FIELD REPRESENTATION OF ORGANIZATIONS OF THE UNITED NATIONS SYSTEM: STRUCTURE AND CO-ORDINATION

Prepared by
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Joint Inspection Unit

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STRUCTURE AND CO-ORDINATION

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Earl D. Sohn

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I. INTRODUCTION

1. This report responds to a request of the General Assembly to the Joint Inspection Unit "to study in-depth the structure of the field representation of the organs and organizations of the United Nations system, particularly with regard to the tasks allotted to the resident co-ordinators" (General Assembly resolution 38/171, paragraph 30). In interpreting the General Assembly's request, the Inspectors have used the term "representation" in a broad sense to include any arrangements whereby an organization has a presence in the field for any purpose, even beyond that of pure development activities.

2. The United Nations is a loosely-knit organization comprising many sectors of specialization having a broad common purpose. These have contributed to development activities in Member States over the past forty years and have resulted in a network of field offices which provide expert guidance, and on-the-spot services to developing host countries. This comprehensive but complex system needs common goals as well as periodic overhaul to ensure that its operations are purposeful, cost-effective and mutually consistent.

3. The system has considerably expanded and strengthened its field representation over the period 1973 to 1983 at country, subregional and regional levels. The first part of this study (chapter II) focuses attention on the size and nature of this growth and examines the extent to which, in the present circumstances, the common purpose can find expression in improved planning and programming and in the execution of programmes. The search for coherence is doubly justified at this time of scarce resources.

4. An analysis of the growth pattern of field establishments provides some comparisons between organizations. The analysis is incomplete, however, for certain obvious reasons: firstly, it would have had to probe deeply into not only field structure and operations but also Headquarters' organizations; secondly, the organizations differ widely in size, organizational philosophy, nature and style of programmes (a fact which influences logistics), as well as in the mix of staff required for the job. To have conducted a study incorporating and seeking to harmonize all these elements would have gone beyond the resources available and have greatly breached the limitations placed on length of reports. Nonetheless, the Inspectors have identified and commented on some broad trends which appear significant. Governing bodies should find these trends of sufficient importance to warrant a deeper analysis in their respective organizations.

5. The report turns its attention in chapter III to the role of the resident co-ordinator and the interplay of forces affecting his relationship with his colleagues in the field. Certain factors receive prominence as either favouring or inhibiting the co-ordination of United Nations system activities.
6. "Co-ordination" has always been a concern of the United Nations system. A number of co-ordinating bodies exist whose primary purpose has been, administratively or programmatically, to provide a sounder basis in logic and practice for multifarious activities by means of: the active pursuit of a common salary system; the positive but not fully realized goal of country programming; the less ambitious but useful objective of "avoiding duplication"; the striving for a unified (shoulder to shoulder) approach to development. All aim at making the United Nations system more effective in the discharge of its obligations.

7. In recent years the debate on co-ordination has widened: donor agencies are now more frequently articulating the issue and the recipients of aid increasingly see merit in collaborative resource assistance. While the 1985 global meeting of UNDP resident representatives held in Copenhagen, Denmark, in October/November 1985 was debating "The Challenge to Co-ordinate", UNDP officials were contributing significantly to the co-ordination of multilateral and bilateral aid to Africa in its current crisis. The General Assembly itself by resolution 40/177 has called on the Secretary-General, after consultation with the executive heads of the specialized agencies, to re-examine critically all aspects of the question of co-ordination and to submit an interim report to the General Assembly at its forty-first session.

8. The Inspectors in chapter IV, "The practical road ahead", have accordingly proceeded on two main tracks: firstly, that co-ordination is a dynamic way to organize multiple contributions in a single effort and requires the will to do it successfully; and secondly, that co-ordination springing from a certain selflessness, an informal awareness of the importance of having one's specialization harmonize with another's for sound development ends, is beneficial to the countries served, whether the co-ordination be within or between sectors, within the United Nations system or between the latter and bilateral agencies.

9. The Inspectors acknowledge their gratitude to all those who gave of their time and experience and whose co-operation helped immeasurably in shaping the report. The Inspectors hope it will assist those who have to deliberate on these issues in their search for viable solutions to the problems identified.
II. THE UNITED NATIONS SYSTEM IN THE FIELD

A. The rise of field representation

10. Fifty-one sovereign nations made a solemn pact in 1945 to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war. In the ensuing 40 years, another 108 nations confirmed the vow. Acting in concert as the United Nations, they endeavour to avert the threat of war, restore peace when there is war and, in a more positive sense, create conditions for an enduring peace. Article 55 of the Charter of the United Nations for this purpose looks "to the creation of conditions of stability and well being which are necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations..."

11. All members pledged themselves to take joint and separate action in co-operation with the Organization for the attainment of these ends. The specialized agencies, established by intergovernmental agreement and having international responsibilities in their fields of endeavour, were brought into a defined relationship with the Organization.

12. Constitutionally, the basic instruments of the specialized agencies, as ratified by individual Member States, give a distinct identity to and confer a separate independence upon the agencies; however, a particular relationship in pursuance of Article 63 of the Charter has been forged between the United Nations and the specialized agencies through instruments of agreement entered into with the Economic and Social Council and approved by the General Assembly. Furthermore, the activities of the specialized agencies may be co-ordinated by ECOSOC "through consultations with and recommendations to such agencies..." (Article 64).

13. To encourage sound economic and social conditions, the United Nations recognized, quite early, the practical value of a regional presence which the Charter foresaw. Thus, within the first three years of the Organization's existence, three of the present five Economic and Social Commissions came into being (ECE in 1947; ECAFE, now ESCAP, also in 1947; and ECLA, now ECLAC, in 1948). ECA came later, in 1958, and ECWA (now ESCWA) in 1973. These Commissions have themselves spawned a great many economic, social, financial, scientific, technical and technological institutions which serve their respective Member States regionally and subregionally. Examples of these include, in the ECLAC region, the Latin American Institute for Economic and Social Planning; in Asia and the Pacific, the Asian Development Bank and the Asian Statistical Institute; and in Africa, the Multinational Programming and Operational Centres (MULPOCs) whose directors represent ECA at the subregional level. The Commissions have also collaborated in the shaping and development of national institutions and have fostered co-operation and integration efforts as the basic foundation for socio-economic development in their respective regions.
14. The early work of the United Nations in economic and social development featured data gathering, information research and analysis, and the dissemination of information. This valuable work, which continues, gained breadth in 1949 from the activities of the Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance (EPTA), overseen by a Technical Assistance Board (TAB). The TAB, whose Chairman was the Secretary-General, provided a framework within which the Participating Organizations (the United Nations and specialized agencies) would co-ordinate their efforts, consult and co-operate fully with each other in activities of common interest. They were to exchange information on developments and progress in the field of technical assistance.

15. The TAB and the Administrative Committee on Co-ordination (ACC) were the instruments for co-ordination at the Headquarters level, but since the activities of EPTA and certain of the agencies' programmes took place in the field, joint representation of the Participating Organizations at field level became essential. Accordingly, a series of appointments to individual countries took place. The first appointees bore various titles: "Representative of the Secretary-General"; "Joint Representative"; "TAB Liaison Officer"; "TAB Resident Representative". Nevertheless, theirs was a common purpose, namely joint representation of the Participating Organizations. Whilst the majority of representatives held their appointments through the agency of TAB, some of the Participating Organizations made similar joint field representation arrangements in other countries.

16. Increasingly over the last 25 years, Member States have spurred the respective organizations to decentralize their operations: there is much literature and a large body of resolutions on this subject in all organizations. The most comprehensive and far-reaching of these resolutions remains General Assembly resolution 32/197. The JIU itself has, in many of its reports, championed the concept of a decentralized structure and operations.

