CONCLUDING REPORT ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION 32/197 CONCERNING THE RESTRUCTURING OF THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL SECTORS OF THE UNITED NATIONS SYSTEM

Prepared by

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Joint Inspection Unit

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Table of Contents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Paragraph</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>1 - 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PART I. MORE EFFECTIVE FUNCTIONING OF THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL</td>
<td>8 - 65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER I. FORMULATION OF GENERAL POLICIES THAT ARE MORE ACTION-ORIENTED</td>
<td>15 - 27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusions and recommendations</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER II. MORE EFFECTIVE INTER-AGENCY CO-ORDINATION</td>
<td>28 - 52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusions and recommendations</td>
<td>49 - 52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER III. MAKING FULL USE OF AVAILABLE PROGRAMMING INSTRUMENTS</td>
<td>53 - 65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusions and recommendations</td>
<td>63 - 65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PART II. A MORE RATIONAL DIVISION OF LABOUR AMONG SECRETARIAT SERVICES AND A BETTER DEFINITION OF THE RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE DIRECTOR-GENERAL</td>
<td>66 - 114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER IV. A MORE OPERATIONAL DIVISION OF LABOUR WITHIN THE SECRETARIAT</td>
<td>71 - 89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. Present division of labour</td>
<td>72 - 76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Principles for a more efficient division of labour</td>
<td>77 - 87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. Conclusions and recommendations</td>
<td>88 - 89</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table of Contents (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Paragraph</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER V. CLARIFICATION OF THE ROLE OF THE DIRECTOR-GENERAL WITHIN THE</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SYSTEM AND THE SECRETARIAT</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. Need to define the responsibilities of the Director-General within the</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>system</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Need to formalize the functions and procedures of the Director-General</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>within the Secretariat</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. Conclusions and recommendations</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
INTRODUCTION

1. Resolution 32/197, adopted by the General Assembly on 20 December 1977, provides for the most far-reaching restructuring exercise devised by Member States in the last 10 years. The proposals and recommendations contained in the resolution are based on a coherent, in-depth analysis designed to achieve (a) greater rationalization of the policies, programmes and activities of the major intergovernmental bodies, including the General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council and its subsidiary bodies; (b) a regrouping of the functions and activities of bodies performing the same tasks; (c) greater decentralization in some sectors; (d) the elimination of overlapping services and departments; and (e) the creation of new bodies to perform functions deemed to be essential.

2. Many of these recommendations have been implemented and have helped to make the system more efficient. Others have never been put into effect, but remain valid, and Member States continue to refer to them and to call for their implementation. It should be noted in this regard that the current structure, duties and functions of the United Nations Secretariat, the main intergovernmental bodies and the inter-organizational co-ordination machinery are basically as clarified in General Assembly resolution 32/197, which demonstrates the continued need for a review of the resolution's implementation.

3. Five years after the resolution's adoption, the Joint Inspection Unit (JIU) included in its programme of work a series of reports reviewing the extent to which the recommendations contained in the resolution had been put into action and proposing to the General Assembly any corrective measures needed. In all, seven reports have been compiled and submitted to the General Assembly, together with the Secretary-General's comments. Those reports deal with matters relating to the Director-General for Development and International Economic Co-operation (ODG/DIEC), Secretariat support services, the Economic and Social Council and two regional economic commissions.

4. The present concluding report is the last in this series and updates the recommendations presented in earlier reports, in the light of the changes which have occurred in recent years. A special effort has been made to avoid any duplication of the content of reports being prepared by bodies other than JIU for submission to the forty-fourth session of the General Assembly. The report does take account of the recommendations of the Group of High-Level Intergovernmental Experts to Review the Efficiency of the Administrative and Financial Functioning of the United Nations (Group of 18) 1/, the conclusions of the Special Commission of the Economic and Social Council on the In-Depth Study of the United Nations Intergovernmental Structure and Functions in the Economic and Social Fields (usually referred to as the Special Commission) 2/,

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1/ Resolution 41/213, in particular, recommendations 25 to 27 concerning the economic and social sectors of the United Nations.

2/ Set up pursuant to Council decision 1987/112 in implementation of recommendation 8 of the Group of 18.
the progress reports of the Secretary-General on the implementation of the reforms recommended by the Group of 18 3/ and the reports and conclusions of the Chairman of the Special Commission 4/.

5. Within the confines of this report, however, it is impossible to discuss in any detail all the areas covered by resolution 32/197 or the JIU reports devoted to it. We shall therefore concentrate basically on the central mechanisms of the United Nations system in the economic and social sectors, namely, (i) the Economic and Social Council as a central intergovernmental policy-making and decision-making body, and (ii) the Secretariat support services responsible for implementing those policies and decisions. Each will be dealt with in a separate section:

Part I will discuss the problems encountered by the Economic and Social Council in carrying out its functions and suggest possible solutions;

Part II will deal with ways and means of achieving a better division of labour between the economic and social departments of the Secretariat.

6. Some of the suggestions and recommendations presented in this report may indeed depart from the traditional and classical approach and are debatable. We, however, believe that they offer additional solutions which could be considered along with those emanating from different parts of the system. Their merit, it is hoped, is to enlarge the present debate on ways and means to improve the efficiency of the ECOSOC and the Secretariat. Needless to say that the final choice, among all solutions emerging from various origins including those outlined in this report, remains with the Member States.

7. The preparation of this report has involved exchanges of correspondence and consultations with many departments of the Secretariat, permanent delegations to the United Nations and Governments, which have provided us with invaluable documents, information and comments. To them, we extend our thanks and appreciation.

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8. The Economic and Social Council is the highest United Nations body responsible, under the authority of the General Assembly, for formulating coherent policies for the United Nations system as a whole, co-ordinating the programmes of the organizations within the system and programming and planning United Nations activities.

9. For more than 20 years, virtually without interruption, reports 5/ prepared, at the request of Member States, by experts, study groups or the Secretary-General have recommended a clearer definition of the Council's functions. Numerous proposals have been made in that connection, some of which have led to the adoption of major resolutions 6/, such as resolution 32/197.

10. That resolution redefined the Council's functions and specified its methods of work. In particular, it assigned to it the following responsibilities:

(a) To serve as the central forum for the discussion of international, economic and social issues of a global or interdisciplinary nature and the formulation of policy recommendations thereon addressed to Member States and to the United Nations system as a whole (para. 5 (a));

(b) To monitor and evaluate the implementation of strategies, policies and priorities established by the General Assembly, by United Nations conferences and by other forums within the United Nations system (para. 5 (b));

(c) To ensure the co-ordination of the activities of the organizations of the United Nations system in the economic, social and related fields (para. 5 (c));

(d) To carry out comprehensive reviews of operational activities throughout the United Nations system (para. 5 (d)); and

(e) To assist in the preparation of the work of the General Assembly by drawing up, for its consideration, recommendations for action on substantive issues (para. 6).

