UNITED NATIONS SYSTEM
COMMON SERVICES AT GENEVA

Part I : Overview of Administrative Cooperation and Coordination

Prepared by

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Joint Inspection Unit
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<table>
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<th>Acronym</th>
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<td>ACABQ</td>
<td>Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions</td>
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<td>CCAQ</td>
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<td>CERN</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICRC</td>
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<td>ILO</td>
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<td>International League of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies</td>
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<td>Joint Purchase Service</td>
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<td>UNRISD</td>
<td>United Nations Research Institute for Social Development</td>
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<td>World Intellectual Property Organization</td>
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Geneva is currently the largest United Nations system duty station in the world in terms of staff and expenditures. It also happens to be the most expensive of the eight major United Nations system locations with over 1000 staff. It is therefore the duty station where it would be most desirable for the Member States to encourage and support efficiency reforms and enhanced inter-secretariat collaboration in the quest for more cost-effective methods and vehicles for delivering programmes.

However, notwithstanding their close physical proximity to each other and several institutional commonalities embedded in the United Nations common system framework, the Geneva-based secretariats operate very few services in common. No services are shared by the five specialized agencies located in the city and parallel support services exist among United Nations entities governed by the same Charter.

The overall picture is one of considerable fragmentation and duplication of overhead structures and costs. This state of affairs appears aggravated by the absence of an intergovernmental consultative or review body to provide strategic direction to all Geneva-based secretariats and entities on administrative and budgetary questions. Additionally, the lack of effective and cohesive institutional leadership of UNOG common services has weakened UNOG's central role at Geneva and deprived it of visibility and identity, leading to its current performance problems.

In the light of the above the Inspectors recommend the following:

**Recommendation 1: New framework for United Nations system common services at Geneva**

In order to give full effect at the Geneva duty station to common service provisions in the Relationship Agreements between the United Nations and the specialized agencies, the General Assembly and the competent organs of the specialized agencies located at Geneva may wish to endorse the new framework proposed in this report for Geneva common services, and require the secretariats concerned to report biennially on its implementation in the context of their draft programme budget submissions (paragraphs 80 - 95).

**Recommendation 2: Revitalization of UNOG common services**

In pursuance of recommendation 1 above, the Secretary-General should consider refining and implementing as appropriate the revitalization measures recommended in this report for UNOG common services, including the establishment of a UNOG common services committee chaired by the Director-General of UNOG as well as the possible appointment, at an appropriate time, of a high-level official to foster broad common services objectives and arrangements at the Geneva duty station (paragraphs 45 - 78).

**Recommendation 3: Intergovernmental oversight of common services at Geneva**

The General Assembly may wish to consider the most effective arrangements for strengthening regular and coherent oversight of Geneva common services, including a more active role by the Geneva Diplomatic Committee as well as more periodic meetings of ACABQ at Geneva focused specifically on issues of administrative and budgetary coordination amongst the Geneva-based secretariats and entities (paragraphs 24 - 26; 47 - 48).
I. INTRODUCTION

1. The JIU review of common services operated by United Nations system organizations located at Geneva follows upon two previous reports by the Unit on the same subject, namely "United Nations system common premises and services in the field" (JIU/REP/94/8), and "Common services at United Nations Headquarters" (JIU/REP/96/5). In this report series, the Inspectors pursue the same objective in each case: to provide a coherent framework for increased administrative management synergies among co-located organizations so as to enable them to rationalise their overhead structures and costs and to concentrate diminishing resources on their constitutional mandates which form their raison d'être.

2. The report series also shares the same legislative framework embodied in the Relationship Agreements between the United Nations and the specialized agencies. The standard article in these Agreements relating to "administrative and technical services" stipulates inter alia that the United Nations and the specialized agencies "recognize the desirability, in the interest of administrative and technical uniformity and the most efficient use of personnel and resources, of avoiding, whenever possible, the establishment and operation of competitive or overlapping facilities and services". In the same Article, the United Nations and each specialized agency further "agree to consult together concerning the establishment and use of common administrative and technical services and facilities, insofar as the establishment and use of such services may, from time to time, be found practicable and appropriate".

3. Some fifty years after they were adopted by the Member States, the above provisions of the Relationship Agreements are still to be given operational expression by the Geneva-based secretariats. The few services shared by all the secretariats, such as the International Computing Centre (ICC), the Joint Medical Service (JMS), Pouch or Training, form the exception rather than the rule. Neither framework nor stimulus has existed until now for administrative and budgetary coordination at the Geneva duty station, not even among United Nations departments and affiliated bodies governed by the same Charter and supreme legislative body, and falling under the authority of the Secretary-General.

4. Long deprived of leadership and constituency within the United Nations, ACC or the governing bodies of the system for that matter, common services are, at long last, being recognized increasingly as a primary instrument for building a coherent, cost-effective and streamlined United Nations system. In this connection, the Secretary-General of the United Nations should be applauded for having identified, as one of his reform priorities, the consolidation of common services and facilities within the Organization at all levels and duty stations. As stated in his report entitled "Renewing the United Nations: A Programme for Reform", the future success of the United Nations "hinges on its ability to achieve a unity of purpose among its diverse departments, funds and programmes, enabling it to act coherently and deploy its resources strategically. In addition, alliances and partnerships with the specialized agencies and other organizations must become part of normal organizational routine" (A/51/950 of 14 July 1997, paragraph 18). In the same report, the Secretary-General also proposes to reduce significantly the administrative costs of the Organization (paragraph 57). In pursuit of this objective, the Secretary-General has appointed at Headquarters an Executive Coordinator for common services who has prepared a "Common Services Strategy Paper" reproduced in Annex 3 to this report.

5. Thus, the Secretary-General's vision and measures to achieve a more integrated and lean Organization, and the high profile he has given to the strengthening of common services as a means to that end, provide the clearest signal to date that common services will finally acquire an identity of their own and become an important component of the current United Nations reform process. That will be a major precondition for achieving efficient common services within the United Nations system at Geneva.

6. The expanding application by the Geneva-based secretariats of technological innovations to administrative and managerial processes presents very significant opportunities for the development of common administrative management tools and approaches that could mobilize synergies in the use of this important cost item, reduce the present excessive fragmentation of technological innovation efforts at Geneva and result in substantial economies. The findings of this report suggest that the integration of
management information systems and technologies could become the backbone of a new framework of Geneva common services.

7. While the executive heads have a primary leadership role to play in achieving cost-effective and user-friendly common services, the success of their endeavours is likely to remain as elusive as in the past fifty years without the strong and uniform support of the governing bodies of the organizations concerned. The considerable duplication of support services and management information systems at Geneva seems to reflect, to a large extent, the polycentric governance structure of the organizations.

8. Not only do the specialized agencies have their respective governing bodies as required by their constitutions, but so also do most United Nations entities. Unlike New York, for example, Geneva lacks a single governance, consultative or review mechanism covering all the organizations and entities located there, providing strategic direction to all of them on administrative and budgetary questions and fostering coordinated and standard approaches to the quest for enhanced efficiencies and economies. As such, hardly any opportunities exist at Geneva for a comparative scrutiny of the organizations’ administrative management budgets and restructuring processes. The Geneva duty station is therefore still to benefit more fully from the exercise by the General Assembly and ACABQ of their oversight responsibilities for administrative and budgetary coordination within the common system.

9. The above issues are reviewed in some detail in the following chapters with the help of graphic illustrations. Chapter II describes the setting for common services, reviews expenditure and staffing patterns and highlights some possible constraints as well as commonalities among the secretariats. Chapter III analyses the pattern of administrative cooperation and coordination and reviews the centrality of UNOG common services in the development of new administrative cooperation arrangements. Chapter IV proposes a new framework for cooperative approaches in the management and delivery of support services.

10. Part II of this report comprises a more detailed analysis of selected common services that offer some lessons and benchmarks for emulation in the design and management of cost-effective and competitive support services shared by some or all the Geneva-based secretariats.

11. The data and other base-line information used for the report were obtained not without some difficulty and considerable delays on the part of the secretariats concerned. In some cases, the information supplied was either incomplete or not easily amenable to inter-organization comparisons. Programme budget documents and other sources have been used as far as possible to corroborate or complete some of the data received in order to ensure that the analysis of expenditure and staffing patterns and ratios is as valid as possible. The Inspectors thank all those who extended their full cooperation in the conduct of this review. Except where otherwise stated, all the data used in the report were collected from the Geneva-based organizations through a JIU questionnaire.
II. THE SETTING

A. Duty station

12. Geneva has been the seat of international institutions and multilateral diplomacy for well over a hundred years. For example, ITU which is located in the city was established in the last century. Geneva also hosted the Headquarters of the League of Nations from 1919 to 1939, and the ILO Headquarters was also established there in 1919. Since 1945 the city has been a major centre of United Nations operations, and for many years it has remained the premier United Nations system duty station in terms of staff and expenditure levels (Figure 1, page 4). Geneva-based organizations and entities employed in the 1994-1995 biennium over 18,000 staff world-wide, of which more than 8,000 at their Geneva headquarters, and expended over US$ 6 billion.

