EVALUATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS NEW AGENDA FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF AFRICA IN THE 1990s (UN-NADAF)
Towards a More Operational Approach?

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Joint Inspection Unit

Geneva
1995
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Acronyms

ACC  Administrative Committee on Co-ordination
ADB  African Development Bank
AEC  African Economic Community
AMCEN  African Ministerial Conference on the Environment
AMU  Arab Maghreb Union
ARU  Africa Recovery Unit (DPI)
CEMAC  Economic and Monetary community of Central Africa (Communauté Économique et Monétaire de l’Afrique Centrale)
CILSS  Inter-State Committee for Drought Control in the Sahel (Comité Inter-États pour la Lutte contre la Sécheresse au Sahel)
CNN  Cable News Network
COMESA  Common Market of Eastern and Southern Africa
CPC  Committee on Programme and Coordination
DAC  Development Assistance Committee
DDSMS  Department for Development Support and Management Services
DESIPA  Department for Economic and Social Information and Policy Analysis
DHA  Department of Humanitarian Affairs
DPFSD  Department for Policy Coordination and Sustainable Development
DPI  Department of Public Information
EAC  East African Community
ECA  Economic Commission for Africa
ECOMOG  ECOWAS Military Observer Group
ECOWAS  Economic Community of West African States
FAO  Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
GCA  Global Coalition for Africa
HABITAT  United Nations Centre for Human Settlements (CHS)
IAEA  International Atomic Energy Agency
IATF  United Nations Inter-Agency Task Force on African Economic Recovery and Development
IBRD  International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank)
ICAO  International Civil Aviation Organization
IFAD  International Fund for Agricultural Development
IGADD  Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development
IMF  International Monetary Fund
ILO  International Labour Organisation
ITU  International Telecommunication Union
LDCs  Least Developed Countries
JIU  Joint Inspection Unit
JUNIC  Joint United Nations Information Committee
MULPOCs  Multinational Programming and Operational Centres (of ECA)
NADAF  United Nations New Agenda for the Development of Africa in the 1990s
OAU  Organization of African Unity
ODA  Official Development Assistance
OSSCAL  Office of the Special Coordinator for Africa and the Least Developed Countries
OECD  Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
PTA  Preferential Trade Area for Eastern and Southern Africa
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<th>Acronym</th>
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<tr>
<td>SADC</td>
<td>Southern African Development Community</td>
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<td>TICAD</td>
<td>Tokyo International Conference on African Development</td>
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<td>UEMOA</td>
<td>West African Economic and Monetary Union (Union Economique et Monétaire Ouest Africaine)</td>
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<td>UNCTAD</td>
<td>United Nations Conference on Trade and Development</td>
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<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees</td>
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<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
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<td>UNEP</td>
<td>United Nations Environment Programme</td>
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<td>UNESCO</td>
<td>United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization</td>
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<td>UNFPA</td>
<td>United Nations Population Fund</td>
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<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>United Nations Children’s Fund</td>
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<td>UNIDO</td>
<td>United Nations Industrial Development Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN-PAAERD</td>
<td>United Nations Programme of Action for African Economic Recovery and Development</td>
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<td>UPU</td>
<td>Universal Postal Union</td>
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<td>WFP</td>
<td>World Food Programme</td>
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<td>WHO</td>
<td>World Health Organization</td>
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<td>WIPO</td>
<td>World Intellectual Property Organization</td>
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<td>World Meteorological Organization</td>
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS

At the request of the Committee on Programme and Coordination (CPC), the Joint Inspection Unit has endeavoured to evaluate as comprehensively as possible the progress recorded to date in the implementation of the United Nations New Agenda for the Development of Africa in the 1990s, launched in 1991 by the General Assembly (resolution 46/151). The implementation of the Agenda was predicated upon a tripartite partnership involving African Member States, the international community, and organizations within the United Nations system. The Inspectors' findings can be condensed as follows.

Within the African region, the New Agenda is as yet very little known; but the priorities pursued by African Member States are broadly consistent with the Agenda's objectives. Overall, a great deal of progress has been registered in the areas of democratic and macro-economic reforms. Economic growth and private investments are picking up in an increasing number of countries. Some of the region's major conflicts, especially in the Southern African subregion, have either been settled or are about to be settled. Regional initiatives have emerged to resolve on-going conflicts and fashion collective mechanisms for conflict prevention and resolution. Concurrently, an institutional foundation is being laid for regional cooperation and integration. However, other challenges remain to be tackled, such as maximising the role of women in development, transforming the commodity sector into an engine of economic growth and development, revitalising the quality of education and health care systems, and strengthening the efficiency and probity of public administration and the judiciary.

At the level of the international community, Africa's development situation was the subject of the Tokyo International conference on African Development in 1993. Africa has also featured prominently on the agendas of other world events, such as the Cairo International Conference on Population and Development, the Copenhagen World Summit for Social Development, the Beijing Women's Conference, and the 1995 High-Level Segment of the Economic and Social Council. However, this global focus on the region is yet to crystallize into tangible goods, with the qualified exception of emerging debt reduction initiatives. Other commitments by the international community under the New Agenda, such as increased ODA flows to gird economic and democratic reforms, or support for commodity diversification, remain on the table.

Within the United Nations system as a whole, the New Agenda has thus far had no impact on the ground four years after it was launched. At the time of this evaluation, there was still general lack of awareness of the existence of the Agenda among United Nations system field personnel in Africa, who ought to be the sharp edge of its implementation. A system-wide plan of action incorporating the Agenda's priorities has been formulated and endorsed by the General Assembly; but it is still to be given operational expression in field activities and resource mobilization efforts. Among the institutional arrangements established within the United Nations Secretariat specifically to promote implementation of the Agenda, the Inter-Agency Task Force on African development is the most relevant to its programmatic and operational requirements.

Independently of the Agenda, however, virtually all the organizations of the System had already been assigning priority to the African region since the mid-eighties, particularly in terms of the growing proportion of resources allocated to the region for technical cooperation activities and humanitarian operations. The evolving situation on the continent is prompting trends within the system to do more and better in confronting the development challenge in Africa. The most visible and probably most promising example of the new departure is the Secretary-General's recent Special Initiative on Africa, which has been under review by ACC since 1994, resulting in the adoption in October 1995 of a system-wide action plan in support of the implementation of the Agenda and of other commitments undertaken at recent global conferences.
However, the severe resource crisis throughout the System may limit the scope of action of the organizations unless they can use the crisis as an opportunity for a further reassessment of their conventional technical cooperation policies and mechanisms. There are already indications that the System is adjusting to the hard times. But more could be done to forge with the African region a new form of development partnership that is more focused on policies and programmes and less on project execution, boosts local capacities, optimises delivery modes, and relies more on joint actions by members of the System. To that end the Inspectors offer the following recommendations.

A. Recommendations to the United Nations system

RECOMMENDATION 1: Promoting the New Agenda

(a) The New Agenda should be used by the organizations as an incentive framework for developing new individual or joint operational and resource mobilization initiatives for Africa, and each organization should report annually to its governing body on the results of such initiatives.

(b) ACC should also report annually to the Economic and Social Council on progress and constraints related to the implementation of the System-wide Plan of Action for African economic recovery and development, as well as other relevant international initiatives and commitments, and should submit recommendations thereon for action by the Council and system organizations.

RECOMMENDATION 2: Reducing the cost of technical cooperation with Africa

(a) The organizations should continue to reduce, where applicable, their reliance on resident experts in technical cooperation projects in favour of expanded use of national or regional human resources and institutions, more direct training and fellowship programmes, short-term consultancies, volunteers, TCDC, south-south and north-south institutional twinning, collaboration with local and foreign NGOs, and periodic visits by the organizations' regular staff to ensure conformity with norms, standards and policies of the System. These alternative modalities of technical cooperation could be further retooled and used more extensively by the organizations.

(b) The organizations should keep under continuous review their technical cooperation staff costs, particularly at Headquarters, and should endeavour to limit such costs to the basic minimum in order to release adequate resources for the wider application of the technical cooperation modalities proposed under (a) above.

(c) Subject to the wishes of host Governments, the organizations should continue to expand the application of the policy of national execution of projects as a means to national Institution building and strengthening. The organizations should focus more on national policies and programmes, and should seek to promote the application of the norms and standards endorsed by African Member States at the global and regional levels.

(d) The organizations should further reduce their infrastructural and overhead costs of technical cooperation in Africa, taking into account, among other things, the recommendations contained in the JIU report entitled "United Nations system common premises and services in the field" (JIU/REP/94/8). Priority consideration should be given to unified procurement and management of goods and services, especially transport equipment, at country level.

RECOMMENDATION 3: Policy advocacy and awareness campaign at the field level
(a) The organizations should be much more actively engaged in development policy advice at the governmental level of African countries in close collaboration and coordination with the multilateral financial institutions, and should intensify popular awareness campaigns on their respective normative instruments, development policies, strategies and programmes of action through maximum use of public and private mass media (television and radio networks, public lectures, printed media, video and audio cassettes, or information technologies, such as CD-ROM);

(b) The organizations should consider establishing in each United Nations Information Centre in Africa (or in each African country) a United Nations system joint information service responsible for:

(i) planning and implementing popular awareness campaigns as proposed above; and

(ii) publishing a monthly Newsletter covering United Nations system events at all levels, and promoting United Nations norms, standards, resolutions and programmes in all sectors covered by the system in the field;

(c) The joint information services should be linked to the information services of ECA, DPI and of all individual organizations of the System, including the multilateral financial institutions, in order to promote a regular two-way flow of development information between the field and global levels of the System.

RECOMMENDATION 4: Institutional capacity building

(a) All organizations should reinforce the institutional capacity building objective of their technical cooperation activities in Africa so that each activity, project or programme aims explicitly to strengthen the managerial, administrative and financial accounting systems of the supported institution, including its performance monitoring and self-evaluation processes.

(b) Where applicable, the organizations should consider the feasibility of promoting, in their respective sectors and for the support of bilateral donors and multilateral financial institutions, two types of umbrella projects in African countries:

(i) An umbrella project designed to establish a comprehensive inventory, to be updated annually, of national and subregional consulting institutions in the public and private sectors with a view to strengthening and using them as implementing agencies for the System's technical cooperation activities.

(ii) An umbrella project designed to strengthen the logistic, technical and operational capabilities of grassroots cooperatives, especially in the food production and food processing sector.

RECOMMENDATION 5: Inter-agency cooperation and coordination

(a) Country level: Under the authority and guidance of host Governments, the System organizations should intensify their cooperation and coordination with the Bretton Woods institutions and to that end should enable Governments to adopt a single country programming mechanism that could also be used for coordination with bilateral donors in supporting long-term national development strategies on a consistent basis.
(b) UNDP and ECA should play a more vigorous role in assisting African countries in the preparation of national long-term perspective studies and development plans that include strong subregional integrative dimensions and commitments at the global level, and serve as the master plan for all other country programming exercises.

(c) **Regional level:** In order to reduce the financial costs and duplicative nature of existing ECA and OAU consultative meetings with the System organizations and donor community, the Secretary-General of the United Nations in his capacity as chairman of ACC, and the Secretary-General of the OAU, in consultation with African Member States, should jointly propose the establishment of an *African Development Conference* that would expand the membership and authority of ECA's Conference of Ministers, and have system-wide scope. The Inter-Agency Task Force on African development and the OAU/ECA/ADB intersecretariat unit could initiate the draft terms of reference of the proposed Conference for review at ACC level, and submission for appropriate action to the relevant intergovernmental bodies.

(d) **Global level:** In the context of the new ACC initiative on Africa, consideration should be given to the setting up of a standing inter-agency working group on the commodity sector composed of ECA, FAO, ITC, UNCTAD, UNDP, UNIDO, WTO, and other relevant organizations such as the World Bank and the Common Fund for Commodities, charged with:

(i) developing and promoting a comprehensive view of Africa's commodity sector development issues, as analysed in paragraphs 93 to 107 of this report, and proposing practical actions to be taken by African countries, central intergovernmental bodies especially the General Assembly and ECOSOC, and by Africa's principal trading partners;

(ii) generating technical, action-oriented proposals for increasing and structuring cooperation between exporting and importing countries for commodities not yet covered by international agreements, especially in the area of fresh fruit and vegetable, and for strengthening existing commodity agreements.

(iii) providing technical advice on commodity issues to African countries and LDCs generally, especially in the context of future reviews of the implementation of the Uruguay Round Agreements, and promoting actions to secure further reduction of tariff and non-tariff barriers, improved market transparency, pricing mechanisms, and other enabling measures likely to increase the commodity export earnings and diversification dividends of African countries on a sustained basis.

RECOMMENDATION 6: Support for subregional integration

In view of the decisive importance that African Member States now assign to the subregional economic groupings they have established to accelerate implementation of the Abuja Treaty instituting the African Economic Community, the development organizations concerned should accordingly reorganize their country and intercountry priorities and activities around subregional development poles, as follows:
(a) Each organization should consider providing, in its sphere of competence, direct technical support to the secretariats of the subregional organizations in order to strengthen their institutional and technological capacities.

(b) All country programming mechanisms (especially long-term perspective studies and plans, country strategy notes and policy framework papers) as well as sectoral programme and project strategies, should maximise subregional integrated approaches to similar development problems.

(c) ECA and its MULPOCs and, whenever feasible, the secretariat of the Inter-Agency Task Force on Africa, should participate in country programming exercises offering opportunities for intercountry initiatives.

(d) Each organization should to the extent possible:

(i) establish and support on a continuing basis a subregional or country-group twinning network of similar country institutions (public and private) in order to strengthen technical collaboration among them and promote exchange of personnel and rational use of resources within each subregion.

(ii) collaborate more intensely with ECA’s MULPOCs in the different subregions.

(e) Organizations with country offices in Africa, but without subregional offices, should take the necessary action to ensure that:

(i) One country office in each subregion or group of countries (e.g. Sahel (CILSS), Horn of Africa (IGADD) Eastern Africa (EAC), Southern Africa (SADC), etc.) is designated and appropriately equipped to serve as a subregional office or focal point responsible for programming and managing subregional intercountry activities; operational management responsibility for such activities should accordingly be decentralized from Headquarters to the field level. Offices thus designated by the organizations should be located in the same city together with ECA’s MULPOCs, whenever possible.

(ii) All country offices in Africa develop a strong subregional or country-group focus, especially in country programming exercises; the allocation of country resources should be optimally rationalized on a subregional or country-group basis in order to maximise intercountry approaches to the solution of common development problems in a more cost-effective manner.

(f) In order further to reinforce the harmonisation and rationalisation of the organizations’ country activities within each subregion, the Inter-Agency Task Force on African development, ECA and UNDP should institute annual or biennial programme coordination meetings of United Nations system country representatives or Resident Coordinators in each subregion, chaired by the executive heads of the respective subregional economic communities and serviced by ECA and/or its MULPOCs.

(g) The organizations should replace their continental programmes for Africa or Sub-Saharan Africa with subregional intercountry programmes covering the main economic communities of the region.

RECOMMENDATION 7: Women in development
In view of the major role played by women in the development of Africa, the organizations of the System should give priority consideration to the implementation of the recommendations contained in the African Platform for Action adopted by the Fifth African Regional Conference on Women, held in Dakar (Senegal) in November 1994, and briefly outlined in paragraph 67 of this report.

B. Recommendations to the United Nations

RECOMMENDATION 8: Strengthening NADAF implementation in Africa

(a) In order to rectify the serious weaknesses observed by the Inspectors in existing NADAF institutional arrangements within the United Nations Secretariat, the Secretary-General should, in the context of his Special Initiative on Africa, propose to the General Assembly new objectives for Programme 45 in the next medium-term plan and programme budget so that the programme's resources are optimally utilized in direct support of African countries and in leveraging additional resource mobilization and other operational actions by the System organizations.

(b) The secretariat of the Economic Commission for Africa should be further restructured taking into account the Inspectors' recommended measures outlined in paragraph 151 of this report, and the need to strengthen complementarities in general and a division of labour in particular with other Secretariat entities (DDSMS, UNCTAD, UNEP, HABITAT), as well as with the specialized agencies, especially FAO and UNIDO.

(c) DDSMS should play a more prominent role in supporting, at the request of Governments, civil service and judicial reforms in Africa, and in that context, should:

(i) intensify support for the introduction of management technologies, especially automated management information systems, in African public administrations, as well as technical advice to Governments on decentralization of development management authority and resources to the district/community levels within a national system of programme and budget performance monitoring, evaluation and accountability;

(ii) collaborate closely with the United Nations Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Programme at the United Nations Office at Vienna, as well as with ECA in advising and assisting Governments of the region to strengthen national legislations and enforcement mechanisms for the prevention of all forms of crime (corruption, illicit capital flight, urban crime and insecurity, drug traffic and abuse, etc.) as an integral part of judicial, civil service and economic reforms in African countries;

(iii) to the above ends, promote together with ECA and the Crime Prevention Programme periodic subregional Ministerial meetings aimed at developing common programmes and weapons to prevent and combat crime in all forms.

RECOMMENDATION 9: Support for conflict prevention and management

(a) In line with the recommendations contained in another JIU report entitled "Sharing Responsibilities for peace-keeping: the United Nations and regional organizations" (JIU/REP/95/4), the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the Director-General of UNESCO should take all necessary measures to promote support by the international
community for the OAU African Peace Fund and for the Pan-African Institute for Peace and Democracy recommended under 10(b).

(b) The Secretary-General should also consider relocating the United Nations Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa closer to the OAU headquarters to form the core contribution of the United Nations to the Pan-African Institute for Peace and Democracy, and thereby strengthen institutional cooperation in this area between the United Nations and the OAU.

C. Recommendation through the General Assembly to the Organization of African Unity

RECOMMENDATION 10: Mechanisms for preventive diplomacy and peace building

The General Assembly may wish to recommend to the OAU:

(a) To promote the concepts of national development armies and more economical collective security systems within a subregional context;

(b) To establish with the technical support of UNESCO and other relevant organizations, a Pan-African Institute for Peace and Democracy which could serve as its think-tank for the analysis of root causes of conflicts and potential conflict situations, and design norms, standards, strategies and procedures for conflict prevention and management. The Institute could derive its core resources from the OAU Peace Fund while additional funds could be mobilized from African public and private sources, and from the international community, especially humanitarian organizations.

(c) To develop a framework of collaboration and coordination with Africa's subregional organizations in the discharge of its mandate for conflict prevention and management, and further strengthen for that purpose its resident missions in the different subregions.

D. Recommendations through the General Assembly to African Member States

The General Assembly may wish to recommend the following actions to African Member States:

RECOMMENDATION 11: National peace commissions

That individual African Member States consider establishing National Peace Commissions with the objective of promoting a dialogue of peace, as well as durable peaceful co-existence among different ethnic, religious, political, cultural, and language groups within their territories. Alternatively, UNESCO's National Commissions in Africa could be further strengthened for this role as part of UNESCO's "Culture of Peace Programme".