11. The Council was also invited to organize its work on a biennial basis and hold shorter, subject-oriented sessions (para. 7); to group substantively-related items on its agenda under a single heading (para. 8); to hold periodic meetings at the ministerial level (para. 9);

5/ See, for example, the report of the Secretary-General of 18 November 1965 (A/6109) entitled "Review and appraisal of the role and functions of the Economic and Social Council".

6/ In addition to resolution 32/197, see Council resolution 1982/50 and, more recently, Council resolution 1988/77 on the revitalization of the Economic and Social Council.
to discontinue or re-group some subsidiary bodies, groups of experts, advisory groups, intergovernmental standing committees and functional commissions (paras. 10 and 11); and to refrain from establishing new subsidiary bodies (para. 12).

12. Seven years after the adoption of resolution 32/197, JIU undertook to review the conditions and results of the implementation of its recommendations 7/.

13. The JIU regrouped the above five functions into the following main ones and examined the way it performed them:

(a) Defining general policies for the United Nations system: synthesis and consolidation of all economic and social data at the world level and guidance in the choice of objectives and methods by Governments and organizations in the United Nations system;

(b) Co-ordinating plans and programmes at the United Nations system level, from the standpoint both of programme content and of mechanisms and procedures; and

(c) Planning and programming the economic and social activities of the United Nations Secretariat.

14. Three chapters will be devoted to these functions, to allow for an analysis of the difficulties encountered by the Council in performing its tasks and for recommendations as to the necessary remedial measures:

Chapter I: Formulation of general policies that are more action-oriented;

Chapter II: More effective inter-agency co-ordination;

Chapter III: Making full use of available programming instruments.

7/ JIU/REP/84/7 (A/39/281-E/1984/81, Add.1 and Add.2), Reporting to the Economic and Social Council.
CHAPTER I. FORMULATION OF GENERAL POLICIES THAT ARE MORE ACTION-ORIENTED

15. The formulation of coherent system-wide economic, social and humanitarian policies is undertaken by the Economic and Social Council mainly on the basis of a general debate. The debate not only permits a better understanding of the viewpoints of Member States and enables areas of consensus to be identified, but also reveals which questions are considered as fundamental by all participants.

16. Unfortunately, the debate frequently fails to lead to the adoption of any recommendation. This is apparently due to the fact that the documentation compiled as a basis for debate is too descriptive, repetitive and voluminous and seldom contains any conclusions or recommendations. Furthermore, it is generally distributed too late to delegations, which prevents them from assimilating the information or consulting their Governments on its content 8/.

17. The Council's efforts to ensure that its deliberations are more action-oriented are further complicated by the fact that, for its general debate, it receives on average some 300 pages of documents including a World Economic Survey, a Report on the World Social Situation and reports by the regional commissions and the Committee for Development Planning (CDP).

18. These documents in fact are only part of a collection of studies of world economic and social issues conducted annually by the United Nations and the organizations within the system, such as the Trade and Development Report of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), the World Labour Report of the International Labour Office (ILO), the World Bank's World Development Report and the International Monetary Fund's (IMF) World Economic Outlook.

19. All these reports deal with world economic and social developments during the past year. It would be desirable to reduce these descriptions, and in some cases to eliminate them completely, and replace them by brief summaries. Conversely, the analytical sections should be expanded and include recommendations which would be set out clearly and separate from the analyses, rather than included in the body of the reports, where they are difficult to pick out.

20. In addition, focusing the general debate on a limited number of carefully selected basic issues would make it easier for the Council to study them and arrive at action-oriented decisions. In performing that task, the Council should be able to count on the assistance of CDP in selecting the basic issues and compiling a clear and comprehensive dossier on each of them, with draft recommendations.

21. The proliferation of the documents prepared for the Council's general debate seems to be due to the fact that, year after year, Member States call for more and more documents, some of which are not justified by any new

8/ JIU/REP/84/7, chapter I.
international development 9/. Given the circumstances, any improvement in the current situation is dependent on parallel efforts being made by the Secretariat and by the Member States, which should request fewer documents and limit the number of items for the general debate to major issues or problems requiring urgent solutions.

22. Although Member States can exercise more discipline, the Secretariat itself should encourage shorter, better written and more pointed documents. In particular, the quotation of large excerpts of past resolutions which often occupy several of the initial pages of documents should be discontinued. Time and resources would be saved if relevant resolutions were to be referred to only by number and a one-sentence description of their contents.

23. Another practice, namely the preparation of "report on reports", should be discontinued. Reference to other reports should be limited to page and paragraph cross references and to the elaboration of conclusions rather than simply repeating the information in extenso.

24. Member States persist in calling for a lengthy general debate extending over "five working days" 10/, which accounts for practically one third of the time available for all the deliberations of the Council's second session. While calling for the adoption of a biennial programme of work for the Council, Member States request the preparation of as many documents as for annual programmes.

25. In addition, the Charter devoted to the Council the responsibility for monitoring and following up the implementation of the overall strategies, policies and priorities established by the General Assembly in the economic, social and related fields, as contained in the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly and the Council. To this effect, the Charter provided the Council with the right to request the organizations of the United Nations system to submit to it reports on the measures taken to put into practice the recommendations of the General Assembly and the Council in these fields.

26. Some Member States feel that the Council should attach more importance and devote more time to its monitoring and follow-up function. This concern has been also reflected in the Council resolution 1988/77 (para. 2 (c)).


10/ Resolution 1988/77, on the revitalization of the Economic and Social Council.
Conclusions and recommendations

27. The Council remains the highest central body in the United Nations for the consideration of international economic, social and humanitarian questions and the formulation under the authority of the General Assembly of coherent general system-wide policies. It is in the course of the general debate that the Council endeavours to articulate such policies. However, the fact that the Council regularly has too many issues before it, together with the over-descriptive nature of the documentation provided, means that the general debate seldom leads to the adoption of recommendations.

