

**REVIEW OF MANAGEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION IN THE OFFICE  
OF THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES**

*Prepared by*

***Sumihiro Kuyama  
Louis-Dominique Ouédraogo  
M. Deborah Wynes***

**Joint Inspection Unit**

**Geneva 2004**



**United Nations**

**JIU/REP/2004/4**

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

**REVIEW OF MANAGEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION IN THE OFFICE  
OF THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES**

*Prepared by*

***Sumihiro Kuyama  
Louis-Dominique Ouédraogo  
M. Deborah Wynes***

**Joint Inspection Unit**



**United Nations, Geneva 2004**

**CONTENTS**

	Paragraphs	Page
<b>ACRONYMS</b> .....		iv
<b>EXECUTIVE SUMMARY</b> .....		v
<b>INTRODUCTION</b> .....	1 – 4	1
<b>I. ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE</b> .....	5 – 12	2
<b>II. STRATEGIC PLANNING, PROGRAMMING, BUDGETING, MONITORING AND EVALUATION</b> .....	13 – 20	4
<b>III. INFORMATION MANAGEMENT</b> .....	21 – 24	6
<b>IV HUMAN RESOURCES MANAGEMENT</b> .....	25– 29	7
<b>V. OVERSIGHT ACTIVITIES</b> .....	30 – 37	8
<b>VI FIELD OPERATIONS</b> .....	38 – 59	10

## ACRONYMS

<b>AHC</b>	Assistant High Commissioner
<b>BO</b>	Branch Office
<b>CIO</b>	Chief Information Officer
<b>COP</b>	Country Operations Plan
<b>DCI</b>	Division of Communication and Information
<b>DFSM</b>	Division of Financial and Supply Management
<b>DHC</b>	Deputy High Commissioner
<b>DHRM</b>	Division of Human Resources Management
<b>DIP</b>	Department of International Protection
<b>DOS</b>	Division of Operational Support
<b>DRRMS</b>	Donor Relations and Resource Mobilization Service
<b>ECHA</b>	United Nations Executive Committee on Humanitarian Affairs
<b>EPAU</b>	Evaluation and Policy Analysis Unit
<b>ERP</b>	Enterprise Resource Planning
<b>ESS</b>	Emergency and Security Service
<b>EXCOM</b>	Executive Committee
<b>FO</b>	Field Office
<b>HC</b>	High Commissioner
<b>HRM</b>	Human Resources Management
<b>IDPs</b>	Internally Displaced Persons
<b>ICT</b>	Information and Communication Technology
<b>IG</b>	Inspector-General
<b>IGO</b>	Inspector-General's Office
<b>IOM/FOM</b>	Inter-Office Memorandum/Field Office Memorandum
<b>ITTS</b>	Information Technology and Telecommunication Service
<b>JIU</b>	Joint Inspection Unit
<b>LAS</b>	Legal Affairs Section
<b>MOU</b>	Memorandum of Understanding
<b>MSRP</b>	Management Systems Renewal Project
<b>NFI</b>	Non-Food Items
<b>NGOs</b>	Non-Governmental Organizations
<b>OC</b>	Oversight Committee
<b>ODMS</b>	Organizational Development and Management Section
<b>OIOS</b>	United Nations Office of Internal Oversight Services
<b>PCOS</b>	Programme Coordination and Operations Support Section
<b>RBM</b>	Results-Based Management
<b>SIBAs</b>	Staff-In-Between-Assignments
<b>SO</b>	Sub-Office
<b>SOAs</b>	Special Operations Areas
<b>SOLAR</b>	Special Operational Living Allowance Rate
<b>UNDAF/CCF</b>	United Nations Development Assistance Framework/Country Cooperation Framework
<b>UNDG</b>	United Nations Development Group
<b>UNEP</b>	United Nations Environment Programme
<b>UNICEF</b>	United Nations Children's Fund
<b>UNSECOORD</b>	United Nations Security Coordinator Office
<b>USG</b>	Under-Secretary-General
<b>WFP</b>	World Food Programme

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

### OBJECTIVE

**To contribute to the ongoing reform exercises undertaken by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, with a view to improving its management and administration.**

### MAIN FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

A. The management of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) can be characterized, by and large, as doing business on the basis of multiple managerial policies and guidelines formulated through various internal committees and boards, rather than based on solid corporate policies. With the recent removal by the United Nations General Assembly of the “temporal limitation on the continuation of the Office of the High Commissioner”, it is now quite opportune to establish solid corporate policies in a number of managerial areas, on the basis of a strategic thinking/approach and by consolidating/streamlining, as appropriate, existing multiple policies and guidelines.

#### **Organizational structure (Chapter I)**

B. The present organizational structure of the UNHCR Secretariat, which is rather fragmented, has a number of shortcomings, in respect of, inter alia, functional duplications between departmental units, placement of some functional units, in addition to the non-uniformity in the organizational nomenclature.

C. Furthermore, the executive management structure presents an anomaly in terms of functional hierarchy as the Deputy High Commissioner is responsible for management and administration and the Assistant High Commissioner is responsible for programmes and operations, yet both positions are at the Assistant Secretary-General level.

### RECOMMENDATION 1

**The Executive Committee may wish to recommend to the United Nations General Assembly that it (paragraphs 6 – 8):**

**(a) Authorize the creation of another Deputy High Commissioner post by converting the existing Assistant High Commissioner post, thus the Office of the High Commissioner will have two Deputies – one in-charge of Programme/Operations and the other in-charge of Administration/Management; it being understood that this measure will have no financial implications; and**

**(b) Amend Chapter III, paragraph 14 of the Statute of the Office of the High Commissioner accordingly.**

### RECOMMENDATION 2

**The High Commissioner should present for comment to the Executive Committee a streamlined and rationalized structure of the Secretariat by, inter alia, consolidating fragmented functions, and relocating some organizational units, on the basis of a uniform organizational nomenclature to be established by taking into account relevant Secretary-General’s Bulletins (paragraphs 9 – 12).**

## **Strategic planning, programming, budgeting, monitoring, and evaluation (Chapter II)**

D. UNHCR would benefit greatly were it to develop and have EXCOM approve a strategic framework to guide, prioritize and focus its work over a four year or longer period. Although short-term crises of whatever nature will always arise, attention to longer-term goals and objectives is essential for the effective functioning of UNHCR, indeed for any organization. The current programme and budget process is cumbersome, lengthy and expensive. Eliminating intermediate steps and programming via a biennial programme budget would serve to rationalize and streamline the current process, as well as implement the strategic framework.