17. The specialized agencies too saw the advantage of a presence in the regions. Thus the larger of them, either acting out constitutional provisions (FAO, WHO), or responding to practical need, set about establishing offices. Soon FAO, ILO, UNESCO and WHO all had staff stationed at field offices. By 1958, reflecting the steady growth of EPTA and increases in their own regular budgets, these agencies and ICAO were represented on all continents.
B. Structure and functions of field offices

18. Today almost all organizations have some form of representation at the field level:

(a) the United Nations is represented regionally by the economic commissions and, through its instrument the UNDP, is represented in 116 countries;

(b) WHO has established regional offices which are subject to the Director-General's programme directives but have complete independence in formulating, with the aid and guidance of regional committees, country, regional and inter-country health programmes;

(c) other larger agencies maintain varying degrees of central control blended with some forms of delegation of authority to the field.

19. The smaller organizations such as UPU and WMO have no field representation. The Department of Technical Co-operation for Development (DTCD), which functions as a United Nations executing agency, conducts a sizeable technical co-operation programme without a field presence but with the resident representatives/co-ordinators acting on behalf of DTCD in the field. UNIDO, now a specialized agency, but until 1 August 1985 functioning as an autonomous organization within the United Nations, has in place a number of Senior Industrial Development Field Advisers (SIDFAs) at country level, who are fully integrated into the offices of the resident representatives/co-ordinators.

20. A study of the functions carried out by these field offices suggests that a prototype office at country and regional levels might have tasks and responsibilities such as are set out below. At the country level, the office would operate like a "multi-purpose embassy" of the agency. Its main functions would be:

(a) representational: in the diplomatic sense, the agency representative in pursuit of its business interacts on behalf of his executive head, not only with the government, but also with other agencies, donors, bilaterals, NGOs and other local institutions;

(b) technical: a whole range of expert guidance to local governments related to the project cycle, from identifying the problems, to concrete proposals, to project preparation and negotiation, to implementation, monitoring and reporting to Headquarters;

(c) information: the country office is the agency's local "antenna", ensuring the flow of information both ways, adapting programmes to national policies, organizing meetings, roundtables and seminars and functioning as a "public relations" agent in promoting the views and goals of the Organization;

1/ The term resident representative/co-ordinator is used in this report to designate the official who at the same time serves as the resident representative of the United Nations Development Programme and as the resident co-ordinator of the United Nations system.
(d) logistical: the local office services missions from Headquarters, co-ordinates emergency relief measures in case of need, acts as a channel to other organizations wanting to contribute to development projects in its area, prepares fellowship dossiers from local Professionals, etc.

WHO's mode of operation least fits this model. Since WHO's constitution posited a decentralized organization from the start, WHO's country co-ordinators and regional directors are less representational in character than their counterparts in other agencies: the WHO official sets out to be and becomes an organic part of the health apparatus of the country or region where he works.

21. At the regional level, functions are parallel with country offices but conducted on a broader scale:

(a) representational: guarantee liaison functions with regional integration bodies, intergovernmental organizations, etc.;

(b) technical: supports country representatives, supervises work of regional secretariats and technical commissions, promotes technical co-operation between countries in the region, provides assistance in the formulation of regional projects, supports and monitors project developments, advises governments on regional questions, etc.;

(c) information: keeps Headquarters up-to-date on trends and developments in its area, collects and analyses information on the ratification and application of conventions and standards, advises Headquarters on the formulation of regional policies;

(d) logistical: organizes regional conferences, meetings and seminars.

22. The involvement of agencies at the subregional level falls understandably between these two scenarios.

23. A detailed picture of the likely functions of these offices appears in the Annex which provides information on three organizations (FAO, WHO and UNICEF). The table below shows the number of offices at the country, subregional and regional levels in 1973, 1978 and 1983:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1973</th>
<th>1978</th>
<th>1983</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Country offices</td>
<td>256</td>
<td>332</td>
<td>406</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subregional offices</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional offices</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>360</td>
<td>479</td>
<td>555</td>
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</table>
24. The aim of setting up field offices must be to bring the powers of decision-making as close as possible to those who have to use the agency's services. Yet if one conceived the movement from centralization to decentralization as a straight line, there would be many agencies at a point on the line still surprisingly close to centralization. The Joint Inspection Unit has presented its views on the pace and scope of decentralization in many of its reports and so the authors of this report will not cover this ground again. Nevertheless, in this context, the Inspectors would make the following comment.

25. Field offices do not all have similar scope for action. Some agencies are overly cautious or reluctant to give to their officers in the field the responsibility and the authority to take necessary action without reference back to Headquarters. Many administrative procedures exercised by Headquarters run counter to real decentralization and make work in the field less effective and more costly. Too many decisions have to await Headquarters' sanction. The Inspectors learnt that field office purposes were sometimes defeated by lower level controls at Headquarters. Country representatives should be tried and talented Professionals chosen for their capacity to manage affairs, to exercise initiative and judgment: they should have the authority to take the necessary decisions in the field. The Inspectors came across cases where representatives found their Headquarters' approach self-defeating: one representative who needed urgent temporary help to prosecute the approved business of his agency could not take a decision for this purpose without approval from his Headquarters; the approval did arrive but so late as to have adversely prejudiced the work intended. Administrative procedures ought to support rather than obstruct field office aims. The need is for the Headquarters' role, functions and procedures vis-à-vis the field to be clearly delineated and so shaped as to serve the aim of rapid decision-making in the field.

26. It is sometimes doubtful whether all country representatives are fully occupied in the field: some the Inspectors met were not. Governing bodies and governments must ensure there is a full-time job for prospective country representatives and sufficient scope for them to "get the job done" when they are appointed. If country representatives have full and solid responsibilities as well as the requisite authority to act in the field, co-operation among those sharing in the development effort may become stronger and more concrete.

27. Viewed as elements of the system, the siting of regional and subregional offices and the overall pattern of representation do not make complete sense. But this is to be understood since the process has been an evolutionary one in which decisions by independent agencies have not been the subject of collegial consultation. Considerations of infrastructure, particularly communications, have influenced choices; political influences have had their play; incentives offered to locate in a particular country may unduly influence a decision; and the standard of living conditions in prospective countries may have a gravitational pull. Furthermore, agencies seldom wish to be pioneers: the logic of having to interact or co-ordinate with other agencies can create a momentum of its own and attract more and more United Nations offices to the choicer capital cities in Africa, Asia and Latin America.
28. The Inspectors believe these tendencies, understandable as they are, deserve to be scrutinized for their overall affect. Indeed, there can be no doubt that further increases in field representation by the United Nations system will multiply dealings with governments, put more stress on their negotiating resources, add to logistical problems, and generally make co-ordination more difficult. It is necessary, therefore, to view objectively the entire arrangements for field representation in the United Nations system and to reassess the needs as they flow from present circumstances.

C. Field representation 1973 to 1983

Deficiencies in data

29. The material provided by organizations in response to a JIU questionnaire varied in detail and comprehensiveness and suffered from some limitations. Three agencies supplied incomplete information or no information at all; and the data provided by three others did not stand up to close scrutiny. Notwithstanding this, the data accumulated suffer from a margin of error between 1 and 2 percent in the aggregate. For the purposes of this study, we consider this a tolerable margin.

Pattern of representation

30. A typology of representation might distinguish between:

(a) Organizations with strong regional representation vis-à-vis their country representation:

(i) the United Nations regional economic commissions;

(ii) WHO in which 326 out of 400 Professional staff are in the regional offices;

(iii) three of the smaller organizations which have no country offices: ICAO with six regional offices;IMO with six regional maritime advisers in the field (three in Africa and three in Latin America) who carry out substantive functions; and ITU which approved Technical Co-operation Area Representatives for the first time in 1984: six are currently on board with two still to be appointed; four senior regional representatives are expected to be appointed by 1986.

(b) Organizations with a blend of regional and country (or area) representation:

(i) FAO with 117 regional out of a total of 242 staff. Prior to 1977, FAO had no country offices;

(ii) UNESCO in which 198 Professionals out of 270 are in regional offices;
(iii) UNICEF which has 109 regional staff out of a total of 304;
(iv) ILO with 87 out of 152.

(c) Organizations with extensive country (or area) representation and little or no regional representation: UNDP, WFP, UNFPA, UNIDO and the United Nations through its UNICs with no regional representation and UNHCR with 35 regional out of 260 staff.