Recommendation No. 1

Notwithstanding any changes in the Council's functions, powers or membership as a result, for example, of its Special Commission's recommendations, the Council should proceed with the rapid implementation of the recommendations contained in its resolution 1988/77 and, in particular:

(a) Allocate not more than three days to its general debate (instead of five as at present), thus paving the way for shorter sessions;

(b) Reduce the documentation submitted for its general debate, by limiting it to matters central to its debate and discarding any document duplicating another or containing no essential analysis or information; and

(c) Identify a number of major items and urgent questions requiring decisions by the Council.
CHAPTER II. MORE EFFECTIVE INTER-AGENCY CO-ORDINATION

28. The co-ordination of economic, social and humanitarian activities of organizations within the United Nations system is another major function of the Economic and Social Council. Resolution 32/197 clarified this function and devoted a whole chapter to the mechanisms which would enable it to be performed more effectively.

29. After recalling that the Council is charged under the Charter of the United Nations with responsibility for the general co-ordination of the activities of United Nations organizations in the economic, social and humanitarian fields, and with ensuring, to that end, observance of the priorities established by the General Assembly for the system as a whole (para. 50), resolution 32/197 stated that inter-agency co-ordination should also apply to the preparatory work of intergovernmental bodies and the implementation of their decisions (para. 51).

30. Resolution 32/197 also reaffirmed that the machinery for inter-agency co-ordination at the intersecretariat level should centre on the Administrative Committee on Co-ordination (ACC) 11/ and recommended the restructuring of that body. At the same time, the resolution suggested that the "reporting systems of the Administrative Committee on Co-ordination should be adjusted to respond fully and promptly to the priority concerns ... of the General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council" (para. 55).

31. In resolution 32/197, the organizations within the United Nations system were asked to intensify their work on planning by, among other things, improving methodology and procedures and holding prior consultations, with a view to establishing system-wide medium-term planning (para. 45). It was also proposed in the resolution that the organizations of the system should harmonize their programme budget presentation, adopt a common methodology of programme classification and description of content and synchronize their cycles (para. 43).

32. Finally, the organizations of the United Nations system were invited to work out, without further delay, solutions to the overlapping of work timetables by holding prior consultations in order that the competent governing bodies might be enabled to take full account of the results thereof before approving such programmes (para. 44).

33. The JIU checked to determine whether those recommendations had been fully and effectively implemented 12/. To that end, it studied the documents submitted to the Council in connection with its deliberations on inter-agency co-ordination.

11/ It now comprises: (a) a Consultative Committee on Substantive Questions (CCSQ): Programmes and Operational Activities; (b) a Consultative Committee on Administrative Questions (CCAQ): Personnel, Financial and Budgetary Questions; (c) an Organizational Committee (ACC/OC); and (d) subsidiary bodies in the fields of statistics, food, public information and long-term development objectives.

12/ JIU/REP/84/7 (A/39/281), chapter II.
34. These documents cover regional and international co-operation, operational activities for development and the medium-term plans of the organizations within the system.

35. A reading of some of them, particularly the biennial reports of ACC on United Nations system on programme-related expenditures, shows that, while they provide useful information and statistics, they do not provide the Council with a rapid and comprehensive insight into the problems involved in co-ordinating the system's activities. ACC's Annual Overview Reports are actually more like descriptive catalogues of ACC's activities.

36. In addition to these reports, there are others dealing with co-ordination in such sectors as mineral resources, population and food 13/. In fact, these reports are basically descriptive and discussion of them generally fails to lead to any conclusion or recommendation by the Council.

37. The Council is also presented with Cross-Organizational Programmes Analyses (COPAs) dealing with economic co-operation among developing countries, science and technology, energy, rural development, youth, public administration and questions relating to the sea. In theory, the COPAs are intended to provide "an analysis of the actual state of co-ordination, rather than a mere description of activities ... and should contain recommendations for action" 14/. However, CPC, as the auxiliary organ of the Council and General Assembly specializing in co-ordination, found that the COPAs have "conceptual and methodological weaknesses ... did not provide the in-depth analysis CPC had expected, did not undertake a critical analysis of programmes in relation to mandates and seldom identified gaps and duplication or determined the effectiveness or otherwise of co-ordination arrangements" 15/.

38. It should be noted, however, that, in general, significant improvements have been achieved in co-ordination mechanisms with the creation of the Consultative Committee on Substantive Questions (CCSQ), the Office of Programme Planning and Co-ordination (PPCO) 16/ and the Task Force on

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13/ These reports were introduced in accordance with resolution 1982/50 (para. (f)). At its second session of 1988, the Council recommended that they should be discontinued (resolution 1988/77, para. 2 (e) (iii)) and replaced by brief analyses on major issues in the medium-term plan.

14/ Council resolution 2098 (LXIII) of 1977 and decisions of the 1978 ACC-CPC joint meeting.


16/ The PPCO has joined with other entities to become the Office for Programme Planning, Budgeting, Monitoring and Evaluation and transferred from the Department of International Economic and Social Affairs (DIESA) to the Department of Administration and Management (DAM).
Long-Term Development Objectives, and also as a result of the harmonization of programme budget 17/ and medium-term plans 18/ presentation and the establishment of COPAs.

39. Nonetheless, much remains to be done in co-ordinating analyses, programmes and activities. Specifically, CPC should draw up a list of topics to be dealt with in COPAs or, intersectoral analyses, with a view to identifying the discrepancies noted between organizational analyses and suggesting ways of reducing them and promoting joint planning.

40. CPC should also prepare models for the studies adopted, indicate the desirable content of the analytical parts and the procedures for presentation of recommendations and stipulate clearly the respective responsibilities in the formulation of decisions to be submitted to the Council.

41. In this regard, it is important to keep in mind that co-ordination is the responsibility of the Council and the organizations of the system, and that it is the role of the Council to set the main targets on the basis of the objectives of each of the organizations.

42. In order to perform this task successfully, the Council needs to be kept regularly informed of new developments regarding the policies, deliberations, conclusions and recommendations of the organizations of the system and their intergovernmental organs. The Secretary-General holds the view 19/ that the statements made by the heads of these organizations in the course of the Council's general debate contain highly useful information and suggests that the Council should consider the possibility of making better use of it. The Secretary-General also proposes that, at its annual organizational sessions and in the course of its deliberations, the Council should identify a limited number of specific topics for in-depth consideration, with a view to achieving better co-ordination. It would be desirable if those topics emanated from the specialized agencies and had a direct bearing on their work.

43. The Secretary-General also agrees with JIU that the documents submitted to the Council for its consideration of co-ordination questions warrant considerable improvement. In particular, the Secretary-General believes that ACC's Annual Overview Reports should go beyond providing a description of the activities of the Committee and its subsidiary bodies and should present an in-depth analysis of the problems encountered in co-ordinating the system's activities.