### **RECOMMENDATION 3**

**The Executive Committee, at its 55<sup>th</sup> session, should consider modifying the programme budget cycle from annual to biennial, in alignment with the UN regular budget cycle, in view of a number of positive results expected from the shift (paragraph 13).**

### **RECOMMENDATION 4**

**To further enhance the results-based approach to planning, programming, budgeting, monitoring and evaluation, the High Commissioner should (paragraphs 14 – 15):**

- (a) Apply, as appropriate, the UN logical framework to the UNHCR budget;**
- (b) Integrate Management Systems Renewal Project (MSRP) into the Results-Based Management (RBM) process; and**
- (c) Incorporate evaluation findings and recommendations into planning, programming, budgeting and monitoring, in addition to enhancing real-time (as opposed to ex-post) evaluation during an operation's process to achieve the specific objectives (expected results).**

### **RECOMMENDATION 5**

**The High Commissioner should submit a long-term strategic framework, for consideration by the Executive Committee. The framework should contain the guiding principles, the organizational priorities and strategic goals, and link them to activities, indicators of achievement, and target dates for completion. Operational partners should be engaged in drawing up the strategic framework to achieve a comprehensive approach in guiding the work of the Organization (paragraphs 16 – 19).**

### **RECOMMENDATION 6**

**The High Commissioner should combine the programme planning and coordination functions of the Programme Coordination and Operations Support Section (PCOS) currently in the Division of Operational Support (DOS) into the Budget Section (in the Division of Financial and Supply Management – DFSM) (paragraph 20).**

## **Information management (Chapter III)**

E. The basic objective of information management is to realize the situation whereby decision makers could have real-time information when required for making a proper judgment and/or decision. For UNHCR, information management is a major organizational challenge: there exists a multitude of separate information systems; the Information and Communication Technology (ICT) function is proliferated structurally; information flow is problematic; and results-based

management has not been fully recognized in developing an Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) system (MSRP).

#### **RECOMMENDATION 7**

**With a view to strengthening information management, the High Commissioner should take the following measures (paragraphs 21 – 24):**

- (a) Preparation of a comprehensive information (and knowledge) management (including ICT) strategy;**
- (b) Integration of modules supporting RBM in the context of developing MSRP, as well as designing an interface between MSRP and Project Profile to feed registration-related information in the planning, budgeting, and monitoring processes;**
- (c) Structural consolidation of ICT related functions into a centralized organizational entity (which is responsible for information management);**
- (d) Designation or appointment of a senior official as Chief Information Officer (CIO) (as the head of the organizational entity in (c) above with the following organizational-wide responsibilities:**
  - i) Keep the organization’s information management strategy and ICT in alignment with its corporate plan and priorities;**
  - ii) Ensure the information management policies and standards are strictly followed and the ICT infrastructure is well managed;**
  - iii) Ensure that key decision makers on both substantive and administrative matters have accurate and timely information;**
  - iv) Facilitate developing and maintaining a culture for improving information (and knowledge) management in the organization by exploring new technological possibilities as required.**

#### **Human resources management (Chapter IV)**

F. UNHCR’s greatest resource is the dedicated and competent personnel working for the organization. To continue to attract and retain high caliber personnel willing to work and perform under the most difficult and trying of circumstances requires, at a minimum, that UNHCR develop a holistic corporate policy encompassing all aspects of human resources management.

#### **RECOMMENDATION 8**

**The High Commissioner should (paragraphs 25 – 29):**

- (a) Request the Division of Human Resources Management (DHRM) to prepare a comprehensive strategic corporate policy on Human Resources Management (HRM) to be submitted to the Executive Committee for its review at its 56<sup>th</sup> session, in addition to enforcing existing rules and guidelines and monitoring their implementation pending the establishment of the corporate policy; and**
- (b) Submit an annual report to the Executive Committee on the composition of the Secretariat, which should include, inter alia, statistics on geographical diversity (distribution), movements of staff across duty stations, Staff-In-Between-Assignments (SIBAs) and exceptions.**

## **Oversight activities (Chapter V)**

G. Internal oversight is provided by at least three different entities with various reporting lines. Although an internal oversight committee was established to coordinate the disparate elements, it does not meet regularly and its membership is too wide and its authority too diffuse. Current arrangements in place for the oversight activities can call into question the overall effectiveness, as well as objectivity and independence of the various functions, especially the Inspector General (IG) function. Given the magnitude of the resources entrusted to UNHCR, there is a need to address the serious shortcomings that currently exist in this critically important function.

### **RECOMMENDATION 9**

**The High Commissioner should strengthen the role of the Oversight Committee by (paragraphs 30 – 34):**

- (a) Ensuring the Committee’s compliance with the provisions contained in its current Terms of Reference, in particular, with respect to the coordination of oversight functions (audit, investigation, inspection, and evaluation);**
- (b) Reinforcing the Terms of Reference by adding provisions on the need:**
  - i) To take specific decisions on all oversight recommendations addressed to the High Commissioner;**
  - ii) To monitor the implementation of all recommendations accepted by the High Commissioner and those approved by the Executive Committee; and**
  - iii) To improve the annual oversight report by focusing on the main findings and recommendations, and by providing information, inter alia, on the impact of recommendations implemented, as well as lessons learned and best practices;**
- (c) Streamlining/limiting the membership of the Committee to enhance the efficiency of its work.**

### **RECOMMENDATION 10**

**The Executive Committee may wish to approve the following (paragraphs 35 – 36):**

- (a) The IG position should be a non-career position serving a five year non-renewable term at the D-2 level, and be appointed by the High Commissioner after consultation with the Executive Committee, and subject to dismissal by the High Commissioner only for cause, following similar consultations with the Executive Committee;**
- (b) The IG should submit individual reports to the High Commissioner, but, at the request of the IG, any such report shall be submitted to the Executive Committee together with the HC’s comments thereon; and**
- (c) Clarification should be sought on the functional relationship between the Inspector General’s Office (IGO) and the United Nations Offices of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) with respect to the investigation function.**

### **RECOMMENDATION 11**

**The High Commissioner should eliminate the rotation requirements for the staff involved in investigation, inspection and evaluation (paragraph 37).**



## Field operations (Chapter VI)

### *Management issues*

H. There appears to be a lack of correlation between refugee caseloads and the actual structural staffing levels of the different field offices. In that connection, management tools were developed internally and they need to be further refined and be used to link refugee caseloads and allocated budget with office size and staff structure.

I. High level vacancy rates in some duty stations appear to be linked to such posts being classified as family-duty stations solely on the basis of the prevailing security phase established by United Nations Security Coordinator Office (UNSECOORD), despite poor living conditions and the lack of basic health and educational facilities. Incentives should be given in such cases to attract potential qualified candidates.