(d) Organizations with no field representation: ITC, UPU, WMO and IAEA.

Staff and office costs

31. In 1973, the United Nations system with almost 8,700 staff members (about 2,450 international Professionals, 194 national Professionals and 6,070 non-Professionals) occupied some 360 offices in 90 countries. Ten years later, total staff exceeded 12,500 comprising over 3,500 international Professionals, 600 national Professionals and 8,680 non-professionals serving in more than 550 offices in over 130 countries.

32. Table 1 shows the number of offices of each organization for the years 1973, 1978 and 1983. Section A shows offices in developing countries 2/; section B shows the same for United Nations system establishments in developed countries (excluding the headquarters of the specialized agencies and IAEA and the United Nations establishments in Geneva and Vienna; the staff of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe has however been included). Table 2 shows for the same organizations the number of staff. Unless otherwise specified, the analysis hereunder has been conducted on the data appearing in part A (developing countries) of tables 1 and 2.

33. The increases both in numbers of offices and staff in developing countries over the decade are substantial: some 20 new offices have been opened every year, or roughly one every two and a half weeks; close to 1,000 international Professionals have been added to the staff complement which, in percentage terms, represents an increase of 45 percent. Non-Professional staff also increased by 45 percent and national Professional staff by 260 percent.

34. It cost the United Nations system 3/ $89.6 million to run these offices in 1973. In 1983, the cost had risen to over $357 million, i.e., about 300 percent more.

2/ For the purpose of this report, these are the developing countries in the various geographic regions excluding Europe. Part B, therefore, shows offices in the developed countries in Europe, North America, Japan and Australia.

3/ For the 11 organizations for which we have these data, see table 3.
35. The Organization with the widest dispersal of offices is the United Nations. It carries out its work in approximately 130 countries: through the five regional economic commissions and their sub-offices; through the offices of the UNDP resident representatives who have representational functions for UNDP itself, UNFPA, WFP, UNIDO, UNCTAD, UNDRRO and DTCO; through UNHCR and UNICEF; through the resident co-ordinators who are normally UNDP resident representatives; and through its information centres. This worldwide network of research, operations and information outposts cost (for the organizations for which information is available, i.e., UNDP, UNICs, UNHCR, ECLA and WFP) $48.5 million to service in 1973 when there were 163 offices as against 186.4 million in 1983 when there were 248 offices, or 284 percent more (including cost of offices in developed countries).

Reasons for growth

UNDP

36. UNDP's programmes have a predominantly country orientation. Its core programme, familiarly called the IPF (Indicative Planning Figure) Programme features country and inter-country programmes in a ratio of 82 to 18. Country offices, which normally have a single-country accreditation but may also serve more than one country, are established when it appears politically and economically sound to do so and always in response to a request by a host government.

37. Between 1973 and 1983, UNDP established offices in 25 countries to cater not only to UNDP's affairs but also to those of UNFPA and WFP directly and to other United Nations system organizations and departments under arrangements of long standing. During the corresponding period UNDP office staff in developing countries (excluding Junior Professional Officers (JPOs)) remained practically stable. If JPOs are included, there is a modest increase from 437 to 500. If the staff of UNFPA, WFP, UNIDO (SIDPAs and JPOs) and the FAO Senior Agricultural Advisers (SAAs) (until 1978) are included, the corresponding figures would show an increase from 667 to 777. Several small island states in the Pacific and in the Caribbean do not have individual offices, their programmes being carried out, for the Pacific, through offices already established in Fiji and Samoa, and, for the Caribbean, through offices in Barbados, Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago.

UNHCR

38. Political oppression, internal or international conflicts, sometimes combined with famine and economic hardship have been the principal reasons for the dramatic growth in the world refugee population. The last ten years have seen an increase from about 2.4 million to nearly 11 million refugees. During this period, donors have responded so encouragingly that expenditures have increased from $21.8 million in 1973 to $593 million in 1983. These funds have been mainly channelled to Africa and Asia. UNHCR, which has independent offices, has found it necessary to open 36 offices in developing countries, and six in the developed world.
UNICEF

39. UNICEF's operations over the past decade have also seen substantial growth from $54.7 million in 1973 to $246 million in 1983 in operational expenditure. Fourteen new offices were opened during the same period, with an overall increase of Professional field staff from 129 to 229. During the corresponding period, UNICEF's Professional project staff also increased substantially from 18 to 350.

UNICs

40. Although the functions performed by UNICs differ from those of the operational organizations of the United Nations system, they have been included in the analysis because of their representational and public-oriented role, and because they are indeed a part of the representational structure of the system. During the 1973 to 1983 period, the total number of UNICs has increased from 48 to 63: from 35 UNICs in developing countries in 1973, 12 new ones opened taking this total to 47: and there are 16 in developed countries, an increase of three.

FAO

41. FAO's operational expenditure has grown from $99 million in 1973 to about $275 million in 1983 (with UNDP funds accounting for close to 80 percent of the total programme in 1973, but falling to 44 percent in 1983). At the beginning of the period, FAO had 48 Senior Agricultural Advisers (SAAs)/country representatives attached to UNDP country offices. Their role was similar to that which UNIDO's SIDFAs still have today. FAO also had four regional offices, staffed by close to 100 international Professionals. Following a decision by the FAO Council in July 1976 "to establish a network of country representatives" as part of an effort to decentralize the Organization, FAO began setting up country offices in 1977. Six years later, at the end of 1983, there were 60 such offices in developing countries with a total staff of 117 international Professionals and 543 General Service staff. During the corresponding period, the number of FAO experts had a modest decline (moving from 1,964 in 1974, to 1,632 in 1978 and to 1,719 in 1983).

42. The picture of growth presented above shows the following characteristics:

- growth in the case of UNDP has been more the result of an increase in independent countries participating in the UNDP programmes than of changes in the size of the UNDP programme or in policies governing field representation;

- as a result of the nature of UNHCR's country activity, the quantum leap in its operations has led to substantial expansion of its field representation in the countries affected;
UNICEF field offices have increased in number in similar fashion due to the growth in contributions and programme expenditures;

WFP, with an exponential growth in programme delivery, has had a relatively modest growth in its field establishments;

the increase in FAO's field establishment due to a deliberate shift in representational policy has not seen a real increase in programme expenditure.

How does Headquarters' staff compare?

Patterns of growth in the field cannot be viewed in isolation from changes at Headquarters. 4/ It may, therefore, be useful to see the figures above in some relation to those of Professional staff at the Headquarters' duty stations of the same organizations. During a similar time period 5/ Headquarters staff has grown at an average of 22 percent, but with considerable disparities in the growth rates of the various organizations between 1974 and 1983:

(a) Some Headquarters' establishments have grown relatively fast. For example, UNHCR had 62 Professionals at Headquarters in 1974 and 169 at the end of 1983, an increase of 172 percent, whilst UNICEF staff has increased by 103 percent from 112 to 228. In both these cases, the increases are clearly a function of the growth of programme delivery (see graph I). In the case of UNDP, while the size of the programme has stagnated and even fallen at the end of the ten-year period, Headquarters Professionals have increased from 244 in 1974 to 288 in 1983 (or + 18 percent), due in some measure to additional responsibilities placed on the Administrator for the management of several trust funds and other activities within the system and the growth of UNDP as an executing agency. UNFPA had 59 Professionals in 1977 and 107 in 1983 (or + 81 percent).

(b) The Headquarters' Professional staff of UNESCO and FAO has grown, albeit more slowly, despite official decentralization policies: UNESCO from 821 to 915 (an 11 percent increase) and FAO from 1,170 to 1,291, up 10 percent.

(c) Among the major organizations, only two - ILO and WHO - have experienced a decrease in their Headquarters' Professional staff. ILO's decrease from 636 to 598, a drop of 6 percent, was largely due to external constraints, notably the temporary withdrawal of the United States of America which led to a reduction in the size of the Organization's programme. WHO's decrease by 24 percent from 631 to 482 emphasizes the Organization's regional orientation, a commitment inherited from WHO's constitution.

