HLCM: Harmonization of business practices across the system, including general management issues, thus, ensuring overall management coherence from global to country level
- UNDG: Promotion of coherent and effective oversight, provision of guidance and capacity-building with country-level partners, coordination of United Nations development operations at country level, addressing policy guidance issues related to country-level operations, including the implementation of Triennial Comprehensive Policy Review resolutions, and support to the RC system.⁶⁵

77. While the two first committees basically play a normative and coordination role, UNDG is more involved in operational activities. While the Inspector welcomes the insertion of UNDG under the CEB umbrella, he calls for the need to revamp the UNDG role from its current mandate to become a truly operational tool for managing and overseeing the whole coherence and integration process, which would be the first step towards independence from any individual organization.

Benchmark 5

Existing inter-agency coordination mechanisms are effectively promoting integration and coherence throughout the system.

⁶⁵ Taken from CEB website.

Through:

- (a) CEB, supported by its machinery, if it is given the mandate and tools to become the actual supreme inter-agency mechanism to implement the mandates of Member States on system-wide coherence and integration;
- (b) Ensuring that all members of the United Nations system family enjoy equal rights in the context of “Delivering as one”;
- (c) Having a strong separate secretariat detached from any individual organization, headed at a high level (under-secretary-general or assistant secretary-general);
- (d) Making UNDG the management and oversight operational tool for coherence at the field level as an inter-agency, jointly financed body, open to all members of United Nations organizations;
- (e) All existing coordination mechanisms, such as the four executive committees, the Policy Committee and the Management Committee, reporting to CEB, through HLCP and HLCM on issues of a system-wide nature; and
- (f) The four executive committees opening their membership to all United Nations organizations on issues of a system-wide nature.

III. COHERENCE AND INTEGRATION BETWEEN THE UNITED NATIONS AND ITS PARTNERS

78. The Inspector believes that for the coherence process within the United Nations to be successful and credible, it should not be seen in isolation from other international players, with which the United Nations system interacts in different ways.

A. The United Nations and civil society organizations

79. Civil society organizations not only complement but also often carry out duties that the United Nations cannot assume for various reasons. Recognizing their key role, particularly in crisis and post-conflict countries, in reconciliation and peacebuilding and in bringing forward the development agenda in support of MDGs, the Secretary-General established “a panel of eminent persons”⁶⁶ that produced a report on United Nations-civil society relations in June 2004.⁶⁷

80. Based on the proposals of the Panel of Eminent Persons, the Secretary-General made concrete suggestions to increase the participation of NGOs in the work of the United Nations in general and its intergovernmental bodies in particular.⁶⁸ The suggestions included the establishment of a trust fund to increase the participation of representatives of NGOs from developing countries; improving the United Nations Secretariat’s dialogue with NGOs; and enhancing country-level engagement with them.

81. Out of all the United Nations system organizations, the humanitarian agencies have indeed been the most successful in engaging with NGOs through concerted efforts. Back in 1992, the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) was created, as a unique inter-agency coordination forum with the International Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement and three NGO consortia.⁶⁹ Chaired by the Emergency Relief Coordinator, IASC develops humanitarian policies, agrees on the division of responsibility among various actors, identifies and addresses gaps in response to needs and advocates for the application of humanitarian principles, assuring a coherent inter-agency response to complex emergencies and natural and environmental disasters.

B. The United Nations and the Bretton Woods institutions

82. Over the years, the United Nations and the Bretton Woods institutions have gradually developed different mechanisms of working together. There is, however, a need for more complementarity in order to strike a balance between “healthy competition and inefficient overlap and unfilled gaps”.⁷⁰ In this connection, it was recommended that as a matter of urgency the Secretary-General, the President of the World Bank and the Executive Director of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) “conclude formal agreements on their respective roles and relations at the global and country level”.⁷¹

83. In the same vein, the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change had also recommended that the IMF Managing Director and the President of the World Bank be

⁶⁶ A/57/387 and Corr.1, para. 141, and General Assembly resolution 57/300 of 20 December 2002, para. 27.

⁶⁷ A/58/817 and Corr.1.

⁶⁸ A/59/354.

⁶⁹ In response to General Assembly resolution 46/182 of 19 December 1991 on strengthening of the coordination of humanitarian emergency assistance of the United Nations.

⁷⁰ A/61/583, para. 71.

⁷¹ Ibid.

represented at meetings of the Peacebuilding Commission to “marshal and sustain the efforts of the international community in post-conflict peacebuilding”.⁷²

84. A concrete example of effective cooperation towards achieving coherence among the United Nations and these institutions is the development by UNDG and the World Bank of the Post-Conflict Needs Assessment (PCNA) methodology which was used in Haiti, Iraq, Liberia, Somalia and the Sudan, to assess needs and costs. It also prioritizes results and was reviewed in common in 2006 “to identify lessons and improve future exercises”.⁷³ Also in 2006, UNDG and the World Bank established a Joint Programme agreement to facilitate donor-financing through a more effective mechanism.⁷⁴ In 2007, DPKO issued guidelines for joint operational initiatives with the World Bank, building on an innovative collaboration in Liberia between the Government, the World Bank, and various United Nations partners, including military engineering contingents of the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) as well as UNDP. In October 2008, the United Nations and the World Bank signed the Partnership Framework for Crisis and Post-Crisis Situations and a supporting Fiduciary Principles Accord was negotiated with 11 United Nations agencies to facilitate the timely transfer of financial resources.⁷⁵

C. The United Nations and other organizations

85. Regional organizations such as the African Union and the European Union have been playing an increasingly important role in peace operations over the past decade. While cooperation between the United Nations and these organizations has been ad hoc, the need for a mutually agreed strategic framework would be required. The establishment of such framework with the leading role of the United Nations requires flexibility from each party to understand differences, realign procedures and management cultures, develop common objectives and priorities and agree on a division of responsibilities on the ground. In this particular instance, the cooperation of the United Nations may even entail building up the capacity of the regional organization to fulfill its role. This is already underway with the African Union and several other partner organizations in Africa at the sub-regional level. Discussions are underway with organizations in other regions as well and in January 2010 the Secretary-General will hold a retreat with regional and other organizations that the United Nations collaborates with in peace and security, in order to advance avenues for cooperation and ways of working together in the field.

86. In connection with the need to formalize and better structure cooperation between the United Nations and regional organizations, the Inspector sees as a positive event the ongoing discussion with regional organizations, including United Nations system-wide declarations, plans of action (African Union) and joint guidelines (European Union). In the Inspector’s view, similar agreements should be negotiated with other regional organizations.

87. In the area of development, in addition to the existing regional commissions (Economic Commission for Africa (ECA), Economic Commission for Europe (ECE), Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), Economic and Social

⁷² A/59/565, annex I, recommendations 83 and 84 (f).

⁷³ “UN/World Bank PCNA Review: in support of peacebuilding: strengthening the Post Conflict Needs Assessment” (January 2007) (see <http://www.undg.org/>).

⁷⁴ UNDG, “Synthesis of resident coordinator annual reports 2006”, p. 72.

⁷⁵ For a comprehensive review of collaboration and cooperation between the United Nations and the Bretton Woods institutions, see the note by the Secretariat of 15 September 2009 to the Economic and Social Council on enhancing collaboration and cooperation between the United Nations and the Bretton Woods institutions (E/2009/113).

Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP) and Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia (ESCWA), various United Nations system organizations have over the years set up their own networks of regional offices in locations scattered around the world according to different regional designs. These regional commissions/offices interact in different ways with the above-mentioned regional institutions, which are sources of potential funding and cross-fertilization. A coherent setting and approach are needed to avoid duplication at this level as well. In this regard, studies were conducted by UNDG in 2007 and took into consideration cost-efficiencies and security issues.

88. The regional commissions and the other United Nations system regional organizations should play a fundamental role as the interlink between Headquarters and the field. Their programmes of work should cascade down from the global programme of work of their organization. They should focus on assisting the regions and subregions to design and implement their regional and subregional programmes. Moreover, they should receive a clear mandate to ensure implementation of the policies and decisions of Member States, under the authority and direction of CEB, and of the process towards optimum coherence and integration at the regional, subregional and country levels.

D. The United Nations and the private sector

89. Interaction between the United Nations system and the private sector is critical in two senses: as an important source of transfer of money and technology for development and due to its responsibility in employment and in the management of natural resources and the environment. In this regard, the ILO constituency is unique in the sense that the private sector and workers' organizations are represented in its governance structures.

90. The past decade has witnessed the proliferation of individual partnerships and global mechanisms between United Nations organizations and the private sector in all fields of activity. JIU has reviewed principles for the use of corporate sponsorships within the United Nations system, identifying best practices, areas which require adoption of policies and guidelines, practices that may either cause conflicts of interest or be detrimental to the United Nations.⁷⁶

Benchmark 6

The United Nations system interacts with its external partners from civil society, Bretton Woods institutions, regional organizations and the private sector in a coherent manner.

Through:

- (a) Providing the necessary institutional framework for interaction that delineates the role of each entity in planning, assessment and implementation;
- (b) Action-oriented engagement of external partners in the Economic and Social Council, the General Assembly and legislative bodies of other United Nations system organizations;
- (c) Developing joint policies and guidelines for interaction between the United Nations system and its partners;
- (d) Establishing a follow-up mechanism to oversee the commitments of each partner;

⁷⁶ JIU/NOTE/2009/1.

(e) Giving a clear mandate and tools to the United Nations regional commissions and other regional offices in the United Nations system to ensure, under the authority and direction of CEB, implementation of the policies and decisions of Member States, and of the process towards optimum coherence and integration at the regional, subregional and country levels; and

(f) Aligning the mandates and location of the United Nations regional commissions with other United Nations regional offices.

IV. UNITED NATIONS COHERENCE AND INTEGRATION AT REGIONAL AND SUBREGIONAL LEVELS

91. There are two regional coordination mechanisms in the United Nations system, namely, the Regional Coordination Mechanism (RCM) and the Regional Directors' Team (RDT). The five regional commissions serve as RCM conveners: ECA, ECE, ECLAC, ESCAP and ESCWA. In its resolution 1998/26, the Economic and Social Council stated that the "team leadership role of the regional commissions calls for their holding regular inter-agency meetings in each region with a view to improving coordination among the work programmes of the organizations of the United Nations system in that region". However, in those regions each of the five RCMs has evolved differently. The RDT scope and mandate contain two elements: coordinated programme support to UNCTs and coherent oversight of the RCs/UNCTs. There are six RDTs, two for Africa and one for each of the remaining four regions, all of which have also evolved differently.