### RECOMMENDATION 12

**In order to further rationalize UNHCR representation at field level and to attract qualified staff in hardship duty stations, the High Commissioner should:**

**(a) Build on previous internal reviews made on office size and staffing parameters and translate them into a management tool which correlates refugees' caseload and operational budget with office size and staff structure. Such a tool should be used by management at Headquarters and in the field to ensure the rationalization of office structures, to allow for comparative analysis and to facilitate the review of country operations plans (paragraphs 41 – 44);**

**(b) Review current living conditions in hardship duty stations and establish, upon consultations with UNSECOORD and other UN agencies operating in the area (especially World Food Programme (WFP) and United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF)), the criteria to be used for attributing the status of special operations areas as envisaged in the IOM/FOM/012/2004 (paragraphs 45 – 46).**

### *Operations*

J. The registration or re-registration of refugees is considered as very important not only for UNHCR but also for other partners and in particular the WFP. Such exercises are subject to resource availability but not undertaking them also entails running the risk of spending limited resources on non-existing refugees, particularly when there is growing concern that, in some operations, the level of assistance to refugees is not in line with established international standards.

### RECOMMENDATION 13

**Based on the situation prevailing in each UNHCR operation in the field, the High Commissioner should:**

**(a) Ensure that no undue delays are put in the process of registration or re-registration of refugees in order to establish as accurately as possible the number of beneficiaries to whom assistance is provided (paragraphs 47 – 48);**

**(b) Submit to the Executive Committee, by no later than its 57<sup>th</sup> session, information indicating the extent to which established international standards for the provision of assistance to refugees are being met by region and programme, and propose**

**options/scenarios for improving the situation, where required, in order to bring such assistance in line with international standards (paragraphs 49 – 51).**

K. Cooperation and partnerships are important for finding durable solutions to refugee situations. It has been recognized that there is a need to integrate humanitarian assistance with long-term sustainable development programming. Such integration should be facilitated by UNHCR membership in the United Nations Development Group (UNDG) and through the United Nations Development Assistance Framework/Country Cooperation Framework (UNDAF/CCF) processes.

#### **RECOMMENDATION 14**

**Bearing in mind the provision of General Assembly resolution 58/153 calling for the integration of humanitarian and development needs in the common country assessment process, the High Commissioner should ensure that, as appropriate, programme goals and objectives included in the Country Operations Plans (COPs) establish clear linkages with the related UNDAF/CCF exercises for the concerned refugee host countries (paragraphs 52-54).**

#### *Relations with host countries*

L. Protracted refugee situations often constitute a tremendous burden for host countries, most of which are developing countries, and they can fuel “asylum fatigue”. Avenues for durable solutions include better information on benefits to be derived by host communities from the presence of refugees as well as burden sharing by other countries.

#### **RECOMMENDATION 15**

**In the framework of his focus on durable solutions concerning refugees, the High Commissioner should:**

**(a) Instruct UNHCR offices at field level to pursue more vigorously, in liaison with the UN Country Teams, their efforts to collate and disseminate in the official and/or local languages of host countries as appropriate, the information on bilateral and multilateral projects, initiatives and other measures taken by various actors to alleviate or redress the impact of refugees on local host communities, as well as to highlight the potential contribution of refugees as agents for development of the host country (paragraphs 55 – 57);**

**(b) Further review the resettlement opportunities offered by developing countries on the basis of lessons drawn from past experiences and submit action-oriented proposals to the Executive Committee and to the General Assembly, in order to take full advantage of such opportunities (paragraphs 58 – 59).**

## INTRODUCTION

1. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) was established as of 1 January 1951 by General Assembly resolution 319/IV. Its main responsibilities<sup>1</sup> are to provide international protection and to search for durable solutions to the problem of refugees and other persons of concern by assisting governments involved to facilitate voluntary repatriation, local settlement or re-settlement. At the beginning of 2004, the number of persons of concern to UNHCR was 18 million worldwide<sup>2</sup>. Like most United Nations organizations, the UNHCR has undertaken management reforms during the past decade to improve programme delivery, accountability and performance.
2. Confronted with new challenges - a changing mandate and responsibilities, increasingly complex donor relations, rise of terrorism, globalization and tension between sovereignty and humanitarian action - the Office initiated in 2001 a process, known as “UNHCR 2004”, meant to provide new instruments adapted to these challenges. With the recent removal of the time limitation on its mandate and its inclusion in the UNDG, the Office is positioned to adopt longer-term perspectives in policy formulation, in planning and programming of its activities and in streamlining structure and processes to increase effectiveness.
3. The present report is the seventh in a series of comprehensive reviews of administration and management in the United Nations organizations. The report concentrates on issues where it is considered that the Joint Inspection Unit could add value, acknowledging that the UN Board of Auditors and the UN Office of Internal Oversight Services (UNHCR Audit Service) have already covered a number of management and administrative issues. The report focuses on six areas: organizational structure; planning, programming, budgeting, monitoring and evaluation; information management; human resources management; oversight activities; and field operations, selecting UNHCR operations in Tanzania as a case study. Management practices of other United Nations system organizations have been taken into consideration for benchmarking purposes, and reference is made to the relevant JIU reports.
4. The Inspectors met with UNHCR officials at Headquarters and in Tanzania, as well as with officials of other UN system organizations, Tanzanian Government officials and representatives of refugees during the field mission. They wish to extend their appreciation to the High Commissioner and all those who assisted them in the preparation of this report.

---

<sup>1</sup> Included in its Statute and guided by the 1951 United Nations Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol.

<sup>2</sup> Source: UNHCR Global Report 2003; of this amount 55 percent are refugees, 6 percent are returned refugees, 29 percent are Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) and returned IDPs, and 10 percent are other persons of concern to UNHCR including asylum seekers

## I. ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE

5. The organizational structure presents the framework of various functions and tasks, and their inter-relationships to achieve organizational goals. At the UNHCR, the organizational structure is partly based on its Statute and on the Secretary-General's Bulletins (ST/SGB/1997/5 and ST/SGB/1998/9). It has evolved over the years coping with the needs as they have arisen, without a careful reflection on the effective way to achieve long-term mission objectives.

### *Executive Management*

6. The High Commissioner for Refugees (Under-Secretary-General), acting under the authority of the General Assembly, is responsible for overseeing the substantive work of the Office and for its administration. In discharging its responsibilities, the High Commissioner is assisted by the Deputy High Commissioner and by the Assistant High Commissioner. Both are Assistant Secretary-General level positions.

7. The Deputy High Commissioner, which is a statutorily provided post, covers, in the main, internal resources management and directly supervises<sup>3</sup> the heads of DFSM, Division of Communication and Information (DCI), DHRM, Information Technology and Telecommunication Service (ITTS), Legal Affairs Section (LAS) as well as MSRP. The post of Assistant High Commissioner, which was created in 1996 to "ensure an institutionalized policy-making mechanism with combined analysis, planning and operational capacities"<sup>4</sup>, covers operational management issues and directly supervises the heads of Bureaux, DOS, Emergency and Security Service (ESS) and Evaluation and Policy Analysis Unit (EPAU).