RECOMMENDATION 12: Regional and International programmes for Africa

That African Member States and their external development partners place a moratorium on the adoption of new regional programmes so that efforts and resources can
be concentrated on strengthening national capacities to implement and manage existing programmes, including NADAF.

RECOMMENDATION 13: Subregional cooperation and integration

That African Member States consider actions along the lines suggested in paragraphs 64-65 of this report in order to accelerate implementation of the Abuja Treaty establishing an African Economic Community; such actions could include, inter alia:

(a) Adoption of common political positions in international fora and in negotiations with the donor community;

(b) Harmonisation of national development plan and budget cycles, macro-economic reform programmes, monetary and investment promotion policies;

(c) Development of collective security systems and other mechanisms for promoting good neighbourliness, peace and stability;

(d) Establishment of joint diplomatic and consular services; etc.

RECOMMENDATION 14: War on poverty by African development armies

In view of the fact that poverty and its consequences of social disintegration represent the most serious national security threat in parts of the region, African Member States may wish to take advantage of the disarmament work of the United Nations by seeking support for the conversion of their military establishments (or significant parts of these establishments) into national development armies (as suggested in paragraph 38 of this report), while giving preference to the development of more collective defence systems within each subregion.
INTRODUCTION

1. The United Nations Committee on Programme and Coordination (CPC), at its May-June 1994 session, requested the Joint Inspection Unit to conduct an in-depth evaluation of the contribution of organizations within the United Nations system to the implementation of the United Nations New Agenda for the Development of Africa in the 1990s (UN-NADAF), adopted by the General Assembly in resolution 46/151 of 18 December 1991.

2. The CPC request for this evaluation was not limited to any particular aspect of the New Agenda (hereinafter referred to as NADAF), which is a broad framework of priorities addressed to African Member States on the one hand and to the international community, especially the United Nations system, on the other. At both levels, numerous partners have their respective roles to play in supporting NADAF. Thus, the wide breadth of the programme and the many actors concerned posed a methodological problem. After considering several possible approaches, each of which would have narrowed the scope of the evaluation to selected substantive or institutional aspects of NADAF, the Inspectors decided that a comprehensive assessment of the state of progress of the programme at this midpoint of its time-frame would be more useful to the Member States and policy organs, and address more adequately the preoccupations implicit in the CPC request to JIU.

3. The Inspectors also faced the difficulty of focusing their evaluation exclusively on United Nations system support for NADAF, given the fact that the programme places primary responsibility for its implementation on African Member States themselves, external inputs though indispensable being considered essentially as supportive in nature. In much the same way, there has been increasing concern of late, both within Africa and among external partners, about the need to ensure African ownership and control of development programmes, whatever their origin, as a sine qua non for their success and ultimate sustainability. As such, any evaluation of external inputs within the NADAF framework would be incomplete and superficial without a prior review of the broader context of the development priorities and initiatives being pursued by African Member States, individually and collectively, and the response of the international community.

4. As discussed in the following chapter, NADAF is one of the many regional development programmes that have been adopted for Africa in different fora within and outside the continent. More particularly, NADAF is additional not only to the several continental programmes adopted by the Organization of African Unity (OAU) since 1980, but also to the sectoral or special programmes of action initiated by individual organizations of the System, including the Bretton Woods institutions, in agreement with their African Member States. These programmes, which were launched before or after the adoption of NADAF in 1991, must be presumed to have for Africa and the international community no less continuing validity and relevance than NADAF.

5. In these circumstances, it proved difficult to establish beyond doubt whether policies and actions pursued by the different partners had been directly dictated by any particular programme at national, regional or international level. To overcome this difficulty, the Inspectors resolved to focus attention, not on the NADAF label per se, but rather on the degree to which actions by Governments and organizations of the System are consistent with the priorities contained in the NADAF framework. Therefore, policies and activities converging with NADAF priorities have been judged to contribute to the attainment of NADAF objectives even in the many instances where NADAF was hardly known as a programme, as will be observed later in this report.

6. In accordance with the United Nations classification of regional groups, Africa in this report comprises all the fifty-two Member States of the OAU. However, Africa is vast and diverse in many respects. There are especially marked differences among the major subregions of
Central, Eastern, North, Southern and West Africa. In addition to the complex ethnic mosaic of its population, Africa is home to a majority of the Arab population in the world, to about five million people of European descent, and to three million of Asian descent mostly in Eastern and Southern Africa. This ethnic and racial diversity, whose potential development benefits are yet to be recognized and maximised, is equally matched by linguistic and religious diversity as well as by the region’s variegated physical landscape, where the Sahara and Sahelian belts contrast with equatorial and temperate zones. As such, references to the region as a whole should in no way be construed to imply that it is a single homogeneous entity.

7. At the same time, Africa also exhibits a number of common historical, sociocultural and economic features particularly evident among the countries and peoples forming each of the subregional economic groupings established by the OAU to constitute the building blocks of an African Economic Community. Despite some variations from one country to another, most African countries face the common complex challenge of nation-building and socio-economic development, as documented in numerous reports on the region produced by organizations of the System. It is the unprecedented nature of this development challenge that sets Africa apart from other regions and that justifies the special measures and programmes adopted for the region by the United Nations General Assembly in the past decade, NADAF being the latest. Additionally, the General Assembly has flagged international support to Africa as one of the five major priorities of the United Nations in the 1990s.

8. In recognition of the fact that much of Africa is currently in historic transition to new political and economic systems, the Inspectors have deliberately avoided delving into past development failures, for which African Member States and the international donor community have recognized shared responsibility. The increasing awareness of the domestic and external root causes of Africa’s development breakdown in the last two decades, and the emerging consensus among Africans and their external partners alike on the priority courses of action needed to set the region back on a sound development track, represent a most important evolution in international development cooperation with countries of the region.

9. Accordingly, this evaluation furnishes some information on the extent to which Africa’s evolving development policies are responsive to NADAF objectives. In so doing, the Inspectors’ intent was not strictly to evaluate the development programmes and priorities of African Governments as such, but to establish a benchmark for evaluating the adequacy of the support provided by the international community in general and the United Nations system in particular. This approach was all the more necessary as NADAF was adopted by the General Assembly as a compact between African Member States and the international community, with mutual commitments to and accountability for its successful implementation.

10. The Inspectors have endeavoured to suggest a number of ways in which the organizations of the System could take advantage of the changes under way to optimise the value of their contribution to the development of Africa, in line with the priorities identified in NADAF. Political and economic reforms in Africa need to be matched by new modes of external engagement with the region in order to avoid the pitfalls of the past and help strengthen Africa’s control of its destiny.

11. At the outset of this evaluation the Inspectors visited United Nations Headquarters where, with the assistance of OSCAL, they had the benefit of a broad range of preliminary views on NADAF. The Inspectors also addressed separate questionnaires to African Member States, United Nations system Resident Coordinators based in Africa, and the headquarters of organizations of the System, requesting information on their current development priorities and their views on measures required to lift the continent out of its present predicament. The high number and quality of replies received from the three sources were indicative of the keen interest
of the respondents in this evaluation, as well as its importance and timeliness for the United Nations system.

12. In addition, the Inspectors visited in separate missions nine African countries in Central, East, North, Southern and West Africa in order to obtain first-hand information on development priorities pursued by African Governments and United Nations system organizations at the field level in the context of the New Agenda. The Inspectors are particularly grateful for the rich and frank exchange of views they had with numerous Government officials, United Nations system personnel and the staff of non-governmental organizations in the frontline of support to Africa's development endeavours. To all of them the Inspectors wish to offer a special word of encouragement in the pursuit of their indispensable mission.
I. REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL PROGRAMMES FOR AFRICA

13. Africa’s development crisis has been the subject of parallel and sometimes competing programme initiatives at the African and international levels since 1980. Firstly, at the African level, there have been successive programmes of action, from the Lagos Plan of Action and the Final Act of Lagos in 1980 to the Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community, concluded in 1991 and, most recently, the Cairo Agenda for Action: Relaunching Africa’s Economic and Social Development, adopted by the Seventeenth Extraordinary Session of the OAU Council of Ministers held in Cairo from 25 to 28 March 1995 and endorsed by the OAU Summit Meeting of 25 June 1995. In addition, more than a dozen sectoral programmes, strategies and plans of action have been adopted at ministerial level in the past fifteen years.

14. These endogenous initiatives, which provide a strategic road map for steering Africa’s development into the next century, have been remarkably consistent over the years in their priorities. These include, for example, regional economic cooperation and integration; agriculture and food security; transport and communications; industrialization; natural and human resources development; science and technology for development; etc. The latest Cairo Agenda for Action reinforces and extends these themes to align them with the evolving situation of the region. For example, the Cairo Agenda places responsibility for the region’s development squarely on African Governments and peoples: "We reaffirm that Africa’s development is first and foremost the responsibility of our governments and peoples. We are determined to lay a firm foundation for a human-centred, equitable and sustainable development on the basis of sound economic policies, social justice and collective self-reliance, in order to achieve accelerated structural transformation of our economies". Democracy, good governance, peace and security, etc., figure prominently at the top of the priorities African Governments have undertaken to implement by themselves under the Cairo Agenda.

15. Concurrently, African Member States have sought continually in the past decade to mobilize appropriate international response to the economic crisis of the continent. As a result, and recognizing the fact that the region is an organic component of the world community, the United Nations General Assembly has taken major initiatives to highlight Africa's development plight as a priority for concerted global action.

16. Thus in 1986 the Assembly convened a Special Session that focused exclusively on Africa’s critical economic situation, and ended with the adoption of the United Nations Programme of Action for African Economic Recovery and Development (UN-PAAERD): 1986-1990. This programme was the first of its kind ever adopted for a continent by the United Nations, and it aroused major expectations within Africa. However, the programme's time-frame coincided with a period of converging disruptive factors, such as the collapse of world market prices for Africa’s primary commodities, which deprived the region of more than US$ 50 billion in export earnings during the programme period, sharply declining terms of trade and expanding debt burden, introduction by an increasing number of African countries of drastic macro-economic reform programmes, political instability and natural disasters in some countries, declining foreign direct investments, and systemic changes provoked in the international political order by the end of the cold war, thus creating a new menu of priorities and conditionalities for Official Development Assistance (ODA). These factors effectively contributed to bury UN-PAAERD and its lofty expectations. For that reason, and taking stock of the worsening economic trends in Africa, the General Assembly adopted, at its forty-sixth session in 1991, a more streamlined NADAF whose time-frame extends to the year 2000.
17. Parallel to Africa's regional programmes and United Nations special programmes for Africa mentioned above, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) have concurrently been pursuing a separate economic agenda for the continent in the context of structural adjustment programmes (SAPs), negotiated with individual African governments. SAPs are now being pursued in the vast majority of African countries and their pervasive cross-sectoral impact has practically relegated all other development programmes and policy prescriptions to the background. While the rationale for economic policy reform is hardly in doubt, some questions have been raised about the high political and social costs of SAPs, and their conditionalities.

18. In addition to the above three overlapping courses of action, individual specialized agencies of the United Nations system are also engaged in distinct sectoral programmes, most of which have been ratified by African Governments at ministerial level. To that should be added global mandates and priorities deriving from international conferences, such as the Rio Summit on Environment and Development, the International Conference on Population and Development, and the recent World Summit for Social Development.

19. Furthermore, bilateral and multi-bilateral development aid programmes also have their development priorities for Africa, which do not always or necessarily correlate with the region's endogenous development blueprints or with the other aforementioned separate programmes of the international donor community, with the qualified exception of economic reform programmes supported by the World Bank and IMF.

20. As can be observed, therefore, Africa's development crisis in the past decade has given rise to well-meaning but overlapping courses of action on the part of African Member States themselves acting collectively and individually in different fora, and on the part of the components of the international donor community, particularly the United Nations system, the Bretton Woods institutions, and members of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC).

21. These autonomous programme packages are, of course, expected to be co-ordinated at the national and regional levels by African Governments themselves in the spirit of development ownership and self-reliance. However, as documented in the literature on the subject of co-ordination, many Governments lack the necessary institutional and technological capacities to negotiate and internalize effectively the numerous and often divergent policy interests, priority prescriptions, programmes and projects that have for too long dominated international development partnership with the developing countries in general and Africa more particularly. To some extent, that appears to have been part of the African development crisis.

22. NADAF should, therefore, be viewed against the backdrop of multitudinous programmes adopted at national, regional and international levels, all competing for host governments' executing and managerial capacities as well as for limited local and external resources. Under these circumstances the question that springs to mind is whether NADAF was really necessary. The Inspectors believe that NADAF and UN-PAAERD which preceded it were indispensable because they embody United Nations development partnership and solidarity with its African Member States. However, because the existence of so many overlapping programming frameworks inevitably creates confusion, complicates development coordination at country level, and strains the absorptive capacities of host Governments, the Inspectors recommend that consideration be given to establishing a moratorium on the adoption of new regional programmes, and that efforts be concentrated instead on strengthening the central and sectoral capacities of African Governments to integrate and manage existing programmes, including NADAF, within their national development plans and strategies. External initiatives should aim to reinforce the implementation and impact of endogenous programmes at country or regional level.

II. THE NADAF FRAMEWORK
A. Summary

23. The priorities listed in NADAF can be condensed as follows:

(a) Promotion of regional economic cooperation and integration, including transport and communications and industrial development decade programmes for Africa;

(b) Intensification of the democratization process, respect for people's and human rights, and the promotion of popular participation in the development process;

(c) Investment promotion, economic reforms and increased private sector involvement in national development efforts;

(d) Human resources development, science and technology, education and capacity-building, equality of opportunity for women, and attention to the needs of children;

(e) Environment, population and development;

(f) Agriculture, food security, and rural development;

(g) South-south co-operation;

(h) Expanded role for non-governmental organizations.

24. The international community commits itself under NADAF to strengthen its support to Africa in the above-mentioned areas, including in particular the search for adequate solutions to the region's unsustainable debt burden, increased resources to facilitate economic policy reforms and diversification of economies and export commodities.

25. Organizations of the United Nations system are given a major role in the implementation of NADAF, such as devising specific programmes for Africa which are consistent with elements of the Agenda, and programmes that are essential in fostering regional and subregional economic cooperation and integration.

26. NADAF can thus be considered to be a carefully negotiated framework of priorities as conceived by African Member States on the one hand and their external development partners on the other. It is as such a consensus document that attempts to obviate to some extent the aforementioned problem of uncoordinated priorities and programmes of cooperation with different components of the international community.

27. Nevertheless, it must still be recognized that the New Agenda does not resolve the problem of parallel programmes at the African and international levels even when the essential priorities and objectives at both levels do converge, as in the case of NADAF and the Cairo Agenda for Action. For example, the Inspectors have had to face questions as to whether Governments and their development partners should assign priority attention to NADAF and not to Africa's endogenous programmes.

28. It is the Inspectors' conviction that African Member States should concentrate primarily on the implementation of their endogenous programmes as a matter of credibility and programme ownership. Indeed, the only way out of Africa's present crisis is for Africans to assume dynamic leadership of their development in all spheres. International programmes like NADAF or the World Bank/IMF's special programmes for Africa serve as a useful framework for mobilizing
resources and actions at the global level to support national and regional programmes. What matters above all is agreement on priorities, and their rigorous internalization within national and intraregional development strategies.

### B. Views of African Governments

29. Since the launching of NADAF four years ago, the situation in the African region has been in constant evolution, marked in particular by peace-keeping and humanitarian operations in some countries, and by political and economic reforms in the majority of countries. Consequently, the Inspectors sought to determine through questionnaires, field visits and discussions with African Government officials, whether NADAF priorities remained relevant to their needs. The Inspectors found the following most recurrent themes:

(a) Private sector development and creation of incentives for domestic and foreign direct investments;

(b) Improvement and expansion of physical infrastructures, especially in transport and communications;

(c) Improved debt management, coupled with efforts to secure debt rescheduling, relief or cancellation;

(d) Achievement of peace and stability, democratic reforms, good governance and decentralization to the community level;

(e) Poverty alleviation and reduction of inequalities in income distribution, especially between urban and rural communities, and increased participation of women in national development;

(f) Human resources development, especially in education and health care, reduction of illiteracy and emphasis on science and technology;

(g) Increased agricultural production to achieve food security, diversification of exports, and agriculture-based industrialization;

(h) Economic policy reforms aimed at rapid economic growth over the next ten years;

(i) Achievement of subregional and regional economic integration in line with the Abuja Treaty establishing an African Economic Community;

(j) Civil service and judicial reforms and strengthening of institutional and management capacities;

(k) Checking population growth, environmental degradation, and desertification trends.

30. The above priority areas correspond by and large to those listed in NADAF and the Cairo Agenda for Action, despite slight differences of emphasis. These two agendas have the merit of being broad enough to accommodate differences of development situations and priorities among the fifty-two countries of the region. Still, the wide range of priorities encompasses practically all the major sectors of national development, thereby making virtually every sector a priority. That certainly illustrates the complexity of Africa's development challenge.
C. **Views of United Nations system organizations and resident coordinators**

31. United Nations system Resident Coordinators in Africa and the headquarters of the organizations were also requested in separate questionnaires to list what, in their views, should be the most important priorities African countries should be pursuing over the next ten years. The priorities proposed for Africa by the Resident Coordinators and the organizations are also broadly the same as those listed in NADAF, the Cairo Agenda and African Governments' replies to the Inspectors, but with the following variations of emphasis.

32. The Resident Coordinators place near-universal emphasis on the need to unleash the energies of the private sector through appropriate institutional reforms and policy incentives, such as credit facilities and tax rebates for small and medium-sized enterprises and industries, in the formal and informal sectors. Poverty alleviation programmes also share the top place with entrepreneurial development in the agenda proposed by the Resident Coordinators. These two overriding priorities are followed by human resources development; control of the HIV/AIDS epidemic; management capacity building, especially in the coordination of domestic and external development inputs and efficient allocation of resources; subregional and regional cooperation and integration; economic and civil service reforms; population control and environmental protection, etc.

33. The organizations of the System generally emphasize peace and stability; good governance, accountability and much improved management of public affairs; stimulation of local and foreign investments, social development aimed at improving education and health care systems and the integration of women in the development process; diversification of production structures and exports; private sector development; transport and communications, etc.

D. **Country and subregional differences**

34. However, the same priorities do not necessarily apply with equal force to each and every country or even subregion; their nature, scope and urgency vary from one country and subregion to another. For example, the democratization process may no longer be a national priority in several countries where a democratic tradition has been nurtured for over ten years. But it remains to be consolidated as a major priority in many countries which only recently experienced a transition to democracy, and to be achieved in the few countries which are still to operate such a transition. Similarly, conflict resolution and restoration of peace and stability remain a towering priority for countries still experiencing conflict situations, while for other countries, the top priority has shifted from conflict resolution to the rehabilitation of war-ravaged physical and social infrastructures.