92. In July 2008, the Regional Commissions New York Office commissioned a study to identify potential synergies and complementarities and to propose a division of labour between RCMs and RDTs with a view to improving system-wide coherence at a regional level. The Inspector welcomes the findings of the review.

93. In the opinion of the Inspector, the RCM focus should be on the regional/subregional agenda, transboundary issues and thematic/policy coherence. A consistent core model should be applied to all five RCMs with additional functions that are specific to the context and priorities of each region. The core model should concentrate on a limited set of core functions and deliverables rooted in the Commissions' convening power, policy expertise and analytical capacity. The RDT central role should be to provide leadership, strategic guidance and support to RCs/UNCTs for the achievement of country-level operational goals. RCMs and RDTs should further seek to coordinate their respective workplans and hold annual back-to-back meetings. Finally, the UNDP role must be considered in the regional context because of its critical role in both RCM and RDT. The regional commissions should, therefore, build and maintain an effective, close and reciprocal relationship with UNDP and the regional arms of other agencies.

Benchmark 7

Regional Coordination Mechanisms and Regional Directors' Teams are effectively promoting coherence and integration at the regional, subregional and country level.

Through:

- (a) RCM providing policy, normative and analytical work on thematic issues at the regional and subregional level;
- (b) RDT providing leadership, strategic guidance and support to RCs/UNCTs for the achievement of country level operational goals;
- (c) Adopting consistent models for RCMs and RDTs across the regions though allowing for some additional functions as dictated by regional context and priorities;
- (d) Firmly placing RCMs in the United Nations architecture comprising CEB and its three pillars;
- (e) Coordinating workplans and annual back-to-back meetings of RCMs and RDTs;
- (f) An effective, close and reciprocal relationship between UNDP, the regional arms of other agencies and the regional commissions.

V. THE CHALLENGE OF LOCAL OWNERSHIP: WHAT THE COUNTRY NEEDS AND WANTS

94. In line with the principle of the sovereignty equality of each State, as set out in the Charter of the United Nations, country ownership should be at the heart of the coherence and integration process in the United Nations system. Respect for the right of each State to determine what is best for it and its citizens is not only crucial for legitimate United Nations system presence in any given country, but also for each United Nations organization to contribute substantially to the design and implementation of the national recovery/development strategy of the country while advocating international norms and standards. In some cases, States may not be able, willing, representative or legitimate and therefore the role of the State in these cases would be different. The Inspector takes note that some States emerging from conflict may not have the capacity or expertise to make the process function; in such cases, the key is to develop a consultative mechanism with the government throughout, involving national authorities, the United Nations system, the Bretton Woods institutions, civil society and bilateral donors.

95. The kind of involvement of the United Nations system in any given country at any given time will depend on the degree of consolidation of the Government's authority and other local powers, as appropriate, and on the specific and evolving country situation. In fragile post-conflict situations and in countries with a low capacity to absorb an influx of resources, higher involvement of the United Nations in helping the country to determine its needs and priorities may be required, as opposed to the situation in stable countries, with solid governance structures.

96. Notwithstanding the above, there is a need to balance the strong presence of the United Nations system with the equally strong imperative need for local ownership, notably in integrated missions established under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations with authority to recourse to force. The United Nations system is to respond to country needs and should be flexible enough to understand and provide what the country wants.

97. Consequently, in the Inspector's opinion, government authorities should drive all stages of the "One United Nations" process at the country level: from conception to implementation and evaluation of the "One plan", in the approval and support to the "One leader", in determining the composition of the United Nations presence in the country, in prioritizing the use of resources from the "One fund" and in the selection of the "One house". Attempts to impose conditionality on United Nations system support is probably the main obstacle to fostering genuine integration of the United Nations system and, therefore, respect for national priorities and "wants" should become the golden rule of United Nations system support to recipient countries.

98. Conversely, coherence is also required at the national level to determine the degree of the desire for, and actual involvement of, the United Nations system. The establishment of an entry point within the Government of Viet Nam to facilitate dialogue with the RC, has enhanced planning and coordination with local authorities and reduced transaction costs. This has been revealed as the key to the success of the "Delivering as one" process and may serve as a best practice to be validated.

Benchmark 8

The coherence process within the United Nations system upholds the sovereign role of each country in defining its "needs and wants" and setting its priorities.

Through:

- (a) Undertaking reliable, common need assessments of the country situation, led by the national authorities;
- (b) Respecting country leadership in developing and implementing national recovery/development strategies, and strengthening national capacity; and
- (c) Developing a consultative mechanism with the Government throughout, involving the national authorities, the United Nations system, the Bretton Woods institutions, civil society and bilateral donors.

VI. “ONE” UNITED NATIONS

99. As has already been mentioned, while there should be only one process, “One United Nations” is currently being worked out within different parallel processes at the country level: within the RC system in the eight pilot projects (Albania, Cape Verde, Mozambique, Pakistan, Rwanda, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay and Viet Nam), and within the SRSR system in the 18 countries implementing the principles of integration (see paragraph 9 above), three of which have been so designed by decision of the Security Council.

100. It is agreed that the profile of the United Nations system representative in any country should be drawn in line with specific evolving needs of the country. The UNCT composition should correspond to the country’s needs and “wants”, which may vary in response due to evolving circumstances, taking into account the comparative advantage of each agency. In practical terms, in countries where peace operations are deployed, the focus of the United Nations presence is on managing a political process which calls for the head of the peace operation to be appointed as the United Nations system representative.

101. To a lesser extent, the HC system present in 27 countries also represents a model of coherence/integration that associates NGOs.

102. The RC system encompasses all organizations of the United Nations system dealing with operational activities for development, regardless of their formal presence in the country. The RC is the designated representative of the Secretary-General and the leader of the UNCT, which is composed of representatives of United Nations funds and programmes, specialized agencies and other United Nations entities accredited in the country, and may include representatives of Bretton Woods institutions. UNDG has produced a number of policies and guidance material in support of the RC system.

103. Within the integrated mission, the SRSR is “the senior UN Representative in the country and has overall authority over the activities of the United Nations”.⁷⁷ Alone or supported by a deputy performing several different functions, the SRSR should devise effective coordination mechanisms between the various mission components (such as security, political, human rights, rule of law, humanitarian and development) taking into account existing humanitarian coordination mechanisms and UNCT expertise.

104. As for the HC system, the terms of reference, approved by IASC on 31 March 2009, indicate that HCs have overall responsibility for ensuring coherence of relief efforts in the field through needs assessments, contingency planning and the formulation of humanitarian programmes, providing response tools and advocacy and information services.⁷⁸ In April 2006, IASC approved an action plan and established a working group to strengthen the HC system.⁷⁹ OCHA has created a unit to support strengthening of the HC system, has proactively solicited a widening of the HC pool to include candidates from NGOs as well. There is now regular annual training for HCs.

105. Like UNDG, DPKO and IASC have also produced policies and guidance, for peacekeeping and humanitarian actions in the field, respectively. Regrettably, DPKO-issued guidance is applicable only to DPKO-led missions and not to DPA-led missions and is

⁷⁷ “Note of guidance ...” (see footnote 10 above), para. 5.

⁷⁸ OCHA website: <http://ochaonline.un.org/>.

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, *OCHA in 2007*, p. 153.

duplicated by other guidelines. For instance, in 2002 DPKO produced the “Civil-military coordination policy” while in 2008 IASC published “Civil-military guidelines and reference for complex emergencies”. Although, in the Inspector’s view, the issuance of these policies and guidelines represents positive attempts towards more effective coordination among the various United Nations field actors, coherence within “One United Nations” will only be achieved when one sole set of policies and guidelines is available and applicable to all. Some new initiatives are under way and the Inspector hopes they will result in the tangible improvement in the field of DPKO and DPA-led operations. The Inspector has been informed that DPA and DPKO are collaborating very closely on the development of guidance and in particular guidance on issues pertaining to integration, which is largely shepherded by the Integration Steering Group.

106. In fact, regardless of these and other guidelines and policies whose system-wide applicability is sometimes doubtful or unknown to the different players in the field, and in spite of recognition of the need for a “single coherent strategy for all UN System actors” that create “political and operational synergies”,⁸⁰ particularly in transition contexts, when it comes to actual implementation on the ground, political, military, development and aid personnel have different stands as to whether and to what extent integration is possible, and who will be integrated at what stage. Integration is feared by some on the understanding that it will bring all the organizations under a single flag, with no “individual” authority and visibility. The fact that Member States have not yet reached a political agreement on “Delivery as One” process and that they have not yet managed to inject an equal measure of coherence into their own intergovernmental deliberations (often speaking with different voices in different bodies) also adversely contributes to the existing misgivings.

107. As has already been mentioned, relief organizations are highly concerned with preserving their legitimate status of neutrality and impartiality, with one foot in and one foot out of the integrated mission. This position was endorsed by the 2005 report on integrated missions,⁸¹ and the concept was successfully implemented in the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) and the United Nations Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS), where OCHA was situated outside the mission premises as a recognized part of the United Nations family but not “integrated”. Other UNCT members fear the loss of operational independence, visibility and ability to mobilize funds, as confirmed by the results of the Inspector’s questionnaire in 72 per cent of the responses. While the need to protect neutrality and impartiality is valid, the Inspector believes that those fears should be duly taken into consideration in any coherence/integration exercise. Therefore, in the absence of principled positions against integration, integration should be pursued.⁸² Actually, in the Inspector’s view, the problem is mostly one of lack of understanding of each other’s roles, along with poor guidance, communication and dissemination of information about the coherence and integration process.

108. When it comes to actual implementation on the ground, there is no strategy; there are no written terms of reference to guide the relationships within the UNCT nor between the

⁸⁰ “Report of the UNDG/ECHA Working Group ...” (see footnote 61 above), p. 7.

⁸¹ E. B. Eide and others, “Report on integrated missions—practical perspectives and recommendations: independent study for the Expanded UN ECHA Core Group” (May 2005).

⁸² See the Policy Committee decision (para. 13 above) in which the Secretary-General reaffirmed integration as the guiding principle for all conflict and post-conflict situations where the United Nations had a country team and a multidimensional peacekeeping operation or political mission/office, whether or not those presences had been structurally integrated.