4/ Some caution should, however, be exercised in such comparisons, since changes in Headquarters staffing patterns may occur for reasons other than those connected with technical programme activities.

5/ Source: CCAQ personnel statistics: the period in fact is slightly different as CCAQ started publishing its series of personnel statistics only in 1975. These statistics covered 1974, therefore growth would not be expected to be less than shown here had the time series begun in 1973.
44. How does the growth in field staff stand next to the evolution of the project or operational staff of the organizations? Whereas UNHCR and UNICEF project staff has mushroomed during the 1974-1983 period, from none to 107 in the case of the former and from 18 to 350 for the latter, the following United Nations system organizations have experienced a noticeable decline in the numbers of their Professional project personnel. 6/

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>1974</th>
<th>1983</th>
<th>Actual</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
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<td>FAO</td>
<td>1,964</td>
<td>1,719</td>
<td>245</td>
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<tr>
<td>ILO</td>
<td>766</td>
<td>585</td>
<td>181</td>
<td>24</td>
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<tr>
<td>ITU</td>
<td>269</td>
<td>185</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNESCO</td>
<td>690</td>
<td>512</td>
<td>178</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UPU</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WHO</td>
<td>1,418</td>
<td>640</td>
<td>778</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

45. The reasons for this decline may be several and vary from organization to organization: there may be a decrease in the real levels of funding for technical co-operation activities; structural changes in the type of projects which are financed may now require proportionally less resident experts than ten years ago; there may be a wider use of short-term consultants, missions, training or equipment. Whatever the reasons, the figures do signify that more Professionals in field offices are serving fewer technical co-operation experts than ten years ago. Indeed, the global ratio of Professional project staff to field office Professionals in developing countries, excluding the United Nations regional economic commissions, has dropped from 4.71 to 1 to 2.15 to 1. 7/ Field office Professionals exercise functions other than those directly related to projects, but this of itself hardly provides a sufficient explanation for the sizeable increase in Professionals at field offices.

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6/ Source: CCAQ personnel statistics. There are, however, three notable exceptions to this trend: the United Nations project staff increased from 1,176 to 1,997; ICAO from 200 to 329; IMO from 16 to 38. The corresponding figures for all the organizations of the common system show a decline of project staff from 6,802 to 6,490 (or - 4.6 percent).

7/ Source: Table 2 and CCAQ statistics.
46. If General Service and national Professional staff are brought into the picture, the global trend does not change: the ratio of all project staff to all field office staff, excluding the regional economic commissions, becomes 1.37 to 1 instead of 1.01 to 1. In fact, with the present trends, field office staff (totalling about 9,300 in 1983) will soon outnumber project staff (totalling 9,417 in 1983). There are other comparisons which might be made: for example, one could relate the growth in field office staff to the growth in projects. Difficulties arise here, however, with regard to taking into proper account the mix in the absolute size of projects, and the relative size and distribution of components within projects.

47. Distribution of offices and Professional staff by region

(a) Africa

The largest increase (75 percent) in staff over the 1973-1983 period has occurred in Africa. A large part of this increase is due to the setting up of UNEP Headquarters in Nairobi and to the 29 new country offices opened by FAO. Apart from these, the fastest growing organizations are UNHCR with a five-fold increase from 16 to 91 Professional staff, and WFP and UNICEF, both of which have doubled their staff respectively from 41 to 82 and from 33 to 75. UNDP has grown at a slower than average rate but has added 79 Professionals.

(b) North Africa and the Middle East

This region has the second highest average rate of Professional staff increase with 53 percent. This increase is largely due to the setting up of ECWA in 1973. FAO, UNHCR and UNICEF show the highest rate of growth, while the staffing of most organizations seems relatively stable (ILO, UNDP, WFP) or in a declining trend, especially since 1978 (ECWA, UNESCO, WHO). The decrease in Professionals shown for FAO in 1983 is explained by the fact that the FAO regional office in Cairo had moved to Headquarters.

(c) Asia and the Pacific

The rate of staff growth for the whole region is 39 percent, or below the average. UNHCR and UNICEF lead followed by FAO, WFP and UNESCO. UNDP's growth is about average and its share of total field representation remains stable in this region. The only Organization with a slightly downward trend is WHO.

(d) Latin America and the Caribbean is the region with the slowest growth in field representation, with 25 percent. UNHCR which moved from none to 39 Professionals has the fastest growth, followed by FAO (+111 percent), and UNESCO (+49 percent).

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8/ The source of this figure is CCAQ document ACC/1984/PEN/39, table 1, from which the staff of establishments in Geneva and Vienna have been deducted; it is higher than the figure derived from the returns to the JIU questionnaire, since replies from several organizations are incomplete, as explained at the beginning of this chapter.

2/ The UNDP breakdown of countries by region has been used.
D. Office premises

48. The Inspectors firmly believe, and it is a belief widely shared, that in any given country the ideal office accommodation for the United Nations system should be a single structure or complex, large enough to house all staff and provide the full range of office services. An arrangement of this type would be the most economical in terms of office rents, and the most efficient in terms of the provision of common administrative and financial services, communications, transport, meeting arrangements, etc. But this is seldom possible now. Formerly, with fewer staff to cater for, it was not uncommon to have all agency support and administrative staff housed under the single UNDP roof. The growth of the programme, which brought with it increases in support staff, began however to exert pressure on existing accommodation. This led eventually to a removal of tenants to other locations. The widening of agency representation has had a similar result. Offers of sometimes rent-free (to the agency not to the host government) accommodation have made it not uncommon for agencies to occupy premises independent of UNDP. A reversal of this trend would be in the best interests of all. Since governments are called upon to provide host facilities under the terms of the basic agreements, it might be of interest to them to determine whether the present scattered arrangements in their respective countries are the most economical and efficient.

49. Today, one out of four FAO and ILO offices share premises with UNDP. WHO, UNESCO and ICAO normally have premises apart although the Inspectors have been informed that three new UNESCO regional offices will be housed in United Nations buildings. Within the United Nations itself, more than half the UNICs, about half of UNICEF's offices and about one-third of UNHCR's offices share premises with UNDP. The only organizations which are consistently housed with UNDP are UNFPA, WFP and UNIDO, the reason being that the UNDP resident representative officially represents these agencies. Where it is possible to have a large concentration of United Nations organizations in shared premises, it might be feasible for governments to encourage a smaller number to share accommodation with UNDP.

50. In response to a question put by the Inspectors as to why agencies vacated premises previously shared with UNDP, several reasons were cited: at the request of UNDP, or of the government (for example, because "free" or better accommodation was offered) and for security reasons, especially in the case of UNHCR. By far the most common answer given, however, was the inadequacy of space, though generally there was a poor level of response from agencies to the question posed.

51. As regards rental costs to the system, the vast majority of offices fall into two categories: "rented from private owner" (38 percent) and "obtained free from government" (36 percent). WHO has the highest proportion of offices obtained free from the host government (59 percent), followed by FAO (54 percent), while the corresponding figure for UNDP is 37 percent. Of the agencies with extensive representation, UNHR has the smallest proportion of "free" offices (18 percent) and the highest proportion of rented offices from a private owner (54 percent). Expenditures on rent for field
offices, however, cover different practices: for instance, host governments may provide premises free of charge or they may reimburse, either partially or fully, the cost of renting office space from a private owner, as part of their contribution towards the costs of field representation. In 1983, UNDP received over $9.8 million and UNICEF $1.7 million as government cash contributions towards local costs of field offices.

E. Common services

52. UNDP provides services of various kinds to other United Nations system organizations, whether represented in the field or not, while the reverse is the exception rather than the rule. The extent to which a UNDP field office is called upon to provide services for other organizations of the United Nations system depends on three principal factors:

(a) whether or not an organization has field representation in that country;

(b) whether an organization's representation in a country is at the national or at the regional level;

(c) the volume of activities which an organization carries out in a country.