35. The same differences in overriding priorities can also be observed among the subregions. For example, the Southern African subregion is probably the most advanced in political and economic reforms, and also has the best physical infrastructures of all the subregions, but has to contend with the widest income disparities and most urgent social development agenda. By contrast, the Central African Economic and Monetary Community has made the least progress in economic reforms, and has the least developed intercountry and even national physical infrastructures (especially roads), but is the most advanced in monetary cooperation and integration. Likewise, and as opposed to the heterogeneous West African (ECOWAS) subregion with the highest number of Africa's least developed countries, the North African subregion (Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) is the most homogeneous in terms of culture and language and has the highest average per capita income. As of now, however, it has the lowest common political denominator for subregional cooperation and integration, partly because the Arab League and not AMU constitutes its principal cooperative mechanism.
E. Additional priority areas

36. There are three priority areas not mentioned above, but which the Inspectors believe should deserve a prominent place on Africa's development agenda.

(a) National development armies

37. The first priority concerns the need to demilitarize national security systems and reduce military expenditures in favour of more democratic and conciliatory approaches and the rule of law in the maintenance of peace and security within and among countries. This issue is obviously linked to the universally acknowledged development dividends of disarmament, but also to the fact that arms flows into Africa and disproportionate military budgets are at the root of armed conflicts, large-scale refugee caseloads and costly humanitarian operations in the region. Angola, Liberia, Rwanda and Somalia are graphic reminders of the disastrous consequences of indiscriminate arms flows and militarization of society in some African countries. Since the arms that kill and dislocate populations in Africa are purchased mainly from the developed countries, necessary measures should be taken and enforced at the level of the United Nations, which could further embargo arms flows to countries and zones in conflict situations.

38. Furthermore, it would seem reasonable to emphasize collective defence systems within a subregional context and to reorient the military establishment in each country towards an essentially developmental role, if only because the armed forces can be assumed to be the most dedicated, the most organized and integrated national institution. Because demobilization would further swell the already high unemployment rate, the military should be retrained, and "re-armed" for the vastly more important battle of nation-building. By this concept of a national development army, military resources would be transformed into development resources and military goals into development goals, while bringing to the development process the same military sense of urgency and discipline as well as techniques of mobilization, planning and execution. This would be the best way to wage war on poverty whose multifaceted effects represent the most serious national security threat at present in many countries of the region. One area among others where this concept could have significant cost benefits is in the building and maintenance of national physical infrastructures, especially urban-rural road networks which are limited and poorly maintained in many African countries.

(b) Crime prevention and control

39. The second priority issue not sufficiently stressed in the above-mentioned priorities relates to the urgency to prevent and combat crime in Africa in all its forms: urban crime, drug traffic and abuse, civil service corruption at all levels and illicit capital flight which by some estimates amounted to US$40 billion in the last 15 years. While these various forms of crime are universal in nature and have international connections, they are beyond doubt much more detrimental to Africa's development than to any other region.

40. Firstly, most African countries are in dire need of development capital and must therefore ensure that available resources (domestic and external)are optimally applied to development purposes. Secondly, a heavily corrupt civil service and judiciary can hardly create the necessary environment for stimulating the private sector and foreign direct investment flows, since corrupt practices increase the cost of doing business. Thirdly, rampant urban crime and insecurity discourage tourism, which is a major source of foreign exchange for many countries. Fourthly, drug abuse, especially by the youth who form the majority of Africa's population, reduces their potential to perform the tasks of nation-building.
41. The Inspectors recall that the ninth United Nations Crime Prevention Congress which met in Cairo, Egypt, in May 1995, recommended some practical measures for preventing and combating crime in all its variants, and called for international cooperation in this area. The Inspectors therefore recommend that the United Nations Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Programme should collaborate more closely with individual African Member States, ECA and the OAU Secretariat in devising effective national and regional instruments and enforcement mechanisms aimed at preventing urban crime and insecurity, drug traffic and abuse, public and private sector corruption, and illicit capital flight from Africa.

(c) Cultural dimension of development

42. The third issue which is even more fundamental to Africa's modernization efforts concerns the indigenous cultural factor, or more precisely the interplay between traditional socio-cultural values and practices and modern development imperatives. It is generally agreed nowadays that development, far from being synonymous with acculturation, should both be quantitative and qualitative, encompassing political, economic, social, cultural and spiritual aspects of the human being, considered as the centre of all development. This recent switch of emphasis among development scholars and practitioners from an essentially materialistic and linear concept to a more holistic and qualitative view of the development process has refocused attention on the indispensable need to anchor development initiatives in the value structures of the beneficiary communities to guarantee their full involvement in and ownership of such initiatives. This emerging consensus is further underscored and promoted by the proceedings of several regional and international conferences organized by UNESCO on the theme "The Cultural Dimension of Development", within the framework of the World Decade for Cultural Development (1988-1997), proclaimed by the United Nations General Assembly in resolution 41/187 of 8 December 1986.

43. As explained by UNESCO\(^1\), one of the objectives of the Decade is to convince the decision-makers in the public and private sector to take account of the diversity of cultures and of cultural interaction among peoples of different countries and regions in designing strategies of action for development. In the view of UNESCO, the promotion of cultural identities throughout the world does not imply erection of barriers against external influences; on the contrary, it should encourage intercultural communication by enabling communities to strengthen their potential for innovation while enriching their cultural exchanges with others. In this vein, the modernization process involves the search for harmony between factors of development and change on the one hand and the demands for cultural continuity and renewal on the other.

44. In many African countries, where the indigenous socio-cultural value systems have suffered well-known historical setbacks, the new concept of development could be a very important guide in framing and implementing future development policies and action plans that empower communities to take charge of their development. Indeed, the increasing calls on African countries to take ownership and control of their development process confirms the criticism that much too often in the past the indigenous cultural factor was either completely ignored or assumed to be neutral in the success or failure of development programmes and projects, whether sponsored exclusively by Governments themselves or in collaboration with their external partners. Emphasis was on the economic and technical feasibility of projects and not on their socio-cultural relevance, feasibility and sustainability.

45. As a result, a disturbing dualism verging on polarization can be observed in many countries as the modernization process and indigenous value systems evolve along parallel tracks, such as in formal and informal economies; modern banking sector and traditional credit and loan societies; supermarket stores and common market places; official (European) languages and local languages; modern justice system and customary law practice; senior district officers and traditional chiefs; modern physicians and traditional healers; etc. While the indigenous institutions are vibrant and gaining ground in many countries, the institutions born of modernization (as now induced) appear to be running aground, as if incapable of internal regeneration.

46. Although such binary examples of development are by no means confined to Africa, they are particularly acute in the region, to the point of revealing crossed development visions pursued by the "developers" and the rest of indigenous society. One possible conclusion may be that Africa's development process, as now conceived and implemented, does not strike a responsive chord in the depth of civil society because the process is still not adequately rooted in the indigenous system of rationality. Only when that happens will the mass of Africa's population release all the creative energies needed to seize control of the modernization process.

47. Of particular importance in that respect are Africa's traditional family and community values of discipline, social responsibility, or socio-economic solidarity that has often provided a life-support refuge for many in times of crises. Such values could also find expression at the broader national development level. Similarly, centuries-old traditional approaches to the settlement of disputes in Africa could have relevance to on-going conflict resolution initiatives in the region, while the traditional social safety net for the young and elderly could inform the design of modern national social security policies and systems. Furthermore, modernizing traditional healthcare systems may prove more realistic, cost-effective and sustainable than building technology-intensive healthcare infrastructures from scratch, just as stimulating the growth of indigenous savings and credit societies would expand opportunities for increasing domestic savings and investments. Likewise, indigenous forms of organization, especially cooperatives, could be employed more widely than before as vehicles for modernization in general and for rural and agricultural development more particularly.

48. These are but a few of the many examples available to show how national development schemes could be founded on the bedrock of Africa's indigenous value systems, or how such schemes could integrate and amplify indigenous socio-cultural paradigms in order to provide opportunities for deliberate adaptation and innovation in the constant interplay between the imperatives of cultural and historical continuum, on the one hand, and the demands of evolution and modernization, on the other.
III. ACTIONS BY AFRICAN MEMBER STATES

49. Although NADAF is not widely known by name within government circles for lack of awareness campaigns at the African level, as explained in the following chapter, the on-going priorities and actions by African Member States are consistent with the priority areas identified in the Agenda, as observed by the Inspectors in the course of this evaluation. Below is an overview of the Inspectors' findings which, for the sake of brevity, are limited to four of the priority areas listed in NADAF. The Inspectors believe that achievements in the selected four areas would have a positive impact in all other development sectors.

A. Democratisation and political stability

50. Democratisation in varying forms and intensity is steadily gaining ground in the vast majority of countries, despite transition difficulties in some countries. Freedom of speech and of the press as well as human rights bodies, both governmental and private, are now more widespread in Africa than ever before in its history. The Inspectors subscribe to the prevailing view that current efforts by African countries to evolve democratic systems of governance based on popular will and the rule of law and order, and respectful of African value principles of dialogue, conciliation and consensus, hold the key to long-term political peace and stability as well as sustained development and prosperity at the national and regional levels.

51. The growing awareness of the peace imperative is not only exemplified by the train of democratic reforms but also by the progressive resolution of conflict situations. Following the positive trend started more than a decade ago by Zimbabwe and subsequently pursued by Namibia and Uganda, Ethiopia, South Africa and Mozambique and more lately Angola, have also finally emerged from Africa's longest and perhaps most intractable domestic conflicts. If the incipient peace process in Angola takes permanent hold as expected, the entire southern part of the continent will be rid, at long last, of more than two centuries of colonial and civil wars. That is an immense achievement for the region as a whole.

52. Various forms of new intra-African initiatives are taking shape to address on-going conflict situations. Reflecting this trend, the OAU is strengthening its conflict prevention and resolution capabilities and has become more actively involved alongside the United Nations in the mediation of domestic conflicts such as in Burundi, Liberia, Rwanda or Somalia. These peace initiatives need to be amplified in order to create favourable conditions for lasting economic development and reverse the present large-scale diversion of external resource flows into peace-keeping and humanitarian operations. In this connection the Inspectors see some merit in strengthening the OAU conflict prevention and resolution mechanism which has received policy and financial support from the United States Government, and certainly deserves the support of other members of the international community. In the same vein, there is need to strengthen also the peace-making and conflict-resolution role of the subregional organizations, as shown by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Military Observer Group (ECOMOG) in Liberia, the Southern African Development Community (SADC) in Angola and Mozambique, or the Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD) in the Sudanese civil war.

53. In order to strengthen pre-emptive approaches to conflicts within and among African countries and consolidate the democratic process and the rule of law and order, the Inspectors recommend the following measures to the General Assembly:

(a) The international community should support the OAU Peace Fund in line with the recommendations contained in another JIU report entitled "sharing Responsibilities in peace-keeping: The United Nations and regional organizations" (JIU/REP/95/4).
(b) As a corollary to the African Peace Fund, the General Assembly could recommend to the OAU to consider establishing a Pan-African Institute for Peace and Democracy, which could serve as the OAU think-tank for the analysis of root causes of conflicts and potential conflict situations, and develop norms, standards, strategies and procedures for conflict prevention and management. The Institute would also help train national personnel in preventive diplomacy, conflict management and peace building. The Institute could be twinned with UNESCO’s Culture of Peace Programme and with selected Institutes of strategic studies in Africa and abroad.

(c) The OAU could be requested to develop a framework of coordination, collaboration or division of labour with Africa’s main subregional organizations (e.g. AMU, CEMAC, COMESA, ECOWAS, IGADD, SADC, etc.) in the discharge of functions regarding preventive diplomacy, conflict resolution, peace-keeping and peace building, including human rights and election monitoring role.

(d) African Member States could be requested to consider establishing, with the technical support of UNESCO, national peace commissions (similar to national human rights commissions), with the objective of promoting a dialogue of peace, as well as durable peaceful co-existence among different ethnic, political, religious, cultural, and language groups within their territories. Alternatively, UNESCO’s National Commissions in Africa could be further strengthened for that purpose as part of UNESCO’s “Culture of Peace Programme”.

(e) The Secretary-General should explore all necessary measures for considerably strengthening the expertise and operational means of the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa and relocate it closer to the OAU Secretariat, to serve as the core contribution of the United Nations to the Pan-African Institute for Peace and Democracy proposed above, and thereby strengthen collaboration between the United Nations and the OAU in preventive diplomacy and peace-building.

B. Economic reforms

54. Progress has also been recorded in the sphere of economic reforms. About 40 countries are implementing various forms of macro-economic policy reforms designed to reposition the role of the state in the national development process and to create a more conducive environment for local private initiatives and foreign direct investment. As observed in a recent World Bank report on this subject: “Adjustment programmes may not have raised all countries’ GDP growth, exports, savings and investment rates to those of adjusting countries in other regions. But the stronger reformers in Africa have turned around the decline in economic performance and are growing for the first time in many years. There are signs that new firms are being created, that exports are growing, that private investment is picking up and that savings performance is improving”. The Managing Director of IMF, in his statement to the High Level Segment of ECOSOC in 1995, also confirmed that “twelve countries in Sub-Saharan Africa implementing growth-oriented adjustment programmes achieved annual real GDP growth in excess of 4 per cent in the past decade”.

55. The number of non-governmental organizations and micro-enterprises, especially in the informal sector, is in expansion, suggesting that economic liberalisation policies are indeed boosting self-help initiatives. Significant decentralization of development decisions and related resources and accountability to local government and district levels should further stimulate the participation of rural populations, particularly women, in the national economic mainstream, and

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ensure that Africa’s modernization process is indeed grounded on its cultural and community values.

56. The Inspectors therefore recommend that the General Assembly encourage African countries that have not yet done so to consider decentralizing development decisions and the management of development programmes and projects, as well as the necessary authority and resources, to the local government/district/community level under a national system of programme and budget performance monitoring, evaluation and accountability.

57. The widening radius of political and economic liberalization, the historic dawn of peace in Southern African countries and continuing efforts to settle other conflicts of the region, could well fulfil the fundamental preconditions for relaunching Africa’s development on a durable basis. That will be the *sine qua non* for reversing brain drain and capital flight, for optimal use of abundant human and natural resources, and for attracting and maximising the benefits of foreign investments and international development cooperation. The next stage is to consolidate and broaden present achievements so that they may produce the expected beneficial impact in other priority sectors identified in Africa’s programmes and NADAF.

**C. Subregional and regional integration**

58. This is an over-arching objective consistently spelled out in all successive regional development blueprints and in NADAF. This priority objective finds expression in the creation over the last two decades of numerous inter-country institutions, including major subregional economic groupings designed to lead the drive towards continental integration in accordance with the Abuja Treaty establishing an African Economic Community.

59. In the past five years a number of new cooperative mechanisms have come into being while some existing groupings have been adjusted or strengthened. The new ones include, for example, the East African Community (EAC) and the West African Economic and Monetary Union (UEMOA by its French acronym), which comprises West African countries of the CFA franc zone. Existing groupings that have received new charters include: the Preferential Trade Area for Eastern and Southern Africa (PTA) which has become the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA); the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) now transformed into the Southern African Development Community (SADC); and the Central African Customs and Economic Union (UDEAC), which becomes the Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa, (CEMAC in French).

60. These developments reflect a growing awareness among African countries of the imperative of integration for their economic survival in the light of economic integration experiences in the other regions of the world and the marginalisation of Africa in global economic trends. The fundamental question is whether Africa as a whole can competitively and profitably integrate the global economy, and thus exorcise its deepening marginalisation, without first of all achieving internal economic and industrial integration.

61. However, while the integration objective is clear, its effective implementation appears hobbled by a number of mutually reinforcing factors:

   (a) The lack of diffusion and application at national level of decisions adopted at regional and subregional levels with respect to economic cooperation and integration;

   (b) Overwhelming national crises and economic survival priorities that have undercut financial participation in subregional and regional cooperative institutions and projects;
(c) Persistence of economic and trade patterns inherited from the colonial period and limited diversification of national economies;

(d) Political conflicts within and among states;

(e) The broad similarity of major tradeable commodities and industrial structures;

(f) Still limited physical and economic integration within some countries;

(g) Inadequate national and transnational transport and communications infrastructures in some subregions;

(h) Incompatibility of national economic and monetary institutions and policies;

(i) Excessive customs control of cross-border trade flows even among countries within the same economic community or customs union; and

(j) The limited stimulus given thus far to the private sector and Africa's civil society at large in the pursuit of regional integration.

62. Notwithstanding the foregoing, there are strong indications that the regional peace momentum as well as political and economic reforms are also laying the groundwork for regional cooperation and integration, as illustrated by the recent adoption of legal instruments to govern trade liberalisation and expansion, monetary cooperation, industry and enterprise, human resources development, science and technology, environment, etc. The next stage is to implement these instruments at the level of each country by incorporating them into national legislation and enforcing their implementation at the level of each department.

63. Another positive trend noted in the 1994 OECD report entitled "Development Cooperation" is the growing recognition by members of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the multifaceted benefits of cooperation and integration in the developing countries, which create more efficient and larger markets and thereby contribute to expand trade and investment flows, including transfer of technology and management skills. Regional integration schemes are also increasingly recognized to contribute to peace and stability within integrated communities, and to provide incentives for pursuing and consolidating macro-economic policy reforms. For these various reasons, according to the OECD report, DAC members now see the necessity of including a regional dimension in their development cooperation strategies (see pages 48-51).

64. The Inspectors believe that more could be done to transform Africa's subregional organizations into locomotives of integration processes. Some of the approaches likely to strengthen the cohesiveness of these subregional organizations could include, for example, periodic ministerial or director-level meetings of the member countries of each subregional community in the different sectors with a view to:

(a) adopting common political positions in international fora and in negotiations with the international donor community;

(b) harmonising national development plan and budget cycles, macro-economic reform programmes, science and technology policies, monetary and investment promotion policies as well as company laws designed to boost the role of market forces in subregional economic cooperation and integration;
(c) evolving mutually reinforcing industrial development policies and structures, and
facilitating the establishment of joint projects and corporations to speed up implementation of
programmes of the African Transport and Communications Decade and Industrial Development
Decade;

(d) developing common strategies with the private sector and donor community in the
mobilisation of resources for the construction and maintenance of motorable roads linking
countries of each subregion.