UNCT and the mission. The Inspector notes that there has been a piecemeal approach to policy and guidance development. One positive example is the Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards (IDDRS), which were agreed upon through an inter-agency process and provide guidance on those in disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) programmes. Policy Committee decisions have also been taken on the rule of law, IDDRS and human rights. However, a more holistic approach must be undertaken. Furthermore, the Inspector recognizes that DPKO/DFS are aware of this lack of policy and guidance for integrated missions and have made serious attempts to develop guidance and also a common Intranet for dissemination of guidance to missions. The United Nations peacekeeping partners need to seriously engage in this guidance development with DPKO/DFS. The Inspector understands that DPA, OCHA and OHCHR are increasingly developing joint policies and guidance with DPKO/DFS. These efforts are to be applauded, should be doubled and done more systematically.

109. Some UNCTs and missions/offices have developed their own terms of reference and guidelines, each time reproducing the same processes. The eight pilot projects are all experimenting, starting from zero, as are the eight integrated missions, although the latter could have enjoyed the benefit of learning from previous experience. There are positive attempts to regulate certain issues through Policy Committee decisions, such as the division of responsibilities between United Nations offices and agencies involved in rule-of-law work, which is apparently not always applied at field level in, for example, the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) and the United Nations Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS).

110. There is a feeling that the process of producing guidance on coherence is very much driven by UNDP and the other executive committee founding members whereas the role of specialized agencies is not well laid out. There is a similar perception that the integration process is to a great extent determined by DPKO, and the views and wealth of expertise of UNCT members, who were in the country “before” the establishment of the peace operation, are there “during”, and will be there “after”, are not always taken into account.

111. To summarize, there is no common mindset, conceptualization, shared vision, strategy nor procedures to execute the coherence and integration process at the country level. Without those, the process lacks the ownership and support of its players. While the cast of United Nations actors that may be involved in a particular activity can change at any given time, it makes the need for clarity and agreement from the outset all the more important. The Inspector has been advised about the issuance of the IMPP guidelines and the establishment of IMTF, the Integration Steering Group and the Interim Task Force.

Benchmark 9

A common mindset, conceptualization, understanding, shared vision, approach and sense of ownership among the United Nations organizations represented in the country.

Through:

- (a) Inclusiveness;
- (b) Respect for the operational independence and visibility of each partner, noting that each entity brings its expertise, but that duplication should be avoided;
- (c) Incentives to encourage integration;

- (d) Development of a common strategic paper providing the principles and basis for working together to which all would formally adhere;
- (e) Agreed procedures and guidelines that apply system-wide; and
- (f) An improved communication strategy to disseminate information about the risks and opportunities of the coherence and integration process.

A. From various models to one flexible model of United Nations presence

112. The Inspector noted that, aside from the development/humanitarian models of United Nations presence for countries in peaceful situations and the two models for integrated missions led by DPKO/DFS and DPA ((a) an SRSG and two deputies, one of whom is political, the other being also the RC/HC (e.g. in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Haiti); and (b) an ERSG who is also the RC/HC (e.g. in Burundi)), all DPA-led missions/offices in countries where there is an RC are now called “integrated presences”. The four non-integrated missions/offices in countries where there is an RC, are of a military nature (United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF), United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP), and United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO)).

113. The Inspector also observed that, regardless of the model applied, the coherence and integration process in the countries visited by him in 2007/2008 had not yet advanced sufficiently. While there are some examples of the establishment of integrated and joint programmes and mechanisms, some teams still do not manage to work together, but just coexist; others have developed more or less effective mechanisms of information-sharing, coordination and decision-making; and few have reached the stage of one strategic, focused and inclusive, planning document. The IMPP Guidelines on field level planning, adopted in December 2009, provide useful models in this regards. In an ascendant scale of integration, the Inspector lists them as follows: China, Somalia, Nepal, Tajikistan, Haiti, Viet Nam, Burundi, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

114. It is clear that there is neither a “one size fits all” nor a cookie-cutter approach to designing the perfect model of integration that would fit all countries in all situations. Nevertheless, some kind of universal model is necessary to ensure that work is not done at cross purposes.

115. In this connection, the Inspector is of the opinion that, in the same manner as the UNDP decision to appoint country directors in some 40 countries to run its core activities⁸³ is helping to change the perception of bias in its favour within UNCTs, the SRSG function would similarly benefit from a delinking from DPKO and DPA as the appointment and selection of SRSG is handled by the Secretary-General’s Office.

116. Furthermore, in the Inspector’s view, if an SRSG or RC is to become the highest or most senior representative of the United Nations system in a given country, he/she should be simply called “Representative of the United Nations system in (country)” and vetted and proposed by CEB. The other members of UNCT should be called “Representative of (organization) in (country)”. UNCT may include a representative from DPKO/DPA, as applicable.

⁸³ General Assembly resolution 59/250 of 22 December 2004, para. 60. There are currently 51 UNDP country directors.

117. Since he/she will perform functions tailored to specific needs and wants, the profile of the representative of the United Nations system in the country and the United Nations presence should be determined and evolved in accordance with the country “needs and wants” during the vetting process, taking into account the comparative advantage of each agency based on its historical local presence, expertise and resources.

118. There should be a core group of organizations that constitute the UNCT on the basis of their comparative advantages. As the environment of the country changes, different components could be added. For example, if a country were to enter into a post-conflict situation peacekeeping and peacebuilding components could be added and then removed, once the environment had changed and the country was in transition.

Benchmark 10

The existence of a flexible integration model to respond to the specific and changing needs of each country, determined through a needs assessment carried out by/or in full consultation with the UNCT and the host country.

Through:

- (a) Consideration for appointment by the Secretary-General, following consultation with CEB, of a “Representative of the United Nations system” to lead the UNCT as the most senior representative of the system in the country, supported by a “representative” of organizations;
- (b) A streamlined process to ensure that the best team is put together, the selection of the SRSG being dependent on a review of the composition of the senior management team of the mission;
- (c) Drawing up the profile of the representative of the United Nations system in any country in line with the specific and evolving needs of the country, in full consultation with the national Government;
- (d) Composition of UNCTs by responding to what countries “need and want” in the specific circumstances. This may vary in response to evolving circumstances, taking into account the comparative advantage of each agency, based on its historical local presence, expertise and resources. It should be reassessed periodically in accordance with the needs of the strategic programming cycle;
- (e) Where necessary, adding new components to the established country team structure, such as peace operations under a Security Council mandate or any other, in full consultation with the UNCT and the Government by inserting the temporary structures into the permanent configuration.

B. Effective leadership

119. In paragraph 169 of its resolution 60/1 of 16 September 2005, the General Assembly stated the need for a United Nations country presence with a “strengthened role for the senior resident official, whether special representative, resident coordinator or humanitarian coordinator, including appropriate authority, resources and accountability”.

120. In the view of the Inspector, strong leadership is needed for the United Nations to speak with one voice at the country level. Strong leadership means visionary, competent and experienced managers, entrusted with the necessary authority, and with the ability to negotiate on behalf of the United Nations system, to shape the “one” country programme and ensure its

implementation by directing the collective mobilization, prioritization and allocation of resources while being individually accountable to CEB for their actions. Effective leaders cannot function without authority and concomitant accountability, effective management teams and structures.

121. Visionary, competent and experienced managers should only be selected through a well-structured competitive process. Rather than training managers, it would be better to identify those with managerial competencies and develop them.

122. In fact, the highest rated obstacle to achieving integration/coherence at the field level, that was identified through the questionnaire prepared by the Inspector, was the issue of personalities, with 41 per cent of responses.

123. In his report of August 2006, on investing in people, the Secretary-General stated that a more rigorous and systematic approach to the selection of high-level officials (at Director level and above), including for peace operations, would be established, with competency-based interviews and other assessment techniques, to select them on the basis of “a sound track record of successful managerial and leadership experience”.⁸⁴

124. In this regard, the Inspector noted that UNDP has quite an elaborate long-standing system for selecting RCs on behalf of the United Nations system, while the selection of the SRSG is often seen as a political appointment completed through the Secretary-General’s Office. As a result, the selection of leaders is far too personalized in integrated missions where the role of individuals within teams is critical to ensure success. Hence it is important to draw upon, and test specific managerial competencies and not rely solely on demonstrated professional competencies.

125. It is clear that requirements for a certain type of leader may change in line with the evolving country situation and needs, even during the mission’s life cycle. Accordingly, while there are generic post profiles and terms of reference, more tailored profiling could be designed for the more specific requirements adapted to the circumstances.

126. Diversification in terms of gender and culture is also crucial to United Nations values.⁸⁵ Regrettably, as of November 2009 there are only four female SRSGs as compared to 32 per cent of female RCs.⁸⁶ As for geographical representation, 46 per cent of civilian heads of mission come from Europe as do 50 per cent of military heads of mission.

127. In the Inspector’s opinion, the participation on an equal footing of all UNCT members in the selection system, with the right to propose, scrutinize, veto and nominate candidates for endorsement by CEB, is key to the credibility of the coherence and integration process.

128. Last but not the least, Member States should take the responsibility for proposing valuable candidates, by identifying potential applicants at national level and then exposing them to the United Nations environment.

⁸⁴ A/61/255, para. 316.

⁸⁵ A/RES/62/155.

⁸⁶ See para.131.

C. Selection of resident coordinators

129. UNDG (in 2000), outlined the selection process and appointment of the RC as follows:

(a) When RC vacancies occur, the UNDP Administrator invites United Nations agencies to present candidates for a competency assessment. The feedback given to the candidate is confidential and it is up to the candidate to share this assessment with the agency. If the candidate pursues his/her application, the agency reviews the outcome of the assessment and determines whether to proceed with the submission of the candidacy to the Inter-Agency Advisory Panel (IAAP);

(b) IAAP consists of 11 agencies. In addition, representatives from DPI, the Department of Safety and Security (DSS), OCHA and UNHCR will be requested to participate in the work of the Panel when it discusses RC appointments to countries facing complex emergencies and to those where RCs are concurrently directors of United Nations Information Centres (UNICs);

(c) IAAP has the responsibility for reviewing the suitability of pre-assessed candidates for specific posts. It recommends suitable candidates to the UNDP Administrator who makes a selection for nomination. Candidates that have been found suitable by IAAP, but not selected for a specific post, comprise a pool for future vacancies;

(d) Before reaching decisions on nominating RCs to the Secretary-General, the Administrator will consult with the executive heads of the UNDG Executive Committee. The Administrator will then seek the views of the UNDG members and others normally consulted in the selection process. Following endorsement of the candidate by the Secretary-General, the CEB members who are not members of IAAP will be asked to clear the candidate on a no-objection basis. The candidacy is then forwarded to the respective missions for Government clearance.