13. The centrality of the city for the United Nations system is further reflected in the fact that five specialized agencies (ILO, ITU, WHO, WIPO and WMO) as well as several United Nations entities (e.g. UNHCR, UNCTAD, ECE, OHCHR, etc.) are headquartered there. The Palais des Nations at Geneva hosts about 300 international conferences and 7,000 meetings annually, almost double the number held at New York Headquarters. About 140 Permanent Missions and nearly as many intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations are located in the city, most of them with world-wide focus. Examples include WTO, CERN, IOM, ICRC, ILRC, IPU, WCC, etc, which raise the strength of the Geneva international community to over 20,000.

14. The largest United Nations system location, Geneva also happens to rank as the most expensive of the eight major duty stations of the system with over 1000 staff (Figure 2, page 4). Because staff posts represent by far the most important object of expenditure for all the organizations of the system, the implication is that Geneva is where the Member States should more actively encourage efficiency reforms and cost-savings and where enhanced inter-secretariat cooperation would be most desirable to achieve more cost-effective operations and economies of scale. The case for such cooperation is reinforced by the organizations’ expenditure and staffing trends examined below.

B. Expenditure and staffing trends

15. Annexes 1 and 2 present expenditure and staffing data for Geneva-based secretariats and entities for the biennia 1984-1985 and 1994-1995. Aggregate expenditures increased in nominal terms during the ten-year period from US$2.6 to US$ 6 billion (130 per cent) while total staff rose from 14,624 to 17,845 (22 per cent). However, as shown in annex 2, UNHCR and WHO between them accounted for 67 per cent and 53 per cent of the total expenditures and staff respectively in the 1994-1995 biennium.

16. For the United Nations entities (excluding the five specialized agencies), expenditures rose from US$1.3 billion to US$ 3.5 billion (160.9 per cent) and staff from 4,954 to 8,714 (75.9 per cent) during the decade under review. Excluding UNHCR data, however, expenditures for United Nations entities increased nominally by 137.8 per cent and the staff by 12.6 per cent. It may be observed that UNOG, which is the central common service provider for most United Nations entities at Geneva, experienced an overall staff reduction of 14 per cent (Figure 3c, page 5).

17. While in the 1984-1985 biennium United Nations entities accounted for 49 per cent and 34 per cent of the total expenditure and staff respectively, their share increased in 1994-1995 to 57 per cent of expenditures and 49 per cent of the staff. For the specialized agencies expenditures increased nominally by just over 100 per cent while staff declined overall by 5.6 per cent. Only WIPO registered a sharp increase of 84.4 per cent in its staffing level.

18. Aggregate expenditures by the Geneva-based secretariats and entities for support (administrative management) services, the area par excellence for common service endeavours, more than doubled in absolute terms from $429 million in 1984-1985 to $874 million in 1994-1995, while staff providing these
services increased by 4.3 per cent from 4,456 to 4,656 during the same period. These data, however, relate only to administrative management services operated at Geneva, exclusive of support services provided by some of the organizations (especially UNHCR, WHO and ILO) at their field duty stations, as well as expenditures for outsourcing to the private sector.

Figure 1: Ranking of major UN system duty stations by number of staff (1985 and 1995)


1985 1995

G-4/8 P-4/8
19. On aggregate, the ratio of support services expenditure and staff to total expenditures and staff of the organizations shows a declining trend during the period considered: from 16.5 per cent to 14.4 per cent for expenditures and 30.5 per cent to 26.1 per cent for staffing tables. However, much of that decline appears to be accounted for mainly by the resource shortfalls registered by support services for United Nations entities whose expenditure ratio dropped from 15.8 per cent: to 11.5 per cent and staffing ratio from 35.5 per cent to 19.1 per cent. UNOG’s share of the expenditures of United Nations entities to which it provides services dropped from 13 per cent to 8.9 per cent and staff from 30 per cent to 14.9 per cent.

20. The picture for the specialized agencies, illustrated by Figure 4 (page 6), shows that support services staff in ILO and WIPO increased somewhat moderately in proportion to their overall staff increases, and dropped in WMO in close parallel to its overall staffing trends during the ten-year period under review. For ITU and WHO, support services resources increased in inverse proportion to their overall declining staff strengths. Moreover, the proportion of administration and management resources to total resources appears much higher (~ by over 10 percentage points) in the specialized agencies taken together than for the United Nations entities during the 1994-1995 biennium (Figure 5 page 7).

21. The explanation for this apparent discrepancy between the United Nations entities and the specialized agencies may lie in the considerable cost-reduction pressures experienced by the United Nations Secretariat as a whole in the past decade as much as in the central provision of services by UNOG, however imperfectly, to the quasi-totality of United Nations entities located at Geneva, notwithstanding the operation by some of these entities (e.g. UNHCR, UNCTAD or ITC) of duplicative support services. The existence of UNOG as a central common service facility for United Nations entities has probably served to restrain, to some extent, the growth in support services expenditures for those entities in the past decade.

22. That conclusion seems confirmed by Figure 6, page 7 which shows that because ECE is serviced mainly by UNOG, its support costs (including some of its UNOG-apportioned costs) are significantly lower than they would have been in comparison with other United Nations Economic Commissions which operate their own services. The comparison can be extended as well to other Geneva-based secretariats with self-contained support services (Figure 7, page 7). However, there are a number of constraints likely to affect the development of common administrative management services at Geneva, as discussed in the following section.
Figure 4. STAFFING TRENDS OF SPECIALIZED AGENCIES AT GENEVA 1984/85 -1994/95

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<th>TOTAL STAFF</th>
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</table>
C. Possible constraint

1. Governance and accountability

23. The fragmentation of support services generally mirrors the plurality of independent governing bodies at Geneva and the Secretariats' autonomous lines of accountability to their respective competent organs. This is so for the specialized agencies which are constitutionally autonomous, but also for the United Nations entities such as UNHCR, UNCTAD, ITC, ECE, OHCHR, UNITAR and UNRISD. Unlike these entities, UNOG does not have its own governing body other than the General Assembly, which meets in New York. Some of the supervisory bodies have budget review and approval authority (ITC, UNHCR, UNITAR and UNRISD) while the others do not. Ultimately, all the subsidiary bodies report to the General Assembly through ECOSOC. Further, the Secretary-General, as the executive head of all the entities, has the authority to further develop and perfect common services for all Geneva-based entities. But that authority is shared with the governing bodies responsible for reviewing and approving the budgets of those entities and for ensuring administrative and budgetary coherence among them. This is hardly done at present.

Figure 5. Percentage of programme support staff to total staff: UN entities and specialized agencies in Geneva

Figure 6 Percentage of programme support to total programme budget of the Regional Commission in 1996/1997

Gráfico 7. Porcentaje del personal de apoyo a los programas respecto del personal total de los organismos especializados con sede en Ginebra y la CEPE
24. The picture differs for the specialized agencies. They have distinct legislative organs and executive management structures which are legally not accountable to the United Nations General Assembly, except with respect to common system issues stipulated in the United Nations Charter and the Relationship Agreements. Under Articles 57-58 and 63 of the Charter, ECOSOC, which meets periodically at Geneva, is vested with system-wide coordination powers. However, it is not quite clear whether ECOSCC's remit does also cover administrative and budgetary coordination of the common system. That responsibility would seem to devolve to the General Assembly assisted by ACABQ at intergovernmental level and to ACC/CCAQ at intersecretariat level.

25. Common administrative services are one element of the common system, just like common personnel standards and salary scales constitute one other element. But while the International Civil Service Commission exists to ensure that common personnel standards are consistently applied within the system, there is no similar intergovernmental mechanism for common services. Probably as a result of this benign neglect, common services have not only suffered an identity crisis over the years but their very concept has tended to be discredited within the system.

26. Although ACABQ and the Geneva Diplomatic Committee periodically review administrative and budgetary issues of Geneva-based organizations, the findings of this report suggest the need for more comprehensive and systematic intergovernmental oversight that provides strategic direction to the secretariats at Geneva on administrative and budgetary questions, including internal restructuring processes, and fosters coordinated and standard approaches in the search for greater efficiencies and economies. The situation is complicated by the fact that the governing bodies meet at different times of the calendar year and hardly any consultative contacts appear to exist amongst them for purposes of policy coordination in their governance of the Secretariats.

2. Historical background

27. The organizations were established in different years (see Table 1) and circumstances. Each has developed an historical identity and management autonomy and culture. Self-contained administrative management structures and mores in existence for over fifty years will surely resist the deep reforms Table 1.

Table 1. Establishment of some Geneva-based organizations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organizations</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Organizations</th>
<th>Year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ITU</td>
<td>1865</td>
<td>WMO</td>
<td>1950</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ILO</td>
<td>1919</td>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>1951</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNOG</td>
<td>1939/1945</td>
<td>UNCTAD</td>
<td>1964</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECE</td>
<td>1947</td>
<td>WIPO*</td>
<td>1970</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WHO</td>
<td>1948</td>
<td>UNAIDS</td>
<td>1996</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Some of the "Unions" administered by WIPO date back to the last Century: the Paris Union (1883) and the Berne Union (1886).