65. The Inspectors recommend the following measures that could translate into concrete
actions the political intent of African governments to strengthen their collaboration towards
common development objectives:

(a) The convening by the OAU of annual meetings of the executive heads of
subregional organizations to enable them to exchange experiences and strengthen coordination
and complementarities among overlapping institutions within the same subregion, such as in
West Africa or East and Southern Africa;

(b) Strengthening political unity within each subregional community through the creation
of:

(i) collective defence and security systems, as well as other mechanisms for
promoting good neighbourliness, peace and stability;

(ii) community parliaments, as already envisaged in the new treaties of CEMAC and
ECOWAS;

(iii) joint diplomatic and consular services and representations, which would have
major cost benefits.

(c) Subregional integration organizations should also be endowed with the necessary
legal capacity to:

(i) take decisions which are legally binding on or have direct applicability in their
member countries as provided for in the AEC Abuja Treaty;

(ii) develop autonomous sources of revenue independent of appropriations by
member countries (as stipulated for example in the new ECOWAS treaty) and
cooperate directly with partners of the international donor community in the
mobilization of resources for integration projects.

(d) Each African Member State could:

(i) formulate a coherent national policy and strategy on subregional and regional
cooperation in particular and south-south cooperation in general, in order to
ensure that national policies and development plans are consistent with the
objectives of subregional and regional integration;

(ii) establish national focal points, separate ministries on inter-ministerial committees,
as already done in some countries, to oversee and speed up the implementation
at national level of integration and south-south cooperation policies and
programmes.
D. Women in development

66. The contribution of women to the economic and social components of the African society is a widely recognized reality. Their presence and participation are conspicuous in many sectors of life in Africa and no basic activity in the economic and social texture of African countries could be envisaged without taking that factor into account.

67. It is worth noting that NADAF converges with the priorities identified in the African Platform for Action adopted at the Fifth African Regional Conference on women, held in Dakar in November 1994, preparatory to the Beijing conference on women in September 1995. The comparison of the two documents, though necessarily synthetic, may be useful for the cause of integration of women in the development process. The critical areas can be identified as follows:

(i) POVERTY - It is presumed that one third of the African population live in abject poverty and the burden is felt particularly by women. The worsening crisis is causing a "feminization" of poverty. Food security is one of the priorities of NADAF. Without a more institutionally organized participation of women in rural life and a recognition of their indispensable contribution to the production of food, the discrimination African women are suffering cannot be overcome. It is necessary that Governments take dynamic action in favour of the economic empowerment of women and their increased participation in rural production and trade as part of the struggle against poverty.

(ii) ILLITERACY - The adult female literacy rate in Africa is the lowest in the world. There are still too many impediments to the access of women to education. The emphasis put by NADAF on the campaign against illiteracy concerns equally women and men. The approach to education in Africa is in fact predominantly male-dominated and this could be changed radically. The enormous feminine potential of the continent can be mobilized for the benefit of Africa only through the full participation of women in the educational system.

(iii) HEALTH - Statistics show that Africa has the highest fertility rate and the highest maternal mortality rate. Health care and related services for women should be given priority attention by governments. They should allocate a greater share of resources to that sector for the promotion and protection of women. The integrity of the African family has been undermined by massive urban migrations leaving the burden of the family on the shoulders of the mother, thereby multiplying female-headed households. Governments should speed up action to subsidize health services and supply family planning, information, education and connected services.

(iv) LAND AND PROPERTY RIGHTS - In many African countries, legislation, traditions, and century-old practices prevent women from inheriting and exercising fundamental civil rights like the right to own property. The commitment of Africans to the international community of donors is linked to the modernization of the internal State structures and good governance, a commitment which is reflected in NADAF. It is therefore necessary that laws and rules be amended to ensure the protection of women's rights and the correction of existing disparities in matters of marriage, divorce, family management, and inheritance.

(v) POLITICAL EMPOWERMENT - Despite the progress of democracy in Africa, the participation of women in political life and in the decision-making process is very limited. One of the main priorities of NADAF is the democratization process and
the full implementation of the various African instruments and declarations on the subject. It is therefore indispensable that measures be taken to assure an adequate presence of women at different political and administrative levels as well as in African regional organizations and international institutions. Women should also be involved in decisions of specific concern or interest to them.

(vi) WOMEN'S RIGHTS - The Convention on the elimination of all forms of discrimination against women has been signed by almost all African States. Other international documents like the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights are very specific on the defence and promotion of women and girls. NADAF states that Africa is committed to ensuring equality of opportunities for women at all levels. It is necessary to multiply and strengthen tools designed to monitor the execution by governments of their international and national obligations to combat discrimination against women.

(vii) WOMEN AND PEACE - Peace is an indispensable prerequisite for development as pointed out in NADAF. As a consequence of conflicts, 35 per cent of the world refugee population is in Africa and 80 per cent of them are women and children. In addition, the number of internally displaced persons, especially women and children, has dramatically increased. It is necessary that women be more involved in peace processes starting from being peace educators inside the family and that their presence in peace-keeping and peace-building initiatives in Africa be strengthened.

68. The above assessment of on-going efforts by African Governments in the implementation of NADAF priorities suggests systemic trends towards the future stability and economic resurgence of the continent. These trends are particularly evident in the areas of democratic reforms and economic liberalisation programmes as well as in the progressive settlement of the region's most economically disruptive conflicts and the establishment of the necessary institutional foundation for economic cooperation and integration. Because success in these fundamental areas will have direct positive impacts in all other sectors, particularly the social development sector in which women play a major role, the Inspectors conclude that African Member States are indeed on the right track in the progressive implementation of their commitments under NADAF. The extent to which they are supported in these efforts by the international community and the United Nations system more particularly is reviewed in the following chapters.
IV. THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY

69. Although NADAF stresses the prime responsibility of African governments and peoples for their development, it no less emphasizes the support required from the international community. The shared responsibility of external partners for Africa's political and economic renewal can be traced to the fact that much of the development history of the continent in the past few centuries has been shaped indelibly by external political and economic forces.

70. Besides the historical rationale, international support for Africa also serves the enlightened self-interest of the world community. Significantly increased standards of living and purchasing power in Africa should further stimulate global trade and investment flows. Similarly, eradication of the root causes of conflicts and poverty would preclude future and probably recurrent outlays of significant international resources for peace-keeping and humanitarian operations in the region.

71. Conversely, if Africa's compound crisis is not effectively reversed, its likely impact in terms of political and social ruptures, swelling refugee movements, environmental destruction, or spreading epidemics, would surely spill over African borders. Therefore, a robust international initiative for Africa in its present political and economic transition beckons as a pre-emptive imperative and not a charitable enterprise for the international community.

72. The commitments stipulated in NADAF for the global community include in particular the search for a durable solution of Africa's debt problem, provision of adequate resources to strengthen economic reforms, and support for the diversification of African economies and commodities. These key commitments have received further emphasis in two follow-up General Assembly resolutions on NADAF, namely 48/214 of 23 December 1993 and 49/142 of 23 December 1994.

73. The same commitments have been recalled in some international conferences and intergovernmental meetings, such as the Tokyo International Conference on African Development in October in 1993, the Copenhagen World Summit on Social Development in March 1995, or Meeting of the High Level Segment of the Economic and Social Council in July 1995. ACC members have equally expressed deep concern, in the context of the Secretary-General's Special Initiative on Africa, over the external constraints that threaten to cripple the continent's economic recovery and development.

74. In spite of the aforementioned General assembly resolutions and numerous discussions and proposals in various fora on international cooperative actions required to address more effectively the African debt problem, promote resource flows to the continent, and support diversification of its economies, the Inspectors have yet to discern concrete movement on these issues, except for debt treatment (see below). Yet, there seems to be a general consensus that fulfillment by the international community of its commitments under NADAF would definitely bolster the positive political and economic transition under way in much of Africa, and brighten the region's prospects for rapid economic recovery and growth.

75. That also was one of the conclusions of the debate on African development at the High Level Segment of the Economic and Social Council in July 1995: "If national efforts are not supported by the international community, reforms undertaken thus far cannot be sustained. It should not be forgotten that the consensus on UN-NADAF rests on the full support of the international community based on genuine partnership. As African Governments have undertaken courageous reforms, there is both a moral and an economic and financial obligation on the part of the international community to assist Africa" (E/1995/117 of 26 July 1995, paragraph 13).
76. It is, however, noteworthy that the discussion at the High Level Segment of ECOSOC did not result in any practical, long-term undertaking by the international community to deal decisively with the external constraints on Africa's development. Nor did NADAF receive the attention and support that could have been expected from ECOSOC. This unsatisfactory outcome was echoed by the disappointment voiced by some delegations during the discussion of the report of ECOSOC in the Second Committee of the Assembly at its Fiftieth Session. Some of the critical constraints on Africa's economic recovery, which the international community undertook to address in the context of NADAF, are briefly discussed below.

A. Debt burden

77. Some progress has been recorded lately on the debt problem. The Naples terms recently adopted by the Paris Club constitute a welcome step forward. Under these terms, the poorest and most indebted countries would, among other things, be entitled to 67 per cent reduction of debt service, compared to 50 per cent under the enhanced Toronto terms.

78. However, as judged by UNCTAD in its 1995 "Trade and Development Report", the implementation of the Naples terms has been hesitant. "The eligibility criteria have unduly restricted the number of countries benefitting from most favourable treatment. Furthermore, the budgetary, legal, or policy restrictions on debt reduction faced by some creditors risk preventing the much needed stock treatment from becoming a reality. Besides, the scope of debt eligible for reduction has been narrowed considerably. While the Naples terms may significantly reduce the debt service ratio for over half of the 33 low-income countries studied, the ratio for many others will remain too high" (see introductory overview, page II).

79. The Naples terms are, however, only one among several other debt reduction strategies currently under active review in different quarters. The World Bank, for example, is considering creation of a Multilateral Debt Facility to cover principal and service payments on multilateral loans to the poorest countries. Other proposals that could relieve Africa's unsustainable debt burden include the sale of a portion of IMF gold reserves for debt reduction, or using part of a new SDR allocation to alleviate multilateral debt. The Secretary-General's Special Initiative on Africa also proposes a set of measures for dealing with the African debt crisis. All these innovative approaches, including those specified in NADAF itself, such as debt-equity swaps, conversion of debt into export-oriented joint ventures, debt buy-backs, debt for environment schemes, or debt for poverty alleviation strategies, deserve to be supported and translated into practical actions by members of the international community.

B. Resource flows

80. NADAF had envisaged a minimum net ODA for Africa of US$ 30 billion in 1992, increasing thereafter by 4 per cent per annum in real terms, to undergird economic reforms and enable African countries to achieve an average annual growth rate of real GNP of at least 6 per cent in the course of the 1990s. However, actual ODA flows to the region have thus far fallen widely short of the NADAF-prescribed target, declining from about US$ 22 billion in 1992 to US$ 19.7 billion in 1993 and stagnating since then. The critical development finance gap currently facing Africa is illustrated by the considerable discrepancy between the region's aggregate resource requirements of US$ 60 billion per annum estimated by the ECA and the World Bank, and actual aggregate net resource flows (ODA and other sources) of US$ 23 billion in 1990, dropping to US$ 21.7 billion in 1993.

81. These dismal resource trends may suggest that NADAF, at mid-course, has so far not succeeded to rally the international community any more than did its ill-fated predecessor, UNPAAERD. Peace-keeping and humanitarian operations, the swell of which was hardly
anticipated by NADAF, have clearly attracted more resources since 1991 than the priority development sectors outlined in NADAF, as discussed in the next chapter. The Inspectors detect no indication that the present resource outlook is likely to improve significantly in the near future.

82. Viewed in a wider context, Africa and NADAF could well become casualties of new worldwide trends in the supply of development capital since the start of the present decade. Post Cold War realities have introduced stiff competition for a globally contracting pool of development resources. Many new claimants to official and private development finance have emerged in other parts of the world. Meanwhile, public aid budgets are declining; donors have tightened conditionality and selectivity in the allocation of development aid, while market forces and foreign direct investments more particularly have won general recognition as the driving force of economic growth and development. Further still, the disappointing results of past development aid, especially in Africa, seem to have engendered aid fatigue if not downright scepticism about the effectiveness of aid.

83. At first view, these new realities do not augur well for Africa's economic recovery since the region is still much more dependent for its development on ODA than any other region of the world, and continues to be sidetracked by foreign direct investment flows and commercial bank loans. But a more upbeat and long-term view of the situation points to an historic opportunity for African countries to finally assume sovereign responsibility for their development, at country and regional levels, through wider application of home-grown reforms and self-reliant strategies unencumbered by the vagaries and conditionality attendant on ODA flows. By so doing, African countries would be confronting, as they should, the hard fact that their present excessive dependence on external development aid is not likely to be sustained for long by the major donor countries which increasingly take the view that trade is better than aid and will ultimately replace aid in all likelihood.

84. Africa's internal resources, which are far from negligible, could still be harnessed more extensively and efficiently to rekindle economic growth. Only by progressively substituting their dependence on external aid with maximum reliance on indigenous resources can African countries expect to exercise effective ownership, control and coordination of their development programmes and projects.

85. It would, therefore, seem indispensable for African Governments to seek to plug the looming resource gap through considerably increased mobilization of their domestic and regional resources which should provide the main current for economic recovery and growth. The creative stimulus required for internal generation of development resources and processes is already being provided by the positive political and economic reforms noted in the previous chapter. However, more could be done to stretch Africa's productive capabilities and endowments.

86. Africa's political class in general includes examples of high standards of probity in the management of public affairs; such examples could become a general leadership norm for countries of the region. The entire civil society should be galvanized to take command of the development process through empowering horizontal strategies such as political, economic and administrative devolution to the district/community level. The military could be retooled to spearhead public works and reconstruction programmes. Macro-economic reforms could aim to boost entrepreneurship and production structures. Intra-regional trade and investments could be increasingly promoted and expanded. Opportunities for income generation could still be broadened. Justice systems and public administrations could be reformed to serve national development interests and goals more rigorously. Domestic savings rates could also be further increased, revenue collection optimised, and public expenditures more efficiently targeted to productive sectors and poverty alleviation programmes.
87. Recent examples within and outside of Africa suggest that global resource flows, both official and private, have more frequently tended to follow, rather than precede, internal efforts to generate resources and rationalize the fundamentals of domestic economic policy within a reliable and predictable context of political stability and effective governance. The lesson appears to be that optimal husbandry of domestic resources is a precondition not only for attracting external resources in an increasingly competitive world context, but also for the productive use of external resources. Viewed in that light, the present external resource crisis facing Africa could well be a blessing in disguise by prodding countries of the region to muster their innermost potential for self-reliant development.

88. The Inspectors observe, however, that self-reliance can be pursued at present only as a long-term goal and not as a proximate possibility. The new institutions of democratic and responsive governance still being established must be enabled to sink firm roots in civil society. The production structures as well as technological and institutional capacities required for internally self-propelling development must first be established and strengthened. Skilled human resources must be developed. Physical and social infrastructures must either be repaired or built from scratch. Perpetually deteriorating terms of trade need to be reversed through improved pricing mechanisms and market access for Africa's major exports. In all these areas, Africa's external partners have a major role to play in supporting the drive towards ultimate development self-reliance.

89. The Marshall Plan that followed the end of the Second World War is perhaps the best example of how official development aid can leverage private-sector investments to enable an entire region to regain economic growth and self-reliance. A more recent example is provided by the substantial flow of public and private resources to countries of Central and Eastern Europe to guarantee the success of their economic restructuring programmes.

90. While many African countries have undertaken a similar restructuring of their economies in line with NADAF commitments, only few of them have thus far received adequate external support. The replenishment of soft loan facilities most relevant to the region, such as the International Development Association and the African Development Fund, is still to garner consensus. Although ODA is declining the resources available could be applied more optimally to support African reforms.

91. For example, bilateral donors could more tightly coordinate their aid and disbursement policies, and synchronize their interventions in high priority areas of reform agreed with countries of the region and multilateral donors. Similarly, greater impact could be obtained and wasteful overlap reduced if the multilateral financial institutions could further strengthen collaboration and synchronize actions with the United Nations development system in support of NADAF priorities, especially in macro-economic and sectoral policy reforms. The numerous conditionalities attached to aid disbursements could be further simplified to speed up the flow of resources and facilitate efficient programme coordination and management by host Governments.

92. Following the example of the Government of Japan, which sponsored and hosted in October 1993 the Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD), and that of the Government of Indonesia which hosted in 1994 the TICAD follow-up meeting on the Bandung Framework for Asia-Africa Cooperation, other members of the international community, particularly members of the Development Assistance Committee, could take similar initiatives to promote and leverage private investment flows to the African region and expand home market access for African exports by lifting trade restrictions and adopting other special measures designed to raise Africa's export earnings.
C. Commodity sector

93. African economies predominantly hinge on the commodity sector (primary production activities in agriculture, forestry, fisheries, and mining). Most countries of the region derive over 90 per cent of their export earnings from a very narrow range of commodities, whose prices on the world market declined sharply throughout the eighties. For example, the prices of coffee and cocoa, two major commodities of the region, slumped by 70 per cent, while cotton, palm oil and sisal registered an average price decline of close to 50 per cent. As a result, Africa's agricultural terms of trade plunged from 100 in 1980 to 64 by the end of the decade. The aggregate loss in export earnings for the region as a whole was estimated at more than US$ 50 billion in the final review of UNPAAERD in 1990.

94. Such a considerable loss in the purchasing power of Africa's key export commodities underscores the impact that external constraints and the international environment generally can exert on the region's economic recovery and growth prospects, irrespective of positive or negative domestic factors. These factors aside, there seems to be a close correlation between the region's worsening crisis in the eighties and the drastic drop in its commodity export earnings during the same period, due to adverse fluctuations in international market prices over which African countries, like all developing countries, have no control whatsoever.

95. Indeed, Africa's worsening debt burden, diminishing resource inflows from official and commercial sources, and plunging commodity export earnings, form a single gordian knot that cannot be cut by African countries alone but only through a brand new charter for cooperation between Africa and its main external trading partners. Without significantly improved performance of the region's commodity sector, and without substantially reduced trade protectionist measures and commodity export subsidies in the developed countries, Africa may never be able to generate the resources needed to pay off its debts and compensate for declining resource inflows. Thus the long-term solution to Africa's development crisis lies at the heart of its commodity sector, which calls for bold new departures within Africa itself, but also at the level of the international community.

96. The General Assembly has since 1989 addressed the problem of African commodities, and has given it prominence in resolutions 48/214 and 49/142 on NADAF implementation. The measures recommended in these resolutions essentially endorse the recommendations of a 1993 report prepared by FAO at the request of the Secretary-General, entitled "Need for and feasibility of the establishment of a diversification fund for Africa's commodities" (A/48/335).

97. This report recommended that:

(a) a diversification facility for African commodities be set up in the African Development Bank for an initial period of three to four years with resources of US$ 50 - 75 million;

(b) national diversification councils be established, comprising representatives of Government, the private sector (including non-governmental organizations), the scientific community and multilateral organizations, to generate a stream of project proposals that fit into national diversification programmes and priorities.