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17/ Currently, all organizations of the system which have programme budgets have synchronized their submission and have in general taken the sub-programmes as basic units for the joint programmes.

18/ All organizations of the United Nations system which engage in medium-term planning follow a plan covering the same six-year period. However, various planning methods continue to be applied within the system. Some organizations have medium-term objectives but no real medium-term plan.

44. However, the General Assembly and the Council continue to express their concern at the difficulty of improving co-ordination of the system's activities. Both bodies regularly revert to this question and adopt pertinent recommendations practically every year. The General Assembly, for example, requested the Secretary-General 20/ to review all aspects of co-ordination in the United Nations and to submit a comprehensive report to it at its forty-second session.

45. In accordance with that resolution, the Secretary-General in fact submitted a comprehensive and exhaustive report on inter-agency co-ordination 21/ in which he analysed the difficulties continually confronting the Council as a result of, among other things, the rapid expansion of the system's programmes and activities, the lack of differentiation between the respective roles of the second and third committees of the General Assembly, the Council and the UNCTAD, or the fact that the Council is compelled to consider the reports of intergovernmental organizations, most of which meet only one month before its own session.

46. The Secretary-General lists the measures decided on by the General Assembly and the Council to overcome these obstacles, in particular the adoption of a biennial programme, the in-depth consideration of a limited number of issues or the holding of prior consultations with the governing bodies of the various programmes and agencies of the system.

47. However, the Council appears to have found those measures inadequate. As a result, it invited CPC to prepare another report and to submit specific proposals to it at its second regular session of 1989, with a view to rationalizing the "co-ordination instruments, such as cross-organizational reports ... and reports of the Administrative Committee on Co-ordination and its subsidiary bodies" to enable "the Council to carry out its co-ordination functions in an effective manner" 22/.

48. While awaiting the proposals of CPC, the Council decided 23/ to discontinue the COPAs in their current form and to replace them, as from 1989, with "mini-analyses" for direct submission to the Council. It also invited the Secretary-General to submit, immediately after the adoption of the medium-term plan for 1992-1997 by the General Assembly, a list of the analyses to be carried out.

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20/ Resolution 40/177 of 17 December 1985.


22/ Resolution 1988/77, paragraph (e) (i).

23/ Resolution 1988/77, paragraph (e) (iii).
Conclusions and recommendations

49. It is a heavy responsibility for the Economic and Social Council to be entrusted with co-ordinating the activities of the organizations of the whole of the United Nations system in the economic, social and humanitarian fields. The numerous studies entrusted by the Council to the Secretary-General, to CPC, to ACC, to the Council's Special Commission and to other expert and advisory groups, as well as the many resolutions and decisions on co-ordination adopted each year by the Council, give an idea of its difficulties in discharging its responsibility.

50. However, while the Council may be making only slow progress towards general co-ordination, it has succeeded in achieving significant results in programme co-ordination and in harmonizing concepts and methodologies, through implementation of the medium-term plan, use of the same terminology and the same planning cycles, and consultations in ACC and intersecretariat meetings.

51. The experience gained by the Council is further enriched by the fact that it has acquired a better understanding of the major problems of co-ordination which are still pending, and of the advantages and disadvantages of the various solutions already tried and a heightened awareness of the progress still to be made.

52. Co-ordination remains an extremely important task in a complex and polycentred system and deserves that the system allocates to it a justified amount of time and resources. The danger of co-ordination becoming an end in itself should be, however, avoided.

Recommendation No. 2

Notwithstanding the proposals which CPC will make to the Council in 1989, the Council must endeavour to achieve the following objectives:

(a) The Council should consider streamlining its debates on co-ordination by, inter alia, a concentration and better preparation of documentation. The study of a limited number of co-ordination problems encountered by the agencies and the United Nations would lighten the Council's burden appreciably and increase its effectiveness;

(b) The Council should make greater use of the existing formal and informal co-ordination mechanisms. At the system-wide level, the Council should make greater use of the Director-General. At the agency Secretariat level, full use should be made of informal consultations between senior officials responsible for policies, programmes and substantive activities. In the field, greater use should be made of resident co-ordinators and resident representatives; and

(c) The Council should ensure that mechanisms of co-ordination remain highly flexible so as to retain within the system a malleability enabling it to cope with emergencies.
CHAPTER III. MAKING FULL USE OF AVAILABLE PROGRAMMING INSTRUMENTS

53. The role of the Economic and Social Council in the planning and programming of United Nations activities in the economic, social and humanitarian fields has been redefined on a number of occasions, as was the case following the adoption of resolution 32/197. That resolution went to some lengths to recommend ways of making the Council's work more efficient. To that end, it requested CPC, which is also the main subsidiary body of the Council in the area of planning and programming in the United Nations, to submit to the Council recommendations on the relative priorities to be accorded to its various programmes (para. 40).

54. In endeavouring to determine the extent to which those recommendations had been put into effect, JIU examined the procedure for preparing the documentation needed by the Council and its subsidiary bodies. In doing so, JIU noted that, in general, the documents submitted to the Council and its subsidiary bodies reached their intended recipients either late or incomplete. The review of 19 major economic, social and humanitarian programmes of the United Nations provided for in the 1984-1989 medium-term plan, shows that a number of subsidiary bodies received the chapters relating to them either late or not at all.

55. In addition, JIU noted the absence of any procedure for submitting programme performance reports to the subsidiary bodies of the Council. Some studies, such as those on the technical co-operation activities of a number of bodies, were simply not submitted to them at all.

56. In short, JIU concluded that the overall picture was one of the partial use of the programming tools by subsidiary bodies. On the whole, JIU notices the absence of a procedure enabling bodies to receive, in good time and in accordance with a coherent sequence, the documents necessary to enable them to discharge their programme formulation responsibilities.

57. JIU recommends that, in order to rationalize their planning and programming work, the subsidiary bodies of the Council should devote some of their reports in alternate years to the study of the United Nations programmes in their respective sectors and, in other years, to the programmes of all the organizations in the United Nations system in a single sector. The latter should deal in turn with the draft medium-term plan or any amendments to it, the draft programme budget, the programme performance reports, operational activities, evaluation reports and COPAs. In carrying out their work, the subsidiary bodies should be provided, as soon as they are available, with documents prepared for planning, programming and evaluation. A precise calendar should be drawn up to enable documents to be produced and considered in good time.

24/ The role of CPC in inter-agency co-ordination (harmonization of medium-term plans and programmes) has been discussed in the preceding chapter.