130. Just before finalization of this report, the Inspector received comments from the Development Operations Coordination Office (DOCO) and DPKO/DFS indicating that new IAAP standard operating procedures had been approved by UNDG on 30 November 2009. These new procedures appear to constitute an improvement to the process. Regrettably, due to the late receipt of those comments and the need to complete the report, the Inspector was unable to evaluate whether or not those new procedures actually represent an improvement.

131. As of March 2009, 41 (or 32 per cent) of RCs are women, 64 (49 per cent) are from the South and 43 (33 per cent) do not originate from UNDP.⁸⁷ Although this constitutes a step forward, impartiality is still perceived as being compromised for various reasons. One of the main reasons is the fact that RCs are accountable to the UNDP Administrator. Indeed, the role of UNDP as manager of the RC system and of UNDG in support of the system has created the perception of a conflict of interest.

132. Officials from some organizations interviewed by the Inspector had, when questioned about it, indicated that they did not feel ownership of the selection process because involvement occurred at the level of human resources departments, the candidates proposed had finally not been selected and the procedures applied lacked transparency.

⁸⁷ Statistics reported to the UNDP Executive Board in June 2009.

133. UNDP in its turn indicated that organizations did not submit enough valuable candidates and in this respect acknowledged that the system represented a drain of their best managers.

D. Selection of Special Representatives of the Secretary-General

134. Unlike the RC selection process, the choice of SRSGs is seen as much more political. DPKO/DFS have developed terms of reference as well as a roster of potential candidates for each post for which Member States may routinely nominate candidates.⁸⁸

E. “Multi-hatted” Special Representatives to the Secretary-General and Deputy Special Representatives/Resident Coordinators/Humanitarian Coordinators

135. “Multi-hatted” SRSGs and Deputy Special Representatives/RCs/HCs are a relatively new function created in the system with the establishment of integrated missions. By the end of November 2009, 12 of these positions had been established and it is expected that their number may increase further.

136. At first sight, when looking at the diversity of responsibilities entrusted to only one person and the potential for conflict of interests resulting from the multiplicity of reporting lines, there may be a tendency to believe that the performance of this “multi-hatted” function is ineffective. On the contrary, after a certain amount of hesitation, there is today general agreement that this is not so, as confirmed in the answers to the JIU questionnaire. While about half of the respondents (54 per cent) agreed that the various functions might be conflicting at times, the majority (85 per cent) disagreed with detaching them. In this regard, the Inspector learned that one of the issues to be reviewed by the working group established by IASC on strengthening the HC system was the circumstances that might lead to the separation of that function from the others.

137. In the Inspector’s view, it is clear that performing diverse and, at times, conflicting tasks requires specific competencies such as good judgement and bridging skills, which are to be expected from such high-level appointees. In terms of physical location, the Inspector noted during his field visits that the incumbents hold offices either within the mission premises or at UNDP or at both sites on a part-time basis. The latter arrangement appears to be the most effective.

138. Conversely, the Inspector is in favour of detaching the function of UNDP resident representative. The “firewall” established with the creation of the post of UNDP country director may work for the UNDP resident representative function as well, adding independence and impartiality to the “multi-hatted” function.

139. As for the selection of “multi-hatted” SRSGs and Deputy Special Representatives/RC/HC/UNDP resident representatives, the Inspector understands that SRSGs are currently appointed by the Secretary-General while the others are now nominated through the IAAP process and then appointed by the Secretary-General.

⁸⁸ See General Assembly resolution 63/261 of 24 December 2008) on the strengthening of DPA in paragraph 12 of which the Assembly underlined “the continued importance of the role of the Secretary-General in ensuring, when appointing his special representatives and envoys, the highest standards of integrity, competency, impartiality and professionalism”.

140. DPKO/DFS and DPA are trying to work more closely with UNDG in the selection of candidates for those positions, for instance, through participation in interview panels. In the Inspector's view, this is a better solution than creating new structures and requirements.

Benchmark 11

A selection process of mission leaders through CEB is in place to ensure the appointment of highly qualified managers with full authority over representatives of all United Nations system organizations in the country.

Through:

- (a) Changing the current title of resident coordinator to United Nations system representative;
- (b) A selection process tailored to the country's needs and specific situation;
- (c) Participation of all United Nations agencies present in the country on an equal footing, with the same rights to propose, scrutinize, veto and nominate candidates;
- (d) Administration of the process by HLCM and appointment of candidates by the Secretary-General after consultation with CEB and the Security Council;
- (e) Detaching the function of UNDP resident representative;
- (f) Member States proposing valuable candidates;
- (g) Evaluating the managerial competencies of candidates; and
- (h) Achieving diversification in terms of geographical distribution and gender in line with United Nations values.

F. Training and development of leaders

141. The responses to the Inspector's questionnaire were equally divided between "sufficient" and "no training/induction received" in connection with the assignment to leadership positions.

142. UNDG has developed several training programmes with support from the United Nations System Staff College (UNSSC) to strengthen the RC system; some of them are of a general nature and others specific to the function, such as: induction training for first-time RCs, in-service briefings for RCs, competency-based training for performance appraisal, team-building, United Nations reform and country programming processes and UNDAF strategic planning retreats.

143. DPKO set up a Senior Leadership Induction Programme (SLIP) for senior mission leaders (such as SRSGs, Deputy Special Representatives, force commanders, police commissioners, chiefs of staff and heads of mission) at which attendance is mandatory within the first six months of the assignment. Additionally, it arranges senior mission leader courses once or twice a year. DPKO is gradually beginning to see a closer correlation between course attendance and field deployment, although this has not always been the case. The United Nations has also established a Leadership Development Programme for D-1 and D-2 managers and CEB endorsed the organization of an inter-agency Senior Management

Network Leadership Development Programme by UNSSC.⁸⁹ The Inspector believes that the induction programme must be adapted to the timetable of the peacekeeping mission and become mandatory before deployment.

144. OCHA has also institutionalized an HC induction event with current and potential HCs and has established a pool of them (including NGO representatives), who will undergo “a four-phase briefing and learning system that spans a one-year period”.⁹⁰

145. Training of teams is imperative as well; quite impossible on appointment since UNCT/mission leaders are not all designated at the same time, but feasible through mobile training teams rotating by region. In this connection, OCHA set up in 2007 a cluster/sectoral leadership training programme for current heads, or individuals on a roster, of a cluster. That could be an interesting experience to be replicated outside the humanitarian area.

Benchmark 12

Leaders receive the necessary training/induction to perform their functions effectively.

Through:

- (a) Putting in place an induction/training module for leaders in coordination with UNSSC, tailored to the different country situations and needs;
- (b) Mobile training teams providing group training to UNCTs and mission leaders by region; and
- (c) Organizing training in clusters by thematic subject.

G. No authority without accountability

146. There should be no authority without accountability and no accountability without authority. This principle was established by the General Assembly and CEB when they approved the benchmarking framework proposed by JIU (JIU/REP/2004/5). SRSGs currently lack both authority and accountability. RCs lack the necessary authority to manage and oversee UNCTs, but are held accountable to a certain degree since their performance is measured by the extent that they are able to push forward the reform agenda. At present, neither the 1999 ACC guidelines⁹¹ nor the subsequent Secretary-General notes of guidance have resolved this issue. However, the report of the Secretary-General report on peacebuilding in the immediate aftermath of conflict (A/63/881-S/2009/304 of 11 June 2009) and its subsequent implementation plan, issued in response to the concern of Member States about a lack of effective and coordinated performance in post-conflict situations, should be considered an effort to redress the situation. SRSGs and other heads of peacekeeping and political missions are now being asked to develop compacts with the Secretary-General.

147. Guidelines on the functioning of the RC system indicate that the RC is responsible for providing team leadership and members of the system are expected to provide full support to

⁸⁹ A/61/255, paras. 319-320.

⁹⁰ See footnote 80 above.

⁹¹ “ACC guidelines on the functioning of the resident coordinator system”, approved on behalf of ACC by the Consultative Committee on Programme and Operational Questions at its fifteenth session, New York, 21-24 September 1999, para. 21.

its functioning. The SRSG should consult and coordinate regularly with the RC and/or HC as well as the country team, drawing on their expertise, articulating a strategy, and exchanging information, particularly on peacebuilding initiatives.⁹²

148. The Inspector was advised that the job descriptions and terms of reference for the RC system had been updated, with the adoption and implementation of a management accountability system and its implementation plan (approved/endorsed by UNDG in August 2008 and January 2009 respectively).

149. The “Note of guidance on relations between Representatives of the Secretary-General, Resident Coordinators and Humanitarian Coordinators” of December 2000 specifies that the SRSG is responsible for giving political guidance to the overall United Nations presence as well as providing the impetus for a coordinated and coherent approach by all the United Nations components in the country.

150. The revised “Note of guidance on integrated missions” of 2006 provides that in integrated missions, the SRSG has overall authority over the activities of the United Nations, represents the Secretary-General, speaks on behalf of the United Nations, establishes the overall framework that guides the activities of the mission and UNCT and ensures that all pursue a coordinated approach.⁹³ The “multi-hatted” Deputy Special Representative/RC/HC is the principal interface between the mission and the UNCT and is responsible for the coordination of the UNCT, for the planning and coordination of development and humanitarian operations in his/her respective capacity of RC and HC, and maintains links with governments, donors, and other development partners for this purpose. Also in 2006, the Secretary-General endorsed the IMPP Guidelines, and the establishment or maintenance of Headquarters-level task forces for each integrated presence, to ensure coherent and consistent support and policy guidance to field presences, and asked each of the 19 integrated presences to have a shared analytical and planning capacity as well as an integrated strategic framework that should be reflected in, and draw on, all other United Nations planning, programming and budget instruments. Once again, those guidelines are not binding on all actors involved in IMPPs.

151. The accountability framework for RCs developed by the UNDG Resident Coordinator Issues Group in March 2006, pursuant to a request of the General Assembly in the Triennial Comprehensive Policy Review,⁹⁴ does not add much to the above provisions, except that it inserts a reference to the RC responsibility to monitor and report on the implementation of UNDAF, and to support relevant resource mobilization for it.

152. The above-mentioned formulations on the authority and responsibilities of SRSGs, RCs and “multi-hatted” Deputy Special Representatives are quite general, while any reference to accountability is almost inexistent. There are many issues that remain unclear concerning the authority of these leaders, particularly in non-integrated missions. Grey areas may generate tensions among them.