98. A follow-up report by the secretary-General on the same subject (A/48/914) elaborated on the ways and means of implementing the above recommendations, with emphasis on actions required at national, regional and international levels in support of diversification of Africa's commodity sector. However, it seems at this stage that establishment of a diversification facility at the African Development Bank is still to secure the firm support of relevant members of the
international donor community, as recommended in General Assembly resolution 49/142, beyond the consensus that the private sector should be fully involved, and that use be made of existing international funding institutions to finance commodity diversification programmes and projects.

99. To vitalise the commodity sector, however, large-scale and long-term investments are required in many countries, especially in national road networks, which existing financial institutions have not always been able or willing to finance. For example, many road project studies developed to date in the context of the United Nations Transport and Communication Decade for Africa have still to attract adequate funding from official and private sources within the international community. Commodity diversification will remain a non-starter without efficient nation-wide and intra-regional transport and communication infrastructures, which are a vital pre-condition for attracting substantial investments to energize the commodity sector.

100. There is no doubt that increased horizontal and vertical diversification of Africa's commodities will, among other benefits, enable countries of the region to take full advantage of new market access opportunities under the Uruguay Round Agreements, and to cushion the impact of the possible erosion of trade preferences enjoyed under the Lomé Convention and the Generalized System of Preferences. Examples within and outside of Africa do show that countries that made an early start in developing and diversifying their commodity sector and economic base in general are today among the strongest economic performers.

101. However, focus on diversification per se appears to have unduly deflected attention from the serious imperfections in the functioning of international commodity markets, particularly the pricing mechanisms that generally reward traders and penalize producers. The extent to which implementation of the Uruguay Round terms will address commodity market distortions is still open to question. Whatever the implementation outcome, however, tariff barriers in reconstructed or disguised forms will continue to hit African commodity exports, and tariff escalation practices by the developed countries in respect of value-added exports from the developing regions will continue to obstruct vertical diversification of Africa's commodity sector. International commodity agreements are not all working satisfactorily, especially those for coffee and cocoa. Price stabilization schemes are either inadequate or function poorly, and there is still considerable room for more active cooperation between producer and consumer countries to ensure a degree of predictability in the operation of international commodity markets, and some stability for the income needed by African farming communities to ameliorate their living standards.

102. Without firm action at the level of the international community to deal comprehensively with these more fundamental issues of world commodity markets and prices, no degree of diversification undertaken by African countries is likely to reap the expected benefits, and export-oriented foreign investments in the commodity sector will continue to be limited by investors' doubts about export market stability and tariff barriers. It can be observed, for example, that African countries diversifying into fresh fruit and vegetable exports are also faced with the same problems in international commodity trade. Yet the fresh fruit and vegetable sector, in view of its dynamic growth, seems to offer perhaps the best opportunity for horizontal diversification of Africa's commodity base.

103. For diversification into new products to work as it should, more world market discipline, transparency and stability would be indispensable. More structured cooperation between producers and consumers is needed, especially in the areas of further tariff reductions or elimination, information sharing, market research, promotion and development, to ensure that commodity diversification is indeed justified and driven by external market demands and trends, as well as by appropriate enabling measures by Africa's major trading partners. Furthermore, emphasis on national commodity diversification councils should not obscure the more urgent need for national export and quality control organizations managed directly by producers'
associations or cooperatives, in order to guarantee for African producers direct access to regional and global markets.

104. Overall, the diversification debate thus far has tended to give only short shrift to the fundamental nature of the commodity sector to the economies of the region. In its report entitled "Africa's Commodity Problems: Towards a Solution", published in 1990, the Expert Group established in 1989 by the Secretary-General to study this issue, noted that "it is the failure in the commodity sector which has been central to the economic crisis facing Africa -as both a contributor and a casualty".

105. The report urged African countries to formulate and implement, with the support of the international community, a national commodity strategy within the context of a long-term planning perspective and taking into account the macro-economic environment, the resource needs, the requirements for human resources development, research and technological development and the potential benefits from regional cooperation, etc. The report also called specifically on the multilateral financial institutions, UNDP, ECA, UNCTAD, FAO, and UNIDO to assist in formulating, implementing and mobilizing resources for such a strategy in each African country.

106. Like other General Assembly initiatives and resolutions on Africa, the above-mentioned report by the Expert Group, which had been set up at the request of the Assembly, has apparently produced no follow-up action within or outside of Africa, besides the narrow discussion of commodity diversification, which is only one of the Expert Group's several pertinent recommendations. The Inspectors believe that the need for national commodity strategies is sufficiently important and pressing to warrant a fresh look by African countries and the international community, including in particular those organizations of the system mentioned in the above paragraph.

107. Such strategies should form the centrepiece of national long-term development policies and plans of action appropriately rationalized within a subregional context in order to foster intercountry complementarities as well as economies of investment and scale. The strategies should provide the policy objectives of macro-economic reforms and sectoral development programmes. Policies and investments in the areas of transport and communication infrastructures, capacity building, science and technology, trade promotion, rural development, private sector development, industrialization, energy and natural resources, environmental protection, intra-regional cooperation and integration, etc, should all aim to revitalise the agricultural commodity sector which is the foundation of African economies and the ultimate guarantor of food security and improved living standards for the majority of African populations.

108. In a nutshell, what happens in the African commodity sector will largely determine the success or failure of the region's economic recovery and development, and the outcome of poverty alleviation efforts that the Copenhagen World Summit on Social Development has hoisted as a major priority for the international community.
V. THE UNITED NATIONS SYSTEM

A. Overview

109. In the course of their field visits to African countries in connection with this evaluation, the Inspectors were surprised to note the near total lack of awareness about NADAF among United Nations system country teams four years after this programme was adopted. This situation was aptly summed up as follows in a letter addressed by one Resident Coordinator to the Inspectors:

"I have had the opportunity to consult with my colleagues and regret to have to report the almost total lack of knowledge of UN-NADAF among the representatives of the United Nations system at country level.

"Although some of us had read about UN-NADAF from the initial brochures and reports of the meetings chaired by the Secretary-General, none of us had realized that specific action was required of us at country level. As one UNIDO colleague concluded, 'I have worked quite a lot on UN-NADAF at Headquarters, but doubt whether I would have heard of it had I been a Country Director. This appears to be typical of the situation in other organizations.

"Clearly, something has gone seriously wrong. I do not know who was entrusted with the responsibility for ensuring that we were all in the picture and encouraged to play our role. Whoever it was, globally or within individual organizations, has evidently not managed to convey the urgency and importance of the initiative to us...."

110. One reason for this odd situation, as will be seen below, is the failure of the United Nations Secretariat units specifically charged with NADAF to promote awareness about the programme within the United Nations system and more particularly, at the field level in Africa. Another reason is that although NADAF was endorsed by the policy organs of some organizations of the system, such as UNDP, UNICEF, FAO and WHO, no concrete action appears to have been taken by these and other organizations to forcefully promote it at the country level. The Inspectors found that the country representatives had received no specific instructions from their respective headquarters regarding NADAF implementation.

111. However, replies by the headquarters of the organizations to the JIU questionnaire for this evaluation revealed that, although their programmes for Africa generally make no specific mention of NADAF, they are broadly consistent with NADAF priority objectives. Virtually all organizations have been assigning priority to Africa since the mid-eighties, well before the adoption of NADAF, and currently allocate a substantial proportion of their resources for operational activities for development to the region.

112. The increasing priority attention that Africa is receiving within the United Nations system is probably best illustrated by the several meetings that have been held since 1994 by the ACC at the level of executive heads to review new approaches to the African economic crisis. These meetings have focused essentially on ways and means of translating into action the Secretary-General's Special Initiative on Africa, which was still in draft form at the time this report was being finalised.

B. United Nations Secretariat

113. The Secretary-General, who in principle assumes overall responsibility for the promotion of NADAF, has taken some useful initiatives to promote international support for Africa. Besides his many public statements in different fora on Africa's development challenge, he established in
1992 a Panel of High-level Personalities on African development. His recent "Special Initiative on Africa", mentioned above, projects Africa as a "test case for international cooperation for development and for the United Nations".

114. However, the Secretary-General's commendable initiatives on Africa do not seem to be fully served uniformly by all parts of his Secretariat, and more specifically by the institutional arrangements established under Programme 45 of the United Nations Medium Term Plan for the period 1992-1997 to promote awareness and implementation of NADAF. The Inspectors' field findings leave no doubt that some elements of those arrangements are ineffective as exemplified by the widespread ignorance of NADAF among the United Nations system country teams in Africa. These arrangements are described below.

115. Programme 45 entitled "Africa: critical economic situation, recovery and development" in the United Nations medium-term plan for the period 1992-1997, as revised, was established pursuant to General Assembly resolution 45/253 of 21 December 1990. The original objective of the programme was to promote implementation of UN-PAAERD by the international community. Following the adoption in 1991 of NADAF, the programme was revised to reflect the thrust of the New Agenda, and was subsequently reaffirmed by the Assembly in resolutions 48/214 (1993) and 49/142 (1994) on NADAF.

116. In terms of structure, the programme is subdivided into three subprogrammes:

- Subprogramme 1: Mobilization of resources;
- Subprogramme 2: Monitoring, assessment, and follow-up of the implementation of action programmes, including their financial aspects;
- Subprogramme 3: Campaign for global awareness of the critical economic situation in Africa.

117. The financial resources allocated to the different subprogrammes, as well as implementing Secretariat units, as provided in the United Nations Programme Budget for the biennium 1996-1997 (Section 7B), are the following:
## Structure and resources of programme 45

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subprogrammes</th>
<th>Implementing Unit and location</th>
<th>Staff posts</th>
<th>Other expenditures US$ Thousands</th>
<th>Resource distribution</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>US$ thousands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>OSCAL (DPCSD) New York</td>
<td>one D-2</td>
<td>574</td>
<td>2,331.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>one D-1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>one P-5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>one P-4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>two P-3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>four GS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>IATF (ECA) Addis Ababa, Ethiopia</td>
<td>one P-5</td>
<td>254.2</td>
<td>611.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>one P-3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>ARU (DPI) New York</td>
<td>one P-5</td>
<td>421.7</td>
<td>1,077.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>one P-3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>two GS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>ten professionals and above six GS</td>
<td></td>
<td>1,249.9</td>
<td>4,020.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
118. The apportionment of these resources by object of expenditure is shown below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Object</th>
<th>1996-1997 estimate (US$ thousands)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Staff posts</td>
<td>2,691.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other staff costs</td>
<td>320.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consultants and experts</td>
<td>449.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Travel</td>
<td>212.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contractual services</td>
<td>309.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General operating expenses</td>
<td>16.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supplies and materials</td>
<td>21.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>4,020.4</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% staff, experts, consultants and related costs</td>
<td>91.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other costs</td>
<td>8.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

119. To the above should be added extrabudgetary funds, especially from UNDP under a project promoting NADAF implementation, amounting to close to US$ 1 million. Overall 85 per cent of the programme resources are currently allocated to New York based Secretariat units, namely OSCAL (DPCSD) and ARU (DPI), and 15 per cent to IATF in ECA. Another preliminary observation is that the resources allocated to the programme are used more to finance personnel costs (staff, consultants and experts) than field-level operational activities directly supportive of NADAF implementation by African Governments and United Nations system organizations in Africa.

120. This apparent anomaly in the use of the programme's resources, which may explain why NADAF is hardly known in the field, can be traced to the original objective of the programme under UN-PAARED, which placed more emphasis on external actions in support of Africa than on mobilizing African civil society to rise up to the region's development challenge as a precondition for more effective external engagement. This original flaw of strategy was regrettably not corrected following the adoption of NADAF. By placing primary responsibility for the development of Africa on African Governments and peoples, NADAF ipso facto required that supportive institutional units and resources be refocused sharply on actions within Africa.

121. The functions assigned in the 1994-1995 biennium to the three subprogrammes and corresponding units can be condensed as follows:

**Subprogramme 1: Office of the Special Coordinator for Africa and the Least Developed Countries (OSCAL)**

(a) Promoting the inclusion of the New Agenda in major international development policies and strategies;

(b) Coordinating responses by the United Nations system at the policy and operational level;

(c) Encouraging the international community to translate its commitments into concrete actions, particularly with respect to increased financial flows to Africa, debt relief, and economic and commodity diversification;
(d) Providing the necessary support to intergovernmental deliberations on African economic recovery and development, and supporting ad hoc group meetings, including meetings of the Panel of High-Level Personalities on African development and OAU-United Nations system meetings;

(e) Follow-up to the Tokyo International Conference on African Development, and organization of workshops and round-table conferences on NADAF priorities; etc.

122. **Subprogramme 2: United Nations Inter-Agency Task Force on African economic recovery and development (IATF).**

(a) Coordination and harmonization at the regional level of the contributions of various United Nations organizations and specialized agencies to the implementation of the New Agenda;

(b) Monitoring and follow-up of the achievements by African countries in the implementation of the New Agenda, and monitoring of key factors of African economic recovery and development, including the resource aspects, debt and commodity issues;

(c) Strengthening system-wide and regional consultations with a view to the implementation of the System-wide Plan of Action for African Economic Recovery and Development;

(d) Preparation of documentation for the mid-term review of the New Agenda;

(e) Monitoring and assessing the support of the international community to African economic recovery and development, with special attention to the needs of the least developed countries; etc.

123. **Subprogramme 3: African Recovery Unit (ARU/DPI)**

(a) Highlighting the critical situation in Africa as a major feature of the ongoing international agenda through dissemination of information materials for the purpose of increasing awareness of the situation in the region;

(b) Publication of "Africa Recovery" and other information materials;

(c) Maintaining liaison with target groups such as parliamentarians, nongovernmental organizations, media representatives, trade unions and academic institutions in order to gain support for NADAF implementation; etc.

**General assessment of Programme 45:**

124. The above summary of programme functions gives an impression of overlap among the three subprogramme units. For example, both OSCAL and IATF have a role in policy and operational coordination within and outside the system, resource mobilization, preparation of follow-up reviews, debt and commodity issues. OSCAL and ARU are also both engaged in information production and dissemination activities. In addition, the functions assigned to the three units appear to be those that their respective parent Departments (DPCSD (OSCAL), ECA (IATF secretariat) and DPI (ARU) would statutorily be expected to perform in any case in their required support for NADAF, exactly as other Secretariat entities like DDSMS and DESIPA, or United Nations programmes and funds are expected to do even without specific and identifiable NADAF units. Moreover, the central resource mobilization role assigned to OSCAL falls squarely
within the mandate of UNDP, besides the fact that the World Bank and other system organizations are equally engaged in resource mobilization on behalf of Africa. Also, the issues of commodities and debt are covered by ECA and the UNCTAD secretariat which has specialized organizational units to deal with these problems.

125. Furthermore, while the functions of subprogramme 2 (IATF) have effectively reinforced the inter-agency coordination role of ECA in line with General Assembly resolution 32/197 which enhanced the coordination and leadership roles of the commissions in their respective regions, the functions of subprogramme 1 (OSCAL) and subprogramme 3 (ARU) should devolve to each organization of the system in its support for NADAF within its field of competence in order to ensure that NADAF priorities fully permeate the programmes and activities of all ACC members without exception. The Inspectors observe in this connection that whereas General Assembly resolution 46/151, which launched NADAF, did not specifically call for additional institutional arrangements to promote its implementation by the system, it did pointedly invite, in paragraphs 39 and 40, the entire United Nations system to "play a major role in the implementation of the international Agenda".

126. The general impression, therefore, is that OSCAL and ARU in particular duplicate the constitutional responsibilities and functions that should be carried out more professionally by the organizations of the system in promoting global awareness of NADAF, devising special programmes and mobilizing resources for its implementation. The existence of additional NADAF organizational arrangements within the Secretariat seems to have had the counterproductive effect of deflecting or diluting the responsibility and accountability of each and every constituent of the System for NADAF implementation. Thus if the lack of adequate awareness of NADAF at the field level in Africa could be attributed more directly to underperformance by NADAF units within the Secretariat, responsibility for the ignorance is also shared by the rest of the System.

Assessment of the performance of individual subprogramme units

127. Office of the Special Coordinator for Africa and the LDCs (OSCAL): In its comments to the JIU, OSCAL describes its mandate as relating to the "promotion of NADAF in global political processes at Headquarters, including such events as the ECA Conference of Ministers for Economic Development and Planning, the UNDP Governing council, the UNICEF Board, the World Social Summit, the Fourth International Conference for Women, etc.". In addition, OSCAL has published a UN-NADAF brochure in 20,000 copies as well as other information materials which, according to OSCAL, were widely distributed within and outside the system. Additionally, OSCAL services meetings of CPC on African issues as well as those of the Panel of High-Level Personalities on African development. It also prepares various types of NADAF follow-up reports and participates in meetings on African development issues.

128. As observed earlier, the publication and dissemination of NADAF related information materials and the performance of other public relations functions, as described above, should properly devolve to the information service of each organization of the System and, within the United Nations Secretariat, to DPI even without the "African Recovery Unit", as well as to ECA which operates a Pan African Development Information Service (PADIS). This comment equally applies to the promotion of NADAF in "global political processes", a function which probably belongs more to African delegations at different duty stations than to Secretariat staff. Further still, the servicing of CPC meetings on African issues and those of the Panel of High Level Personalities, which are very few in any given year, could be more professionally done by ECA which has the institutional expertise for that purpose. Judging from the fact that resource flows to Africa have dropped sharply in recent past, the question arises as to whether OSCAL has at all performed its central function of resource mobilization for Africa, or whether it could realistically
perform that function better than UNDP, the multilateral financial institutions or other system organizations engaged in Africa.

129. To justify its role and location at Headquarters, OSCAL argues that NADAF is not a regional (African) programme to be managed by ECA, but an international Agenda with a global character to be managed from Headquarters. The Inspectors fully agree with this view, which is self-evident, since every United Nations programme is by definition international in scope, irrespective of its location. In this sense and unlike the OAU, ECA is also an international programme focused on Africa, like NADAF. In order to strengthen even more the global character of NADAF and ensure optimal use of the scarce resources allocated to the programme, the Inspectors believe that OSCAL should in no way take on the responsibilities and functions that each international/global organization of the System ought to assume for the promotion and implementation of the Agenda within its respective sector and in accordance with Assembly resolution 46/151.

130. In its comments to the JIU, OSCAL appears to agree with the above view by stating as follows: "It is not the task of OSCAL to publicize the New Agenda among members of the United Nations system country teams in Africa nor is it responsible for bringing the UN-NADAF to the attention of individual ministries in countries. It is ultimately the task of each United Nations organization participating in the Task Force on African Economic Recovery and Development and of African ministers involved in global political processes on the New Agenda, including, in particular, African Permanent missions accredited to the United Nations".