25/ JIU/REP/84/7, (A/39/281), chapter III.
58. The Secretary-General shares the view of JIU that the medium-term plan and the programme budget should be distributed more widely to the Council's subsidiary bodies since they represent the principal tools available to Member States in guiding the Secretariat's work, ensuring its effectiveness and monitoring its implementation 26/

59. The Secretary-General also considers that the deficiencies pointed out by JIU with regard to documentation (delays, partial distribution, etc.) are aggravated by the fact that a number of subsidiary bodies of the Council do not accord sufficient attention to medium-term plans, programme budgets and performance reports, since they view themselves as technical organs of the Council and thus not obliged to take any position on the programmes submitted to them. The Secretary-General is of the view that all subsidiary bodies of the Council should assume their planning and programming responsibilities.

60. The Secretary-General also undertook to seek ways and means of implementing JIU's recommendations, with a view to improving the content of the documents prepared for the Council and its subsidiary bodies and ensuring that they are distributed in time 27/

61. In 1986, CPC conducted a review of its own functioning on the basis of a report by the Secretary-General 28/ and submitted a number of suggestions for the improvement of the documents received from the Secretariat for the preparation of medium-term plans and programme budgets.

62. Finally, in 1988, Member States again reaffirmed the importance which they attached to the in-depth examination by the Council of the medium-term plan and proposed programme budget and the submission to the General Assembly of recommendations on the priorities and overall programme of the United Nations 29/.

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27/ A/40/284, pages 13 and 14.
28/ A/41/38, chapter II.
29/ Resolution 1988/77.
Conclusions and recommendations

63. Since the adoption of resolution 32/197, programming and budgeting procedures have changed appreciably. In 1978, they were still at an experimental stage, whereas now they are codified in the form of detailed regulations 30/.

64. Furthermore, programme planning and budgeting are used by the Secretariat to identify marginal activities and transfer resources from low priority to higher priority programmes.

65. Nevertheless, the basic documents prepared by the Secretariat to assist the Council and its subsidiary bodies in their planning and programming work are still distributed too late and incomplete, or are disregarded by a number of subsidiary bodies.

Recommendation No. 3

The Secretariat should continue to strive to ensure that the documents needed by the Council and its subsidiary bodies to perform their planning and programming tasks effectively are prepared in good time and distributed in full. The distribution of such documents as preliminary drafts or provisional versions could be one way of overcoming the delays observed and help to remove some of the obstacles resulting from the fact that meetings of the Council's subsidiary bodies overlap or are held too soon after one another.

30/ ST/SGB/204.
PART II. A MORE RATIONAL DIVISION OF LABOUR AMONG SECRETARIAT SERVICES AND A BETTER DEFINITION OF THE RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE DIRECTOR-GENERAL

66. Resolution 32/197 recommended the restructuring of the economic and social departments of the Secretariat and the regrouping of the following sectors in four separate entities:

(a) Interdisciplinary research and analysis and cross-sectoral analysis (para. 61 (a) and (b));

(b) Economic and social sectors which are not covered by other United Nations organs, programmes or specialized agencies (para. 61 (c));

(c) Technical secretariat services for CPC, the Economic and Social Council, the General Assembly, ad hoc conferences and intersecretariat co-ordination machinery (para. 61 (e)); and

(d) Co-ordination within the system of activities in the field of development and international economic co-operation (para. 64).

67. With regard to statistics, resolution 32/197 left open the choice of whether to assign them to the entity (a) or entity (b) (para. 61 (f)); as to the technical co-operation carried out by other entities of the Secretariat, resolution 32/197 recommended to assign them to entity (b) (para. 61 (d)).

68. The human and financial resources of the social and economic departments of the Secretariat were hence redeployed among four departments: the Department of International Economic and Social Affairs (DIESA), the Department of Technical Co-operation for Development (DTCID), the Office of Secretariat Services for Economic and Social Matters (OSSECS) and the Office of the Director-General for Development and International Economic Co-operation (ODG/DIEC) 31/.

69. Between 1981 and 1984, JIU produced four reports on the operational modalities of these four new entities 32/ and to put forward recommendations clarifying their respective assignments. These reports were submitted to the General Assembly together with the comments of the Secretary-General 33/.

31/ A/33/410/Rev.1.

32/ JIU/REP/81/9 or (A/36/419), JIU/REP/83/2 or (A/38/172), JIU/REP/83/7 or (A/38/334) and JIU/REP/84/6 or (A/39/94).

33/ A/36/419/Add.1, A/38/172/Add.1, A/38/334/Add.1 and A/39/94/Add.1.
Some entities have since undergone major changes 34/., as reflected in the reports of the Secretary-General 35/.

70. In this part, we shall analyse the obstacles confronting each of these entities. Two separate chapters are devoted to them:

Chapter IV: A more operational division of labour within the Secretariat;

Chapter V: Clarification of the role of the Director-General within the system and the Secretariat.

34/ The most important are the separation of part of the Office for Programme Planning and Co-ordination (PPCO) from the Department of International Economic and Social Affairs (DIESA) and its attachment to the Department of Administration and Management (DAM) and the transfer of the management of the Centre for Social Development and Humanitarian Affairs (UNOV/CSDHA) to Vienna and its attachment to the United Nations Office at Vienna (UNOV). The heads of the United Nations Centre on Transnational Corporations (UNCTC) and the Centre for Science and Technology for Development (CSTD) were required to report to the Secretary-General through DIESA. In 1987, OSSECS was transferred to the Office of the Under-Secretary-General for Political and General Assembly Affairs, which was rebaptized the Office of the Under-Secretary-General for Political and General Assembly Affairs and Secretariat Services.

CHAPTER IV. A MORE OPERATIONAL DIVISION OF LABOUR WITHIN THE SECRETARIAT

71. In this chapter, we shall begin by recalling the principles set out in resolution 32/197 for the distribution of tasks among the main economic and social support services of the Secretariat in order to verify their application and indicate what changes should be made to achieve a better division of labour.

A. Present division of labour

72. In accordance with resolution 32/197, the distribution of functions among the individual Secretariat entities should be based above all on a clear distinction between sectors of activity. Thus, interdisciplinary research and analysis should be entrusted to one entity, together with cross-sectoral analysis, since these are activities relating to the same sector. Likewise, energy, natural resources and public administration should be clustered together in a single entity because these contribute well-defined sectors.

73. However, the distribution effected in 1978 was made, not on the basis of the distinction between the sectors identified by resolution 32/197, but by opposing two functions: research and analysis, on the one hand, which was assigned to DIESA and technical co-operation, on the other hand, which went to DTCD. This inevitably resulted in confusion. DIESA was entrusted with undertaking studies and analysis relating to some sectors but had to leave other sectors to DTCD. Likewise, DTCD was required to provide support for technical co-operation activities relating to some sectors, but had to abandon others to DIESA.