⁹² Ibid., and “Standard directives for the Special Representative of the Secretary-General” (3 August 1998), para. 7.

⁹³ See footnote 10 above.

⁹⁴ Resolution 59/250, para. 58.

153. Furthermore, neither SRSGs nor RCs can influence the appointment or removal of UNCT members, nor do they participate in the evaluation of their contribution to the “One United Nations”.⁹⁵

154. Finally, RCs are appraised in their performance, but SRSGs are not appraised in a systematic way. The performance appraisal system of RCs by inter-agency regional directors is quite cumbersome. Since 2007, RCs have been appraised by an inter-agency body (RDT special session on RC/UNCT appraisal) with input from UNCT members through a 180 degree assessment.

155. During his missions, the Inspector confirmed that the challenge of authority and accountability of SRSGs and RCs was the same, valid and unresolved.

Benchmark 13

The “One leader” at country level is empowered with the necessary authority and held accountable to the CEB machinery for successfully implementing the “One plan”.

Through:

- (a) Determining the extent of authority delegated to the representative of the United Nations system to ensure coherence/integration at country level, including over UNCTs;
- (b) The chain of command within UNCTs being clear and unambiguous;
- (c) Clearly defining delegation of authority in administrative instruments and individual delegation orders, that are consistent and comprehensive, including delegation of all financial and human resources;
- (d) Appraisal of the representative of the United Nations system through performance-oriented systems of accountability and effectively holding him/her accountable for results delivered;
- (e) Appraisal of his/her managerial competencies, in the case of the RC, by UNDG (IAAP) and those with a presence in UNCT, and in the case of the SRSG, by the Secretary-General with input from DPKO/DFS/DPA;
- (f) The representative providing input to the performance appraisal of UNCT members as to their contribution to the coherence/integration process and the implementation of the “One plan”; and
- (g) Mechanisms established to resolve discrepancies in the case of integrated missions.

H. Conditions of service

156. SRSGs are usually appointed at the level of under-secretary-general since they deal with “large, politically complex” situations, requiring “a high degree of political authority and diplomatic skill, including dealing with problems at the highest national level, often the head of State or head of Government”.⁹⁶ Some missions require one or two deputies, who are appointed at assistant secretary-general or D-2 level, as are the force commanders. Executive representatives and representatives of the Secretary-General are usually appointed at assistant

⁹⁵ See JIU/REP/2005/02 and E/2004/4-DP/2004/12, para. 41.

⁹⁶ A/C.5/48/26, para. 5.

secretary-general and D-2 level with some exceptions at the under-secretary-general level depending on the complexity of the mission. RCs, country directors and local heads of agencies may be graded at D-1/D-2 level. Although the grade of the “One leader” is not necessarily linked to the issue of authority, it has influence in certain instances when UNCT members have the same level. “One leader” does not at all mean individual power for decisions, which are the result of a collective exercise. The “One leader” would be empowered to ensure, and accountable for, the implementation of collective UNCT decisions.

157. As for conditions of service, the report of the Secretary-General on investing in people indicates that “significant differences ... exist between staff with 300-series appointments and those with 100-series appointments, between staff with 100-series appointments who are mission appointees and those who are assigned from Headquarters and between staff serving with peace operations and those serving with the United Nations funds and programmes. The differences relate to the designation of missions as family or non-family, the payment of compensation for maintaining a second household, the scope of the rest and recuperation scheme, the calculation of hazard pay and the lump-summing of travel entitlements.”⁹⁷

The Inspector recognizes that some progress has been made to harmonize conditions of service and work is still under way. In its resolution 63/250 of 24 December 2008 the General Assembly approved a series of human resources management reforms, which came into effect on 1 July 2009. Efforts are under way to address inequities in the treatment of staff at non-family duty stations.

158. It is quite difficult to retain high-quality staff, with vacancy rates of “between 22 and 26 per cent and a turnover rate of 30 per cent for Professional posts”,⁹⁸ compared to a maximum of 8 per cent for other United Nations system organizations represented in the field. It is clear that without the support of qualified staff, leaders will be unable to succeed in their strategic tasks. Hence, the Secretary-General proposed: (a) the introduction of one United Nations staff contract under one set of staff rules, with three types of appointment (temporary, fixed-term and continuing), and with conditions of service equivalent to the 100-series contract, varying according to the length of service; and (b) the harmonization of conditions of service of secretariat staff in the field with those of other organizations by designating field missions in line with security phases, introducing the special operations approach for non-family duty stations, and revising the scheme for rest breaks including through lump-summing.⁹⁹

159. Given the annual recurrent cost of such proposals, estimated at US\$ 280 million, the General Assembly decided¹⁰⁰ to request the International Civil Service Commission (ICSC) to consider them and to report to it at the second part of its resumed sixty-first session. In its report for the year 2006,¹⁰¹ ICSC concluded that the Secretary-General’s proposal on one type of contract be revised to conform to the Commission’s contractual framework and recommended the phasing out of the appointment of limited durations in non-family duty stations in favour of fixed-term contracts with the same compensation package. This was accepted and adopted by the General Assembly.¹⁰²

⁹⁷ A/61/255, para. 272.

⁹⁸ Ibid., para. 276.

⁹⁹ Ibid., para. 277, proposal 4.

¹⁰⁰ Resolution 61/244 of 22 December 2006.

¹⁰¹ A/61/30/Add.1.

¹⁰² Resolution 63/250.

160. On top of the less attractive conditions of service described above, current challenges for the implementation of the recently introduced “mandatory” staff mobility policy within the United Nations¹⁰³ and those faced by staff to move across the system even voluntarily, reduce the possibility of finding qualified candidates to meet the increasing demand for human resources in the field. The Inspector is aware of the difficulties in encouraging mobility across the United Nations system due to the inequities of the compensation packages and other entitlements and conditions of service.

I. Support structures and coordination and decision-making mechanisms

161. Several information-sharing, coordination, and decision-making mechanisms operate at field level under the authority of SRSGs, Deputy Special Representatives, HCs and RCs.

162. Established pursuant to a General Assembly resolution¹⁰⁴ as reflected in the “ACC guidelines on the functioning of the resident coordinator system”,¹⁰⁵ the field-level committees, composed of all resident and non-resident United Nations system representatives and chaired by the RC, review substantive activities, country programmes, sectoral programmes and projects, coordinate joint activities and interact with other development partners and national governments.

163. In integrated missions, the Senior Management Group (SMG), comprised of the heads of major functional components of the mission, assist the SRSGs in planning and implementing the mission plans, supported by an integrated planning capacity that should bring UNCT and financial institutions into the planning and implementation process. Some integrated missions have created effective integrated mission-UNCT management teams, with agreed terms of reference and workplans, as in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

164. Other field coordination mechanisms open to participation of all system organizations are the Security Management Teams (SMTs) for security and the Operation Management Teams for the administration of joint services.

165. As for support structures, the RC function is backed up by a coordination unit, financed by the Support to the Resident Coordinator Fund and the Country Coordination Fund from which US\$ 100,000 are allocated per year for the most basic capacity (one international/national staff and an administrative assistant). Additional funds may be mobilized from other agencies or local donors. In 2006, the staffing of such units varied from one or two to 12 individuals supporting UNCT activities.¹⁰⁶

166. In peace operations, 67 per cent of the missions/offices that responded to the Inspector’s 2007 questionnaire had a unit and/or staff dedicated to integration with UNCTs. These units coordinated activities (93 per cent), shared information (86 per cent) and carried out joint planning (71 per cent). However, unlike DPKO-led missions, where integrated structures have been designed in support of mission leadership teams (Joint Operations Centre, Joint Mission Analysis Centre and Joint Logistics Operations Centre), there were at the time no structures for integrated missions led by DPA.

¹⁰³ See JIU/REP/2006/7.

¹⁰⁴ Resolution 47/199 of 22 December 1992, para. 40. See also resolution 50/120 of 20 December 1995, para. 41.

¹⁰⁵ Para. 24 (see footnote 92 above).

¹⁰⁶ UNDG (see footnote 74 above), p. 67.

167. According to the responses to the Inspector's questionnaire, the SRSG offices are not provided with enough resources for integration, and are inadequately staffed and financed. Similarly, the Deputy Special Representative/RC/HC position co-financed by the mission and UNDG pursuant to a General Assembly resolution¹⁰⁷ lacks adequate backstopping for its "multi-hatted functions", as confirmed by two thirds of the answers. The number of staff dedicated to supporting these functions did not exceed three in 79 per cent of cases and funding was provided by DPKO only in 43 per cent of cases. It is expected, however, that resources for the SRSG offices will be addressed as a follow-up to the Secretary-General's report on peacebuilding.¹⁰⁸

168. Representatives of the mission and UNCT met weekly in 41 per cent of the cases, twice a month in 27 per cent and monthly in 18 per cent of cases. Others met irregularly or did not meet at all. The meetings were chaired by the SRSG with the Deputy Special Representative/RC and the RC co-chairing on a rotational basis. The quality of the relationship with UNCTs was qualified as excellent by 43 per cent of the respondents, as very good and satisfactory by 19 per cent, as simply good or poor by 14 per cent and 5 per cent, respectively.

Benchmark 14

Representatives of the United Nations system are given the resources to exercise the coordination responsibilities entrusted to them effectively.

Through:

- (a) Grading representatives of the United Nations system at under-secretary-general, assistant secretary-general or D-1/2 level depending on the complexity of the country situation; but always one grade above other members of UNCTs;
- (b) Harmonization of the conditions of service of staff serving in the field;
- (c) Adoption of a system-wide mobility policy;
- (d) Establishing coordination/integration units in all duty stations without exception, with direct reporting lines to the representatives of the United Nations system;
- (e) The coordination units supporting the representatives of the United Nations system in their coordination functions within UNCTs, between the UNCT and the mission/office, the UNCT and the Government and the UNCT and other partners (donors, civil society and private sector); and
- (f) The coordination units organizing regular monthly meetings with the participation of all parties. In addition to information-sharing and backstopping of meetings, the coordination units are responsible for joint planning, monitoring and evaluation and for resource mobilization.

J. Planning for effective coherence and integration

169. Coherence and integration are not possible without effective planning. Currently, several "integrated" strategic planning processes exist within the United Nations system,

¹⁰⁷ Resolution 59/296 of 22 June 2005.