131. However, the Inspectors note that one of the primary functions assigned to OSCAL in the United Nations medium-term plan for the period 1992-1997, as revised, and in the proposed programme budget for the biennium 1996-1997, is the coordination of responses to the Agenda by organizations of the system at the policy and operational levels, a function properly belonging to IATF in view of its system-wide coverage, which OSCAL lacks.

132. **Inter-agency Task Force on African Economic Recovery and Development (IATF)** stands out as a useful mechanism for strengthening inter-agency consultations and collaboration within the context of the United Nations System-Wide Plan of Action for Africa. Members of the Task Force include all ACC members as well as African regional organizations, such as the OAU and the ADB. Its meetings are attended by development professionals of the System. As such IATF constitutes a valuable tool for giving effective operational expression to the Secretary-General's Special Initiative on Africa which seeks to translate NADAF priorities into concrete operational initiatives supported by ACC members. The Task Force has the additional unique advantage of fostering complementarities and cohesion among its members and particularly so between ECA, the World Bank and other members of the Task Force.

133. The Inspectors recommend that the work of the Task Force evolve along the following directions:

(i) Establish effective upstream and downstream working links to ensure that its recommendations are incorporated into programme planning processes at the headquarters of each organization, and into Governments’ and United Nations system country programming frameworks, such as Country Long-Term Perspective Studies, Country Strategy Notes, Country Framework Papers, Round-Table meetings or Sectoral Consultations;

(ii) develop guidelines for more active and regular participation of ACC members in country programming processes, especially for members not represented at country level, to ensure that the full spectrum of the System's norms and
expertise are adequately reflected in country programmes in general and Structural Adjustment Programmes more particularly;

(iii) Develop practical guidelines for significantly expanded support of the organizations for subregional cooperation and integration through the introduction of subregional dimensions in country programmes and projects within a subregional or country-group context.

134. **Africa Recovery Unit (ARU)** in DPI publishes "Africa Recovery" (3 issues, including one double in 1993, and 2 issues in 1994, one of which was double). Circulation of this publication was 25,000 copies in English and 8,700 in French in 1993 and about the same in 1994. Information supplied by ARU to the Inspectors indicates that "Africa Recovery" was fairly well distributed in 1993 and 1994 to African Governments, institutions and media, including United Nations Information Centres in the region, and to the international community.

135. However, in terms of African news coverage, circulation and periodicity of publication, "Africa Recovery" is nowhere comparable to more professionally-honed African weekly or monthly publications with a world-wide audience, such as New African, West Africa, Africa International, African Markets, African Business, Jeune Afrique, Jeune Afrique Economie, etc. The Inspectors believe that using the columns of this rich African press to promote NADAF and other United Nations system programmes and initiatives on Africa would be by far more cost-effective than the present arrangements.

136. For example, the latest (June 1995) issue of "Africa Recovery" contains such news items like rising African debt and declining development aid; drought in southern Africa; worsening emergency situation in Rwanda, Burundi, Liberia, Angola, Somalia, Sierra Leone and Sudan; African Women prepare for Beijing; mixed results of the devaluation of the CFA franc, etc. These news items had already either been covered in DPI press releases, or in greater detail by more authoritative international news media and United Nations system publications.

137. Further, it is noted from the information supplied to the JIU by ARU that besides "Africa Recovery," most of the other functions performed by this unit form part of the regular work programme of DPI, such as periodic briefings and press releases on United Nations operations in Africa and coverage of conferences and meetings on Africa. Moreover, DPI has an Africa section in its Radio Service, which produces a regular weekly programme in English and French called "Africa at the United Nations", and apparently includes material on NADAF. DPI's Television and Audio-Visual Production Section also contains regular coverage of African development issues and is apparently distributed to African television stations.

138. In addition to DPI's regular public information services that include coverage of Africa, independently of ARU, the expansion of cable television in the last couple of years, and more particularly the reports of Cable News Network (CNN), have had a major impact in heightening global awareness of Africa's critical situation in general and humanitarian crises in particular. For example, CNN reports on the tragedies in Somalia and Rwanda certainly contributed more than any other factor in mobilizing global public opinion and humanitarian relief actions that ensued in those two instances.

139. Equally important are the awareness-raising and resource mobilization roles of humanitarian programmes or entities of the system, established specifically for that purpose, such as DHA, UNHCR, UNICEF, WFP, etc. or the similar roles played by numerous international non-governmental organizations, which increasingly use global cable television for that purpose.
How does ARU or even DPI compare its role with the more intensive and results-oriented activities pursued regularly at the global and African levels by the United Nations humanitarian system and international non-governmental organizations?

140. A vital ingredient that ought to permeate United Nations system development cooperation efforts generally and in Africa more urgently is development information and how-to-do awareness campaigns targeting government policy-makers, local mass media and partners at community level and civil society in general. At present, that ingredient is sorely lacking in Africa and responsibility for this serious shortcoming goes beyond ARU or DPI to include the entire system. As observed in a separate JIU report entitled "Communication for Development Programmes in the United Nations system" (JIU/REP/94/4), the situation regarding communication activities in the United Nations system is not satisfactory. "Communication for development programmes do not feature as a priority theme for most agencies, with the exception of UNESCO, UNICEF and FAO.... The most significant lacuna in the development machinery of the United Nations system is that the UNDP modalities of project execution do not provide scope for a communication dimension".

141. The expanding liberalization of the mass media and development of a vibrant private press in many African countries, and information technologies, represent affordable tools that can be employed by the organizations to promote greater awareness in Africa and other regions about their normative instruments and activities as well as development policies, programmes and projects. Very basic documents, such as reports on major international conferences, are lacking in the field.

142. Not only should development information be beamed on African countries as an integral component of the System's development strategies and activities but also factual and timely information on the evolution of conditions in Africa and other regions, and the successes and constraints on the organizations' field activities, should be provided regularly to the policy organs of the System, to ensure that resolutions and decisions of the policy organs are indeed based on fresh, credible and first-hand information emanating directly from the field. That requires field-based information or communication professionals, or a country dimension for the Joint United Nations Information Committee (JUNIC).

143. Such a joint tool, complemented by expanded use of the local African mass media, would promote a much needed two-way information traffic between the African operational level and the global level of political and policy processes. It is a well-known fact that until the recent ascendancy of a free and vigorous press in many African countries, much of the region had been a passive recipient of information from the global level. Ongoing changes in the region provide a unique opportunity for the global community also to listen to and read from Africa. The system's information strategy in the region should therefore help project Africa's perspectives on the international scene.

144. The Inspectors regret to have to conclude that the above has not been the case as far as NADAF is concerned. The information component of the Agenda is not only ill-designed and implemented, but is also restricted almost exclusively to ARU/DPI, whereas it ought to be the responsibility of the information service of each organization of the system, starting with ECA/PADIS. In its comments to the JIU, ARU/DPI makes an impressive case to justify its usefulness, if not indispensability, citing numerous compliments and awards it has received from the international community for its work in general and "Africa Recovery" publication in particular.
145. For the Inspectors, however, all such compliments appear meaningless so long as there is no trace of impact in Africa for ARU/DPI's hallowed achievements outside of Africa. What matters at the end of the day are practical results within Africa in terms of heightened awareness of the system's programmes and activities on behalf of the region. As of now, the verdict in the field is that "Africa Recovery", decked with numerous laurels, is probably one more African white elephant; NADAF is hardly known in the region because no effective awareness campaign was mounted to publicize the Agenda and its priorities. African Governments and civil society at large are in critical need of practical, development information relevant to their economic recovery. They also need to have their points of view known to the international community. ARU/DPI and the rest of the system are yet to start addressing those needs in a systematic and comprehensive manner.

146. Other Secretariat entities with a direct role in supporting NADAF implementation are ECA, UNCTAD, the Department for Development Support and Management Services (DDSMS) and United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP). Their performance is reviewed below.

**Economic Commission for Africa, (ECA)**

147. Almost all NADAF priorities correspond to ECA's current work programme as reflected in the United Nations Medium-Term Plan 1992-1997, and Programme Budget 1994-1995. In January 1994, (three years after NADAF was adopted), ECA established an Inter-Divisional Committee on NADAF "to ensure that all substantive Divisions and Offices are effectively involved in the implementation of the New Agenda, especially in the monitoring process". The Secretary of IATE was designated also as Secretary of the Inter-Divisional Committee. ECA also instructed its five Multinational Programming and Operational Centres (MULPOCs) to collect social and economic data and prepare annual reports on subregional achievements in the context of a UNDP-financed project (RAF/93/004) on the monitoring of NADAF.

148. These ECA initiatives concerning NADAF were evidently prompted by the above-mentioned UNDP project. The Executive Secretary's directive to ECA Programme Managers regarding the actual role of the Inter-Divisional Committee could not have been more vague. ECA, like all other organizations of the system, has simply continued to implement its regular programme of work, considering NADAF as the continuation of UN-PAAERD, an assumption the Inspectors do not fully share. It is recognized that ECA in the past few years has witnessed some restructuring, though not necessarily in response to NADAF, as well as rapid succession of leadership.

149. The Inspectors' discussions with African Governments and United Nations system officials, including ECA staff, suggest that, since its establishment in 1958, ECA has recorded commendable achievements, notably in the creation of many subregional and regional institutions, including the African Development Bank in 1963, as well as in the formulation of regional development strategies. Also, the meetings-servicing functions ECA has performed to date are also judged to have been useful in fostering continental consultations and collaboration on a range of development issues cutting across Africa's main language blocs. At the same time, practically all ECA partners consider that the time is now opportune for a strategic reorientation of ECA's priorities and programmes as well as its working relations with African Governments and the private sector, Africa's regional and subregional intergovernmental organizations, and other organizations of the United Nations system, especially UNDP, specialized technical agencies and the World Bank.
150. As noted in Chapter III, Africa's political and economic situation and priorities are evolving rapidly from what prevailed barely five years ago. ECA must not only adapt to these new developments within its environment but must also evince a greater sense of mission and urgency by rushing to the economic rescue of its member countries. In the rapidly changing African development context, a case can be made for a thorough review of ECA's original, essentially research-and conference-oriented mandate. Today's African realities demand the delivery of concrete development goods. Past emphasis on research, studies, meetings and formulation of regional programmes and strategies did contribute to the framing and adoption of Africa's endogenous regional programmes, culminating in the Abuja Treaty establishing an African Economic Community. ECA must now reorganize and move decisively to the phase of implementation.

151. At present, ECA has a serious image problem within the United Nations system. At country level, ECA is perceived as remote from the development dynamics and evolving priorities of its member countries. Notable examples of priority areas outlined in NADAF where ECA could be extremely useful to African Governments, but has been overshadowed by other organizations of the System, include the make-or-break African development issues of macroeconomic policy reforms, investment promotion strategies and programmes, debt relief and management, and export diversification and promotion schemes.

152. The Inspectors take the view that, if ECA had taken NADAF with the necessary gravity of purpose and accordingly reorganized its programme priorities and resources to support its implementation at country, subregional and regional levels, surely the New Agenda would have been more widely known and implemented than at present in African Government ministries and United Nations system offices in Africa. Yet, the key priorities of the Agenda fall squarely within ECA's statutory realm of competence, as provided in the Secretariat's Revised Programme Budget for the biennium 1994-1995 (A/45/6/Rev.1).

153. The above observations leave no doubt that ECA needs to re-engineer itself for the difficult African development challenge it has to tackle for the rest of the present decade and more so into the next century. A new, more streamlined mandate and organizational strategy for ECA should, among other things, enable it to:

(i) be actively involved at country level in assisting Governments to design or strengthen their macroeconomic policy frameworks and public sector reform programmes, investment promotion strategies, commodity diversification and export promotion schemes, etc., within the context of Africa's regional development blueprints;

(ii) be similarly engaged at country level to ensure that the country strategies and programmes (e.g. Long-Term Perspective studies, Round-Table conferences, Country Strategy Notes and Policy Framework Papers) of international organizations do incorporate or take into account, whenever feasible, subregional dimensions and priorities;

(iii) concentrate its expertise on a hard core of programmes outside the constitutional competence of other organizations of the United Nations system, such as intra-African economic cooperation and integration; Transport and Communications Decade programme for Africa; collection, analysis and dissemination of development statistics on Africa and periodic review and publication of national, subregional and regional social and economic development trends; science and technology policies, programmes and institutions; women in development; or
investment feasibility studies and trade promotion and facilitation activities in collaboration with UNCTAD;

(iv) strengthen and preferably institute collaboration and complementarities with other organizations of the United Nations system, including in particular the Bretton Woods institutions, and study together with the other parties concerned the possibility of establishing a joint ADB/ECA/IBRD/UNIDO Africa investment promotion and facilitation division or programme that could spearhead accelerated implementation of the United Nations Transport and Communications Decade and Industrial Development Decade programmes for Africa;

(v) decentralize at least thirty percent of its staff to its Multinational Programming and Operational Centres (MULPOCs) and relocate these centres to enable them to provide technical support on a regular basis to the individual member countries and secretariats of the different subregional economic communities, and to collaborate more intensely with United Nations system field offices with subregional scope, such as in Abidjan, Cairo, Nairobi, etc.;

(vi) significantly enhance its information dissemination and sales publications programmes to ensure that African States and populations as well as the international community are regularly kept informed of socio-economic developments in Africa, and also bearing in mind that ECA's overall image will benefit immensely from a full-fledged information and publications effort reflecting the creativity and achievements of the Commission, its member countries and the United Nations system in Africa.

154. The new directions outlined above would require changes in staff profiles over the medium term. Generally, the qualifications and professional experience of ECA staff should be several notches above the average of what can be found in African economic planning ministries. ECA needs fewer general economists and researchers and many more first-class operational specialists in the different areas of its mandate as may be eventually redefined.

**United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD)**

155. The UNCTAD Secretariat has a one-person NADAF focal point, institutional responsibility for the United Nations Programme for the Least Developed Countries (LDCs), 32 (67 per cent) out of 48 of which are to be found in Africa, and the United Nations Programme on Science and Technology, which is of special relevance to Africa. In the view of UNCTAD, many of the priorities identified and recommendations made in the Programme of Action for the LDCs, adopted at the Paris LDC Conference in 1990, correspond to those contained in NADAF. UNCTAD's reports on and activities for the LDCs naturally cover the vast majority of African countries, LDCs for the most part. Since the Inspectors consider UNCTAD's programmes to form an integral whole with United Nations Secretariat programmes, as shown in the medium-term plan for example, there is overlap between UNCTAD's LDC functions on the one hand and those of OSCAL on the other.
156. UNCTAD's contribution to the implementation of NADAF and the LDC Programme of Action can be summarized as follows:

157. **Trade**: Activities cover trade policy development, trade liberalization, promotion and expansion including through promotion of cooperation among enterprises and their associations. Under this programme, considerable support was provided during the Uruguay Round. UNCTAD expects to continue this support by assisting individual countries in their assessment of the results of the Round and, equally significantly, in seeing what measures need to be taken by the subregional groupings in order to take advantage of the new trading environment.

158. **Finance**: UNCTAD's assistance addresses monetary and financial cooperation, such as support to clearing and payment arrangements, and efforts towards developing single monetary unions. Additionally, UNCTAD assists African countries in improving debt management and support for the insurance sector. Other supportive activities aim at encouraging foreign investment flows, especially non-debt-creating financial flows for development.

159. **Commodities**: UNCTAD's work in this sector addresses the evolution of various commodity markets, the liberalization of export-marketing systems and their impact on national export policies, the role of the State and the enterprise sector in the export of commodities and the implications of utilizing commodity exchanges and other mechanisms of international trade. These initiatives are expected to help inform commodity policy in subregional groupings and contribute to the work under way in the field of commodities and sustainable development.

160. **Transit transport, trade facilitation and communication**: UNCTAD's support has significantly contributed to the marked improvement in these sectors in recent years, an improvement which became very obvious during the recent drought relief operations in southern Africa. All UNCTAD’s technical cooperation activities have substantial technical training and human resources development components. Increasingly, these programmes cover private sector personnel who, after all, are the principal actors in the development process.

**Department for Development Support and Management Services (DDSMS)**

161. The activities carried out by DDSMS can be summarized as follows:

162. **Development planning**: DDSMS provides technical assistance ranging from strategy formulation and multi-annual investment programming to local development planning. The importance of its programmes in this area, as well as in development administration, was given renewed emphasis in the 1986 United Nations Programme of Action for African Economic Recovery and Development (UNPAAERD) which, like NADAF, attached high priority to improving the management of African economies. More recently, DDSMS has endeavoured to enhance its effectiveness in the provision of better planning for advisory services and building up the capacity of selected training institutes in Africa concerned with macro-economic policy and research. The objective was to enable them to provide African experts with the requisite research and analytical skills needed to articulate these policy alternatives on a country-by-country basis. This trend is expected to continue in the coming ten years with a sharp focus on supporting "national execution" of United Nations programmes and projects. Other activities under this heading include capacity building in macro-economic management and public investment programming, management information system and poverty alleviation.
163. **Public administration and finance**: The primary focus is to assist Governments in strengthening their administrative and financial systems for development in line with their development priorities. This objective responds to emerging challenges of "governance", including strengthening legislative administration, restoration of civil administration, electoral and post-electoral processes improvement, democratization of public administration processes and linkages with the private sector. Other primary targets of the programme for Africa include innovation in financial management and revenue mobilization, deregulation of government affairs in the relationship between government and the private sector and the increased use of modern technologies in public management.

164. More than half of the projects in the programme on public administration and finance are devoted to the African region. Of special significance are electoral and post-electoral processes, such as in Malawi and Mozambique. This programme is also very much involved in the relief and rehabilitation process in Rwanda, particularly in the establishment of the administrative machinery necessary to restore normal conditions and stability in the economic and social management of the country. Another important activity recently undertaken for the benefit of African countries was the convening of the Panafrican Conference of Ministers of Civil Service, held in Tangier, Morocco, in June 1994. DDSMS should also assist, in collaboration with the United Nations Crime Prevention Programme, in developing appropriate national legislations and other tools for crime prevention and control as outlined in chapter II.

165. **Minerals sector**: DDSMS has assisted African countries in generating major export earnings from the exploitation of mineral resources. Through its advisory and technical services, the Department has assisted countries in identifying geological deposits which could be further explored and developed by the private sector. It is now working with countries to develop legal and fiscal systems to improve the investment climate and ensure that international standards are implemented. Local expertise is being developed through in-depth training programmes. In this way, foreign companies are being attracted to develop major mining projects in these countries, thus creating increased export earnings as well as encouraging technology transfer.