8. The current executive management structure, whereby responsibilities relating, in general, to administration and management are placed under the Deputy High Commissioner and those relating, in general, to programme and operations under the Assistant High Commissioner presents some anomaly in terms of management structure particularly with respect to functional hierarchy. To rectify and strengthen the executive management profile, the Assistant High Commissioner post should be converted to Deputy High Commissioner for Programme/Operations. This conversion would entail no financial implications, but may require an amendment of paragraph 14, Chapter III of the Statute of the Office of the High Commissioner. (→**Recommendation 1**)

### *Need for streamlining*

9. The organizational structure could also be streamlined through a number of measures including the consolidation of fragmented functions and relocation of certain organizational entities.

10. Certain functions are fragmented over various entities: for example, ICT-related activities are performed by sections/units in ITTS, DOS, DCI, Department of International Protection (DIP), DHRM (see paragraph 22); training is conducted by units/officers in DFSM, DHRM and Bureaux; and finance-related activities are covered by units/officers in the Bureaux besides the Finance Section (DFSM). Their consolidation would enhance efficiency and lead to economies of scale by eliminating redundancies.

11. Protection, together with assistance to refugees, is a core activity in UNHCR. Protection has two aspects: one related to standards setting, protection policy formulation and legal advice under the responsibility of DIP, and the other, "operational" protection, related to ensuring

---

<sup>3</sup> UNHCR Manual, Chapter 2

<sup>4</sup> A/AC.96/846/Part VII/Add.1

protection to persons of concern, under the responsibility of Bureaux. Considering the strong link between “operational” protection and protection activities performed by DIP, it could be beneficial to have the DIP placed under the Deputy High Commissioner in charge for Programme/Operation (see paragraph 8), instead of reporting directly to the High Commissioner.

12. Currently the planning/programming process is separated structurally from the budgetary process, making the consultative process for preparation of a coherent programme budget complicated and time-consuming. It is also prudent to consolidate the resource mobilization function currently under Donor Relations and Resource Mobilization Service (DRRMS placed in DCI) in DFSM. In addition, various terms are used to designate entities (Office, Bureau, Department, Division, Service, Section, Desk, Unit). A uniform nomenclature should be used when streamlining the overall organizational structure, by duly taking into account the relevant Secretary-General’s Bulletins. (→**Recommendation 2**)

## II. STRATEGIC PLANNING, PROGRAMMING, BUDGETING, MONITORING, AND EVALUATION

### *Annual budget vs. biennial budget*

13. UNHCR operates on an annual budget cycle. The budgets of most organizations in the UN system are prepared on a biennial basis, and UNHCR should not be an exception. Biennial budgets facilitate long-term planning, contribute to financial stability and produce a better match between multi-year work programmes and the budgeting process. They save the Secretariat, the delegations and capitals a great deal of time and resources. In UNHCR's case, biennial budgeting would align its planning and budgeting process to that of the UN where some two percent of UNHCR's budget is funded by the UN regular budget, as well as to that of the UNDG partners thus facilitating integrated programming, planning, budgeting and implementation. The adoption of a biennial budget should not affect the required flexibility to respond to emergency situations. (→**Recommendation 3**)

### *Results-based approach to planning, programming, budgeting, monitoring, and evaluation*

14. Results-based management is built on: a) defining strategic goals; b) formulating specific, measurable and realistic expected results which lead to goals' achievement; c) formulating performance indicators and continuous monitoring of performance; and d) improving performance and accountability based on feedback and lessons learned. While UNHCR made progress at the programme/project planning level, by preparing a guide<sup>5</sup> to be used by staff and implementing partners in project formulation, significant work remains to be done at the corporate level to link the global objectives with the expected and actual results. This is especially true for global operations/programmes<sup>6</sup>, where multiple stakeholders are involved and the results are of a qualitative nature. The Management System Renewal Project (MSRP) was not conceived to support the results-based management approach, although the software used (PeopleSoft) is RBM-capable. MSRP capabilities should be more fully exploited in the context of results-based planning, budgeting, monitoring, and evaluation, as well as reporting.

15. Evaluation is indispensable to the overall assessment of organizational effectiveness, as well as for the measurement of the impact of its policies and activities on refugees and other persons of concern. To actively support the enhancement of a results-based approach, the evaluation function should be used more strategically and be given the necessary leverage to feed the results of evaluations back into the planning and programming process and into policy development. Currently, there is no formal mechanism in place to enforce the implementation of evaluation-related recommendations in the planning and programming process. Based on the review of the UNHCR evaluation policy, the Inspectors consider that the evaluation approach should be reassessed to better integrate the requirements of results-based management in evaluation. (→**Recommendation 4**)

### *Need for a long-term strategic framework*

16. Although UNHCR has made considerable efforts in performing a strategic analysis and assessment of the current situation and in setting strategic directions, more needs to be done. UNHCR senior officials explained that, given the unpredictability of operations and the time limitation on the mandate (now removed), a strategic medium-term plan was not considered very relevant. They also referred to the financial crisis that UNHCR faced during 2000-2003, which

<sup>5</sup> Practical guide on the use of objectives, outputs and indicators, March 2002, Division of Operational Support. It contains inter alia principles for preparation of logical frameworks, definitions of objectives, outputs and indicators as well as examples of objectives, outputs and indicators by sector of activities.

<sup>6</sup> Related to refugee women (including gender mainstreaming and equal access to humanitarian assistance), refugee children, environmental issues and natural resources management in refugee and returnee areas, HIV/AIDS.

diverted attention from the longer-term perspective to a day-to-day approach. They highlighted that senior management is currently considering a longer-term approach. In the absence of a comprehensive medium-term strategic plan, senior managers prepare “strategic guidance” and “policy priorities papers” to assist their staff in preparation of the Country Operations and Headquarters Plans, which are the basis for the annual budget.

17. A long-term strategic framework (currently UNHCR has a two year strategic framework for 2006-07) encompassing four or more years should be developed to guide UNHCR’s future work. The Millennium Declaration Goals, as well as “UNHCR 2004”<sup>7</sup>, “Agenda for Protection”<sup>8</sup> and “Framework for Durable Solutions”<sup>9</sup> could serve as the bases for such a long-term planning guide. The framework would address where UNHCR should be going and what it should be doing. Built into the process is the understanding and recognition that such a document should be flexible enough to reflect evolving and changing circumstances. A long-term strategic framework is essential for an effective shift towards an RBM approach and a much-needed basis for improving other elements of UNHCR’s budgetary process.