74. Furthermore, some activities were attributed to DIESA rather than to DTCD for no valid reason. This was the case for the Statistical Office (SO) which is carrying out in fact research as well as technical co-operation activities.

75. Also, in order to make DIESA comparable in size to DTCD, it had to be given additional units dealing with fiscal issues, energy, transport and population. Once again, overlapping and duplication between DTCD and DIESA were bound to occur.

76. The solution to these problems could, we believe, lie mainly in returning to the spirit of resolution 32/197, while at the same time taking account of subsequent developments and making a minimum of changes so as to avoid serious disruption of the Secretariat's work.
B. Principles for a more efficient division of labour

77. The principles for a more efficient division of labour are explicitly or implicitly set out in resolution 32/197 and may be summarized in three points.

1. Cluster together activities relating to well-defined sectors in distinct entities

78. According to this criterion, all activities falling within the same sector or related sectors should be assigned to a distinct entity. Such a division would make it possible to reduce or even totally eliminate the risks of duplication and to distinguish easily one entity from another. Specifically, this principle would imply that:

(a) DIESA would have responsibility for the world economic analysis and interdisciplinary research;

(b) DTCD would cover the basic infrastructure sectors (energy, natural resources, mining, transport, water, ocean economics and technology) and the administrative infrastructure sectors (public administration and finance, development planning and fiscal issues);

(c) UNOV/CSDHA would deal with the social and humanitarian sectors, including population (because of its close relationship with the former); and

(d) SO would have the world economic statistics sector.

79. As regards existing major programmes 36/, the distribution would consequently be as follows:

(a) DIESA would cover major programme 10: development issues and policies (with the exception of sub-programme A.5 of programme 1 and programme 2);

(b) DTCD would have (i) major programme 11: energy; (ii) major programme 17: natural resources (including programme 1, currently managed by DIESA (mineral resources, coastal and marine resources, water resources) and programme 2 (mineral resources, water, cartography)); (iii) major programme 19: public administration and finance; and (iv) major programme 24: transport development (which should be transferred from DIESA to DTCD).

(c) UNOV/CSDHA would be responsible for (i) major programme 18: population (with its two programmes 1 and 2, which are at present covered respectively by DIESA and DTCD) and (ii) major programme 21: social development and humanitarian affairs; and

(d) SO would be in charge of major programme 22: world statistics, with the exception of sub-programmes A.4 (energy statistics), A.5 (price statistics) and A.6 (social and demographic statistics), which should go respectively to DTCD, UNCTAD and UNOV/CSDHA.

36/ See the medium-term plan for the period 1984-1989, A/37/6, Supplement No. 6.
80. It would be advisable, moreover, to give new titles to some of these entities so that their names correspond to the sectors which they cover. While the name of UNOV/CSDHA probably requires no change, the designation of DTCD on the other hand ought to be replaced by: Department for the Development of Infrastructure Services. As regards DIESA, the reference to social affairs should be omitted from its title. It would thus be readily apparent that the Secretariat has four main entities specializing, respectively, in:

(a) international economics,
(b) social affairs,
(c) infrastructure services and
(d) world statistics.

81. In addition, since the spring session of ECOSOC is traditionally devoted to social matters, it would be logical that it should take place in Vienna in order to allow the permanent missions in Vienna to exercise effectively their prerogative. Furthermore, such a change would ensure the carrying out of the Secretary-General's plan announced two years ago to the General Assembly in the first progress report on the implementation of General Assembly resolution 41/213, to the effect that UNOV should become the nucleus for all activities relating to social policy and social development 37/. It would also reflect General Assembly resolution 42/126 which, inter alia, "requests the Secretary-General to strengthen, within existing resources, UNOV as a nucleus for all issues and reports relating to social policy and social development including its research capabilities".  

2. Assign all the necessary facilities to each entity

82. This would imply that, to cover efficiently the sector (or sectors) assigned to it, each entity should be able to:

(a) Undertake directly, and for its own account, economic and technical studies, analysis and research relating to the sector (or sectors) for which it is responsible;

(b) Gather all the necessary information and statistical data necessary for carrying out these studies;

(c) Undertake technical co-operation activities: headquarters support, field implementation, supervision, follow-up and evaluation;

(d) Prepare the required documents (in analytical and directly usable form, and including action-oriented draft recommendations) for the account of the intergovernmental bodies to which it is responsible;

(e) Implement the activities and programmes decided on by these bodies and report to them on the state of advancement of the tasks entrusted to the entity;

(f) Carry out evaluation and follow-up of all the entity's activities;

37/ Document A/42/234, para. 30 (g).
(g) Prepare consolidated reports dealing with the various sectors entrusted to the entity; and

(h) Provide the required information and assistance, in accordance with pre-established agreements determining the degree of involvement of each partner, to the departments responsible for overall planning, programming, co-ordination, evaluation and reporting within the Secretariat on the system.

83. The staff of each entity, as specialists in their own sector (or sectors), would therefore decide what information or statistical data should be gathered and would collect them directly without passing through intermediate stages. They would then have to prepare the necessary studies, analyses and research and would ensure execution of the requisite technical co-operation tasks.

84. The great advantage of concentrating all the necessary facilities in the hands of those responsible for covering a particular sector is that it helps to save time and human and financial resources, to avoid duplication and overlapping and to obtain a high quality of work.

3. **Combine overall functions**

85. In general, these functions are assigned to central entities for reasons of economy or independence. The first category includes support services for technical co-operation such as recruitment of experts, fellowships and procurement of equipment. As far as the Technical Assistance Recruitment and Fellowship Office (TARFO) located in Geneva is concerned, we believe that it should be strengthened and that its functions should be expanded.

86. The gathering, processing and dissemination of world economic statistical data and information also falls into this category of functions which should be performed by a central service. A case in point is the Statistical Office (SO). However, SO should decentralize regional or sectoral statistics to the regional commissions and the specialized departments of the Secretariat.