¹⁰⁸ See paragraph 146 above.

namely, IMPP for start-up and ongoing missions led by DPKO or DPA (regardless of whether or not these involve structural integration of the UNCT and the mission on the ground through a “triple-hatted” Deputy Special Representative/RC/HC); the Common Humanitarian Action Plan (CHAP) for OCHA; implementing agencies and NGO humanitarian activities; and UNDAF for development, in addition to the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) of governments and the World Bank, or any other national strategy.

170. In principle, any such planning process should be inclusive, focused, results-oriented and nationally owned, based on the comparative advantages of each agency and of the United Nations as a whole. National governments and partners from outside the United Nations system should be involved in the process, which should normally be initiated by an independent assessment that establishes a division of responsibilities between the various United Nations and non-United Nations actors (Bretton Woods institutions, bilateral donors, NGOs) involved in addressing needs regardless of whether or not they are based in the country or are non-residents. It is imperative that such assessments draw on the long-standing experience of UNCTs to identify the root causes of problems and in doing so the regional dimension is mainstreamed into the country situation. A temptation to avoid is the abandonment of focus for the sake of inclusiveness.

171. UNDAF was the main strategic planning tool created as part of the reform agenda of the Secretary-General in 1997 to articulate a coherent vision for a unified approach towards common development goals at the country level.¹⁰⁹ The first UNDAF guidelines were adopted in April 1999 and have been revised subsequently. By the end of 2006, nearly all UNCTs had engaged in the UNDAF process, with few exceptions, those countries in crisis or post-crisis situations or those with a very limited United Nations presence. The Inspector notes that the quality of UNDAF has improved considerably in recent years.

172. However, UNDAF does not integrate results and resources nor link the programming, monitoring, reporting and evaluation process for accountability purposes. Although there are some good UNDAF examples, in many instances it is just a sum of the activities in the country programme of each agency, grouped around some broad outcomes, with few joint programmes bringing a multidisciplinary approach to interventions, avoiding duplication and increasing impact. In 2006, only 57 per cent of UNCTs reported having developed or been in the process of implementing at least one joint programme, out of a total of 345 joint programmes across the system. The three main areas of joint programming/implementation were HIV/AIDS, health, and governance/democracy. The agencies more currently involved were by and large UNDP, UNICEF and UNFPA, followed by WHO, WFP, ILO, FAO, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), UNIFEM and the Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS).¹¹⁰

173. No documents for joint planning have been devised. For example, the “One plan” in Viet Nam is an extended UNDAF with outputs grouped around five major outcomes and indicative resources. Its preparation was strongly driven by the national Government and happened in two phases, a first phase initiated prior to the pilot project initiative, which brought in the six funds and programmes that were ready for the “One United Nations” (UNAIDS, UNDP, UNFPA, UNICEF, UNIFEM and United Nations Volunteers (UNV)) and a second phase during which the other United Nations organizations resident in the country

¹⁰⁹ “Renewing the United Nations: a programme for reform” (A/51/950), para. 73.

¹¹⁰ UNDG (see footnote 74 above) p.56.

joined the plan. The main challenge faced in this process was the dilemma between focus and inclusiveness.

174. IMPP was adopted by the Secretary-General's Policy Committee in October 2006. However, the process recommended initially was found to be so complex that a revision was initiated. This has recently come to fruition with the development of revised IMPP guidelines for Headquarters and the field, which were approved by the Integration Steering Group in June and December 2009, respectively. The new guidelines are less prescriptive but set minimum standards for integration throughout a mission's lifetime. In responding to the Inspector's questionnaire, one third of the missions/offices indicated that they had not been involved in a joint planning exercise with UNCT. Such joint planning exercises produced a joint planning document in 60 per cent of the instances, and only in 24 per cent of them did the document incorporate an exit strategy. In elaborating this document, IMPP was partly or never used in 37 per cent of the cases, respectively. The number of joint programmes included varied between 2-3 (22 per cent), 5-10 (28 per cent) and none (22 per cent) and the main areas were HIV/AIDS, election, governance/democracy, rule of law and gender. Donors were involved in the planning process in 44 per cent of instances.

175. The 2009 IMPP Guidelines on Integrated Planning for UN Field Presences may provide useful guidance on the Integrated Strategic Framework (ISF), which bring together the mission and UNCT's combined mandates and resources around an overarching framework of agreed peace consolidation priorities. The ISF allows the mission and UNCT to also: prioritize and sequence agreed elements: facilitate an appropriate shift in priorities and/or resources: and regularly take stock. Regrettably these guidelines are not binding to all actors involved in the United Nations system operations in the field, including peace operations.

176. Both mission plans and UNDAF may coexist, since they are not mutually exclusive and led by different actors. Yet there can be duplication. Therefore, it is necessary to create linkages among them to avoid overlapping and effectively articulate the shifting role of the United Nations system from peacekeeping to peacebuilding to development. The integrated peacebuilding strategy may well present an opportunity for bringing together all actors, including governments, the United Nations, the Bretton Wood institutions, civil society, the private sector and donors – and defining a common strategy on how to implement an integrated approach to peacebuilding. The 2010 review of the peacebuilding architecture will provide the opportunity for a critical review of this approach. It should be noted that in Sierra Leone the integrated peacebuilding strategy was eventually integrated into the PRSP in order to avoid potential duplication of strategies.

177. The country assistance framework for 2008-2010 in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the revised and extended UNDAF in Burundi are good examples of transitional post-conflict assistance strategies. The country assistance framework stands for the best practice so far in integrated planning since it involves the United Nations, the World Bank and 19 bilateral donors representing 95 per cent of ODA to the country. It also includes benchmarks in a number of areas (both ODA eligible and non-ODA eligible) that are considered critical for returning to a development path. They build on the PRSP, the existing UNDAF and the Government's strategies, defining a limited number of common strategic priorities under a shared vision for a sustainable peace. Individual agencies maintain other specific priorities in their country programmes as mandated by their governing bodies and financed under their results-based budgeting process. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo the United Nations was initiating its UNDAF process whereas in Burundi it was revised before the end of the cycle to make it coincide with the timing of the mission. Both

had staff designated for these coordination and planning efforts. In Burundi, a representative of the Government sat in all meetings and one full-time staff was dedicated to UNDAF, funded by DOCO and trained at UNSSC in Turin, Italy. They were long planning processes consisting of several months of interaction, initiated at different stages of the United Nations involvement (MONUC is an integrated peacekeeping operation in the mid-term consolidation phase and the United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi (BINUB), established in 2007, represents a transition from a peacekeeping mission to an integrated peacebuilding office). The integrated peacebuilding strategy (IPBS) developed in Burundi in 2007 built on existing frameworks such as UNDAF and PRSP and outlined the common strategy of in-country actors towards peacebuilding. A gradual phasing out from a peacekeeping mission to a peacebuilding mission following the 2010 elections was recommended by a technical assessment mission in mid-2009.

178. In the Inspector's view, regardless of the type of planning instrument utilized, it should provide for the following to be an effective managerial tool: a vision of the United Nations comparative advantage and role in the country, a reduced number of goals and priorities and objectives in line with the country's "needs and wants", cost estimates and indicators to measure results.

179. In implementing the "One plan", the best practice so far is the theme/cluster approach. Among development agencies, this approach is based on the comparative advantage of agencies and started as a consultation mechanism for the preparation of the common country assessment (CCA) and UNDAF in cross-cutting subjects to evolve into joint programming and implementation. The cluster approach developed by IASC for humanitarian agencies is more structured with higher predictability, timelines and accountability than the theme group concept of UNDG. IASC has 11 pre-established clusters by sector/area of activity and leads at global and country level with the participation of NGOs, terms of reference for their functioning, authority to mobilize resources, mechanisms to assess their performance and training modules for leaders and members. Within peace operations, the theme/cluster approach is not applied although there are isolated examples of effective joint planning and implementation such as the election process in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The Inspector notes that this approach only works if there is a genuine convergence of interest/mandates among agencies, enough capacity to manage the cluster and that there are costs associated with the approach. This "cluster" concept has also been included in the new IMPP guidelines for the field, where the development of thematic working groups and the implementation of key components of an integrated peace consolidation strategy are encouraged.

K. Monitoring, reporting and evaluation

180. Reporting on performance against plans through a results-based management system was introduced at the United Nations during the 2003-2004 biennium.

181. Progress towards carrying out Security Council peace mandates is monitored through periodic reports by the Secretary-General, prepared by the mission/office, with the increasing involvement of the UNCT, and finalized at Headquarters. However, in the absence of success indicators to measure progress towards meeting established objectives and an agreed reporting format, some of these reports lack clarity and in-depth analysis which would ease the decision-making process.

182. Other than these reports, there is no evaluation mechanism to assess either integrated missions or non-integrated missions. Evaluation has traditionally been a weak area in DPKO. Although the creation of a Peacekeeping Best Practices Section in 2002 represented a step forward, it was primarily an internal policy development and a lesson learned mechanism for DPKO, DFS and the 17 missions supported by DPKO. The Section disseminates most of its findings internally on an Intranet for the use of United Nations staff, and external publications to the wider peacekeeping community on its website that was established in 2004. In 2009, the Section along with the Integrated Training Service opened a resource hub on its website for the use of Member States and partner training institutions, for access to materials to support their training efforts. In recent years, the Section has posted a number of best practices officers to selected missions with terms of reference that include ad-hoc evaluations on request, in terms of structure and reporting lines. These officers are not linked to the monitoring and evaluation units that are being considered for establishment within some missions/offices; they play more of a proactive management and mission support role than evaluation units.

183. DPKO has taken significant steps since 2004 to institute comprehensive evaluations of mission performance. Over the 2004-2007 period, DPKO undertook evaluations of missions (both traditional and integrated), using resources that had been temporarily reallocated from other duties. These evaluations were comprised of teams of experts in various fields drawn from across DPKO and led by a retired senior peacekeeper (often a former force commander). The evaluation teams visited missions and reviewed their performance against benchmarks including the mission mandate, DPKO policies and procedures, and United Nations system-wide standards. The results of these evaluations formed the basis of an action plan for remedial action to redress shortcomings at both DPKO and mission levels.