18. Programming based on the strategic framework should be done via the biennial programme budget as referred to in paragraph 13. Strategically conceived and well-formulated programmes should lead to an improved strategic budget document. Resources allocated for the biennium would be harnessed to bring the organization closer to the attainment of its strategic objectives and the realization of the goals identified in the long-term strategic framework. UNHCR should follow the objectives set in the strategic framework and use the guidelines on priority setting (Action 1 of IOM 29/2001) in prioritizing and re-prioritizing its activities. This is especially critical given historical discrepancies between approved budgets and funds made available to finance the budget.

19. The High Commissioner has called for institutionalization of participatory programming practices in all field operations. He highlighted the need to engage operational partners<sup>10</sup> in the assessment of the needs and planning process to improve co-ordination and avoid duplication<sup>11</sup>. In addition, UNHCR’s participation in the UNDG will pave the way towards better coordination and integration of resources among humanitarian players to better cope with refugees’ needs. These are necessary and integral parts that should be factored into the preparation of the long-term strategic framework. (→**Recommendation 5**)

#### *Need for a central entity for planning, programming and budgeting*

20. Currently, there are two separate entities responsible for planning, programming and budgeting: PCOS within the DOS, and the Budget Section within DFSM. Consolidating planning, programming and budgetary functions in one unit, or combining PCOS’ programme planning function with the budgetary functions of the Budget Section would sustain progress towards results-based management and enhance accountability for results. Actually it is the norm in the UN system that planning, programming and budgeting are placed in one organizational unit since the programme and budget processes are inextricably linked. There should not be programming without budget and vice versa. (→**Recommendation 6**)

<sup>7</sup> A/58/410

<sup>8</sup> A/AC.96/965/Add.1 and the Third Edition, October 2003

<sup>9</sup> EC/53/SC/INF.3 – Standing Committee, “Framework for durable solutions for refugees and persons of concern”

<sup>10</sup> Defined as governmental, inter-governmental and non-governmental organization and UN agencies that work in partnership with UNHCR to protect and assist refugees, leading to achievement of durable solutions.

<sup>11</sup> IOM-FOM 48/2003, 24 July 2003

### III. INFORMATION MANAGEMENT

21. Timely and accurate information is vital for an organization's effective functioning. This is particularly true in the case of UNHCR, which is field-based and operates in a changing environment necessitating the organization to adjust swiftly to new situations. The basic objective of managing information resources is to provide the key decision makers with real-time information when needed for making a proper judgment and/or decision, and the first step towards attaining this objective is to prepare a comprehensive information (and knowledge) management strategy. UNHCR does not have such a strategy. The strategy should be composed of objectives, activities and indicators leading to achievement of the objectives (including the improvement of information flows, standardization of information, access to information (and knowledge)), together with related costs and timeframes for implementation.

22. Besides the need to prepare an information management strategy, information management is a major organizational challenge for UNHCR: there are a number of separate information systems run by various entities (including ITTS, MSRP, Electronic Publishing Unit (DCI), Protection Information Section (DIP), Project Profile and Geographic Information and Mapping Unit (DOS), DHRM) involved in different stages of information management processes (including ICT activities), which has led to compartmentalization and self-centered approaches. In addition to these major challenges, problems such as obstruction of information flows, overabundance of scattered information not created as 'knowledge' assets, etc. need to be addressed.

23. In an attempt to cope with some of these problems, UNHCR opted for an ERP solution through the development of the MSRP. However, in developing MSRP, UNHCR appears not to have streamlined existing work processes, an important pre-condition for cost-effective implementation of any ERP system. Modules to support results-based management were not embedded in the MSRP. Another project (Profile) to improve registration procedures was started separately from MSRP in the second half of 2002. An interface should be ensured between the two projects (systems), so that Headquarters will have access to information on refugee caseloads and use it in the planning, programming, budgeting, and monitoring processes.

24. Strategic and coherent management of information requires the central leadership of a senior official, usually called Chief Information Officer (CIO), with managerial skills and ICT competency.<sup>12</sup> Such a senior official should be the head of the organizational entity (which is responsible for information management) to be established by consolidating ICT related functions currently dispersed throughout the Organization. (→**Recommendation 7**)

---

<sup>12</sup> For further details, see JIU/REP/2002/9



#### IV. HUMAN RESOURCES MANAGEMENT

25. Human resources management was the subject of a comprehensive audit performed by the UN Board of Auditors in the second half of 2002. The audit covered topics such as decentralization and delegation of the HRM function to the field, the HR information system, staffing and post structure, contracts, posting and promotions, staff members' allowances and benefits, and staff security. Another audit was performed by OIOS on the UNHCR decentralized personnel administration, during July and August 2003.

26. At the time of the JIU review, UNHCR was in the process of finalizing the implementation of recommendations contained in the two audit reports. To respond to various audit findings and recommendations, UNHCR issued, in November 2003, the revised rules of procedures of the Appointments, Postings and Promotions Board (APPB) and the procedural guidelines for Appointments, Postings and Promotions (APP). These procedural guidelines deal with issues identified by the Board of Auditors, such as indefinite contracts, SIBAs, rotation framework, rank-in-post and promotions.

27. While acknowledging the reflection of audit recommendations and progress achieved by UNHCR, the Inspectors consider that these procedural guidelines do not really constitute strategies as such. UNHCR should have a strategic corporate policy on human resources management (taking into account recent developments), which should cover, inter alia, planning, recruitment/appointment, rotation, promotions, and staff development. In this context, a clear mandate should be given to DHRM to prepare such a policy. This function would be in addition to its executing functions.

28. With respect to the revised procedural guidelines, the Inspectors wish to caution UNHCR on certain aspects that may need further consideration. The "second tier"<sup>13</sup> alternative allows managers who consider eligible candidates proposed in the DHRM list as "unsuitable" to request a second list of candidates. The misuse of the "second tier" alternative could be interpreted as unfair, giving preferential treatment and could create animosity among staff members. The UNHCR Secretariat acknowledged that it is using this alternative only in very limited exceptional cases.

29. Paragraph 92 of the procedural guidelines stipulates that "in promoting the international character of UNHCR, due regard will be given to *geographical diversity* and the consequent need to avoid concentration of international professional staff of any one nationality or region in any given country operation or Headquarters Division/Department..." Staff composition as at 31 December 2003 indicates, for instance, that for certain operations in Africa, nationals from African countries made up between 55 and 75 per cent of the professional staff, showing in some cases a regional concentration of the professional staff. Also, it appeared that staff serving in the C, D and E categories of duty stations<sup>14</sup>, located especially in Africa, have limited opportunities to be selected for posts located in A, B and H duty stations or other field offices outside the African Bureau. To ascertain that the principles of geographical diversity (distribution) and rotation are translated into practice, UNHCR should report periodically to the Executive Committee (EXCOM) on the status of implementation of paragraphs 92 and 47<sup>15</sup> of the guidelines, as well as exceptions pertaining to paragraph 85. (→ **Recommendation 8**)

<sup>13</sup> UNHCR Procedural Guidelines for APP, November 2003, paragraph 85.