Programme support

53. Where organizations have established their own representation in a country, the local representatives are usually fully charged with the programming of their regular and other non-IPF funds, although the resident co-ordinator also has a responsibility to ensure the co-ordination of such funds with other projects and programmes. Local representatives also participate actively in UNDP-financed programme activities: indeed, the presence of such representatives often facilitates sectoral consultations with governments and enhances technical support to projects. However, while this reduces the workload otherwise borne by the UNDP field office, it complements rather than eliminates UNDP's involvement.

54. In cases where there is no local representation, the programme support services devolving on UNDP are naturally heavier than where organizations have local representatives. However, programme support services are not infrequently provided by staff and consultants on mission from the organizations concerned. Notwithstanding such missions, operational support to programmes on a day-to-day basis, including the organization of conferences, seminars and workshops, is borne essentially by the UNDP office.
Administrative and financial support services

55. UNDP is asked to provide the full range of administrative and financial support services to organizations without country representation. For other organizations with in-country representation, the provision of such services varies considerably. It appears that UNICEF and the World Bank, in most cases, provide their own administrative and financial support, thus placing the least demands on UNDP. This practice may not always be the most economical approach. Some other organizations, notwithstanding their local presence, rely on the UNDP field office for most support of this type. The following listing gives the administrative and financial tasks UNDP offices may be called upon to perform:

(a) Personnel
- security;
- provision of ID cards, visas, laissez-passer renewal;
- clearing of personal and household effects;
- advice and assistance in obtaining housing;
- school admission;
- duty-free privileges;
- transportation;
- hotel reservations/airline tickets, etc.;
- repatriation.

(b) Project/Programme execution
- licensing and registration of vehicles;
- clearing of project equipment;
- registration of project equipment;
- procurement on behalf of projects;
- imprest accounts;
- fellowship management;
- Daily Subsistence Allowance (DSA) payments, travel advances;
- administrative backstopping and logistics pertaining to visits of missions and visitors on United Nations official business;
- transportation for experts.

(c) Agency servicing
- rental and maintenance of office space;
- telex and cable services;
- pouch services;
- mail distribution.

56. Moreover, in the majority of countries, UNDP handles administrative tasks on behalf of the common system such as cost of living surveys, local salary scale reviews and local rental studies.
57. It is clear from the returns received that the UNDP field offices continue to provide, in accordance with their constitutional mandate, a substantial volume and wide range of services to other organizations of the United Nations system. The estimated percentage of time devoted to such services varies, several returns putting it at 40-50 percent of total office time. There is considerable consistency, in the view of the resident representatives reporting, that the establishment of in-country representation by other organizations does not result in a substantial reduction in the UNDP workload; nor should it, it might be argued. One respondent estimates that 15 percent of office time is given over to services for organizations represented locally. This cost, in the view of the Inspectors, would be substantially greater if such organizations attempted to introduce their own support capability and would, at the same time, duplicate a long-established, well-tested system which has served the UNDP well over the years.

58. The variety of forms of field representation bringing closer to countries the special expertise of the United Nations system is a positive benefit particularly to the developing world. The very strength of the diversity, however, puts serious difficulties in the way of harmonizing actions and co-ordinating purposes and goals. Part III of the report looks more deeply into the challenges and problems of co-ordination.
III. THE RESIDENT CO-ORDINATOR

A. Historical

59. In 1983, the JIU prepared a report on Field Offices of the United Nations Development Programme (JIU/REP/83/4). That report considered how resident representatives functioned as heads of UNDP field offices without examining too closely their newly-assigned role as resident co-ordinators. However, the report did foreshadow events in the following terms:

"The present report... could... serve as a useful basis for any future study that the JIU may decide to undertake on the resident co-ordinators and their inter-agency co-ordination role as well as the structure of United Nations system representation at the country level." (paragraph 5)

60. The policy aspects of co-ordination within the United Nations system at the country level are comprehensively dealt with in General Assembly resolution 32/197 on the restructuring of the economic and social sectors of the United Nations system. One of the aims of restructuring is the delivery of quality programmes, at least possible cost, through the United Nations system, all its parts interacting in a spirit of goodwill and trust. Governments too need to have confidence in the United Nations system if its efforts are to succeed.

61. The current role and responsibilities of resident co-ordinators may best be viewed against their historical background. The origins of the resident co-ordinator go back to the Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance (EPTA) mentioned in chapter II, paragraph 14, which was the United Nations' first substantial programme of technical co-operation in favour of the developing world. Joint representation of the Participating Organizations at field level began in 1950, one year after EPTA came into being. The first appointment of a TAB resident representative in 1950 led to a number of others over the next two years, so that, by May 1952, 15 representatives were accredited to developing countries. The network gradually expanded.

62. In 1958, the UNDP's Special Fund came into being and the TAB resident representatives assumed field responsibilities on behalf of the Special Fund. By 1960, there were 36 resident representatives.

63. During this first decade, the role and responsibility of resident representatives took shape so that in 1960 they performed, under delegated responsibility and authority, a multiplicity of functions, among which were:

- representing the Executive Chairman of TAB and the Managing Director of the Special Fund;

- representing the United Nations and the specialized agencies on matters not related to EPTA and the Special Fund;
- acting as the principal channel of communication between the Technical Assistance Board and the government in connection with the establishment of the annual technical assistance programme for the country;

- co-ordinating consultations on the formulation of EPTA country programmes and Special Fund requests;

- implementation, reporting and evaluation activities;

- administrative support to the system.

An early ACC document described the relationship between resident representatives and Participating Organizations as follows:

"(e) While the Resident Representative has a co-ordinating function, the responsibilities for programme consultations at the technical level rest with the Participating Organizations. Each organization makes its own arrangements for maintaining contacts with Governments at all necessary levels regarding its regular programme, sending information to the Resident Representative when this is relevant to the Expanded Programme. Some Participating Organizations, however, have decided that particular Resident Representatives should also be their field representative for technical assistance activities and, in some cases, for other purposes." 10/

64. Broadly speaking, these functions basically hold true today. They have expanded somewhat, however, particularly since the Capacity Study and the Consensus which emphasized the role of the resident representative as central to the integration of United Nations activities.

65. From the beginning, the resident representative had a natural co-ordinating role: he was recognized as the official channel for programming consultations and assistance requests and as a proper but neutral spokesman for the system. How that role is being performed today and what factors influence their co-ordination efforts as resident representatives of the United Nations Development Programme and as resident co-ordinators of the United Nations system is the subject of the analysis which follows.

B. Factors favouring co-ordination

Government and donors

66. The primary duty of co-ordinating all aid flows into a country is, of course, the government's. The United Nations system, however, if needed, is in a good position from its neutral standpoint to assist governments in this task: it can supply a service which the governments through staff and training deficiencies may not be able to supply with current pressures on their scarce economic and managerial resources.

67. Governments generally support the institution of the resident co-ordinator as a means of bringing a coherence to the contribution of the United Nations system to a country's total development efforts. This support is crucial. The experience and personality of the resident co-ordinator, his standing with the government and among his colleagues, and a strong co-ordinating ministry are also important ingredients in successful co-ordination.

68. One sign of a constructive and helpful approach to co-ordination and one which may aid in overcoming the diffidence of some agencies towards co-ordination efforts has been the willingness of some bilateral donors to give their support to varying methods of co-ordination. These have included:

- Roundtables organized by UNDP through the resident co-ordinator to facilitate government planning in the light of specific resources offered in the form of aid; the roundtables previously concentrated largely on discovering how much aid is being pledged to individual countries. Their scope, however, is being enlarged to allow for deeper examination of the countries' economic needs and aims. The World Bank group and often the IMF contribute macro-economic and fiscal analyses.

- The Technical Co-operation Assessment Mission, a joint collaborative effort of UNDP and the World Bank which identifies and analyzes a country's priority requirements within the framework of the government's plans and objectives. The mission would draw on the experience and knowledge of aid partners.

- Consultative Groups organized by the World Bank to bring key interested parties together to plan the best means of meeting priority needs. These groups can engage in consultations that are broadly economic - sometimes on a subregional level - or more narrowly confined to a vital sector or subsector.