87. Two overall functions which should be assigned to distinct entities, with a view to ensuring independence and objectivity, are planning and programming at the Secretariat or system-wide level. At present, this is the function of the Office of Programme Planning, Budget and Finance, which is responsible, *inter alia*, for preparing the medium-term plan and the programme budgets. Similarly, evaluation at the Secretariat level is a task which, in the interest of objectivity, should be performed by a central unit independent of the substantive entities. This is currently the case, since responsibility here is borne by the Management Advisory Service and the Central Evaluation Unit. Co-ordination should also be entrusted to an independent entity. At present, this task is not clearly defined within the Secretariat, and the respective roles of ODG/DIEC at the Secretariat level, and that of CPC and the Economic and Social Council at the policy-making level, are not properly delimited.
C. Conclusions and recommendations

88. A major step towards a rational and efficient division of labour, with less overlapping and as far as possible avoiding duplication and wastage of energy and resources, could be made by redeploying certain services while maintaining the present Secretariat support structure for economic and social activities.

89. The guiding principle for such streamlining would be a division of labour based on (a) clustering together sectoral activities in distinct entities; (b) providing each of these entities with all the necessary facilities for them to function effectively; and (c) assigning the overall functions of programming, budgeting, evaluation and co-ordination at the Secretariat or system-wide level to independent entities.

Recommendation No. 4

Apart from the changes that are to take place in the existing structure of the Secretariat by 1990, pursuant to the recommendations made by the Group of 18 and on which the Secretary-General will report to the General Assembly at its forty-fourth session, the General Assembly may request the Secretary-General to take the recommendations of resolution 32/197 into account in the ongoing process of reorganizing the economic and social sectors of the Secretariat. The Secretary-General should, in particular, ensure that the new structure now being evolved makes it possible to:

(a) Achieve a more operational division of labour between DTCD, DIESA, UNOV/CSDHA and SO based on the clustering together of distinct sectors in each of these entities, as described in paragraphs 77 to 81 above; and

(b) Assign to each of these entities all the necessary facilities for the effective performance of its functions, as enumerated in paragraphs 82 to 84 above.
CHAPTER V. CLARIFICATION OF THE ROLE OF THE DIRECTOR-GENERAL
WITHIN THE SYSTEM AND THE SECRETARIAT

90. In the terms of resolution 32/197, the main function of the Director-General is to assist the Secretary-General in carrying out his responsibilities as chief administrative officer, under the Charter of the United Nations, in the economic and social fields. Accordingly, the Director-General is in charge of:

(a) Ensuring the provision of the effective leadership to the various components of the United Nations system in the field of development and international economic co-operation and exercising overall co-ordination within the system in order to ensure a multidisciplinary approach to the problems of development (para. 64 (a));

(b) Ensuring, within the United Nations, the coherence, co-ordination and efficient management of all activities in the economic and social fields financed by the regular budget or by extrabudgetary resources (para. 64 (b)); and

(c) Undertaking any tasks entrusted to him by the Secretary-General (end of para. 64).

91. Implementation of these recommendations has presented difficulties as regards the definition of the responsibilities and functions of the Director-General within the Secretariat and the system as a whole.

A. Need to define the responsibilities of the Director-General within the system

92. The Director-General has encountered difficulties in exercising the leadership entrusted to him by resolution 32/197, in that he has to carry out his responsibilities vis-à-vis the Secretary-General and to the executive heads of the system's organizations, who derive their powers from intergovernmental bodies.

1. Director-General's responsibilities to the Secretary-General

93. While it is clear that the Secretary-General derives his power from the Charter of the United Nations and the General Assembly, the Director-General bears only the responsibilities delegated by the Secretary-General.

94. In clarifying the responsibility of the Director-General to the Secretary-General, it is obvious that two extreme solutions should be avoided; namely, either to assign full and total responsibility in the economic and social fields to the Director-General or to reduce his role to that of a mere spokesman holding no ultimate responsibility. The practical solution would be to enumerate the areas of responsibility which the Secretary-General might wish to delegate to the Director-General and those he would retain himself. A distinction would thus be introduced between, on the one hand, the areas in
which the Director-General has the power of decision (while keeping the Secretary-General informed) and, on the other hand, those in which he acts on the instructions of the Secretary-General (the latter retaining the power of decision).

95. The main advantages of this solution would be that the Director-General would be endowed with real responsibility in certain well-defined areas, thus permitting him to exercise his leadership in the manner indicated by resolution 32/197, and at the same time to alleviate the burden on the Secretary-General.

96. In its report on the subject of the Director-General, JIU suggested that this delegation of authority should be made on an ad hoc basis. JIU believes that the Director-General should meet with the Secretary-General periodically to keep him informed of major issues and obtain instructions and guidance. The Secretary-General or the Director-General might invite persons concerned with the issues being discussed to be present at these meetings and, after each meeting, the Director-General would announce the decisions which had been taken by the Secretary-General 38/. The Secretary-General has welcomed this suggestion and expressed his intention to hold systematic consultations with the Director-General 39/.

2. **Director-General's responsibilities to the organizational heads of the United Nations system**

97. The Director-General is also hindered in the exercise of his leadership in respect of the organizations forming part of the system. First, the organizational heads of the United Nations system determine the policies and programmes of their own secretariats in accordance with the directives laid down by their respective governing bodies, to which they are accountable. The mandates and instructions they receive from these bodies rarely refer to the role of the Director-General.

98. Secondly, some organizations of the United Nations system have activities covering not only development and international economic co-operation, but also other sectors outside the responsibilities of the Director-General, and the distinction between these two categories is not easy to apply.

99. In order to resolve the first difficulty, JIU suggested that the General Assembly should invite the Director-General to keep the inter-governmental bodies regularly informed of the activities he undertakes in carrying out the functions entrusted to him by resolutions 32/197 and 33/202. To overcome the second problem, JIU recommended that the Director-General should be invited to examine, with the heads of the organizations concerned, those activities which are related to development and international economic co-operation 40/.

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38/ A/36/419, paragraph 23.

39/ A/36/419/Add.1, paragraph 6.

40/ See recommendations 3 and 4 of the JIU report on the Director-General.
100. To our knowledge, no action would appear to have been taken on these two recommendations, although the General Assembly has reiterated its recommendations on strengthening the Director-General's leadership 41/.

B. Need to formalize the functions and procedures of the Director-General within the Secretariat

101. In the course of time, the Director-General has been invested with an increasing number of functions, often on an ad hoc basis. JIU has examined these functions 42/ and has submitted recommendations aimed at better defining them and at rationalizing their procedures.

1. Functions

102. These may be grouped under six main headings which call for the following comments:

(a) International Development Strategy

103. Supervision of the implementation of this Strategy provides the Director-General with a unique instrument enabling him to evaluate the progress achieved by the international community in the field of development and international economic co-operation. To carry out the analysis and synthesis needed for the preparation of the Strategy, the Director-General has called upon the substantive departments, in particular DIESA. It would be desirable to determine the procedures governing this co-operation, especially in respect of the contribution of each secretariat entity to the work required by the Director-General and as regards the implications, in terms of resources and time, of such a contribution.