Establishment of some Geneva-based organizations that might be necessitated by the building of inter-secretariat common services as envisaged in this report, especially if there are implications for job security and authority status. Administration and management departments have grown over the years to such a high level of staffing, grades and authority that they now tend to overshadow constitutional programmes which justified the creation of the agencies in the first place. This trend may explain why some of these departments are gaining in staff strength to the detriment of substantive departments (Figure 4, page 6). The central question, therefore, is where the secretariats should concentrate their diminishing resources: on excessive self-administration or on the pursuit of their constitutional mandates?
28. The five specialized agencies in particular have not managed to develop all these years any real
tradition of cooperation among them, beyond ad hoc informal consultations among service managers.
Despite their very close proximity to one another, they have nothing similar to UNOG, the central service
provider for United Nations entities. Further, the smaller agencies (ITU, WIPO and WMO) are wary of any
cooperative arrangements which could erode their identity or in which their needs and priorities would be
swayed by those of the larger agencies.

3. Mandates and scales of operation

29. The mandates of the organizations and entities are nearly as different as their scales of operation.
Among United Nations entities, UNHCR, OHCHR and OCHA have a number of common attributes in the
area of humanitarian affairs and human rights protection. But UNHCR is more field-oriented and
decentralized than any other Geneva-based entity. It currently accounts for 60 per cent of the total staff of
United Nations entities at Geneva, down from 68 per cent in 1985. UNHCR's very large scale of operation,
its extensive decentralization to the field and the emergency character of its work, have been presented as
justification for its progressive delinking from the UNOG common service pool.

30. ECE, UNCTAD and ITC also have some substantive similarities. ECE is serviced essentially by
UNOG, but UNCTAD and ITC operate some in-house support services. Although UNCTAD is one of the two
parent bodies and also the administering authority for ITC, the two nonetheless maintain separate
administrative services, including the separate administration of their technical cooperation programmes,
even though UNCTAD provides services in this area to other Geneva-based entities, such as ECE, OHCHR
and UNRISD. This latter entity has however expressed to the Inspectors its preference to be serviced
entirely by UNOG in order especially to avoid being billed separately by UNOG and UNCTAD as at present.

31. The mandates and governance structure of the specialized agencies also differ markedly. The
secretariats of ITU, WIPO and WMO have relatively similar types of operation and are highly centralized. ITU
and WIPO in particular share a number of important attributes. Their secretariats function in fact as common
services to their sectoral legislative or regulatory bodies. They are also strongly oriented towards the private
sector. Over 400 private corporations are members of ITU and contribute upwards of 10 per cent of its
budget while up to 80 per cent of WIPO's budget is financed from the private sector through patent
registration fees. Both agencies also manage major income-earning publication programmes, including
electronic publishing. Thus significant administrative synergies would seem entirely feasible between the two
agencies which, moreover, are physically very close to each other. If realized, such synergies could cover
and benefit WMO as well.

32. The mandates of ILO and WHO are dissimilar except in occupational health, and their governing
mechanisms quite unique within the system (ILO's tripartite structure and WHO's Regional Committees).
Both are decentralized, relatively in the case of ILO with about 30 per cent of its staff outposted to the field,
and extensively in the case of WHO with 60 per cent of its staff working in its regional and country offices.
WHO alone accounts for close to 50 per cent of the combined staff of the five agencies. In terms of size and
breadth of operations, UNHCR, WHO and ILO are relatively close, but in terms of the feasibility of pooling
administrative resources into common service projects, ILO and WHO whose Headquarters are barely 50
metres apart, would be likely mates by virtue especially of their 1948 Agreement which provides for joint
ILO/WHO inter-secretariat committees

4. Sources of funds

33. While executive heads have broad authority for the management of the regular budgets, the same
does not always hold true for extrabudgetary resources and earmarked funds. The donors of these funds
generally seek to exercise control over their use either by creating additional supervisory bodies, as in WHO,
or separate accountability procedures often requiring dedicated staff to administer, as exemplified by the
extrabudgetary and trust funds managed by some United Nations entities, especially UNCTAD, ITC and
UNEP's office at Geneva.
34. For example, the different conventions under UNEP’s aegis are administered by separate administrative units with blurred lines of accountability to executive management. Such separate and parallel approaches not only weaken central authority for consistent application of financial and administrative rules but also check cost-effective administration of resources. Inter-secretariat common services may prove difficult to achieve if integrated administrative and accountability structures covering all sources of funds are not achievable in individual secretariats.

D. Commonalities

1. Common membership

35. The foregoing constraints notwithstanding, Geneva-based secretariats and entities do share a number of common attributes, besides the Relationship Agreements, which could be used to strengthen cooperation in the management of support services. One such element is their legal status of international public organizations with near-universal membership and responsibilities. The organizations exist to promote cooperation and coordination amongst their members for the solution of common problems and advancement of common goals. The secretariats could apply that lofty goal to themselves also by reinforcing inter-secretariat cooperation and coordination in the conduct of mandates and delivery of programmes.

2. Common system

36. Not only do the secretariats share legal compatibilities, they also belong to a single international civil service based on a common system of salaries, allowances and conditions of service. They share the same basic framework of administrative and financial regulations and rules despite some variations, as well as common accounting standards. The ACC mechanism, especially CCAQ and ISCC, also could be used to greater effect to advance common service projects.

3. Co-location

37. Co-location is an important factor for some common services to be practicable. At the Geneva duty station the secretariats are all in very close physical proximity, which implies that the pooling of support services is a practical proposition if the will to do so exists in the governing bodies and secretariats.

4. Similar administrative management systems

38. Similar administrative management systems are probably the most important single denominator shared by the secretariats. Not only does a department of administration and management or its equivalent exist in each secretariat but the departments are also more or less similarly structured by major function, such as personnel recruitment and administration (or human resources management); budget and finance; procurement, management information system and technology; conference services; general services; etc. These basic structural similarities should facilitate achievement of inter-secretariat synergies in the performance of support functions.

5. Common reform goal

39. Many Geneva-based secretariats are currently undergoing internal reforms aimed at achieving more efficient managerial systems and processes as well as cost-savings. Although the reforms affect substantive programmes in some cases (e.g., United Nations entities, ITU or WHO), they are mostly focused on administrative management and information systems where, as shown in the following paragraph, opportunities exist for integrated efforts by the secretariats in order to release substantial resources for the benefit of their constitutional programmes and functions, which form their raison d’être.

6. Technological innovations

40. Technological innovations represent a core element of the above-mentioned reform initiatives. The secretariats have invested heavily in the past five years or so in the modernization of information systems and technologies which are transforming age-old methods and procedures of work. As currently applied to
financial and personnel management functions and electronic publishing in some secretariats for example, technological standardization and integration of the secretariats could easily form the backbone of common services of the future at Geneva, with immense benefits in efficiency gains as well as cost and staff savings, provided of course that the emerging opportunities are not missed by the governing bodies and secretariats.

7. Common services

41. Common services such as the International Computing Centre, Pouch and Mail, Language and Management Training, or Joint Medical Service, which are currently shared more or less successfully by all Geneva-based secretariats provide paradigms and benchmarks that could be used to develop new and efficient cooperative arrangements.
III. ADMINISTRATIVE COOPERATION AND COORDINATION

A. Pattern

42. Administrative cooperation within the Geneva international community can be illustrated with four concentric circles (Figure 8). The inner circle comprises UNOG and other United Nations secretariat entities funded mainly from the regular budget and whose support services are mostly integrated within UNOG. The second encompasses United Nations affiliated bodies and other entities funded essentially from extrabudgetary sources and which depend partly and unevenly on UNOG support services. The third circle represents the five specialized agencies whose administrative links amongst themselves and with UNOG are quite limited, save for a few common services. The fourth circle includes non-United Nations system entities, such as Permanent Missions, intergovernmental organizations and some major non-governmental organizations which participate in some common services. It can be observed that administrative cooperation and coordination decreases from the inner circle (UNOG centre of gravity) towards the outer circles.

Figure 8. CIRCLES OF ADMINISTRATIVE COOPERATION AND COORDINATION

SLIDING SCALE
1. Full integration of support services within UNOG (UNCTAD only partly integrated)
2. Partial integration with UNOG but UNHCR and ITC virtually self-contained
3. No integration with UNOG; few common services with UNOG
4. Participate in some services (e.g. conference services, language training, ICC, JMS, etc.).