- Co-ordination led by a United Nations agency to aid in finding a consensus on how to handle a specialized but complex subsectoral operation. The World Food Programme's activities in Mali are a case in point.
Some of these efforts have fallen short of success: for instance, many bilaterals believe that roundtables could provide opportunities for a more critical assessment of a country's development thrust and firmer decisions on what are the precise areas into which bilaterals can put their effort. There are signs, however, that the more thorough preparations necessary for this kind of assessment by donors are taking place. Roundtables now require governments to present their aid requests "in the context not only of development plans and strategies, but also of balance of payments projections and other relevant economic aggregates".

69. All these steps depend on the will of recipient governments, but an impartial United Nations presence in a co-ordinating role can do much to protect the interests of weaker countries. The LDCs are particularly hard-pressed to find the manpower resources necessary to deal with a multiplicity of donors: as early as in 1980 there were some 82 donors (bilateral and non-governmental) providing development assistance to African countries. \[1\/\]

70. The forms of co-ordination mentioned in the paragraphs above all have a programme rather than project perspective. They aim at finding what priorities can provide the desired country capability and at co-operating to meet the priorities. The Inspectors do not wish to suggest that there is no longer any self-interest in multilateral or bilateral technical co-operation, but believe some signs suggest (certainly in Africa) a more constructive approach to co-ordination.

**Impetus of programming**

71. The logic of programming at the expense of formulating isolated projects has been exerting some pressure in favour of co-ordination. By its very nature, programming involves seeing the whole rather than the parts: if this is to be achieved properly at the country level, the representation in the field must have solid responsibilities for assisting with the formulation and execution of programmes. Part of their duties must be to promote the harmony of their Organization's interest with those of other members of the United Nations family and with the valuable contributions being made by bilaterals and non-governmental organs (NGOs).

72. Some organizations have already been co-operating among themselves in specific sectors. The World Bank and UNDP are co-operating in energy sector assessment and management programmes with ILO in some cases and with WHO in the Special Programme for Research and Training in Tropical Diseases. More formal agreements exist with several specialized agencies for the International Drinking Water Supply and Sanitation Decade, the Consultative Group for International Agricultural Research and the World Bank co-operative programmes. There are arrangements with regard to

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other special activities: for example, the UNESCO/ILO/FAO Inter-Secretariat Working Group on Agricultural Education; the co-operation between IFAD, UNDP, UNICEF and WFP with the Belgian Survival Fund; between UNICEF and WHO with regard to health and nutrition; and among DTCD, UNDP and the World Bank with regard to technical co-operation in the field of development planning. 12/ These forms of collaboration are conducive to wider programme efforts.

73. UNDP, UNFPA, UNICEF and WFP, which together spent over $1.6 billion in development programmes in 1983, collaborate through the Joint Consultative Group on Policy (JCGP). The executive heads of the four organizations have jointly agreed that greater harmony and complementarity in their respective programmes could be brought about by "co-ordinated programming", i.e., that the organizations would work together from the earliest stages of programming and project formulation to determine possible areas of complementarity and to avoid duplication. The Inspectors view co-ordination here as natural since these organizations form part of the United Nations itself. To explore the potential of such an approach, JCGP decided as an initial step to focus efforts on collaboration within the area of health and nutrition, with particular reference to the deteriorating economic and social situation in Africa. 13/

74. The Director-General for Development and International Economic Co-operation clearly has a role to play in this effort. So far, in the face of the legally enshrined independence of the specialized agencies, his office has tried by persuasion to encourage greater co-operation within the system. Among other things, the Director-General's role has been one of smoothing difficulties, often procedural, that stand in the way of administrative harmony. He relies on the resident co-ordinators to exercise every effort in the field to see that governments' requests are incorporated into the programme activities of the United Nations system; but the situation is not made easier by the mandate which accompanies the guidelines for the execution of the work of resident co-ordinators, one of which provides that the resident co-ordinator is to assume "overall responsibility for and co-ordination of operational activities for development" (resolution 34/213), while it is explicitly added that the guidelines "do not affect relations between governments and individual organizations of the United Nations system". These two provisions are not mutually reinforcing and do not make co-ordination any easier. The Inspectors believe, however, that the Director-General can be a positive force in the search for consistency, provided governments give his office full support in efforts to improve coherence in United Nations system planning and activities. The Joint Consultative Group on Policy (JCGP) is one such useful step towards co-ordinated programming. It is salutary that co-ordination efforts should move forward in smaller intersectoral groupings instead of awaiting full-scale participation by all concerned.

12/ See paragraph 73 of A/38/417 on Operational Activities for Development, Note by the Secretary-General.

13/ Idem: see paragraph 74.
UNDP's capability

75. In his normal capacity (without the mantle of resident co-ordinator), the UNDP resident representative has over the years acted for and on behalf of the United Nations system in financial, personnel and general administrative matters as well as in security. He has been a spokesman for the system in solving problems of common interest. The representatives of the agencies have accepted him as primus inter pares in these prescribed areas and, though in general terms country programming has not produced a truly combined effort of substantive programming by the United Nations family in most countries, his role in the formulation of the country programmes was hardly ever viewed with suspicion. There is, therefore, something of a residue of goodwill for the role of a co-ordinator - so long as individual interests are respected. Certainly UNDP's services in the field to the entire United Nations family are a positive bonus in the present search for better co-ordination.

76. UNDP's development service network with offices in 116 countries gives administrative support to UNFPA at Headquarters and in the field, administers various funds and activities assigned to its supervision by the General Assembly (e.g., the United Nations Capital Development Fund, the United Nations Volunteer Fund, the United Nations Sudano-Saharan Office) and provides representation for several other organizations at the field level. It also provides administrative support to many specialized agency projects in the field. This network has a good capability to assist the co-ordination efforts of the United Nations system:

"The wealth of information and experience UNDP has acquired with respect to the international processes and flows of technical co-operation are not limited to the United Nations system, and can be made available in the form of advisory services to government units charged with overseeing and co-ordinating technical co-operation." (See paragraph 55 of DP/1984/4.)

This fund of experience is most recently being put to use with the creation of the United Nations Office for Emergency Operations in Africa of which the Director is the Administrator of UNDP. It has been a difficult assignment in co-ordination involving both bilateral and multilateral donors but UNDP's historical role in this field has made it the natural focal point for the required co-ordination.

C. Factors inhibiting co-ordination

UNDP's relative decline as a funding programme

77. The decline in funding available to UNDP since 1980 has perhaps had some influence - largely an emotional one - on those who are not fully committed to co-ordination goals. In 1981, the level of core contributions dropped by 6 percent in nominal terms and since then there has been a marginal increase in 1983 providing a total of $713.9 million as compared with $705.2 million in 1980 - not a significant increase when inflation is taken into account.
Meanwhile, the specialized agencies attracted increasing amounts of extrabudgetary funds so that UNDP funding has shown a considerable decline when set against the increases gained by the specialized agencies and other bodies. World Food Programme funding, for instance, about equals that of UNDP, and some of the larger agencies in a particular country may have more trust and other funds to disburse than UNDP itself. This is a comparatively new phenomenon and, not surprisingly, it has, to some minds, reduced UNDP's clout. As the central funding organization, UNDP, when strong financially, could expect easier co-operation from the specialized agencies who relied on its coffers. Commenting on this state of affairs as early as mid-1982, the Administrator, in introducing his 1981 Annual Report to the Governing Council's twenty-ninth session, said unequivocally:

"The conclusion is inescapable: the dramatic increase in funds-in-trust expenditures may not only have served to deflect contributions from UNDP's central resources, but clearly has adversely affected the capacity of UNDP to perform that critical co-ordination task which the international community has assigned to it."

The Inspectors, however, consider that whether UNDP retains a strong funding capacity or not, its credentials to be at the centre of the co-ordination effort in the United Nations system remain intact.