184. In 2007, as part of the realignment of DPKO into two departments, DPKO and DFS, DPKO established a small evaluation capacity within the Policy, Evaluation and Training Division, composed of the Peacekeeping Best Practices Section and the Integrated Training Service. This Division supports both DPKO and DFS and ensures that a common platform for policy, evaluation and training is provided to both departments and to field missions. The evaluation team has created an evaluation policy for mission and Headquarters, and has continued to conduct evaluations in field missions, DPKO and DFS, as well as to support the self-evaluation of programmes and subprogrammes in both departments. Evaluations undertaken include comprehensive evaluations of peacekeeping missions, thematic evaluations, and evaluations of Headquarters programmes. These evaluations provide an assessment of mission and programme performance, resource utilization, policy effectiveness and shortcomings, and identify areas that can be strengthened for the more effective functioning of DPKO, DFS and field operations supported by both departments. Evaluation findings and recommendations provide information for the management, policy development and training activities of both departments and strengthen the ability of Headquarters to provide strategic guidance to mission leadership. In addition, the OIOS Inspection and Evaluation Division conducts evaluations of peacekeeping missions and activities. To avoid duplication of efforts, the programme of work of the evaluation team in DPKO and that of the OIOS Division are coordinated.

185. RCs are required to prepare annual reports based on detailed guidelines to assess progress towards meeting UNDAF goals, contributing to the national development process and identifying good practices and lessons learned in coordination and joint programming.

186. Individual reports are consolidated into annual synthesis reports that serve to feed information for the Economic and Social Council's annual ministerial review and assessment process, and the triennial comprehensive policy review of operational activities for development of the United Nations system on which the Secretary-General reports to the General Assembly.

187. The UNDAF monitoring and evaluation framework calls for annual, mid-term and final UNDAF reviews. In 2006, UNCTs reported conducting a mere 18 of such reviews. It has, however, been reported that the framework has been too difficult to implement under current circumstances.

188. Under the 2008 Policy Committee decision on integration and the subsequent IMPP field guidelines, missions and UNCTs are required to develop integrated strategic frameworks that include monitoring mechanisms, allowing senior managers regularly to take stock of progress. In this regard, it is notable that for some United Nations presences (in particular those in the advanced peacebuilding phase), UNDAF may meet the minimum criteria for such a framework, in which case additional mechanisms are not required.

189. The pilot projects will also develop their own monitoring and evaluation framework for the "One plan" programme. At the time of the Inspector's visit to Viet Nam, the framework was in the process of being designed.

190. The above are all internal self-evaluation processes that are not independent by definition, although necessary and beneficial for incorporation of learning and feedback into the planning and programming process. Independent evaluation should be exercised by external bodies and eventually by internal evaluation, when adequately established, positioned and resourced.

191. In this connection, each organization of the system has to a different extent developed its own oversight mechanism that may or may not include all the components of oversight (audit, evaluation, investigation and inspection), which do not all meet the criteria of independence, as defined in the JIU report on oversight lacunae in the United Nations system,¹¹¹ and which may work independently from one another.

192. In terms of external oversight, other than the policy review bodies that have already been mentioned, such as ACABQ, CPC and ICSC, there is the Board of Auditors of the United Nations and its funds and programmes (except WFP), the external auditors of the specialized agencies and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and JIU. JIU is presently the only existing system-wide oversight mechanism of the United Nations with a mandate for inspections, evaluations and investigations.¹¹² The Unit has undergone, in recent years, a process of internal reform to improve its efficiency and effectiveness,¹¹³ but it requires more adequate staffing for the effective performance of its broad function.

193. In 2006 the High-level Panel on United Nations System-wide Coherence recommended that a system-wide evaluation mechanism be set up by 2008 and a common

¹¹¹ JIU/REP/2006/2, paras. 38-48.

¹¹² The Panel of External Auditors comprising all external auditors of the United Nations family has a role of coordination, exchange of information and promotion of best accounting and auditing practices.

¹¹³ See General Assembly resolutions 62/226 of 22 December 2007, 62/246 of 3 April 2008 and 63/272 of 7 April 2009.

evaluation methodology applied across the system by 2010. While early efforts to create such a mechanism failed, during its first regular session of 2007 CEB requested the United Nations Evaluation Group (UNEG), the network of units responsible for evaluation in the United Nations system, to revert to it with details on the scope, funding, and governance of a United Nations system-wide evaluation mechanism. In September 2007 UNEG prepared a draft paper entitled “Establishing an United Nations-wide evaluation system”, which proposed strengthened evaluation units in all United Nations organizations, UNEG professional networks and an independent evaluation unit. JIU has addressed a letter to UNEG taking exception to this latter element since it would overlap with the mandate of the Unit, and with the General Assembly resolution that reaffirmed “the unique role of the Unit as the only system-wide external oversight body”.¹¹⁴ Recognizing that there was a need for more system-wide evaluation, in particular at the country-level, the Assembly thus requested the Secretary-General to propose at its sixty-fourth session “modalities for the establishment of an independent system-wide evaluation mechanism to assess system-wide efficiency, effectiveness and performance, bearing in mind the evaluation functions carried out by respective United Nations organizations, Joint Inspection Unit and the United Nations Evaluation Group”.¹¹⁵

194. In April 2007, CEB commissioned UNEG to establish substantive parameters and processes for the evaluation of the “Delivering as one” pilot projects.¹¹⁶ Subsequently, UNEG finalized a study to assess baselines and indicators for an evaluation of the projects.¹¹⁷

195. In December 2007, the General Assembly called “for an independent evaluation of lessons learned” from the voluntary efforts to improve coherence, coordination and harmonization in the United Nations development system (referring to the pilot projects), “for consideration by Member States, without prejudice to a future intergovernmental decision”.¹¹⁸ While it is unclear at the time of writing this report who will undertake this evaluation, the Inspector strongly believes that such an evaluation could be conducted by JIU, based on the benchmarking framework proposed by this report.

196. The Inspector recognizes the need for “One” oversight mechanism for the audit, evaluation, inspection and investigation of the “One plan” and related joint programmes and projects to ensure a coherent approach and a rational use of existing oversight resources while avoiding oversight fatigue.

Benchmark 15

A results-based approach is applied to ensure a coherent and integrated planning, programming, budgeting, implementation, monitoring, evaluation and reporting process from the very outset of the preparation of the “One plan”.

Through:

¹¹⁴ Resolution 60/258 of 8 May 2006, para. 2.

¹¹⁵ General Assembly resolution 63/311 of 14 September 2009, para. 8.

¹¹⁶ E/2007/69.

¹¹⁷ UNEG, *Evaluability Assessments of the Programme Country Pilots—Delivering as One UN: Synthesis Report* (December 2008).

¹¹⁸ General Assembly resolution 62/208 of 19 December 2007, para. 139.

- (a) Developing a single common country programme and strategy for all United Nations system organizations represented or not in the country with the full participation of all actors;
- (b) Conducting prior needs/mission assessments to identify the root causes of problems with the involvement of UNCTs and other actors outside the United Nations family;
- (c) Translating country strategies into prioritized results-oriented and focused plans/programmes;
- (d) Focusing on the simultaneous efforts of all United Nations components;
- (e) Setting progressive targets at country level for the establishment and implementation of joint programmes;
- (f) Developing the cluster approach in the areas of peacekeeping, peacebuilding and development;
- (g) Establishing indicators to measure progress towards meeting objectives;
- (h) Setting up effective monitoring and self-evaluation mechanisms;
- (i) Regularly feeding the results of evaluation into the planning process;
- (j) Improving the quality of the reporting process;
- (k) Resorting to existing oversight mechanisms to provide an independent assessment of progress achieved in the coherence/integration process; and
- (l) Harmonizing the current financial, human resources and planning, programming, budgeting, procurement, monitoring and evaluation regulation and rules.

L. One fund

197. Early in this report, the Inspector indicated that coherence and integration were not possible without the political will of Member States; political will that translates into the financial commitment of donors to support the “One United Nations” process. Resources have to go hand in hand with mandates.

198. It is well known that the funding of field operations and programmes comes from different budget sources: a special scale of assessed contributions for peacekeeping, assessed contributions on the regular budget scale for political missions, and voluntary contributions for many peacemaking initiatives for peacebuilding, development and humanitarian activities and even private sector funding.

199. Peacekeeping funding is mandatory. As such this gives peacekeeping operations a huge advantage over agencies. Therefore an important element of integration should focus on embedding those parts of agency staff and activities that answer to the Security Council mandate within the peacekeeping operation to ensure that the activity is funded and that overlapping and turf fights are reduced.

200. UNDP, UNFPA, UNICEF and WFP are funded by voluntary contributions and OCHA, OHCHR, UNEP, the United Nations Human Settlements Programme (UN-Habitat), UNHCR, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and UNRWA are also increasingly so financed by at least two thirds. The specialized agencies and IAEA rely more and more on extrabudgetary resources for technical cooperation programmes.

201. To mitigate the risks of their growing dependence on voluntary funding, the United Nations organizations have developed different initiatives with uneven success at Headquarters and country level, such as: multi-donor trust funds (MDTFs), the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF), the Peacebuilding Fund, a voluntary indicative scale of contributions, thematic funds, pooled funding and strategic umbrella agreements with specific donors.

202. At country level, for development activities, the United Nations is not a major funding source, but rather a convener and coordinator, a normative and capacity-building player. Core funds available at country level are spread out in small budgets by organization, with little resources left to implement individual programmes and even less for joint programmes. Considerable efforts are invested in fund-raising and managing numerous donors/recipients with a variety of reporting requirements, cycles and procedures resulting in high transaction costs. Increased competition for funds results in even higher administrative and support costs.

203. Voluntary funding for development is frequently conditioned to specific donor interests that may differ from the country's "needs and wants". The conditionality and unpredictability of this funding undermine planning and distort the delivery of programmes and projects with under/overfunding, as a result of donor priorities, which do not always match the development priorities of the recipient countries.

204. In humanitarian situations, where the United Nations may play a more decisive role, funding is more forthcoming, with less conditionality and better timing. Pooled funding has been quite successful in reducing transaction costs for donors and recipients, and in increasing transparency and focus, for example, in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

205. In 2006, in seeking greater harmonization, through the UNDAF common country assessment, 48 per cent of joint programmes were financed in parallel and 22 per cent pooled; whereas 22 country or region-specific consolidated appeals were launched with a 67 per cent funding rate.¹¹⁹

206. In multidimensional peacekeeping missions, a number of activities mandated by the Security Council lack funding, and trust funds are established for that purpose. Contributions are, however, scarce and SRSGs do not have resources at their disposal to meet certain operational needs, other than approximately US\$ 1 million per mission for quick-impact projects with a ceiling of US\$ 25,000 per project. These projects are intended for confidence-building purposes only.