43. Table 2, page 13, further exhibits this pattern of cooperation while the inter-secretariat and geographical scope of existing common services is illustrated in Table 3, page 14. The two tables confirm the limited range of support services covering all the Geneva-based secretariats, namely UNIS, some UNOG recruitment functions, language training, pouch, UN Laissez-Passer, ICC and JMS. The latter two services are administered by WHO. UNOG and WHO between them manage or host all Geneva-based common services. UNCTAD also provides a common service facility to some United Nations entities in the administration of project personnel. There are no services common to the five specialized agencies.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A. COMMON SERVICES COVERAGE</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 1. All Geneva-based UN system organizations and some non-UN entities in Geneva | Pouch  
Training  
Library  
UNIS  
ICC  
JMS  
ESS (data/voice networks) |
| 2. Specific to all Geneva-based UN system organizations | Laissez-passer (except ILO) |
| 3. Specific to UN entities | Security and safety *  
Conference services *  
Publishing  
Printing  
Travel |
| 4. UN entities + some specialized agencies | Staff insurance  
JPS Board  
Visa (including WMO)  
ITU/Telecom |
| 5. Specific to all specialized agencies | None |
| 6. Specific to some specialized agencies | Staff insurance (ILO/ITU) |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>B. COOPERATION AMONG SERVICE MANAGERS AND/OR USERS</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 1. Periodic formal meetings | Joint Purchase Service  
CCAQ Training Sub-Group |
| 2. Periodic informal meetings | CCAQ Training Sub-Group (Geneva)  
ICC, ISCC, ITAC, TIC (Geneva) |
| 3. Ad hoc consultations or exchange of information | Technologists  
Legal Counsel  
Staff Counsel  
Financial Managers, etc. |
| 4. Services outsourced jointly to private sector | Unknown |

* Plus ILO, WHO during annual general conferences held in Palais des Nations
### Table 3. SCOPE OF EXISTING COMMON SERVICES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COMMON SERVICE</th>
<th>UNITED NATIONS SECRETARIAT ENTITIES</th>
<th>INCLUDES UN AFFILIATED BODIES</th>
<th>COVERS ALL GENEVA-BASED UN SYSTEM</th>
<th>INCLUDES NON-UN SYSTEM ENTITIES IN GENEVA</th>
<th>INCLUDES ORGANIZATIONS/ DUTY STATIONS OUTSIDE GENEVA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Recruitment</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Staff administration</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Press, NGOs, Perm. Missions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Budget</td>
<td>Except ECE</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accounts</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Payments</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Payroll</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Treasury</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Staff insurance</td>
<td></td>
<td>WMO, BIE</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security and safety</td>
<td>UNHCR, UNDP, UNICEF, ITC</td>
<td>ILO, WHO Conference</td>
<td>Palais services (no charge)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Procurement</td>
<td>For supplies only</td>
<td>Tenders through JPS *</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Travel</td>
<td>UNHCR only **</td>
<td>IMO, FAO, UNESCO</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laissez-Passer</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Visa</td>
<td></td>
<td>WMO</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conference</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNIS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Publishing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Printing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pouch</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Electronic services</td>
<td></td>
<td>MEC</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**SERVICIOS NO PRESTADOS POR LA ONUG**

| JMS            | UNV Bonn | ICC |


** For insurance of travel documents only (i.e., Laissez-Passers, UN Certificates)
44. All common services at Geneva, including UNOG, represented in the 1994-1995 biennium 39.2 per cent of the expenditures and 28.6 per cent of the staff of the secretariats’ programme support resources. The services common to all the secretariats represented a mere 4.5 per cent and 1.9 per cent of their combined support services expenditures and staff respectively. As a result of this limited scope and depth of cooperative arrangements among the secretariats for the rational management of their overhead resources, there is a general pattern of fragmented administrative structures within the three circles described above. For example, there are 10 different personnel services (of which five for United Nations entities alone), and almost as many finance, procurement, electronic data processing, conference, publishing and printing services, which point to the very long way ahead in the building of administrative cooperation at Geneva. This challenge is further discussed in the following paragraphs at two levels: UNOG common services and non-UNOG services.

B. UNOG Common services

45. UNOG common services consist mainly of the Division of Conference Services (translation, interpretation, meetings, documentation, publication, printing, library, etc), the Division of Administration (Personnel Service, Financial Resources Management and Electronic Service, General Services), and United Nations Information Service (UNIS). The Office of the Director-General of UNOG also performs some common service functions such as diplomatic and protocol functions or legal counsel for all United Nations entities and some agencies. The users of Conference Services are predominantly institutional. OHCHR, UNCTAD and ECE account for over 50 per cent, in some cases over 70 per cent (e.g., translation and distribution) of the work load of the Conference Services Division. Most of the services of the Division of Administration are provided principally to staff members while UNIS’ services are directed essentially to the public and more particularly to journalists and permanent missions.

46. UNOG is theoretically the centre of gravity for common services at Geneva but the reality is otherwise. In the course of gathering findings for this report, the Inspectors were informed of the general dissatisfaction of individual and institutional users of UNOG common services. This is not to say that the services do not function as such since most of the complaints were not about issues of service value but about long delays in service delivery and lack of accountability and transparency, especially in costing and billing methods, or in the use of common services income (see Table 4, page 17). The problems are somewhat complex and could be summarized as follows:

1. Intergovernmental orphan

47. UNOG lacks an intergovernmental oversight or advocacy body similar to those that monitor the performance and project the image of other United Nations entities at Geneva. No specific mechanisms exist to oversee the efficient operation of services or drive the performance of service managers. More generally, common services within the United Nations system have not always received the consistent attention and support that could have been expected from the governing bodies, except in some duty stations such as Vienna or field locations. Some Member States tend to adopt different positions in different governing bodies. Common services within the United Nations system need an articulate and consistent intergovernmental policy expression.

48. Another reason may be the lack of adequate and uniform enforcement of the Relationship Agreements mentioned in the Introduction, even though common services with a long record of stability and success, such as the Pension Fund or United Nations Laissez-Passer, are the ones expressly mentioned in those Agreements. In other words, the actual and potential value of UNOG as a common service facility at Geneva is still to be fully recognized by the General Assembly and Secretary-General.
2. Regional office operation

49. UNOG is one of several regional (European) offices of the United Nations and is treated almost provincially as such by Headquarters, in spite of the fact that most of the major entities and secretariats using its services are all headquartered at Geneva and have global operations. That makes Geneva an eminently global centre which, as noted moreover in the previous chapter, is also the largest United Nations system duty station in the world. UNOG's global responsibilities arising from that fact have not earned it special attention and concrete enabling measures by Headquarters with respect to the budgeting, staffing and management of UNOG services. For example, the apportionment of common services resources between Headquarters and UNOG in the areas of conference services, library, personnel, security and safety, pouch and mail, etc., appears skewed in favour of Headquarters whose inter-agency span of common services is smaller than UNOG's. The number of United Nations entities and staff serviced exclusively or partly by UNOG increased by 76 per cent in the last decade (see paragraph 16) in contrast to the declining trends at Headquarters (see Figure 1, page 4) excepting the 1992-1995 bubble of peace-keeping operations. Besides, the narrow scope of management authority and flexibility Headquarters has accorded to UNOG over the years has equally bedevilled its performance.
Table 4. MANAGEMENT OF SELECTED COMMON SERVICES AT GENEVA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>UNOG</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Division of Administration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Procurement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Users oversight or advisory committee</td>
<td>Yes/No¹</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Quality/efficiency standards exist</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Satisfactory costing/billing formula</td>
<td>No⁴</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Performance measures, monitoring and evaluation</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Responsive and accountable to users⁵.</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. External quality audits and benchmarking</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Cost accounting system⁷</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. The JPS Committee has not met for two years and its recommendations are generally ignored.
2. An intergovernmental committee on conferences exists at United Nations Headquarters as well as the United Nations Publications Board. No users’ inter-departmental committee exists at UNOG.
3. Intergovernmental committee at United Nations Headquarters but no users’ committee at UNOG.
4. The budgeting, costing and billing of all UNOG services are done by the Financial Resources Management and Electronic Service (FRMES).
5. For example, periodic reporting of workloads, performance achievements and constraints, and customer satisfaction surveys.
6. Occasional customer satisfaction surveys.
7. Includes, for example, regular analysis of the actual costs of products, processes and services in relation to established budgets and standard costs, and reporting thereon to user entities.
50. That fact was underscored as far back as 24 years ago in a 1974 document entitled "Administrative arrangements for the UNCTAD/GATT International Trade Centre" (A/C.5/1604) which stated as follows:

"A part of the reason that the International Trade Centre has been less than satisfied with the administrative services provided by the United Nations Office at Geneva is the lack of delegation of authority to Geneva from New York.... There have been many complaints of the back and forth communications required between Geneva and New York before decisions on relatively minor matters could be made. For the administrative arrangements to work satisfactorily, it will be essential for more authority to be delegated from New York, especially in the personnel and financial entitlements areas.

"Another difficulty perceived by the Centre is the lack of client attitude and timely responsiveness of the United Nations Office at Geneva in carrying out administrative functions .... A further difficulty is the lack of experience by the United Nations Office at Geneva in administering field project personnel. Each side perceives that the other has been preoccupied with its own activities, using previous methods of operation as a frame of reference."

51. That 24 year-old quotation, which explains why ITC eventually setup its in-house support services, may still be valid today in echoing the assessment of nearly every other institutional user of UNOG services. It is why UNHCR decided to delink progressively from UNOG, and also why hardly any specialized agency at Geneva appears ready to participate in any expanded common services arrangements managed by UNOG. Indeed, the specialized agencies also appear to be delinking from the few services shared with UNOG until now, ILO having just terminated its participation in JPS. The share of the specialized agencies in UNOG's common services income fell from 6 per cent in 1985 to 2 per cent in 1995 (Figure 9, page 19). In short, therefore, UNOG's difficulties as a service provider may have given an overall negative image to common services at the Geneva duty station.