166. **Energy sector**: DDSMS is assisting the African energy sector in the development of energy master plans and power system planning, in establishing and strengthening energy departments and national oil companies, in oil exploration and investment promotion, in the development of hydro and geothermal energy projects, in the demonstration of solar and wind energy technologies, and in promoting improved energy conservation and management. At the regional level, DDSMS is promoting regional energy integration through interconnection of national electricity grids and development of oil and gas pipeline infrastructure for improved regional trade. The Department is participating in the African Energy Programme of the African Development Bank and recently completed execution of a study analyzing the strength and weaknesses of energy institutions in Africa. The general weakness of energy ministries and organizations is largely due to an operating environment characterized by subsidized energy prices, non-commercial orientation of energy supply and distribution business, large gaps between salaries in the public and private sectors, and lack of political stability. The Department is currently working with the ADB and ECA toward the possible establishment of a regional energy institution.

**United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP)**

167. **At national level**, UNEP accords high priority in assisting African countries to strengthen their existing environmental policies, laws and institutions; to implement new national strategies and plans for sustainable development, to integrate economic; environmental and equity impact
assessment in development planning and decision-making; and to undertake capacity building programmes in the public and private sectors, including the strengthening of local community and NGO participation and activities. The new Country Strategy Notes offer opportunities for close inter-agency cooperation.

168. **At the subregional level**, UNEP makes extensive use of and helps strengthen the environmental expertise and programmes of intergovernmental organizations, especially for managing shared natural resources, combating transboundary pollution and desertification problems, and building environmental monitoring, information exchange and training capacities and networks. Special programmes of support have been put in place to complement the efforts of major African intergovernmental organizations such as the Southern African Development Community (SADC), Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), Inter-Governmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD), Inter-State Committee for Drought Control in Sahel (CILSS), Preferential Trade Area Organization (PTA). UNEP supports, in co-operation with a number of United Nations agencies, the environmental programmes of the above organizations.

169. The UNEP Africa Programme, also supported by a number of United Nations agencies, is geared toward:

(a) providing technical assistance and advisory services on all major aspects of environmental protection and natural resources management;

(b) mobilizing financial and technological resources for resolving or avoiding national and regional environmental problems;

(c) increasing capacity building and support programmes, especially on environmental monitoring, impact assessment, information exchange and public awareness, participation, education and training.

170. **At the regional level** UNEP focuses on the implementation of the priority activities in the African Common Position on the African Environment and Development Agenda and the new AMCEN policy and programme; facilitating coordination and cooperation among the regional and sub-regional environmental programmes of the key agencies within and outside the United Nations system; and creating and expanding African networks of specialized centres and training courses on all aspects of environmental management for sustainable development.

171. UNEP continues to assist African governments in the implementation of key global environmental conventions (e.g. on wetlands, international trade in endangered species, ozone layer depletion, climate change, biodiversity, etc.) as well as their own regional conventions (e.g. the 1968 African Convention on the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources; the 1991 Bamako Convention banning the import of hazardous wastes into Africa, or action plans, for example, on protecting and developing the marine and coastal environment in Eastern Africa and the West and Central African regions; for combating desertification throughout Africa (e.g. in the annex to the new convention on desertification) and specifically in the Sahel and Kalahari-Namib regions; and for managing the shared water resources of the Niger River in West Africa and the Zambezi River in Southern Africa.

172. Regional networks in support of sustainable development have also been expanded significantly. For example, under the AMCEN programme UNEP helped establish and continues to support eight Regional Technical Cooperation Networks in Africa on water resources
(WATNET), environment education and training (ETNET), soils and fertilizers (SOFERNET), climatology (CLIMNET), science and technology (SATNET), energy (ENERNET), genetic resources and biodiversity (BIDNET) and environmental monitoring (EMNET).

**Synthesis**

173. It is self-evident from the foregoing overview that while the field-level impact of the work of some Secretariat entities supporting NADAF is difficult to trace, other entities are playing a valuable role, especially IATF, UNCTAD, DDSMS and UNEP. Of the three NADAF units, IATF which receives only 15 per cent of the resources of Programme 45, has by far the greatest cost-benefit potential, particularly in the light of the Secretary-General’s Initiative on Africa, which promises to rally the entire System around specific NADAF priorities in the context of the System-wide Plan of Action for African economic recovery and development. IATF is also logically located in ECA which has System coordination responsibilities at the regional level as well as direct working relations with African Governments, subregional and regional organizations. Thus if the IATF mechanism is properly strengthened it could prove an invaluable asset for the system in evolving collaborative and disciplined approaches supportive of African Governments and civil society.

174. OSCAL and ARU have the conviction that they are playing the useful role of working up international public opinion on behalf of Africa. But the Inspectors are of the view that the functions assigned to these two units need to be reviewed to ensure that responsibility for the promotion and implementation of NADAF permeates the entire United Nations system, particularly at the concrete field level. The Inspectors believe that IATF is the ideal mechanism for achieving that goal. Similarly, the information component of NADAF should be intensified at the field level, in direct support of African countries and United Nations system country teams. DPI’s information centres in Africa and the local media should be fully enlisted in this effort and the resources now allocated to ARU/DPI could be reassessed accordingly.

175. The proposed new orientations of Programme 45 would seem to be consistent with the operational emphasis of the Secretary-General’s Special Initiative on Africa, as well as with IATF’s current efforts to translate the System-wide Plan of Action into concrete programmes and projects. The resources of Programme 45 should therefore be used to catalyze field-oriented operational actions, especially resource mobilization, within and outside the United Nations system in support of NADAF implementation. The Inspectors note with concern that most of those resources are now used to finance established posts at Headquarters with no linkage whatsoever with field activities of the System, whereas the resources could be more optimally applied by IATF members for example to leverage significantly more resources for operational initiatives in the region. As of now, Africa is not drawing the benefits it is entitled to from Programme 45 because of a basic flaw in the original design of the programme and its institutional arrangements, so much that the main beneficiaries of the programme seem to be those operating it.

176. While a case can be made for a small, perhaps one-person NADAF liaison facility at Headquarters, such a facility could be institutionally linked to IATF to underline its system-wide coverage and utility, or to UNDP which is co-chair of the Secretary-General’s Steering Committee responsible for coordinating the system around the Special Initiative on Africa, or even to the Executive Office of the Secretary-General in his capacity as chairman of ACC. If NADAF is to be moved finally from the phase of discourse, meetings, workshops, etc to the stage of concrete implementation, Programme 45 would need to be rethought and recast to give right of way to field-level actions.
177. ECA's past contributions to African development have been commendable in the areas of institution-building, and formulation of regional strategies and programmes, but its very broad programme framework would require significant restructuring in the light of the new pressing needs of African Member States and the evolving roles of other partners, especially the specialized agencies and multilateral financial institutions.

178. The Inspectors observe that some of ECA's programmes and subprogrammes correspond more or less to similar programmes in UNCTAD (Trade, economic cooperation among developing countries, science and technology); in DDSMS (public administration and finance, natural resources, energy); in UNEP (environment and development); in UNIDO (industrial development); or in FAO (agricultural and rural development). A more thorough rationalization of the distribution of functions and resources among these entities and organizations in their support for NADAF is urgently needed.

C. Other organizations within the United Nations system

179. The United Nations Humanitarian system has borne the full brunt of Africa's crisis over the past five years or so. DHA, UNHCR, UNICEF, WFP and other relevant organizations of the System have been stretched to the limits by major humanitarian operations in Angola, Liberia, Rwanda, Somalia, Sudan and elsewhere in the region. WFP alone delivered close to US$1 billion worth of emergency resources to the region in 1994. UNICEF's expenditures increased from US$170 million in 1987 to US$304 million in 1994, not only for humanitarian operations but also for development programmes. Overall, about four times more resources flowed in 1994 into humanitarian and peace-keeping operations in Africa than into development activities. More than any other factor, civil wars in the region have been the cause of this anomalous pattern of resource flows. The positive changes under way in the region, as manifested in particular by the progressive resolution of conflicts, should enable the humanitarian organizations to collaborate with African Governments and the rest of the system in building the continuum from humanitarian relief to reconstruction and to development.

180. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) is currently supporting in the region over 2,500 projects of differing scope valued at close to US$1.5 billion and corresponding roughly to UNDP's cumulative resource allocations to the region in the last five years, in current dollars. However, the real value of UNDP's cooperation with countries of the region extends beyond the size of disbursements and project portfolios to include development policy advice, multilateral aid coordination, the numerous supportive services provided by the UNDP's network of country offices covering the entire region and, perhaps most important of all, African Governments' perception of UNDP (together with the rest of the system) as a trusted, neutral and dependable development partner.

181. In the last several years, UNDP has initiated major policy shifts in its development cooperation strategy, which are already having a positive effect on the quality of United Nations system operations in Africa. For example, there is increasing emphasis on sustainable human development, institutional capacity building, national execution of projects, poverty alleviation, etc. Concurrently, new programming and coordination tools have been developed and are progressively being refined, such as the programme approach, national long-term perspective plans, or country strategy notes. However, UNDP's strong country focus has not enabled it to maximise its potential contribution to strengthening intercountry collaboration in tackling common development problems in a cost-effective manner. Thus resources programmed for the intercountry programme for Africa (1992-1996) amounted to only US$169 million, dropping by over US$40 million compared to the third intercountry programme cycle.
182. **United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO):**

For several years UNESCO has been grappling with the African development challenge in very significant ways through its regular programmes. These include, for example, science for progress and environment, preservation of cultural heritage, free flow of information and the development of communication, promotion of non-violence, human rights and democracy, promotion of cultural pluralism and inter-cultural dialogue.

183. Peace-building is becoming a major activity of UNESCO in Africa in the context of its "Culture of Peace Programme", formally established in February 1994. In a nutshell, this programme aims to establish national peace programmes in countries emerging from conflict situations as well as in countries with potential for internal conflicts. Under this programme, UNESCO successfully contributed to the reconciliation of different political factions in the Congo in December 1994, and to the establishment of a "Maison de la Paix" in Burundi, also in December 1994, with the objective of strengthening the fragile national peace process in that country. A similar initiative was launched in Mozambique and Somalia. This new programme is a highly commendable initiative which deserves the generous and sustained support of the international community, public and private.

184. In February 1995, UNESCO convened at its headquarters in Paris an international meeting entitled "Audience Africa". Its principal objective was to provide Africans, on the eve of the Copenhagen World Summit for Social Development, with the opportunity to review the whole question of development and development priorities in their continent in the light of the new challenges facing the world. This review was to take account of lessons of the past, requirements of the present, the demands of the future and the realities of the current international situation. Participants were invited accordingly to "set down the terms of a self-reliant development policy that would secure the economic, social, political and cultural progress of the present populations and the survival, in dignity, peace, democracy and justice, of generations to come". Other UNESCO initiatives specifically tailored to Africa include, for example, its "Priority Africa" activities, or those undertaken within the framework of the World Decade for Cultural Development.

185. **The World Health Organization (WHO):**

The World Health Organization (WHO) is more extensively engaged in Africa than in any other region of the world, whether through its Regional Offices in Brazzaville, Congo, and in Alexandria, Egypt, or through its headquarters-based programmes, such as the Global Programme on Aids (GPA), now transformed into a joint and cosponsored United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (involving, in addition to WHO, UNDP, World Bank, UNICEF, UNFPA, and UNESCO), Expanded Programme on Immunization (EPI), Programme on research and Training in Tropical Diseases (TDR), or the programme of Intensified Cooperation with Countries and People in greatest need (IWC). Established in 1989, IWC provides comprehensive support to countries in the formulation and implementation of national health policies that correct social inequities and ensure universal access to basic health services. The programme also helps countries identified to be in greatest need to mobilize, coordinate and manage domestic and external resources. Out of the 26 countries in which IWC is under way, 11 are in Africa.

186. Some of WHO's concrete achievements in Africa include for example, its childhood immunization campaigns conducted jointly with UNICEF and aimed at vaccine-preventable childhood diseases such as diphtheria, measles and polio. Thanks to this programme, which has been under way for close to 20 years, childhood immunization coverage in Africa has expanded from less than 5 per cent in the mid-seventies to close to 80 per cent today. That probably is one of the greatest development achievements in Africa in the past two decades. Similarly, the 20 year old Onchocerciasis Control Programme (OCP) in West Africa, cosponsored by FAO, UNDP,
and the World Bank, has succeeded in eliminating river blindness in 11 endemic countries of the region, thereby enabling millions of peasants to regain economically productive lives and the countries to raise their overall health status and economic output. These are relatively unknown but very tangible achievements for the region as a whole.

187. **Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO)** has also made a very substantial contribution to African development in the past twenty years through its major programmes on food and agricultural policy, fisheries, forestry, or rural development and agrarian reform. Since 1994, FAO has endeavoured to strengthen its field presence in Africa, through decentralization of staff and more authority for programme development and management from its headquarters in Rome. The organization has launched some recent initiatives of particular relevance to Africa, such as a special programme for increasing food production in low-income food-deficit countries, and the special programme for Emergency Prevention System for Transboundary Animal and Plant Pests and Diseases.

188. Other development issues receiving FAO's priority attention in Africa include, for example, enhancement of food security, environmental and resource management for sustainable development, improvement of nutritional levels, support for adjustment and reform of macro and sectoral development policies, rural development, and fostering economic and technical cooperation among African countries. However, the volume of FAO's field operations in the region financed from extrabudgetary sources has contracted sharply of recent, following a general trend within the system. FAO's regular Technical Cooperation Programme (TCP) resources for Africa meanwhile increased from US$66 million in 1990 to about US$73 million in 1994, in current dollars.


190. The Ten-Point Programme aims, among other objectives, to assist African countries in the development of appropriate industrial strategies supportive of market-oriented economies, and in the formulation of private-sector development policies. Support for regional industrial cooperation and integration, building of institutional capabilities, expansion of investment promotion activities, or dissemination of technological and industrial information to countries of the region, are other features of the Ten-Point Programme. Country support strategies specifically tailored to the needs and conditions of each country represent the main vehicle for the programme's implementation. The country strategies provide for subregional dimensions in the perspective of industrial cooperation and integration which UNIDO recognizes as a major development priority whose achievement would help expand the size of domestic markets and the region's industrial base. UNIDO's Industrial Action Programme for the LDCs is of additional benefit to the African region. Under this programme, the organization emphasizes the rehabilitation and modernization of existing industries, especially agro-industrial ventures, investment promotion, human resources development and retraining as well as industrial consultancy services. The LDC programme is targeted both to the public and private sectors, especially small and medium-sized industries.
191. The International Labour Organisation (ILO) has since 1990 reinforced its field presence in Africa and reorganized its development cooperation mechanisms, which now consist of a Regional Office in Abidjan, 11 subregional or area offices and 5 Multidisciplinary Advisory Teams in Central and West Africa, East Africa, North Africa, North-west Africa and Southern Africa. ILO's major priorities for the region have also evolved in the past five years to reflect concern for the social impact of structural adjustment programmes which have adversely affected ILO's sectors of competence, and to support the democratisation process in the region. The organization has adopted an "active partnership" with its tripartite constituents in the region, namely Governments, employers, and workers, who are expected to work together in implementing ILO's regional programmes. These include employment creation and poverty alleviation, labour information for employment policy formulation, improvement of training systems to meet employment needs, development of small enterprises and informal sector activities, protection of workers, reform of social protection systems, promotion of democracy, and equality of opportunity and treatment for women and disadvantaged groups.

192. International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has responded to the African crisis by shifting its technical cooperation strategy in Africa towards practical end-user-oriented activities. This new strategy which is guided by the Agency's "model project" concept, aims to obtain more practical impact of nuclear technology related projects on the socio-economic development of the region, especially in food production, health, and hydrology. This new emphasis is expected to be additional to the regular provision by the Agency of training and advice in areas of nuclear science and technology. Furthermore, IAEA's Regional Cooperation Agreement for Africa (AFRA) is part of an inter-regional network of three Regional Agreements used by the Agency to implement projects aimed at establishing self-sufficiency in the use of nuclear science and technologies in fields such as industry, health, hydrology and agriculture. The interregional network emphasizes the transfer of technology from the most advanced developing countries in the three regions to the less advanced countries within the spirit of TCDC. More recently, the Agency has undertaken to strengthen the management of this network, which holds potential benefits for Africa, by supporting intense upstream activities in order to achieve even higher quality programmes.

193. The need for concision does not permit a comprehensive review in this report of the useful work being done by other organizations of the system in support of Africa in their respective areas of competence, e.g. UNFPA, ICAO, IMO, ITU, UPU, WIPO and WMO. The above coverage is intended simply to illustrate the fact that the system as a whole is indeed assigning priority to Africa and sharpening its strategies and tools in order to provide more effective support to the region. Because this trend emerged from the system's largescale emergency operations in Africa in the mid-eighties, it can hardly be attributed to NADAF as such. The Inspectors' findings leave no doubt that, besides the Inter-Agency Task Force on African development, the New Agenda has so far had little practical effect on the individual or joint programmes of the organizations, on the programming of new activities, or on the level and nature of resource flows to Africa. Probably because of the ineffectual application of the seed programme resources allocated to NADAF, it was not widely promoted as a system-wide incentive for more active prospection of extrabudgetary sources of funds. However, ACC is now proceeding to do just that thanks to the new Special Initiative on Africa

D. The resource crisis

194. While NADAF called for additional resource allocations, the reverse has actually occurred for non-emergency activities of the system, excluding IBRD. Since the adoption of the Agenda in 1991, there has been a decline in development cooperation expenditures by the system in Africa,
falling from about US$900 million in 1991 to an estimated US$800 million in 1994. During the same period, expenditures for peace-keeping and humanitarian operations financed by the Department for Peace-keeping Operations (DPKO), UNHCR and WFP rose from US$1.3 billion in 1991 to UN$3.1 billion in 1994, or nearly four times the estimated combined amount expended by development organizations of the system in the same year. Thus civil wars in a few countries and their humanitarian consequences have drained extrabudgetary funds that could have been used for development purposes in the majority of countries. As such, the region as a whole is reaping the stark results of military conflicts in some countries. This situation justifies the urgent strengthening of regional, subregional and national mechanisms for preventive diplomacy, conflict resolution and peace-building, as recommended elsewhere in this report.

195. However, the drop in the System's extrabudgetary funds for development in Africa is not attributable only to the expanding outlays for peace-keeping and humanitarian operations in the region. There has been an overall decline in ODA flows through the United Nations multilateral system (excluding the multilateral financial institutions). UNDP has had to reduce by 30 per cent its programmable resources for the current fifth cycle. Many new claimants for development capital have emerged from the collapse of the cold-war system of international relations at a time when most donor countries are reducing their development aid budgets as a result of domestic pressures on public expenditures. Thus net ODA disbursements to Africa as a whole declined from about 25 billion in 1990 to 21.5 billion in 1993 and may have dropped even further in 1994.

196. In addition, the new UNDP policy of national execution, which the JIU fully supports, has also contributed to a reduction in the levels of extrabudgetary funds available to the organizations for project implementation globally and in Africa more particularly. The contraction of extrabudgetary resources since 1991 has been drastic for some traditional executing agencies of UNDP, such as FAO, ICAO, DDSMS, or the regional commissions.