**UNDP's relationships with the agencies**

78. Some resident representatives have commented that:

(a) the institution of the function of resident co-ordinator has not improved relationships with the other United Nations system partners in development co-operation;

(b) if anything, it has worsened relationships since it has aroused suspicions of power play which previously did not exist; and

(c) the agencies accepted the resident representative as "primus inter pares" so that the explicit overlay of the role of resident co-ordinator seemed gratuitous.

79. Many resident representatives think the title of resident co-ordinator has made it more difficult for them to co-ordinate, particularly, substantive programmes and projects. In addition, the fact that the individual now wears two hats does not help: he owes loyalty to the Administrator as resident representative and to the Secretary-General as resident co-ordinator. Furthermore, the Director-General for Development and International Economic Co-operation, charged with bringing coherence into the ways of the system as a whole, is seen as a new protagonist whose moves demand a certain watchfulness; so that while some agencies may obey the letter of the new prescription, the spirit behind their efforts is not entirely supportive.
80. Some agencies also see UNDP as a competitor for projects since UNDP executes a number of projects itself through its Office for Project Execution (OPE). In circumstances where the UNDP resident representative could be expected to take on something of the role of an arbiter as resident co-ordinator, the agencies sense an inherent conflict between the separate facets of his job. The position of the resident co-ordinator is not helped by what one might refer to as the "UNDP image" which he may carry. These psychological factors have some weight.

United Nations system organizational complexity

81. In examining the complexity of the organizations in the United Nations system, one has to remember that the original purpose of establishing the specialized agencies was to provide research and set standards in various functional areas and to encourage the agencies to develop into centres of excellence in their special fields. The leap from this role to one of "fighting the battle" on the ground and pursuing operational activities in the field was a bold one, signifying positive concern with the plight of developing countries.

82. The change in purpose and emphasis did not take into account the need for a different kind of United Nations system structure if operational activities were to become a top priority. The structures originally conceived for one type of organization had to take on the demands of a new kind of activity. The Inspectors do not think it particularly helpful to re-open the debate on whether central control of finance and programmes in the United Nations system is more desirable than deconcentration into separate compartments. Suffice it to say that the specialized agencies as well as the other approved programmes have built up independent sectoral policies, not always with broader United Nations system interests in mind, and individual agencies are structured differently to suit their individual philosophies. The spur to common action has, therefore, not been strong. Mandates have encouraged it but the will has sometimes been lacking. The Administrative Committee on Co-ordination (ACC) itself has not been able to put in place any central mechanism for bringing under control and making more rational the disparate activities of United Nations system organizations in the field.

83. The task is, of course, made no easier when one considers the different paths the organizations have taken to their individual goals: their different programming cycles and programming methods; the varying degrees of decentralization practised by and within the agencies; the varying types and levels of organization they foster in the regions. All these make co-ordination one with the other more difficult.
The role of directors of UNICs vis-à-vis resident co-ordinators

84. The Inspectors from time to time sensed some doubt concerning who has primacy as the representative of the Secretary-General in an individual country on United Nations ceremonial occasions: the director of a United Nations Information Centre (UNIC) or the resident representative/co-ordinator? The Department of Public Information (DPI) would probably see the answer as relying on two strands:

- that information is not an operational activity and does not come within the responsibilities of the resident representative/co-ordinator;

- that the director of a UNIC is appointed by the Secretary-General as his representative for United Nations information purposes while the resident representative/co-ordinator is appointed by the UNDP Administrator as resident representative and by the Secretary-General as resident co-ordinator.

85. These propositions give a jurisdictional propriety to the status quo. However, there appears to be some lack of consistency in the circumstance of two United Nations officials, with functions that overlap, being separately accredited to the same government by the Secretary-General. The Inspectors believe the role of the resident co-ordinator vis-à-vis the UNIC director needs some re-thinking. It seems difficult to argue in today's information-conscious communications-alive environment that information can be divorced from the realities of operational effort in the field. There would seem to be some sound arguments (not the least of which is coherence) for bringing the resident representative/co-ordinator, as a central figure in technical co-operation, more firmly into decisions on the United Nations information output in the country to which he is assigned. Indeed, some resident representatives are now directors or acting directors of UNICs, a fact which makes the dichotomy appear less rational.

86. Two comments taken from the report of the Joint United Nations Information Committee (JUNIC) on "Public Perceptions of the United Nations system" (A/AC.198/G.8) deserve repeating here:

"... the information services of the United Nations system should play three major roles: advising on the overall communication component of policy and operational issues; contributing to policy formulation by acting as one of the organization's principal mirrors of external opinion, especially that of the media; and facilitating the fullest possible understanding and coverage of United Nations policies and activities by the media and other opinion makers." (paragraph 19).

"Though different agencies have different aims and target audiences, they do have a range of shared public information objectives as well as similar core groups of people that they must all reach. There is also a need to co-ordinate responses to public criticism where no distinctions among agencies are made. Mechanisms for continuing co-ordination and co-operation to this end do not exist." (paragraph 23(b)).

These statements argue implicitly for a solution to the question: who is to lead the information effort in a given country? The Inspectors believe there can be a role here for resident co-ordinators. The matter is discussed further in the next chapter.
IV. THE PRACTICAL ROAD AHEAD

A. Governments vis-à-vis the United Nations system

87. Governments have the sovereign responsibility to co-ordinate the flow of aid into their respective countries. However, some of the mandates urging co-ordination in the United Nations system do not always find support in practical steps taken by governments at the national level to see that the co-ordination of aid is effective. Some governments continue as a matter of course to deal with individual agencies of the United Nations system, both at sectoral and central planning levels, without the participation of resident co-ordinators: this despite the fact that governments have collectively brought resident co-ordinators into being. Others either do not have the apparatus or the manpower to ensure that individual sectoral ministries do not put their own interests above those of national economic planning. It is clear that governments have a commitment to assist wherever they can the co-ordination process within the United Nations system: they should provide impetus to resident co-ordinators both

- by supplying relevant information which would enable the latter to promote co-ordination within the system; and

- by discouraging those within the United Nations system who would wish to go their separate unco-ordinated way.

88. As to assistance from the United Nations system in the wider context of the co-ordination of all resource flows to a country, it is clearly a government's responsibility to decide the degree of the co-ordination effort it requires of the United Nations system through the resident co-ordinator. The government must, from its vantage point, have the most comprehensive view of its needs: where the United Nations system fits into the picture is a matter for the decision of governments.

89. One delegate at the 1985 session of ECOSOC in Geneva, having noted that there appeared to be a number of problems in regard to co-ordination and that inter-agency differences had been less than helpful in dealing with some aspects of the African crisis, put the matter squarely and rightly so. Co-ordination at the recipient country level, he said, should be the primary responsibility of the country itself and international assistance should be channelled in such a way as not to abridge the sovereignty and independence of action of the aid-receiving countries.

90. Where the United Nations system has been providing significant assistance to a country and where the bilaterals also have a strong interest in improving the accountability for relatively large sums spent in developing countries in the form of aid (as in the Sahel), there has been something of a stimulus to co-ordination by bilaterals with multilateral donors, particularly on the African continent. The general picture appears to follow these lines:
The middle income group and the more advanced of the developing countries may consider they can themselves co-ordinate the inputs they desire from aid donors, multilateral and bilateral. They would, therefore, rely on the services of a resident co-ordinator to see that United Nations system inputs are mutually compatible. In the past, however, particularly in emergencies, resident co-ordinators have been asked to co-ordinate both types of aid even in the stronger developing countries.

Developing countries with weak economies such as the LDCs or those suffering from natural disasters which pose special problems will from time to time need assistance with the co-ordination of United Nations system and bilateral aid. The bilateral donors themselves increasingly acknowledge the usefulness of making both forms of aid serve the common purpose of building national capability where this is lacking and providing a better economic framework for progress. UNDP with its roundtables in Africa and Asia and the World Bank with its consultative groups in various parts of the world are addressing the need. The UNDP roundtables could (many bilaterals believe) provide an improved service by not only trying to establish the extent to which bilateral donors will give aid to particular countries but by encouraging the emergence of basic agreements between governments, the multilaterals and the bilateral aid on the planning and programme goals to be attacked. Recent UNDP experience with roundtables confirms that efforts are going into broader analyses of country economic and fiscal problems as a context within which better development planning can take place and aid can be better used. Some agencies believe they have not been involved to the degree they would like in the roundtable process. Co-ordination on this front, involving the agencies as well, would seem a natural corollary to current efforts.