3. Executive leadership

52. UNOG's apparent lack of a coherent chain of command may also have added to its problems. Although headed by a Director-General (USG), UNOG's major divisions and services, especially the Division of Administration, maintain direct reporting and accountability channels to Headquarters Department of Management, also headed by a USG.

53. Further, the Director-General has no authority relationship with the programme managers, also at USG level, of the major United Nations entities located at Geneva (UNHCR, UNCTAD, ECE, OHCHR) who are the major users of UNOG's services, nor does he have formal managerial authority over the lesser graded directors of other United Nations entities such as ITC, UNITAR, UNICEF, UNEP or UNRISD. Almost invariably, the heads of some of these entities tend to refer directly to Headquarters, if not to their respective governing bodies, to seek special delegated authority to operate parallel support services (UNCTAD, ITC, UNITAR, etc). ECE and OHCHR, for example, have shown commendable discipline in their relations with UNOG.
4. Grade structure

54. The absence of cohesive leadership for common services at Geneva is also manifest in the grade structure of UNOG managers. There is an obvious missing grade link between the Director General and the Directors (D-2) of the two main common services divisions (Conference and Administration). In the distant past, UNOG had an Assistant Secretary-General position with some responsibility for inter-agency collaboration at Geneva. A similar position existed in New York. The arrangement seemed ideal for nurturing inter-agency administrative cooperation and coordination at the two premier duty stations (New York and Geneva) of the United Nations system. The Inspectors note the appointment at Headquarters of an Assistant Secretary-General for Central Support Services to also serve as the Executive Coordinator for Common Services at Headquarters as well as locations away from Headquarters, including Geneva.

55. There is, however, a case for a high-level position at Geneva with effective administrative management responsibility, including especially managerial support for integrated information technology applications. At present the directors of the two main UNOG divisions are graded at D-2 level while their counterparts in the specialized agencies, for example, are graded at Assistant Director-General level (ILO, ITU, WHO and WIPO). The UNOG Chief of Personnel is similarly graded as the Director of personnel at UNHCR as well as UNCTAD’s and ITC’s chiefs of administration. She is one grade lower than her counterparts in the major specialized agencies. The same comparison holds true for other UNOG services.

56. The grade structure appears to conform more to UNOG’s perceived status as a United Nations regional office than to its potential inter-agency leadership role in the development and management of services common to all Geneva-based organizations. The Inspectors wonder how UNOG managers can assume effective leadership on behalf of the Secretary-General for Geneva common services if they cannot, because of their lower grade status, speak and negotiate at eye-level with their counterparts in other Geneva-based secretariats. In other words, the relatively lower grade structure of UNOG managers could be a psychological handicap in any effort to extend UNOG services to other organizations at Geneva.
5. Organization

57. The hierarchical organization of some UNOG services, particularly in the Division of Administration, deserves a hard look. Unlike the Conference Services Division which smoothly combines vertical and horizontal approaches to the management of tasks and processes (for example, the different process stages of translation are identified and pre-programmed, with process-time allotments from one unit to another), the Division of Administration has a complex vertical system of chiefs of service, section, subsection, group and sub-groups. Almost lost in this crowded system of chiefs is the operational bottom line where activities and processes are effectively performed and managed in many cases and where the operational responsibilities of UNOG are discharged and value created for its user departments.

58. Responsibility centres, which allotment documents show to be at divisional level, do not appear to correspond to budget centres (service level) and the latter do not correspond to activity centres (e.g. secretariats of personnel review bodies, visas, Laissez-Passer, Bern Card and Attestation units, pouch and mail, security and safety, printing and the numerous other units in General Services), where the responsibilities of directors and the various chiefs are actually carried out. Although these bottom line units and activity managers are the real drivers of UNOG common services, their expenditure and staffing figures are curiously hard to obtain because the budgeting and organizational system accounts mainly for Divisions and Services. The overall result is that accountability for the operation and management of UNOG common services is not rigorously focused on the units and staff actually providing the services.

59. The Inspectors believe these bottom line units and managers should be more clearly identified and empowered in a new organizational structure that economizes authority titles and hierarchical levels in favour of horizontal approaches to the management of activities and processes which contribute value and efficiencies to the substantive work of UNOG's customer departments. The compression of vertical levels should result in shortening process-time cycles and decision-making or approval delays (e.g., recruitment and placement, job classifications, appeals, education grant and travel claims, etc). The wider the inter-agency responsibilities and functions of a common service unit, the more operating and budgetary autonomy it should have. A restructured and revitalized UNOG should focus more on the management of process-time cycles and less on command and control structures and relationships.

6. Design and operation

60. The same problems noted in this area by the Inspectors in their review of common services at United Nations Headquarters (JIU/REP/96/5) also exist at UNOG. Its service units appear to be more a product of history (demise of the League of Nations) than the result of a purposeful effort to design and subsequently perfect services which are "owned" by the users, or which are customer-friendly, accountable and responsive to substantive departments and programmes. That is why most of the services fail the litmus test of genuine common services as shown in Table 4, page 18. In other words, UNOG's service users are a captive clientele with hardly a choice or voice regarding the cost, quality and efficiency of services received.

61. Financed in the main from the United Nations regular budget, UNOG services seem to have been set up mainly for the core Secretariat entities located at Geneva. The affiliated entities funded mostly from extrabudgetary resources and whose importance and presence at Geneva have grown significantly over the years, tend to be serviced rather grudgingly as second-rate customers not to be "subsidized" by the regular budget. As such, UNOG's potential as centrepiece of common services covering all the Geneva-based entities and specialized agencies, especially in pursuance of relevant provisions of the Relationship Agreements, is currently not being fully realized.

62. Additionally, there is a general perception by the user entities that UNOG treasures the enforcement of regulations and rules, as a goal in itself, over the contribution of value and efficiency to the work of user departments. The operation of services appears warped by standard routine and is hardly sensitive to differences in the nature, scale and emergency character of user demands. That seems to be the main reason the essentially operational entities with major responsibilities and activities in the field, where speed of response to demands is of the utmost essence, have been delinking progressively from UNOG's ossified
procedures. However, as shown in Annex 3 to this report, the Secretary-General is developing a new accountability system for support services which also should help reengineer UNOG services as well.

7. **Staffing**

Staff shortages have also taken their toll on UNOG. As observed in the preceding chapter, UNOG's overall staff strength has been in decline in the past decade in contrast to the expanding demands of the United Nations community at Geneva during the same period. For example, its human resources as a percentage of the programme support staff of all Geneva-based organizations and entities declined from 33.8 per cent in 1984/85 to 27.9 per cent in 1994/95. As a percentage of the staff resources of United Nations entities only, UNOG declined during the ten-year period from 30 per cent to 14.9 per cent. Excluding UNHCR's staffing figures, UNOG declined from 47.8 per cent to 36.6 per cent during the last decade. Whereas in 1984/85 each UNOG common service staff member supported $115,500 worth of programme activity, the figure more than doubled to $238,000 in 1994/95.

However, the degree of staff penury has varied among service units and divisions. Overall, the Division of Conference Services appears more adversely affected, notwithstanding its meritorious efficiency-reform efforts, than the Division of Administration which has managed to rely more on extrabudgetary posts, especially in FRMES which controls UNOG's purse and where extrabudgetary posts now outnumber regular budget positions. In contrast to FRMES, areas such as UNIS, Personnel Service and several General Service units (security and safety, messenger service, procurement, pouch and mail, etc.) have barely managed to cope with stagnant or declining staff strength. For example, the staffing table of the Pouch Unit has remained practically the same since 1980 even though the number of institutional pouch users and destinations have doubled and tonnage delivered has increased by almost 80 per cent since then. The Inspectors do not take issue with the Secretary-General's staff reduction measures as such. They believe, however, that staff cuts, as applied to UNOG, may have been counterproductive by weakening the epicentre of common services without sufficient regard for the expanding demand side or clientele for these services.

8. **Technological innovations**

Introduced tardily in UNOG in the early nineties, technological innovations are still to yield full impact on enhancing the efficiency of services, shaping administrative structures and procedures, or compensating for staff reductions. The Electronic Services Section (ESS) is generally credited with good performance despite its resource limitations, but its common service potential beyond the confines of UNOG remains to be further developed and integrated with telecommunication services. Currently, it provides access to UN entities and specialized agencies at Geneva to the UN global telecommunication network.

The Optical Disk System (ODS) is also proving to be a very efficient and useful innovation in the electronic storage, retrieval and distribution of parliamentary documentation. Its system-wide common service capabilities and benefits need to be promoted more deliberately. Other conference-serving technologies, such as remote interpretation and translation, also provide a window of opportunity for cost savings and coordinated approaches at the Geneva duty station provided the UNOG technical infrastructure for such services can be developed accordingly. For example, the Division of Conference Services reports savings of about $500,000 attributable to "remote translation" for conferences held away from Geneva.