<sup>14</sup> As per hardship classification prepared by the International Civil Service Commission.

<sup>15</sup> "All international professional staff members who have been appointed by the High Commissioner to Standard posts are subject to rotation... Staff members in the International Professional category are expected to serve the larger portion of a normal career in field duty stations".

## V. OVERSIGHT ACTIVITIES

30. In UNHCR, the internal audit function is discharged by the UNHCR Audit Service of OIOS<sup>16</sup>. It reports to the Under-Secretary-General for Internal Oversight Services, and communicates the audit findings to the Deputy High Commissioner, based on a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) signed by the two parties in July 2001. The UN Board of Auditors carries out the external audit of UNHCR activities. Evaluation activities (evaluations and operational reviews, as well as thematic and policy studies of a global nature) are performed by EPAU, which reports directly to the Assistant High Commissioner. IGO conducts inspections, investigations, reviews and inquiry activities and is directly accountable to the High Commissioner. Monitoring activities are undertaken at the programme managers' level and are based on guidance and support provided mainly by PCOS. An internal Oversight Committee<sup>17</sup>, headed by the Deputy High Commissioner, was created to provide the forum for the exchange of information and coordination among the various oversight functions.

### *Need to strengthen the Oversight Committee*

31. In light of the structural separation (or lack of consolidation) of the various internal oversight functions, and the multiplicity of reporting lines, the Inspectors are concerned about the effectiveness of the oversight function, particularly because the Oversight Committee appears to have been functioning unsatisfactorily. Its composition is too wide and its authority is too diffuse, in respect of co-ordination and follow-up of the recommendations pertaining to inspections and evaluations.

32. In two previous JIU reports on oversight, the Unit discussed in detail the advantages of consolidating different internal oversight elements of an organization into a single office<sup>18</sup> but it also recognized that effective functional coordination of separate entities can be achieved through other means such as an oversight committee<sup>19</sup>. In the case of UNHCR, full consolidation cannot be envisaged at least at this stage primarily because the UNHCR budget is funded partly (about 2.6%) by the UN regular budget and partly by voluntary contributions; OIOS has been entrusted with responsibility for the audit function on the basis of the provisions of existing financial regulations and rules (Financial Regulation 5.15 of the United Nations and article 12 of the Financial Rules for Voluntary Funds administered by the High Commissioner for Refugees). Under the circumstances, while maintaining the current structure of internal oversight in UNHCR, it would be essential to strengthen the role of the Oversight Committee, in particular with respect to coordination and follow-up of oversight recommendations, especially those generated by inspections and evaluations which are not consistently acted upon.

33. UNHCR presents to the EXCOM an annual report on its oversight activities. The report is structured on three distinct sections (evaluation and policy analysis, internal audit, inspection and investigation). The document lacks consistency in terms of information provided and format, and does not provide information such as staffing levels and allocated budgets. Future reports should be better coordinated among the oversight entities and include information on the impact of implemented recommendations, lessons learned and best practices, as well as staffing and resources.

<sup>16</sup> Current Memorandum of Understanding was signed in July 2001 (previous Memoranda signed April 1997 and in April 1999 respectively). The MOU highlights the OIOS mandate to perform the internal audit function for UNHCR, in accordance with the Financial Rules for Voluntary Funds administered by the High Commissioner for Refugees.

<sup>17</sup> Its membership includes DHC – Chairperson, AHC – Alternate Chairperson, Controller, Directors of DIP, DCI, DOS and two Bureaux to be nominated on a rotation basis. IG, Chief of the UNHCR Audit Service (OIOS) and Head of EPAU attend the meetings on an ex-officio basis.

<sup>18</sup> JIU/REP/93/5, paragraphs 153-164

<sup>19</sup> JIU/REP/98/2

34. Follow-up mechanisms in place for both inspection and evaluation activities do not support effective monitoring and reporting on the implementation of recommendations. Also, unlike the internal audit recommendations, there is a lack of managers' interest in implementing recommendations originating from evaluations and inspections. While a system is in place for inspections (two parallel databases – active and archive), the follow-up is not consistently performed. The reasons cited are the nature of recommendations, mostly related to the managers' performance, and the absence of a person/function dedicated to the follow-up exercise. With respect to evaluation activities, there is no formal mechanism in place through which the managers are required to implement accepted/approved recommendations. As a result, there is no assurance that valid recommendations are fed back into the planning, programming and budgetary processes. (→**Recommendation 9**)

***Need to enforce the operational independence of the IG***

35. The IOM-FOM/65/2003 describes the role, responsibilities and rules of procedure of the IGO. It states that the IGO discharges its functions without need for prior clearance and hindrance. The IG is directly accountable to the High Commissioner. He/she is appointed for an indefinite period of time, which together with the practice of internal nomination (versus outside appointment) may seriously erode the independence and objectivity of the incumbent and could generate conflicts of interest. This is a major concern, as the independence of the Inspector General is a *sine qua non* for an effective oversight function.

36. With respect to investigations, IOM-FOM/65/2003 (paragraph 5.1.10) stipulates that “allegations of misconduct against senior staff of the Executive Office will be referred to OIOS as appropriate and will not be dealt with directly by the IGO”. It also stipulates under paragraph 5.3.3 that “allegations against members of the Senior Management Committee, Representatives/Chiefs of Missions, or their deputies, will be investigated directly by the IGO, as will any case in which the alleged misconduct could *prima facie* have wide repercussions on the credibility and integrity of the Office”. There appears to be an inconsistency in the provisions above, since according to the UNHCR Manual Chapter 2, some of the members of the Executive Office are also members of the Senior Management Committee. Also, in the “Report on oversight activities”<sup>20</sup> presented to the EXCOM (53<sup>rd</sup> session), UNHCR committed itself to sign a MOU with OIOS, “to clarify and formalize the terms of cooperation in investigations between the two offices”. As the MOU with OIOS was not concluded, the Inspectors consider that the functional relationship between IGO and OIOS with respect to the investigation function should be clarified without delay. (→**Recommendation 10**)

***Eliminate the rotation requirement for the oversight functions***

37. The inspectors, investigators and evaluators are subject to rotation. This is a concern as it may hinder their independence and objectivity. It is highly likely they would eventually assume functions under the supervision of staff that could have been subject to oversight reviews. Moreover, inspection, investigation and evaluation activities require a certain amount of specialized skills and it is not efficient to apply the rotation requirement to staff performing these activities. (→**Recommendation 11**)

---

<sup>20</sup> A/AC.96/966, paragraph 21 (page 13).