207. In this regard, the Peacebuilding Fund established in August 2006¹²⁰ constitutes an important step towards marshalling resources for post-conflict recovery in areas for which no other funding mechanism is available. This includes activities in support of peace agreements in relation to national institutions, activities to enhance the capacity to promote coexistence and conflict resolution, activities related to the establishment of basic administrative services and critical interventions to respond to imminent threats to peace, for example, the reintegration of ex-combatants under a DDR programme. To date, the Fund has received over US\$ 310 million in contributions from 46 donors, many of them non-traditional donors. Fourteen countries including all four on the agenda of the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) have benefited so far from the Fund. Decisions in PBC countries take into account the IPBS endorsed by PBC and funding decisions are made by a national steering committee co-chaired by the Government and the United Nations.¹²¹

¹¹⁹ UNDG (see footnote 74 above), pp. 55 and 76.

¹²⁰ A/60/984.

¹²¹ United Nations Peacebuilding Fund website (www.unpbf.org).

208. The High-level Panel on United Nations System-wide Coherence recommended that sufficient core/assessed funding be secured for those organizations committed to the reform process, including to support the RC system and that all contributions be pooled at country level under one budgetary framework with donors refraining from funding interventions outside the “One” programme. This funding should be predictable and multi-year and organizations should align their funding cycles.

209. In this connection, UNDG has developed terms of reference for the operation of multi-donor trust funds with a steering committee co-chaired by the Government and the RC or Deputy Special Representative, composed of the United Nations, the Government and donor representatives and with UNDP as administrative agent in most cases, to decide on the allocation of funds based on established requirements and priorities and due reporting and auditing dates.

210. The Inspector noted some good examples of working with a wide range of donors to secure adequate funding for the “One” programme. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the funding of the country assistance framework (CAF) was secured through agreement with the World Bank and 19 bilateral donors present in the country. In Viet Nam, donors have committed to finance the activities of the first phase of the “One plan” and a One Plan Fund Mobilization and Allocation Committee was established to prioritize activities for funding in close coordination with the Government. The RC was to administer the Fund on behalf of UNCT and was responsible for fund mobilization.

211. The Inspector agrees with the funding principles outlined in the report of the High-level Panel on United Nations System-wide Coherence and sees positively the efforts by UNDG to establish an operational framework for the One Plan Fund through steering committees.

212. Likewise, donors should become increasingly conscious that it is a better investment to fight the root causes of conflicts and more rational to create the capacity to prevent and resolve conflicts before they escalate into costlier tragedies, as indicated recently by the Secretary-General.

213. Donors have become increasingly aware of and concerned by the harmonization and effectiveness of aid, as illustrated by the Rome Declaration of February 2003; the Principles and Good Practice of Humanitarian Donorship adopted in Stockholm in 2003, which recognized the need for a dynamic and flexible response, and the Paris Declaration in which donors committed to “[l]ink funding to a single framework of conditions and/or a manageable set of indicators derived from the national development strategy” and to “[i]mplement, where feasible, common arrangements at country level for planning, funding (e.g. joint financial arrangements), disbursement, monitoring, evaluating and reporting to government on donor activities and aid flows”,¹²² while setting indicators to measure progress that include aid predictability and untied aid. Finally, in 2008 the Accra Agenda for Action called for reducing “the fragmentation of aid by improving the complementarity of donors’ efforts and the division of labour among donors, including through improved allocation of resources within sectors, within countries, and across countries”.¹²³

¹²² The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (see paragraph 17 above), paras. 16 and 32.

¹²³ Accra Agenda for Action, para. 17.

214. Other than the above-mentioned limitations imposed by donors' preference for tied and bilateral aid, it has been acknowledged that the United Nations financial rules and procedures remain a significant obstacle to the "One fund". The most frequently referred to are the differences in budget cycles, agency administrative costs, financial systems, cost recovery and cash transfer procedures. In this connection, progress has been achieved with the new harmonized approach to cash transfers to implementing partners (HACT) introduced in 2006 in a number of countries that have harmonized their programme cycles. HACT is expected to be implemented in all countries except "Delivering as one" and a working group has been set up for that purpose where both the Government and UNCT members are represented.

215. Finally, the challenge for UNCTs is not only to increase the amount and flexibility of funds received and to harmonize procedures to channel such resources more effectively, but also to enable them to adapt to the capacity of the country to absorb such aid and meet donors' expectations for rapid disbursement and delivery.

Benchmark 16

A funding mechanism exists that includes all United Nations system organizations present in the field, the host country, the Bretton Woods institutions, bilateral and multilateral donors, international and national NGOs and other members of civil society, to ensure coherence, integration and correlation between need assessments and available resources.

Through:

- (a) Linking country programmes and strategies to funding;
- (b) Involving Bretton Woods institutions and individual donors in the strategic planning process to increase ownership and transparency;
- (c) Providing increased funds for quick-impact projects and financing DDR activities under security programmes from assessed contributions;
- (d) Applying pooled funding for increased efficiency;
- (e) Establishing mechanisms to prioritize activities for funding;
- (f) Establishing effective inter-agency disbursement procedures; and
- (g) Revising the financial and administrative rules at Headquarters level to make them mutually compatible.

M. One house

216. Integration/coherence at administrative level means common premises and services in "one United Nations house". The rationale behind the one house idea is to reduce administrative costs, which absorb resources that, instead, could be dedicated to development, thereby improving the ratio of programme to support costs.¹²⁴ In this connection, in 2007 the Secretary-General recommended in his report on the triennial comprehensive policy review of operational activities of the United Nations development system that related savings on transaction costs be better monitored and "channelled into programme funding to be made

¹²⁴ Economic and Social Council, "Consolidated list of issues related to the coordination of operational activities for development, 2005" (E/2005/CRP.1).

available for operational activities for development in developing countries”.¹²⁵ The Inspector would like to see such savings reinvested in development on a recurrent basis and not as a one-time exercise, similar to the established principles for the development account.

217. The Inspector recognizes that it will not always be possible to collocate all parts of the United Nations – due to different types of relations with government authorities and civil society – however, when possible collocation in “one house” should be strived for.

218. Pushed forward throughout the system and particularly within the eight pilot projects, administrative integration lags far behind strategic and programmatic integration. In the triennial comprehensive policy review of operational activities of the United Nations development system of 2005 the creation of 20 joint offices by 2007 was requested. Only one has so far been established, in Cape Verde for four United Nations funds and programmes. Arrangements towards the establishment of other such offices are in process.

219. The setting up of common services is progressing, though slowly. In 2005, more than 60 out of 134 UNCTs reported joint activities in the areas of security (by far the most frequent one); procurement of fuel, paper and stationery; travel arrangements; information technology and telecommunications.¹²⁶

220. As a first step, Operation Management Teams were set up, composed of the most senior operations and administrative managers, to make assessments and recommendations to UNCTs on activities requiring their approval for joint initiatives. The Teams are also called on to plan and manage joint activities. UNDG has issued terms of reference and guidelines for their functioning.

221. In general, effective progress is hampered by lack of political will and commitment, by insufficient technical support and funding and by the differences in systems, rules and regulations among organizations.

222. Nevertheless, integration happens in spite of the rules and requires some degree of flexibility for “rule-breaking”, accommodating financial and budgetary processes to the overarching goal of achieving integration. In this connection, a lot of pressure is currently put on directors of administration and chief administrative officers both to comply with the rules and to work around them to achieve prompt results.

223. Whereas harmonizing regulations and rules is a process that requires policy decisions by the comptrollers, ACABQ, the Fifth Committee and budget and finance committees, funds and programmes and specialized agencies often go the other way, micromanaging and adopting policies that undermine integration efforts. At the time of writing the comptrollers of the United Nations, UNDP, UNFPA, UNICEF and WFP were working towards developing a single set of harmonized financial regulations and rules. A draft set of harmonized financial regulations and rules, reviewed by OLA, had been prepared by a working group comprised of representatives from these agencies. Furthermore, DPKO reports that common services had been addressed in peacebuilding offices and at the time of writing, preliminary reports show that implementation in BINUB has been relatively successful. Such lessons could be validated as best practice for wider application.

¹²⁵ A/62/253, paras. 50 and 51(e) (i).

¹²⁶ UNDG, “Synthesis of Resident Coordinators Annual Reports 2005”, p. 30.

Benchmark 17

A “one United Nations house” is set up where United Nations system organizations in the country share common premises and services while related savings are reinvested in development activities within the country.

VII. THE UNITED NATIONS COUNTRY TEAM AND OTHERS

224. The integration of partners from outside the United Nations system into country team activities was first encouraged by the 1999 ACC guidelines, which refer to the participation of representatives from Bretton Woods institutions and civil society in thematic groups and in the UNDAF common country assessment process.¹²⁷

225. Several initiatives followed with uneven success. In 2004, after the publication of the report of the Panel of Eminent Persons on United Nations-Civil Society Relations, which called for the United Nations to become “an outward-looking organization” and to “[c]onnect the local with the global”,¹²⁸ the Secretary-General proposed strengthening the institutional capacity for engagement with NGOs at country level through the establishment of focal points within UNDG and UNCTs.¹²⁹ In 2006, the High-level Panel on United Nations System-wide Coherence recommended that the United Nations and Bretton Woods institutions cooperate at country level in the development of needs assessments, PRSPs and MDG strategies, in data collection and evaluation mechanisms, in setting up multi-donor trust funds and establishing a clear division of labour.¹³⁰ UNDG has reported attempts to involve NGOs in the preparation of country assessments and UNDAF. The IPBS developed between the country and PBC is the latest inclusive strategic planning document including the United Nations, Bretton Woods institutions, civil society, the private sector and donors at the country level. IPBS should thus become the strategic planning document for all actors although at the time of finalizing this report it has remained one out of several parallel planning instruments – which is adversely affecting integration and coordination.

226. In the context of integrated missions, it is important to establish clearly the boundaries of integration and cooperation between the United Nations and civil society, including NGOs, and agree on common principles of intervention to preserve the quality of the relationship.

Benchmark 18

Civil society representatives, Bretton Woods institutions, group donors and the private sector participate in the “One United Nations” process at country level.

¹²⁷ “ACC guidelines ...” (see footnote 92 above), paras. 11 and 19. Indeed, the latest draft common country assessment UNDAF guidelines mention “stakeholders” which “refer to governments, including line ministries; social partners, including workers and employers organizations, other development partners relevant to a country context; civil society; and NGOs”.

¹²⁸ A/58/817 and Corr.1.

¹²⁹ A/59/354.

¹³⁰ A/61/583, p. 48.

Through:

- (a) Designation of focal points within UNCTs;
- (b) Participation in country needs assessments; and
- (c) Involvement in the design, implementation and evaluation of country strategies and plans.