197. The above resource picture seems to bode ill for the organizations’ development cooperation with the developing countries in general. The paradox is that while the system is assigning priority to Africa, and is called upon to do more for the region, its means of execution are dwindling partly because humanitarian relief priorities in a few countries seem to have confiscated the attention of the donor community away from substantive socio-economic development priorities in the vast majority of countries. Should the present pattern of resource flows to the region persist in the next five years, it will surely sink the prospects of implementation of NADAF priorities by African governments with the technical support of organizations of the system, and NADAF would go the same way of oblivion as UNPAAERD.

198. A more likely scenario is that peace-keeping and emergency operations in Africa will wind down gradually in the medium-term, as a result of the progressive resolution of the region's most disruptive conflicts, some major gains in democratic reforms and the steady strengthening of regional and subregional dispositions for conflict prevention and management. However, even if this scenario holds out, it might not automatically imply that the same level of resources now flowing into peace-keeping and humanitarian operations will redound to the development component of the System, considering in particular the present global trends and tight competition for the allocation of ODA, and the possible shift of development cooperation strategies of the donor community from United Nations system intermediation towards direct partnership with the beneficiary communities. The UNDP policy of national execution is an illustrative variant of this possible trend which, if generalized by DAC members, could have unpredictable consequences on the United Nations development system, including UNDP as well.
199. For that reason, the organizations must devise new, imaginative modes of engagement with Africa based on optimal methods of delivery, more upstream policy advice and less project execution, more systematic and institutional collaboration among themselves and with multilateral financial institutions and bilateral partners at the concrete field level, and increased mobilization and utilization of domestic resources for development, including in particular a strengthened partnership with the private sector. Some of these new directions are further discussed in the following chapter.
VI. TOWARDS NEW MODES OF ENGAGEMENT

A. Critical retrospection

200. The overall dismal outlook for technical cooperation resources is by no means the only justification for forging fresh approaches to the challenge of development in Africa and other regions. Over the past decade, both multilateral and bilateral technical cooperation policies and practices have come under fire for a variety of reasons. These include, for example, excessive reliance on foreign resident experts, the high costs of delivery, the supply-driven propensity of projects and their extreme fragmentation, the difficulty of coordination and management by host governments, failure of many projects to build up and use local institutions and human capacities, etc.

201. These shortcomings are extensively documented in the specific African context by a 1993 publication entitled "Rethinking Technical Cooperation: Reforms for Capacity Building in Africa" by UNDP Regional Bureau for Africa and Development Alternatives, Inc. The authors of this publication sum up their assessment of technical cooperation in Africa in the past decades as follows:

"Virtually all countries express their views that technical cooperation is out of sync with the availability of trained national human resources. There is something wrong: the reliance on expatriate personnel does not diminish in spite of huge efforts and of gains in training of nationals. Even worse, unemployment among qualified local professionals is growing. Technical cooperation was justified by shortages in national human resources; it was expected to lead to self-reliance. Now, after decades of independence and concerted efforts at training, technical cooperation persists" (pages 5-6).

202. Lamenting the inability of international development cooperation to use established local skills and institutions, another author offers the following rule of thumb:

"If a project is funded by foreigners, it will typically also be designed by foreigners and implemented by foreigners using foreign equipment procured in foreign markets".3

203. Despite the above criticisms which contain an element of truth, the Inspectors do not subscribe to the sweeping judgement that the System's development cooperation with African countries has been an overall failure. While there have been defects, there have also been achievements, especially in human resources development and creation of many institutions at national and intercountry levels. Failures can be attributed essentially to two major factors. The first has been the persistent economic crisis and policy environment which represented in many countries a constraining context not only for external development partnership with the region but also for domestic development initiatives. The second factor has been the very slow adaptation of the United Nations system's development strategies and tools to the rapidly

changing patterns and forces of international development cooperation. Critics, including the JIU⁴, have generally taken issue with quality performance, costs and delivery modes of technical cooperation, and certainly not with its intrinsic justification.

204. A positive, two-pronged evolution now under way could lead to a highly improved development partnership with Africa. As noted in chapter III, many countries are in transition to new political and macroeconomic regimes that promise a stimulating environment for socio-economic development, including judicious and optimal utilization of external resource inputs. Concurrently, the United Nations system also is in transition to a new value system of development cooperation, as illustrated by the shifting of emphasis towards support for norms, institutions and processes of good governance (democracy, peace building, human rights, electoral systems, etc.), private-sector development and investment promotion, national execution of projects and capacity building and the progressive decline in the number of resident experts, programme approach, upstream policy advice, especially in public sector reforms, etc. These new trends are in line with NADAF priority objectives as well as with those of many individual African countries (see chapter III). This growing convergence of priorities, policies and approaches needs to be reinforced considerably, as suggested in the rest of this chapter.

B. Cost of technical cooperation

205. The high cost of the system’s cooperation methods has been the most frequent target of criticisms. This problem was tackled by the JIU as far back as 1978 in its report on "Role of Experts in Development Cooperation" (JIU/REP/78/3), which urged across-the-board shift of policy towards government management and execution of projects (national execution) and other innovative, less costly modes of delivery. The aforementioned publication by the UNDP Regional Bureau for Africa and Development Alternatives Inc. illustrates the problem as follows:

"In Tanzania, for example, the total cost of technical assistance in 1988 was some US$300 million, of which at least 200 million represented the salaries, per diems, housing allowances, air travel and other direct costs of the 1,000 or so international experts provided as the core of technical assistance. In contrast, the total salary cost of the whole civil service in Tanzania in the same year was US$100 million. The situation in Tanzania is not untypical. The time has come to rethink the purpose of aid and technical assistance within the United Nations system" (page 14).

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⁴ Recent relevant JIU reports include:

1) United Nations system cooperation with multilateral financial institutions (JIU/REP/92/1).
2) Decentralization of organizations within the United Nations system (JIU/REP/92/6).
3) United Nations system support for science and technology in Africa (JIU/REP/94/1).
4) National execution of projects (JIU/REP/94/9).
206. Besides the expert component, which typically represents between 50 and 80 per cent of project costs, separate field offices, vehicles, supplies and administrative support services, constitute another important cost factor which, however, could be reduced substantially through more systematic sharing of premises and support services, as proposed by the JIU in a separate report\(^5\), and unified procurement and management of field supplies and transport equipment\(^6\). The fact that each organization prefers to have its own premises, support services, supply chain and warehouse or transport pool, irrespective of the very wasteful implications of such multilayered duplication of resources, is probably the clearest evidence that frugality is not the greatest asset of the system in the conduct of its development mission.

207. The proportion of staff costs to programme expenditures is yet another issue that deserves a more detailed review than is possible in this report. Figures provided to the JIU by some organizations, or obtained by the Inspectors from programme budget documents, show that the cost of their regular and project staff (based at headquarters and in Africa) working full time and exclusively on their technical cooperation programmes for Africa in 1994 differed significantly as a percentage of their technical cooperation expenditures (financed from regular and extrabudgetary sources) for Africa in that year, as follows:

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<tr>
<th>Organizations</th>
<th>Percentage of staff costs</th>
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<tr>
<td>IAEA</td>
<td>12</td>
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<td>FAO</td>
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<td>UNFPA</td>
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<td>ICAO</td>
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208. The above figures should, however, be read with caution because the organizations’ technical cooperation backstopping services at Headquarters are differently organized. In most cases technical and administrative support at headquarters is provided globally rather than by geographical region. This implies that some of the above figures actually understate the staff portion of programme expenditures. While no one would dispute the need for staff to administer programmes and projects, transfer skills and know-how and promote the organizations’ norms, standards and policies through technical cooperation programmes, questions inevitably arise as to the real impact of staff thus employed on development problems in the field; no comprehensive evaluation exists as to their cost benefits or value for money in the present system of delivery. The recurrent cost of staff employed by the system organizations at Headquarters to support their field operations in Africa approaches US$300 million at present. The organizations should critically review the cost-benefits of this method of financing development cooperation.

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209. Another important object of expenditure relates to conferences, meetings, seminars, workshops, consultancies and reports, especially by headquarters-based programmes. The usefulness of these activities is beyond question. What is at issue, however, is their costs relative to results, the lack of follow-up and evaluation of their impact, or their discontinuous, ad hoc pattern, which is linked to specific, disconnected projects rather than to a national or regional programme strategy of awareness-raising, demonstration exercises, information dissemination and technology transfer, the results of which can be easily verified.

210. When all the above-mentioned expenditures are added up, (field office establishments, vehicles, administrative overhead, experts, headquarters and field-based technical cooperation staff, meetings, travel, per diem allowances, etc.) there is practically nothing left with which to combat poverty at the grassroots level in Africa. It is this self-financing structure of technical cooperation expenditures of the organizations that has fed the perception that the international development system exists to cater for itself rather than for the poor in the developing world. While Africa is theoretically supposed to have "received" in 1994 an estimated US$800 million worth of the system's technical cooperation programmes and projects, it is virtually impossible to ascertain how much of that amount actually percolated down to the poor in Africa. In all likelihood the funds simply revolved within the United Nations development system. How then can African countries take ownership of programmes whose resources are entirely beyond their control?

211. In the light of the foregoing analysis the Inspectors recommend the following measures.

(a) All organizations should henceforth take the necessary action to expand the use of national or regional human resources and institutions employed on special services contracts. More emphasis should be placed on direct training and fellowship programmes, short-term consultancies, volunteers, TCDC, south-south and north-south institutional twining, expanded collaboration with NGOs, and periodic visits by the organizations' regular staff to ensure conformity with norms, standards and policies of the System. These alternative modalities of technical cooperation could be further refined and used more extensively by organizations of the System.

(b) All organizations should further review their ratios of staff costs to technical cooperation expenditures and take the necessary action over the medium-term to reduce the staff cost element in their technical cooperation programme expenditures for Africa. Resources thus released should be used for the modalities proposed under (a) above.

(c) Subject to the wishes of host governments, the organizations should continue to expand the application of the policy of national execution of projects.

(d) The organizations should be much more engaged in development policy advice and advocacy at governmental level and should intensify popular awareness building at country level in general about their respective normative instruments, policies and programmes of action through maximum use of public and private mass media (television and radio networks, public lectures, printed media and information technologies, such as CD-ROM. DPI and UNDP should take the lead in establishing at country and subregional levels a Joint United Nations Information Service that could, in addition to the above, publish a monthly United Nations system Newsletter on the organizations' development activities at the global and field levels.
(e) The organizations should additionally reinforce the institutional capacity-building objective of their technical cooperation activities in Africa so that each activity, project or programme aims explicitly to strengthen the managerial, administrative and financial accounting systems of the supported institution, including its performance monitoring and self-evaluation processes.

(f) Consideration should be given to the recommendations contained in the JIU report entitled "United Nations system common premises and services in the field" (JIU/REP/94/8) in order to reduce the establishment and overhead costs of the System's field operations in Africa. Priority should be given to unified procurement and management of goods and services, especially transport equipment at country level.

(g) Relevant organizations of the system should consider the feasibility of promoting two types of national umbrella projects supported by bilateral and multilateral financial institutions in each African country, subject to the agreement of host governments:

   (i) An umbrella project designed to establish a comprehensive inventory, to be updated annually, of national and subregional consulting institutions in the public and private sectors with a view to strengthening and involving these institutions in the implementation of the system's technical cooperation activities;

   (ii) An umbrella project designed to strengthen the logistic, technical and operational capabilities of grassroots cooperatives, especially in the food production sector.

**C. Support for sub regional integration**

212. The subregional economic groupings established by African Member States to spearhead the process of regional integration in accordance with the provisions of the Abuja Treaty establishing an African Economic Community should be seen and used by the organizations as a means for rationalizing and optimising their development cooperation with Africa within a subregional context. Accordingly, each organization should consider the following:

   (a) Providing direct technical support to the secretariats of the subregional groupings to enable them to develop and formulate integration projects and undertake subregional perspective studies in the different sectors;

   (b) incorporating subregional or country-group dimensions in country activities, whenever appropriate, in their respective sectors of competence.

   (c) establishing and supporting on a continuing basis, a subregional or country-group network of national institutions and NGOs in order to strengthen technical collaboration among them, facilitate exchange of staff and experiences and ensure more optimal use of resources within each subregion or group of countries;

   (d) strengthening collaboration with ECA subregional MULPOCs in the respective sectors covered by the organizations.
D. **Inter-agency collaboration, coordination and interaction**

213. **Country level**: The various mechanisms now in place or still being developed (Resident Coordinator system, common premises and services, programme approach, National Technical Cooperation and Assistance Programme (NaTCAP), Long-Term Perspective Studies, Country Strategy Notes, etc.) should contribute to strengthening collaboration within the United Nations System at the level of each African country. The next challenge lies in two areas. Firstly, collaboration with the Bretton Woods institutions needs to be further developed in a more systematic manner not only because the World Bank at present provides more technical cooperation resources than the United Nations development system, but also because of the impact of structural adjustment programmes in the social sectors usually covered by the development organizations. A separate JIU report entitled "United Nations System Cooperation with Multilateral Financial Institutions" (JIU/REP/92/1) recommends actions required to that end.

214. At a time when ODA flows through the United Nations system are declining, organizations of the system would find it to be in their enlightened self-interest to establish more systematic development partnership with the multilateral financial institutions in support of African countries, which should take the initiative to bring about such partnership, that should also extend to the bilateral and multi-bilateral donor community. Therefore, African Governments should explore the feasibility of merging the different country programming frameworks used by the system and the Bretton Woods institutions so that the resultant framework, based on national long-term development plans, can also be more readily used by bilateral donors, who after all account for the majority portion of technical cooperation resources flowing to Africa and the developing world in general.

215. The other aspect of country-level coordination concerns long-term perspective studies, which the Inspectors consider to be a highly useful initiative. At present these studies appear to be few and far between in the African region, as efforts to develop the country strategy notes have clearly taken the upper hand. Yet the Inspectors believe that country perspective studies and plans of ten to twenty-five year periods should take precedence over the strategy notes, which have a five-year time frame. Ideally, the latter should fit into the former and not vice-versa. It is therefore recommended that ECA and UNDP should play a more vigorous role in advising and assisting Governments to prepare and implement long-term development plans, with the support of the System organizations in their respective sectors. Such plans, which should incorporate subregional and regional integration features and commitments at global level, should serve as the framework for other country programming tools as well as for inter-agency collaboration and coordination in supporting African countries.

216. **Regional level**: The proliferation of overlapping regional programme initiatives at the African level and within the United Nations system and donor community, as discussed in Chapter I, is probably the clearest evidence that present regional coordination arrangements are far from satisfactory. The Inspectors' findings suggest that existing separate OAU/ECA coordination or consultative mechanisms with organizations of the system are duplicative, costly and confusing, and are generally ineffective in follow-up and results, partly because policy harmony between the OAU, ECA and ADB is as yet far from achieved despite their inter-secretariat unit, and partly because neither the recommendations of OAU-convened meetings nor those of ECA's Conference of Ministers and other sectoral meetings, carry much policy influence, not to mention force of applicability, at the level of other organizations of the system, multilateral financial institutions and members of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC).
217. For these reasons, the Inspectors see the need to establish a more cost-effective, action-oriented and broad-based regional policy coordination forum whose recommendations can directly inform development policies and strategies in each African Member State and guide the regional initiatives of other development partners of the international community, particularly the donor community. That would imply, in effect, the expansion of ECA’s existing Conference of Ministers into an African equivalent of the United Nations Economic and Social Council, whose recommendations can be addressed directly to African Heads of State and Government, to the legislative organs of ACC member organizations, including the Bretton Woods institutions, and to the Development Assistance Committee of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. The Inspectors recommend that the OAU/ECA/ADB inter-secretariat unit and the Inter-Agency Task Force on African development elaborate draft terms of reference of the proposed new policy coordination forum, which may be called African Development Conference and whose formal membership would include all of Africa's major development partners. The draft terms of reference should be reviewed at the level of ACC and submitted for action to the relevant intergovernmental bodies.

218. The main features and advantages of the new arrangement would be the following, for example:

(a) The proposed African Development Conference would meet annually, at fixed dates, and would be chaired by the OAU Secretary-General. The secretary of the Conference would be the Executive Secretary of ECA, assisted as alternates by the ADB President, World Bank's Vice-President for Africa and UNDP Administrator or their representatives.

(b) It would absorb ECA's Annual Conference of Ministers and the OAU's periodic ministerial meetings in economic and social sectors and biennial consultative meetings with the System organizations.

(c) United Nations system participation should preferably be at the level of executive heads;

(d) Each annual session of the Conference should be focused on a particular priority theme (e.g. science and technology, transport and communications, regional cooperation and integration, diversification of commodity exports, culture and development, etc.), and substantive inputs should come from within Africa and ACC members concerned by each theme, and coordinated by the OAU/ECA/ADB inter-secretariat unit.

(e) The Conference would solidify synergies between the OAU, ECA and ADB on the one hand and between them and Africa's external development partners, particularly the donor community, on the other.

(f) Membership of the conference would include in addition the subregional economic communities, associations of African Chambers of Commerce, Agriculture and Industry, trade union organizations, and African federations of non-governmental organizations, in order to ensure that its policy decisions and recommendations are nourished by the different perspectives and experiences of partners in different sectors and at different levels.
(g) The Conference would provide an ideal forum for meshing Africa's endogenous development blueprints with the programmes, priorities and conditionalities of external partners.

(h) As the effective governing body of ECA at the regional level, the Conference should enhance the regional coordination mandate of ECA within the United Nations system in Africa and thereby facilitate implementation of the relevant provisions of General Assembly resolution 32/197.
VI. CONCLUSION

219. Many changes now under way in the African region, especially in the areas of political and economic reforms, conflict resolution and peace building initiatives or regional cooperation and integration, promise to fulfill the fundamental preconditions for regional peace, stability and economic resurgence. These systemic trends, which confirm that African Member States are indeed implementing their commitments under NADAF, need to be supported over the long-term through the equal implementation of commitments undertaken by the international community, such as increased ODA flows in support of economic reforms and commodity export diversification schemes, or debt treatment.

220. The important role devolving to the organizations of the System in support of NADAF is now likely to be translated into more concrete results following the Secretary-General's Special Initiative on Africa. The institutional arrangements established within the United Nations Secretariat to promote NADAF have not all proved fully effective. To respond more decisively and promptly to emerging development imperatives of the region, ECA needs a brand new programme and organizational strategy that reinforces its subregional presence and its technical and operational collaboration with other organizations of the System. While the individual specialized agencies and ACC in general have strengthened their commitments to Africa’s development, they are faced with a serious resource problem which, however, could have the positive effect of jerking the system into more optimal and frugal methods of technical cooperation with Africa and the developing world in general.