Technological applications are more advanced in some common service units than in others. For example, FRMES and the Security and Safety Service have made substantial progress in the application of automation systems, while the Pouch and Mail Unit and Printing among others, remain in need of technological modernization. The Integrated Management Information system (IMIS) is still a project with an uncertain completion deadline. Its "Releases" to date have not yet produced tangible efficiency or cost-reduction benefits in UNOG. More generally, its potential appears limited as a common service for all Geneva-based organizations, and even for all United Nations entities located at Geneva. For example, UNHCR and UNICEF continue to operate independent management information systems they consider more appropriate for their requirements.
68. In general, and notwithstanding the commendable efforts of UNOG’s Electronic Services Section and increasing interactions among technologists, there appears to be limited high-level leadership for technological innovations and integration among Geneva-based United Nations entities. No such leadership exists at all at the level of all Geneva-based organizations beyond the forum of ISCC, an ACC body. The absence of such a central driving force has resulted in diverse modernization efforts and incompatible systems.

69. Furthermore, although much has been done to introduce computer technology into UNOG’s operational routine, the Inspectors were informed that much of the investment remains patently underutilized partly because it has not yet been backed up by appropriate user training resources and programmes. The psychological reluctance of some staff to adapt to changes induced by modern technology may also be limiting the efficiency and productivity benefits to be expected from technological innovations.

9. Budgeting and cost allocation

70. In their report on common services at United Nations Headquarters, the Inspectors observed that common services budgets were hardly rational because they did not seem to reflect the true costs and workloads of common service units. The same observation holds true for UNOG services. Without comprehensive work measurement and cost accounting standards (besides standard salary costs), the costing and budgeting of services is bound to be arbitrary. Probably for that reason, the Inspectors heard widespread complaints from user entities about UNOG’s methods of costing services provided to the substantive departments.

71. At issue, in particular, is whether the high managerial overhead of UNOG (complex, vertical structure discussed in paragraphs 57-58) should be included or not in the costing of services provided by activity managers. Another issue is that in most cases service costs are not established by the managers concerned but by FRMES using a pro-rata formula. The question was raised, for example, about the justification and methodology used to cost the value of information technology services. The limited cost accounting system developed by the Publishing Service, for example, could be a useful building block for more comprehensive systems.

72. Unlike novel cost-allocation and recovery methods being introduced in some Geneva-based agencies, such as ITU’s integrated financial management system (IFM) or WMO’s “internal trading” system, UNOG is still to develop a thorough system of attributing costs to the regular budget institutional users of its services. Such costs are currently attributed and recovered unevenly in respect of extrabudgetary institutional users. The charge-back system used by the Pouch Unit for all its customers irrespective of funding source may be worth emulating by other service providers. While regular budget entities have “apportioned costs” in their programme budget documents, it is far from clear which items and expenditure levels are covered by those costs and how they are managed to respond to ebbs and flows in user demands. For example, UNCTAD, ECE and OHCHR are the heaviest users of UNOG conference resources, accounting for over 50 per cent of the workload of conference units. That implies that the costs of the Conference Services Division should correspondingly be borne on a pro-rata basis by the budgets of the afore-mentioned three entities. That at present is not the case.

73. Furthermore, not only do UNOG common services resources appear arbitrarily budgeted in relation to real costs and workloads, they are also not managed by the common services concerned but by FRMES which seems to wield significant influence over the allocation and management of UNOG’s resources, and by extension over the management of other common service units. For example, the income generated by service units is not always allocated back to strengthen the services in question, except for FRMES itself; common service users currently finance over half the staff of this service.
74. The Inspectors recommend that common services should be budgeted at activity management level as semi-autonomous, self-supporting facilities whose direct and indirect costs should be segregated proportionally to all user entities except the policy organs. Common service budgets should be expanding or contracting from one year or biennium to another in direct response to user demands and work loads. In other words, the budgeting and staffing of common service units should be demand-driven, not supply-conditioned as at present. Each user department irrespective of funding source should have a common service budget line and account, and common service managers should be enabled to develop cost-accounting methodologies, as well as internal performance monitoring and evaluation systems specific to their respective services, and empowered to manage their budgetary and staff resources in fulfilment of their accountability to user departments.

10. Ownership committee

75. As earlier noted, UNOG's common services are currently oriented more towards Headquarters in New York in terms of their direct reporting and accountability channels than towards the Geneva-based programme managers using these services. The notion that UNOG should be accountable exclusively to New York obscures the fact that Geneva-based programme managers, like all United Nations programme managers, equally are accountable to the Secretary-General for the efficient management of their programmes and resources. So long as UNOG remains administratively wedded to United Nations Headquarters as at present, its potential as a common service facility for all United Nations entities and the specialized agencies at Geneva may prove difficult to maximize.

76. Therefore, in the absence of an intergovernmental oversight mechanism for UNOG, the Inspectors see the need for a more active involvement by the heads of the United Nations entities in the management oversight of UNOG common services. Rather than decoupling from UNOG, these entities should be delinking UNOG from New York by strengthening their "ownership" of UNOG services and contributing to service improvements and problem resolution. This would be more feasible in the context of a high-level users committee chaired by the Director-General of UNOG and comprising the heads or their representatives of the major United Nations entities at Geneva, including UNHCR. The committee could meet every six months and it should be open-ended to include the specialized agencies wishing to participate formally or informally.

77. The establishment of this committee should be accompanied by a significant measure of decentralization of management authority from New York. The committee should, in effect, exercise authority on behalf of the Secretary-General for the organization, staffing, budgeting and overall modernization of UNOG common services. It should, therefore, have all the powers of a management committee or executive board to which UNOG service managers will be fully accountable for their performance. The pro-rata segregation of UNOG's costs to the entities represented on the proposed committee should help clarify authority and accountability relationships between UNOG service providers and service users.

78. The foregoing paragraphs suggest that UNOG is far from meeting the objective established for common services by the Secretary-General in his Programme for Reform: "the objective is to assure that support services are cost-effective, high quality and timely, provided on a competitive basis and result in full client satisfaction. This implies a clear price structure for common services, a transparent system of budgeting and reimbursement, accountability to clients for the delivery of services, user-feed back mechanisms, harmonization of regulations, rules, policies and procedures and economies of scale and selective outsourcing." (Document A/51/950 of 14 July 199, paragraph 243). There is, therefore, an obvious need to rebuild the institutional infrastructure and credibility of UNOG as the linchpin for implementing the relevant provisions of the Relationship Agreements mentioned in the Introduction. A revitalized UNOG common service centre will be the major pre-condition for reconfiguring common services among United Nations entities and extending some of the services to other Geneva-based organizations. In so doing, UNOG's responsibilities and status arising from the global significance and centrality of the Geneva duty station to the United Nations system should be fully recognized by the Secretary-General and General Assembly.
C. **Non-UNOG services**

79. It may be instructive that among the most comprehensive and successful common services currently existing at Geneva are two services not managed by UNOG but hosted by WHO, the largest Geneva-based specialized agency. The two services in question are ICC and JMS. As can be observed in Table 4, ICC, which was practically fading until 1993 when it had a new director with appropriate managerial and technological expertise, demonstrates two facts: firstly that a common service arrangement among all Geneva-based secretariats and involving other organizations outside Geneva is entirely feasible if the will to make it work exists; and secondly that a common service arrangement can be professionally managed and remain fully accountable to user entities. JMS and ICC are reviewed in greater detail in part II of this report subtitled: "Selected case studies".
IV. NEW FRAMEWORK

80. The same basic framework proposed by the Inspectors for the organizations located in New York (see Common Services at United Nations Headquarters - JIU/REP/95/5; General Assembly document A/51/686, annex, paragraphs 62-65) is also recommended, mutatis mutandis, for Geneva-based organizations. The objectives and guidelines set forth in that report for common services are reproduced below for ease of reference.

A. Main objectives

81. The Inspectors recommend that common services should aim to:

(a) Ensure the most efficient and cost-effective use of the human and financial resources of the participating entities, individually and collectively, through the elimination of similar, overlapping non-core services and pooling of the managerial and technical cream of each functional discipline into common or joint endeavours dedicated to management excellence;

(b) Encourage high performance standards through the identification and replication of best management practices;

(c) Foster a single vision and coherence of concepts and approaches within the United Nations system by using common services as instruments of integration, including harmonisation of the operational policies, methods and procedures of the system;

(d) Reinforce support for integrated approaches, facilities and services at the field level in keeping with relevant General Assembly resolutions on operational activities for development;

(e) Promote a global, interdependent network of common services, for example through mutual technical support, horizontal information exchange, and communication of lessons of experience among services in different locations.

B. General guidelines

82. The Inspectors have identified the following general guidelines, which are not exhaustive, as being essential to the successful organization and management of common services:

(a) Institution by the entities concerned of the most appropriate and uniform operational policy, methods and procedures for each common service with due respect for the mandate and mission identity of each participating entity;

(b) In view of the specific nature of each common service, the participants should decide on the most appropriate modality for organizing and providing the service concerned, including in some cases the need for relatively autonomous, self-supporting joint ventures, or use of outsourcing to the private sector under a single policy and contract;

(c) A user oversight or advisory committee should be established, where non-existent, for each service or group of services, where appropriate, and endowed with clear terms of reference including authority and responsibility for approving service work plans, budget proposals, developing and monitoring standards of quality and efficiency, selecting key service managers and evaluating their performance, and ensuring full accountability to all users, with special emphasis on the need for cost-accounting and periodic reporting of performance achievements and constraints;

(d) Common service participants should decide on the best policy for budgeting, staffing, managing and sharing the costs of each service to ensure consistent performance standards and professionalism, including entrepreneurial flair where required.