(b) Integration of social and economic policies

104. Another major function of the Director-General is to put together economic and social issues of UNOV/CSDHA and DIESA and to ensure that they are fully integrated at the policy level. To facilitate the work of the Director-General in this area, the substantive liaison officers of outposted United Nations offices should be attached to the Office of the Director-General, e.g. UNOV, Habitat, UNEP, etc. (the logistical and administrative functions performed by these offices could be done collectively by an appropriate executive office). The liaison officers would still represent the interest and concerns of their respective offices but would also be able to provide direct advice and input to the Director-General's work. Similarly, by meeting with them collectively on a regular, say monthly, basis, the Director-General would be able to keep abreast of all these different programmes, as well as to ensure that they all move in a consistent direction. (It would prevent, for instance, the presentation of resolutions not consonant with overall policy which are now usually unknown until it is too late.) Such an arrangement would greatly strengthen the Director-General's role at the hub of the various United Nations secretariats.


42/ See the above-mentioned report JIU/REP/81/9 or A/36/419.
(c) Medium-term plan and programme budget

105. The Director-General participates actively in overseeing the draft medium-term plan. Indeed, the introduction to this document, which is prepared by ODG/DIEC, provides a coherent framework for Secretariat policy and sets out the main orientations in the field of development and international economic co-operation. However, the Director-General's role in the preparation of the programme budget, and particularly in monitoring the coherence of the economic and social programmes, remains weak and should be better defined and strengthened.

(d) Technical secretariat services for CPC, the Economic and Social Council and the General Assembly

106. Responsibility for approving the items on the provisional agendas of the General Assembly, the Economic and Social Council and CPC relating to economic and social affairs, and for representing the Secretary-General in these bodies, has led the Director-General to maintain close links with OSSECS. Following the transfer of OSSECS to another department, the Director-General should maintain a close working relationship with the new technical secretariat services for the meetings of these three bodies. The Office of the Director-General should, in particular, keep the secretaries of these meetings regularly informed of problems of development and international economic co-operation directly affecting them. For their part, the secretaries should draw the Director-General's attention to any important issue that is raised and concerns his field of competence.

(e) Operational activities for development

107. The Director-General's responsibility under resolution 32/197 for ensuring the coherence, co-ordination and efficient management of all United Nations activities in the economic and social fields financed by the regular budget or by extrabudgetary resources is currently limited to the preparation by the Director-General of annual reports on operational activities for development and triennial comprehensive policy review reports. In preparing these reports, the Director-General should formulate proposals aimed at making operational activities more coherent and better suited to the requirements of development and international economic co-operation.

(f) Management

108. Each head of a Secretariat entity is, of course, responsible for the proper management of his own entity. It remains for the Director-General, as recommended by resolution 32/197, to determine whether development and international economic co-operation activities are being efficiently managed at the Secretariat level. The Director-General's role in identifying and solving the problems of efficient management in these fields (through the budgeting and programming process, the meetings of senior officers in the economic and social fields and the meetings of executive secretaries of regional economic commissions studies and evaluation) still needs to be defined and made clear.
(g) Resolution of jurisdictional issues

109. Action by the Director-General to resolve conflicts of competence in the areas under his purview either at the request of the Secretary-General, an intergovernmental body, the Under-Secretary-General for Administration and Management or the heads of one or more entities, or on his own initiative, should help to prevent deadlocks. This ad hoc responsibility should be exercised in accordance with pre-established arrangements that would not only set out the procedures for the Director-General to follow, but would also take into account the administrative and budgetary implications of his mediation.

2. Procedures

110. In exercising the above functions, the Director-General has recourse to three main procedures: consultative arrangements, reporting arrangements or clearance of documents. All these procedures could be significantly improved.

(a) Consultative arrangements

111. The consultations held on the occasion of meetings which the Director-General holds personally or jointly with the heads of entities on policy follow-up, or with high-level officials to deal with decisions taken by the intergovernmental bodies would be rendered more effective if they were planned and their agendas included subjects more closely related to the central issues discussed by the General Assembly.

(b) Reporting arrangements

112. The heads of Secretariat entities report to the Director-General on the basis of ad hoc arrangements. The Director-General should be kept more regularly and consistently informed of the activities of these entities concerning development and international economic co-operation. The Director-General and the heads of the Secretariat entities should be able to determine the procedure for such an exchange of information.

(c) Clearance of documents

113. Some documents relating to economic and social affairs which are to be presented to the Economic and Social Council or to the General Assembly are not submitted to the Director-General for clearance until the last minute, thus leaving him with no opportunity to ensure their coherence or conformity with the resolutions of those two bodies. To overcome this obstacle, the Director-General should make arrangements for clearance of the most important documents at the editorial stage. In order to be effective and justified, this clearance should be of a substantive nature and not of a procedural or editorial kind. It should be, however, decided that, given the large number of documents submitted to the ODG/DIEC and the fact that a number of these documents are of a routine and non-policy nature, only documents dealing with policy should go through the Director-General's Office.
C. Conclusions and recommendations

114. The Director-General can exercise the functions assigned to him by resolution 32/197 fully and efficiently only if his responsibilities within the organizations of the system and within the Secretariat entities are clearly delimited in agreement with the Secretary-General and the heads of those organizations and entities. Furthermore, the Director-General's functions and the procedures for their implementation would be rendered much more effective if they were formalized.

Recommendation No. 5

(a) To enable the Director-General, under the authority of the Secretary-General, to carry out the responsibilities assigned to him by resolution 32/197, in particular the duty of "ensuring the provision of effective leadership to the various components of the United Nations system in the field of development and international economic co-operation", the Secretary-General and the executive heads of the system should identify the fields to which these responsibilities are to apply and determine the machinery for carrying them out.

(b) The functions of the Director-General and the procedures for their implementation should also be clarified and formalized. For this purpose:

(i) The Secretary-General should issue a bulletin containing the terms of reference of the Director-General and of ODG/DIEC;

(ii) The Secretary-General should arrange for the United Nations Organizational Manual to be revised in order to include a section concerning the Director-General and ODG/DIEC, and to enable consequential changes to be made in the other sections;

(iii) The Director-General should prepare an annual plan of work indicating the priority activities he is to undertake and the contributions he anticipates from other entities;

(iv) The medium-term plan should include a programme concerning the Director-General;

(v) The programme budget should identify the outputs of ODG/DIEC.