## VI. FIELD OPERATIONS

38. To perform its mandate, UNHCR maintains in 120 countries more than 250 offices supervised by five Bureaus under the Department of Operations. The 2004 budget for operations amounts to USD 662,586,000 representing 70 percent of the total approved annual budget. In terms of allocated budget, UNHCR's biggest operations are located in Africa (35 percent), followed by Central Asia, Southwest Asia, North Africa and the Middle East (17 percent), Europe (11 percent), Asia and Pacific (5 percent), the Americas (3 percent).

39. To gain first-hand knowledge of issues related to administration and management at field level, the Inspectors, based on consultation with Headquarters, selected UNHCR Tanzania as a case study for the review, taking into account the fact that Tanzania is a long time host of the largest caseload of refugees in Africa. As of March 2004 the number of persons assisted by UNHCR in Tanzania was approximately 460,000, mainly Burundians and Congolese, some of whom arrived in 1993. This figure does not include close to half a million refugees who came from Burundi in the late sixties and early seventies and had settled in the country.

40. With such a protracted refugee situation, UNHCR is confronted in Tanzania with increasing "asylum fatigue". The continued presence of a large number of refugees in the country has been politicized and the Government is exerting pressure to find a rapid solution for their repatriation to their home countries. Against such a background, the review of UNHCR Tanzania focused on three main areas: management issues, operations and relations with the host country. While the findings are based on the particular field mission concerned, most of the issues covered as well as related conclusions and recommendations have an organization-wide relevance.

### *Management issues*

#### *Structure and staffing of the Field representation*

41. Besides its Representation Office or Branch Office (BO) in Dar es Salaam headed at D1-level, the structure of UNHCR Tanzania includes three sub-offices (SO) located in the Kagera Region (in Ngara) and the Kigoma Region (in Kibondo and Kasulu), and one Field office (FO) in Kigoma. The SOs are headed at P-5 and the FO at P-4. In addition, two antenna offices are maintained in Lugufu and Mwanza, the latter for logistics purposes.

42. Data on refugees' caseload, staffing levels and the approved 2004 administrative budget for UNHCR field offices in general point to a lack of correlation between refugee caseloads and the actual structure and staffing levels of the different offices. A management tool was developed by EPAU aiming to correlate office size with parameters such as refugee caseload, allocated budget and to allow comparisons between offices that are comparable. A parallel exercise was undertaken by the ODMS on office staffing parameters concentrating on staff structure (rather than staff levels). Such tools are important for achieving the harmonization of office size, staffing structure across the operations and they should be refined to further link refugee caseload, and allocated budget with office size and staff structure.

43. In the 2005 COP - submission for Tanzania, the BO proposed to upgrade Kigoma office from FO to SO and downgrade the office in Kasulu to a FO reporting to the new SO in Kigoma. Justifications given for this structural change included the expectation that the point of gravity of the operations will shift from Kasulu to Kigoma as well as the need for UNHCR representation in the Kigoma region to take into account local administrative structures, the central government being represented at the regional level by a Regional Commissioner and at the district level by District Commissioners. In that connection, it should be recalled that there were originally only two sub-offices (Ngara and Kigoma), with two field-offices in Kasulu and Kibondo under the

Kigoma sub-office' supervision. In January 2001 these two field offices were upgraded to the level of sub-office, while the Kigoma sub-office was downgraded to the level of field office.

44. Actual caseloads more than alignment with local administrative structures should be the driving force for structuring UNHCR presence at field level. Subsequently, there is a need for an all-inclusive (Ngara, Kibondo, Kasulu and Kigoma) critical analysis of current size and structure of offices and their staffing level and structure, based on refugees' caseload and type of activities. Since all offices are currently self-contained in terms of protection, assistance and administration, and to avoid duplication of activities, further rationalization should be considered by exploring whether activities such as providing policy direction and ensuring consistency and harmonization of protection and assistance, monitoring, budget preparation and reporting, and administration could be combined for all offices (Ngara, Kibondo, Kasulu and Kigoma) within a single sub-office, while the others would be field offices. (**→Recommendation 12 (a)**)

#### *Vacancy rate*

45. As of 1 January 2004, 10 percent of the posts were vacant, especially for posts related to protection, field assistance and field security. Although basic health and education facilities were lacking and living conditions were generally poor, duty stations in North-western Tanzania were classified as family duty stations, based on the prevailing security phase determined by UNSECOORD. Difficulties normally associated with the mission status give right to the application of the Special Operational Living Allowance Rate (SOLAR). As there is no official recognition of such a status in the case of North-western Tanzania, staff members are understandably reluctant to bring their families, and potential candidates for some vacant posts apply instead for vacancies in other duty stations.

46. Since 1 January 2001, locations declared by UNSECOORD as non-family duty stations are classified as Special Operations Areas (SOAs) and are entitled to the SOLAR. Although the decision to establish a SOA is generally linked to the prevailing security phase (i.e., phases III, IV, V), there are possibilities for exceptions based on the operational requirements of the Office<sup>21</sup>. While such exceptions should be granted sparingly, they should take into account actual living conditions besides the security phase applicable to the concerned duty stations, in order to provide additional incentives to potential candidates having to serve in hardship duty stations. (**→Recommendation 12 (b)**)

#### ***Operations***

##### *Issue of re-registration*

47. The MOU signed between the WFP and UNHCR in July 2002 lays down the division of responsibilities between the parties for planning needs assessment, resource mobilization, food delivery and distribution, fund raising, monitoring, reporting and evaluation and coordination. The MOU requires that the beneficiary numbers and the refugee food security situation be updated at least annually in a joint exercise by UNHCR and WFP, involving other operational partners and donor governments.

48. The latest registration exercise was performed in 2001. WFP officials stressed the need for a comprehensive re-registration, as the accurate identification of beneficiary numbers was essential for assessing needs and, subsequently, for efficient planning and use of resources. Although they shared the concern of WFP and expressed their commitment to the re-registration exercise, UNHCR officials indicated that the Organization was searching for modalities to improve the re-registration process in order to enhance security and minimize movements

---

<sup>21</sup> See IOM/FOM 12/2004

between camps, while preserving the refugees' dignity. A new system using biometrics for re-registration was tested in early 2004, on a small camp (2,000 refugees), but proved to be relatively expensive and time consuming and irrelevant in the case of newborns. Registration exercises are subject to resource availability but they should be considered among top priorities, considering the potential savings that could derive from discounting non-existing refugees. **(→Recommendation 13 (a))**

#### *Level of assistance to refugees*

49. There is a growing concern with respect to the inadequate and still declining level of care and maintenance of refugees. Out of a total budget of USD 27,361,875 approved by EXCOM for Tanzania in 2004, less than 50% was allocated for care and maintenance of refugees, which implies that only USD 0.08<sup>22</sup> on average were assigned daily per refugee. In 2002, a mission sponsored by the United Nations Executive Committee on Humanitarian Affairs (ECHA) reviewed the situation of protracted refugees in Tanzania and their impact on host communities. It acknowledged that, inter alia, "the refugees in Tanzania do not receive as much assistance from the international community as refugee programmes in other parts of the world although every attempt is made, despite limited resources, to achieve international standards". The refugees themselves criticized the level of assistance provided to them, especially the scarcity of non-food items (NFI) such as kitchen sets, blankets, plastic sheets, and sanitary items (upon arrival, refugees are provided with standard packages of NFI).