83. To the above general guidelines could be added the following other principles emphasized to the Inspectors in the course of this review:
(a) Common services should not exist for their own sake; their main rationale should be to add value and efficiency to, and reduce the cost of, the work of participating organizations;

(b) Common services should not be organized as monopolies; participating organizations should have a choice and some flexibility;

(c) Common services should also be competitive with external service providers in terms of cost, quality and efficiency. For this reason, they should be subjected to periodic internal or external quality audits and benchmarking;

(d) Common services should emphasize standardized approaches and similarity of objectives; they should encourage inter-operability of equipment items and technologies as well as support staff mobility among the secretariats.

84. Besides the above general guidelines and some desirable common service attributes listed in Table 4, the Inspectors believe the United Nations Joint Staff Pension Fund, ICC, Pouch, etc, also do provide tested models that can be used by the organizations in designing and developing common administrative arrangements at the Geneva duty station.

C. Plan of Action

85. On the basis of their findings, the Inspectors recommend a Geneva plan of action for common services illustrated by Figure 10 and including the following stages:

86. The Secretary-General of the United Nations, in his capacity as Chairman of ACC, should convene a meeting of Geneva-based executive heads of the specialized agencies and United Nations programme managers with the specific purpose of launching a plan of action for Geneva common services;

87. In phase 1 all the secretariats concerned should set up an implementation or advisory committee of the heads of administration and management (or their representatives). The committee would have the following terms of reference:

(a) Consider the ways and means of establishing a Geneva Technological Innovations and Integration Task Force supported by ICC and ISCC and the best possible methods for achieving technological compatibilities among Geneva-based secretariats;

(b) Identify on the basis of paradigms afforded by existing successful services, a list of services or functions which could be performed centrally for all Geneva-based organizations within a five-year time frame. The Inspectors propose the following in particular:

- Geneva international telephone and e-mail directory for all secretariats and permanent missions;
- An area network for the Geneva international community (similar to the Geneva metropolitan area network project);
- Optical disk system linking all secretariats and permanent missions;
- Management and Cost Accounting Unit;
- Central conference servicing facility to support relatively large conferences and meetings and charged with harmonization of calendars of conferences and reservation of conference rooms bearing in mind that UNOG conference rooms are now underutilised at less than 50 per cent of their capacity. The facility here proposed could exclude interpretation, translation and text processing functions unless otherwise decided by two or more organizations;
- A United Nations system publishing house with a common heavy-duty printing plant which could be used by organizations at other duty stations. Each organization may retain pre-press functions;
- A revitalized joint purchase service with broadened mandate;
• Travel agency services;

• Common outsourcing policies, approaches and arrangements, taking into account the recommendations contained in the JIU report entitled "The challenge of outsourcing for the United Nations system " (JIU/REP/97/5; A/52/338).

(c) Other objectives as may be deemed necessary by the Committee.

88. Concurrently with the work of this Committee, the United Nations Secretary-General may consider measures to restructure and revitalize UNOG in order to restore its performance credibility and image, taking into account the findings and recommendations of this report.

89. In phase 2 of the proposed plan of action, and parallel to the implementation of Genevawide common services as proposed in phase 1 above, three pilot common service centres should be established at Geneva within a five year period (2000 - 2005), as follows:

Figure 10. PLAN OF ACTION FOR GENEVA COMMON SERVICES (2000-2010)

→ Equalize responsibilities and stakes: each participating organization is also a common services provider.
→ Each common service centre has a management committee.
→ Each executive head is responsible and accountable to peers for the efficient management of services assigned to his/her organization.
→ Creative competition is encouraged among the centres and pools in the cost effective delivery of high quality services, and annual management reviews are conducted to identify benchmarks for emulation, recognize and reward star performing centres and pools.
→ Staff mobility among centres and pools.
FIGURE 11. MANAGEMENT OF COMMON SERVICES: A VIRTUOUS CIRCLE

(a) **UNOG Centre (restructured and modernized)** which should progressively absorb all the support services now performed by other United Nations entities, except UNHCR whose support services should be absorbed on a case by case basis to be agreed by those concerned and bearing in mind the long-term goal of achieving integrated and highly efficient support services for United Nations entities at Geneva. In a reconfigured UNOG, the Director-General's office could become a common service pool in its own right, for example through direct oversight of some politically-sensitive functions like security and safety in addition to protocol and legal services. Further, a field operations support Division could be established as part of the UNOG centre but not necessarily integrated within the current UNOG set-up as such. The proposed new Division would absorb technical cooperation support and other field oriented functions now performed by the different UN entities at Geneva, such as UNCTAD, ITC, ECE, UNDP and UNICEF regional offices and perhaps eventually UNHCR. In addition, a small management and cost accounting unit could support the modernization of UNOG common services and also assist other common service centres in their search for managerial and cost efficiencies.

(b) **ILO/WHO Centre**: both agencies should agree on the support services to be provided in common starting with a common catering facility, integrated office space management and joint medical unit (JMS). At least 50 per cent of their existing (especially general services and internal administration) programme support resources at Headquarters, should be integrated progressively, with either organization hosting or managing an equal share of such services;
c. ITU, WIPO and WMO centre would also be similarly established, with each agency managing or hosting a proportionate share of pooled services.

90. The management of Geneva-wide common services identified in phase 1 above should be apportioned as appropriate to the three pilot centres, which should compete creatively in pursuing staffing, cost and technological efficiencies with the expert support of the management and cost accounting unit proposed above. Additionally, the pilot centres should foster interchange of common service managers, performance results and other lessons to guarantee mutual support among them and strengthen common approaches and convergence of administrative management objectives. Appropriate lessons should also be drawn from common services arrangements in New York, Vienna and field duty stations.

91. Figure 11 illustrates a virtuous circle for the management of common services. Some of the expert support service functions (budget and finance, personnel, procurement, etc) currently performed by professional staff in the different organizations can very well be taken over by properly trained General Service staff (GS-5/6) equipped with appropriate specialist databases. Thus significant economies would seem possible simply by compressing grade levels and relying on General Service staff and advanced technology to deliver services.

92. In phase 3 (2006 - 2010); the secretariats should undertake an in-depth review of their experience with the three pilot common service centres and consider further measures to strengthen linkages among the centres.

93. The framework and plan of action are not cast in concrete. They are proposed primarily to give impetus and direction to an inter-agency collaborative process that should be further developed and refined for implementation and fully owned and managed by the Geneva-based organizations, especially in furtherance of shared efficiency and restructuring objectives.

94. The proposed measures are, therefore, entirely feasible, especially if the governing bodies and secretariats concerned display the type of collective vision and will for action evinced, for example, in the far-sighted and dogged pursuit of European economic and monetary integration. The fact that four of the five specialized agencies located at Geneva, have new executive heads should help to forge new cooperative strategies and tools. All the organizations and entities stand to gain from implementation of the plan of action not only in terms of reduced overhead costs but more significantly in terms of more sharpened focus on their constitutional mandates. The disciplined construction of common services, driven by technological modernization and integration of the secretariats, could generate other returns, such as the rationalization of internal support systems and processes, especially among United Nations entities and in WHO and ILO, by enabling comparability of staffing efficiencies among the secretariats or requiring substantive departments to exercise greater discipline in their requests for services and compliance with submission deadlines.

95. If the plan of action is implemented to the extent that the organizations and entities concerned achieve an average 30 per cent reduction in their combined overhead staff of 4,656 (see para. 18, page 4) within five years, that should yield staff savings of about 1,400 representing cost savings of over $200 million per year, on the basis of the latest standard salary costs applicable to the Geneva duty station.

96. The Inspectors therefore recommend that the framework and plan of action be endorsed by the General Assembly and the competent organs of the Geneva-based specialized agencies.
ANNEX 1
AGGREGATE EXPENDITURES AND STAFF OF GENEVA-BASED ORGANIZATIONS: DISTRIBUTION BETWEEN THE UNITED NATIONS ENTITIES AND SPECIALIZED AGENCIES

A. EXPENDITURES (nominal figures)

**Total en 1984/1985 : 2,6 million de dólares**
- Specialized agencies: 49%
- UN entities: 51%

**Total en 1984/1995 : 6 millones de dólar**
- Specialized agencies: 43%
- UN entities: 57%

B. RECURSOS HUMANOS

**Total en 1984/1985 : 14 624**
- UN entities: 34%
- Specialized agencies: 66%

**Total en 1994/1995 : 17 845**
- UN entities: 49%
- Specialized agencies: 51%
ANNEX 2
AGGREGATE EXPENDITURES AND STAFF OF GENEVA-BASED ORGANIZATIONS:
PERCENTAGE SHARE OF EACH ORGANIZATION

A. EXPENDITURES (nominal figures)

B. HUMAN RESOURCES
ANNEX 3
COMMON SERVICES STRATEGY PAPER
(Prepared by the United Nations Department of Management)

BACKGROUND AND PURPOSE

1. Secretary-General Annan's reform objectives were outlined in his note to the President of the General Assembly (A/51/829 of 17 March 1997). Responsibility for fleshing out the Secretary-General's proposals for common services approaches was assigned to the Under-Secretary-General for Administration and Management, who in turn requested the Assistant Secretary-General (OCSS) to establish a Task Force charged with identifying concrete initiatives that would help achieve the Secretary-General's objectives in the common services area.