50. UNHCR officials explained that the structure of expenditures was very much linked to the location of offices and refugee camps, the infrastructure available in Tanzania as well as the cost of logistics. UNHCR also provides assistance to the refugee-affected areas and funds the security package scheme (approximately USD 1million per year) designed to ensure the civilian and humanitarian character of camps and maintain law and order in and outside the camps. In addition, UNHCR provides funding to its national and international implementing partners not only for the implementation of programmes but also for salaries and administrative costs (10 to 20 percent of the total budget for care and maintenance). To avoid duplication of efforts and reduce support costs, an exercise was performed during 2003 to rationalize the number of implementing partners involved in the UNHCR programmes by reducing them from 27 to 17.

51. While the financial constraints faced by the Organization as well as local conditions have a bearing on the level of assistance to refugees, drastic cuts on the allocation of resources to UNHCR Tanzania may have impaired its capacity to provide to refugees the assistance that could be considered as a minimum to preserve the human dignity. Although the number of refugees has not declined proportionately, the operational budget has been reduced by some 38% over the past four years. It is recognized that the funding constraints contributed, inter alia, to a deterioration of the infrastructure in the camps and a reduction in essential services to refugees below internationally prescribed standards such as the so-called SPHERE standards<sup>23</sup>. Staff shortages are said to have led to insufficient or inadequate monitoring in the camps, thus leaving refugees even more prone to criminal activities and to sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV). **(→Recommendation 13 (b))**

#### *Coordination and Partnerships*

52. UNHCR is working closely with the Government of Tanzania, implementing partners and other UN agencies, especially WFP and UNICEF. All stakeholders appear to be satisfied

---

<sup>22</sup> This amount does not include food, which is separately provided by WFP, based on the MOU concluded with UNHCR

<sup>23</sup> Minimum standards collaboratively established by humanitarian organizations for disaster (either provoked by calamity or conflict) assistance covering sectors such as water, sanitation, nutrition, food, shelter and health care. They are based on the principle that populations affected by disaster have the right to live with dignity.

with the degree and quality of cooperation and partnership. At field level this is achieved, inter alia, through joint needs assessments and gaps analysis, joint plans for activities to be implemented and joint assessment missions.

53. The 2002-2006 UNDAF/CCF approved for Tanzania did not integrate the humanitarian component of the UN intervention in Tanzania. In 2003, following the recommendations made by the ECHA mission mentioned in paragraph 49, the United Nations agencies jointly developed a new Strategic Framework for Humanitarian and Development Assistance for North-western Tanzania for the period 2004-2006 which sought to complement the UNDAF/CCF by integrating humanitarian assistance with long-term sustainable development programming and to provide international minimal standards of assistance to the communities hosting refugees.

54. As a result of the UNHCR 2004 process initiated by the High Commissioner, the General Assembly approved resolution 58/153 of 22 December 2003, whereby it invited the UNDG “to include, through the resident coordinator system and in full consultation with the Government concerned, consideration of the needs of refugees and, as applicable, other persons of concern to the Office of the High Commissioner in the common country assessment process and the subsequent formulation and implementation of their development programmes”<sup>24</sup>. As appropriate, programme goals and objectives included in the COPs should establish clear linkages with the related UNDAF/CCF exercises for the concerned refugee host countries.

**(→Recommendation 14).**

### ***Relations with the host country***

#### *Addressing “asylum fatigue”*

55. As recognized in the ECHA review referred to in paragraph 49, “Tanzania has generously provided asylum to significant numbers of refugees from a succession of countries, and has done so in conditions that ensured the harmonious coexistence of refugees and the local population.” However, there are clear signs of “asylum fatigue” and concerns have been aired in the past few years by high officials of the Government of Tanzania including by the Head of State about the considerable burden placed on the host country and local communities by the continued presence of refugees and related issues of regional security and inter-state relations within the Great Lakes region.

56. Similar concerns were also conveyed to the JIU by officials of the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) who commended the collaboration with UNHCR but were of the view that more could be done to address issues such as assistance provided to host communities, rehabilitation of the environment and improving security in the refugees-affected areas.

57. UNHCR, UNICEF and WFP officials explained that significant progress has been made to assist host communities, especially through the provision of education material, vaccines and free access to health facilities. They pointed out that Tanzania received an important amount of bilateral assistance estimated at some 3,148 million euros for the period 2001-2003<sup>25</sup>, and that some of the development assistance is complementary to humanitarian assistance, particularly in sectors such as health, water and sanitation. However, they also estimated that there was still a need for enhanced information and advocacy on assistance and remedial activities undertaken by UN agencies, bilateral donors and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) in the refugee-affected areas. **(→Recommendation 15 (a))**

<sup>24</sup> General Assembly resolution A/RES/58/153, para.4

<sup>25</sup> Tanzania 2004 CAP

*Focus on durable solutions and burden sharing*

58. In his report to the 58<sup>th</sup> session of the General Assembly<sup>26</sup>, the High Commissioner noted that “the majority of countries hosting large refugee populations today are developing countries”<sup>27</sup>. The search for durable solutions entails not only efforts to ensure that refugees are included in the development agenda but a commitment by the international community for better burden sharing.

59. Improved resettlement opportunities are part of the quest for durable solutions, taking into account the contribution that refugees can make to the economies of resettlement countries. Although statistics point to developed countries being the prime destination for resettlement programmes, possibilities offered in developing countries need to be further investigated. Information provided during the JIU field mission in Kibondo indicated that Benin and Burkina Faso offered such opportunities to refugees from 1997 and 2003 in favor of refugees originating mostly from Rwanda, Burundi and Democratic Republic of Congo. However, these two programmes were put on hold for several reasons that were the subject of an exhaustive evaluation published by EPAU in April 2004<sup>28</sup>. According to that evaluation, resettlement programmes to developing countries should only be introduced if some conditions can be met. Immediate and long-term actions were proposed and deserve serious consideration by all concerned. (→**Recommendation 15 (b)**)

---

<sup>26</sup> A/58/410. “Strengthening the capacity of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees to carry out its mandate”

<sup>27</sup> Ibid, para. 31.

<sup>28</sup> EPAU/2004/04-Rev.1. Refugee resettlement in developing countries The experience of Benin and Burkina Faso, 1997-2003