2. The Task Force, and the eleven working groups it commissioned, succeeded as a rapidresponse mechanism, helping to quickly target a range of actions to be undertaken. Outputs from the Task Force were used to shape the Secretary-General's report to the General Assembly (A/51/950 of 14 July 1997) and subsequent status updates.

3. The appointment in October 1997 of an Executive Coordinator for Common Services and the assembly of a small support team provide a mechanism for ensuring that momentum generated by the Task Force is sustained. The process is now, however, at a point of transition which requires the development of an overall strategy; clarification of the roles and tasks of the various parties directly involved (the Executive Coordinator, the Task Force, and the working groups); and identification of the linkages and relationships with other groups whose activities include or affect common services issues. The present document is intended to serve as a starting point for consideration of these issues.

BASIC PRINCIPLES

A. Mandate

4. The Under-Secretary-General for Management appointed the Executive Coordinator and commissioned the Task Force, and is therefore the individual to whom actions are reported and recommendations made by the Executive Coordinator. While the Executive Coordinator's mandate includes the Secretariat, Funds, and Programmes, the spirit underlying the common services initiative is to find practical ways of reinforcing the notion of "One United Nations" in which different entities, pooling resources and standardizing practices, can more easily and effectively draw from each other's respective strengths.

B. Common Services - A Working Definition

5. The term "common services" has been used to describe a variety of service arrangements. The present proposals are based on a differentiation between two types of such services:

Central services are those which are provided to various units within the same organization, and are carried out under a direct line of management authority which is within that organization.

Common services are those which are provided, through various formal or informal mechanisms, to "client" organizations other than the providing organization. Management of such common services requires a responsiveness to the concerns of client organizations whose consent and cooperation is an essential element of the common service framework. There may be direct or indirect modalities of compensation from one organization to another for such services.

6. A service can be both central and common: in fact common services would normally be based on an existing central service, particularly when a "lead agency" concept (i.e., drawing from the recognized comparative advantage or capacity of one organization) is used. It can also be the case that an organizational unit that provides services to clients also performs normative functions which are not, strictly
speaking, services to those clients. The performance of normative functions and the provision of client services are two different (though potentially overlapping) roles which must be distinguishable from each other, i.e., both the provider and the client must know and agree on which role prevails in a given setting.

ELEMENTS OF A STRATEGY

7. The basic elements of a proposed initial common services strategy are outlined in the ensuing paragraphs. As additional experience is gained, this initial strategy will be subject to refinement.

A. Improvement of Central Services

8. The United Nations must ensure that central services operate in a business-like, client-oriented manner. Efficient, flexible and cost-effective central services are essential, not only because of their practical and financial importance, but also because sound central services are the logical staging ground for the provision of common services.

9. Decisions with regard to central services can be taken and carried out more readily than those affecting common services, which require consultation and consensus-building.

10. Consequently, the Executive Coordinator will identify and promote expeditious implementation of improvements in central service mechanisms. The primary, though not exclusive, focus of this strategic element will be on the United Nations Secretariat, where a sizeable number of central and common services are located. "Lead agency" mechanisms will provide the same challenge and opportunity to organizations other than the Secretariat to build their areas of strength.

B. Promotion of Common Service Approaches

11. As noted above, one of the key characteristics of a common service is that the service provider and to client must agree on a relatively broad range of issues in order for the arrangements to be viable, including the scope of the services, quality and timeliness parameters, decision-making mechanisms, and compensation formulae. Reaching such agreements is particularly difficult when the organizations are using different operational instrumentalities, including regulations, rules and procedures.

12. Starting from the ongoing or potential common services areas identified by the Task Force and working groups, the Executive Coordinator will promote the development and utilization of common services approaches through:

- establishing and/or supporting multi-organization common services planning, coordination, and/or implementation groups,
- developing evaluation criteria according to which choices can be made among common services modalities, including, inter alia, "lead agency" approaches, outsourcing, umbrella agreements, and electronic procurement facilities; and
- pursuing the harmonization and/or synchronization of different operational instrumentalities.

C. Coordination of Activities Related to Common Services

13. A plethora of working groups, task forces, committees and individuals is working on topics which wholly or partly concern common services approaches, including, inter alia, the United Nations Development Group (UNDG), the Consultative Committee on Policy and Operational Questions (CCPOQ), the Consultative Committee on Administrative Questions (CCAQ), the Joint Consultative Group on Policy (JCGP), and the Inter-Agency Procurement Working Group (IAPWG). In addition, bodies such as the Board of Auditors, Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS), and Joint Inspection Unit (JIU) regularly address related topics. Greater clarity with regard to subject matter and accountability, and better coordination of initiatives and actions, will help provide a coherent and effective framework for achievement. At the same time, confusion, delay, and gaps in issue coverage will be minimized.
14. The Executive Coordinator will develop an overview profile of all groups working on issues related to common services, and will propose, as appropriate, a coordinated division of labour which would optimize the return to the overall UN system on the resources invested and which would establish clear accountability for the various components of reform and management enhancement activities.

D. Promotion of Common Services Approaches Beyond New York

15. It is expected that common services approaches will be promoted at as many locations as are practicable, including not only New York, Vienna, Geneva and Copenhagen, but also Regional Commissions and country-level offices. While these dispersed initiatives can be encouraged and supported from New York, inclose collaboration with other groups that are involved with these issues, real progress at other locations depends on applying the knowledge, staff resources, and motivation of stakeholders based at those locations.

16. In order to strike a balance between spreading attention and resources too thinly, on the one hand, and under-reaching, on the other, the Executive Coordinator will approach the extension of common services facilities to other locations by:

- initially focusing primarily on developing objectives, timeframes, and implementation modalities for New York common services initiatives;

- establishing an information-sharing network with heads of offices, organizations and agencies in all major locations through which new initiatives can be encouraged and/or supported;

- overseeing the replication in other locations of Task Force/working group arrangements similar to those in place in New York, and providing guidance and backstopping to them in their workings;

- initiating common services pilot projects in Geneva, Vienna and other suitable locations, with Vienna being a probable initial candidate; and

- liaison with the UNDG on country-level initiatives.

ROLES AND RELATIONSHIPS

17. For the foreseeable future the Executive Coordinator/Task Force/working group framework provides a useful platform for at least New York-based common services initiatives. The roles of each of these participants and their relationships with each other in furthering the proposed strategy can, however, benefit from some clarification.

18. It may also be noted that human and financial resource available to the Executive Coordinator, Task Force, and working groups are limited. Consequently project proposals for extra-budgetary funding will from time to time be put forward.
EXECUTIVE COORDINATOR FOR COMMON SERVICES

19. The Executive Coordinator, individually and by way of the common services team which has been assembled, will:

- Coordinate and oversee implementation of the strategy outlined in the present document, including to develop and/or modify it in light of experience gained;

- Liaise with and keep informed the heads of Departments, Funds and programmes on common services issues;

- Promote implementation of central service improvements within the Secretariat, reporting thereon to Task Force members;

- Oversee development of and obtainment of funding for common services project proposals;

- Chair the Task Force on Common Services;

- Establish, monitor, and evaluate the effectiveness of working groups and other issue-specific mechanisms that may be put in place;

- Report on Task Force/working group activities to the Under-Secretary-General for Management and, as required, to other individuals or UN bodies.

TASK FORCE ON COMMON SERVICES

20. The Task Force on Common Services will:

- Assist the Executive Coordinator in reviewing implementation of the common services strategy and in assessing any changes required in the strategy or in its modalities of implementation;

- Review proposals and recommendations put forward by the working groups on common services, including project proposals for outside funding; and

- Recommend initiatives or actions that will establish or reinforce a common service, particularly those that will require commitments of cooperation, participation, and human and/or financial resources from the organizations they are representing.

21. Representatives to the Task Force, within their organization, will assist in explaining and engendering support for initiatives/actions recommended for implementation by the Task Force.

WORKING GROUPS OF THE TASK FORCE ON COMMON SERVICES

22. Working groups are established or abolished by the Executive Coordinator with the concurrence of the Task Force. The Chairperson of a working group is appointed by the Executive Coordinator with the concurrence of the Task Force. As the working groups are not intended to be permanent, it is expected that the Chairperson will serve for as long as the working group is convened; this can be reviewed and revised upon the recommendation of the Executive Coordinator, the Task Force, or the working group itself.
23. Working groups are responsible for:

- Fact-finding with regard to existing or potential central or common services;

- Recommendation of specific actions to be undertaken, along with timetable, estimate of resources required, and definition of accountability for implementation;

- Liaison and/or coordination with other working groups, as appropriate;

- Identification and/or elaboration of common services projects suitable for outside funding; and

- Exploring and reporting on concerns referred to the working group by the Task Force.