Where groups of countries, such as island developing countries, fall under the surveillance of a single resident representative/co-ordinator, it is feasible to avoid piecemeal projects and give the aid a pragmatic frame which, with the agreement of the countries, can help to promote consistency in their joint economic efforts.

Other countries which have too small a United Nations family programme to require any too elaborate arrangements for co-ordination on an individual basis may not require too formal a co-ordination apparatus.

91. Some statements which resident representatives/co-ordinators have made to the Inspectors, generally speaking, have suggested that while there is co-ordination through the UNDP resident representative of certain administrative, personnel, financial and security matters embracing the United Nations system organizations in the field, not a great deal of programme co-ordination has yet taken place: programmes have not generally resulted from prior inter-agency consultations aimed at avoiding conflict or duplication of work in the field.
92. Organizations of the United Nations system are naturally inclined to pay close attention to issues of co-ordination or the "balancing" of programmes within their particular sectors: they tend to be less concerned with intersectoral harmony and balance which take them out of their milieu. But both types of co-ordination - intrasectoral and intersectoral - are needed for coherent planning. For this the resident representative/co-ordinator must continuously have access to such information as will enable him to perceive linkages, as well as opportunities for harmonizing goals, early enough to bring co-ordination into play. To deny him such information or to offer it grudgingly or belatedly is to defeat the prospect of achieving more rational plans and more mutually-reinforcing projects.

B. The role of the resident co-ordinator

93. The role of the resident co-ordinator understandably has different emphases in different places. Local circumstances influence how it is perceived and how it operates. Nevertheless, a resident co-ordinator has as a major responsibility the task of promoting complementary and joint programming in the country where he is assigned with the ultimate aim of achieving the integrated programming of all United Nations system technical inputs. For this he requires the full support of governments and of the agencies, both at field and Headquarters' levels. It is of the utmost importance that field representatives are kept aware of programming activities, such as project preparation and development with bilateral donors, and that this information is shared with resident co-ordinators at the earliest possible stage.

94. Many resident representatives/co-ordinators have told the Inspectors they see no change in their functions with the institution of the role of the resident co-ordinator: their capacity and responsibilities are what they were. The added title has (they say) tended to make some agencies suspicious that there was an intent to reduct their power. Doubtless, the creation of the role of resident co-ordinator has elicited some responses which seem to have arisen from mistrust. While these responses have not helped the situation, the Inspectors have not found the attitudes of agencies to be generally negative.

95. Perhaps one could say that if the hopes for country programming as a unifying force had fully materialized and country programmes had become, by and large, the result of co-ordinated thought and the complementary use of resources, the role of a resident co-ordinator would have been easier. As it is, the resident co-ordinator is expected to build on a consensus which does not yet exist. The way ahead, therefore, must be pragmatic, must recognize the circumstances as they are and move forward from that perception.
C. The attributes of a resident co-ordinator

96. The serious problems of drought and economic decline in sub-Saharan Africa have given new emphasis to developmental planning and to co-ordination and it seems clear that the resident co-ordinator of the future will need to be not only a manager of the highest quality with a capacity to get the most out of the human resources available, but one possessing strong intellectual gifts and well able to appreciate the macro-economic implications of the given situation. But he must not lose sight of the opportunities for co-ordination in the smaller compass, at the level of subsectors, where this seems feasible. If his efforts to co-ordinate are to be successful, however, the resident co-ordinator will need some staff who are trained in the economic disciplines and who can assist in producing the substantive documentation for his sessions with the government and for roundtables, Technical Co-operation Assistance Missions, and Consultative Group meetings which seek to gain consensus among all interested parties on broad economic planning and programming issues.

97. The Inspectors were often advised that the personality of resident co-ordinators was important: that resident co-ordinators should not attempt to lord it over their colleagues or dominate the scene; they should be partners in a common effort; they should be flexible. One resident co-ordinator told us he holds meetings of United Nations system representatives at different times in the offices of representatives other than UNDP's; and the chairperson of an individual meeting is the representative who is host of the meeting. Resident co-ordinators will not all accept this as a procedure they would wish to adopt, but the Inspectors believe there is room for this kind of flexibility which recognizes that bringing sectional interests into a meeting of minds may justify experiment and faith - a sense of mission even.

98. Where governments which do not have the human capability in place seek the services of a resident co-ordinator to co-ordinate multilateral, and possibly bilateral or NGO, aid to their countries, it is essential that the resident co-ordinator possess the leadership, managerial and intellectual qualities necessary for the position. The task will make demands on the resident co-ordinator considerably beyond those of the ordinary resident representative. Experience, know-how and the ability to work easily with others are attributes of prime importance in the choice of a resident co-ordinator.

D. The relationship between resident co-ordinators and UNICs

99. The UNDP resident representative is appointed by the Administrator. As resident co-ordinator, he or she is appointed by the Secretary-General, after consultation with United Nations system organizations. The director of a United Nations Information Centre (UNIC) is also appointed by the Secretary-General. There have been situations where conflict has arisen (often on purely ceremonial issues) between resident representatives/co-ordinators and directors of UNICs. In some cases, directors have disclaimed
the resident representative/co-ordinator's having any say in how they conduct their affairs, since directors, they say, are accountable solely to the Secretary-General. Furthermore, their regular contacts with national governments are with a Ministry (Foreign Affairs or Information) different from that with which resident representatives/co-ordinators are normally in contact (normally Finance or Economic Planning Ministries): directors, therefore, have a special role to play outside the purview of the resident representative/co-ordinator.

100. There is no doubt that the situation is complicated by the fact of separate jurisdictional areas, but logic would seem to suggest that a resident co-ordinator whose job is to assist in bringing the system's elements together for a better product in the field should have a critical interest in information matters which are an important part of total operational effort. The Inspectors recognize the breadth of duties which resident representatives/co-ordinators have to undertake and, therefore, do not recommend that all resident co-ordinators assume responsibility for information. It must be admitted, however, that some resident co-ordinators have in fact supervised information work and with credit. The Inspectors believe some basic features of the situation stand out against the background of which future policy should be addressed:

(a) the Director-General is the appointed representative of the Secretary-General with special responsibility for development and social and economic co-operation. The Director-General's role is to motivate the United Nations system organizations to work together and this role is performed in the field, on his behalf, by the resident co-ordinator. It would be inconsistent if the Secretary-General's appointee for information were to be considered to be outside the purview of the resident co-ordinator;

(b) the exposure which a resident co-ordinator has to various facets of government activity and his sensitivity to the problems of the country make him a suitable person to supervise the United Nations information effort in the country. The Under-Secretary-General for Public Information should interview resident co-ordinators to gauge their suitability and/or interests in information, prior to their appointment as directors;

(c) all administrators/managers ought to be but are not information-conscious or information-bent: it would be desirable, therefore, where it was not feasible to appoint resident co-ordinators as directors, to recruit as directors of UNICs media professionals who would act as advisers to resident co-ordinators in information matters. Judging from the fruitful consultations which have proceeded between DIEC, UNDP and DPI on previous information issues, it should be possible to ensure that UNIC directors who are advisers to resident representatives/co-ordinators are able to carry out their General Assembly responsibilities without hindrance from resident co-ordinators;

(d) directors would be expected to consult with and offer advice to resident co-ordinators on information matters as well as to take into account the resident co-ordinator's advice in the pursuit of their work;
(e) all resident co-ordinators should not necessarily take charge of information. Individual country circumstances should be taken into account. Collaboration between the director and the resident co-ordinator should however be imperative;

(f) the question whether the resident co-ordinator or the director has primacy on ceremonial occasions such as United Nations Day should be settled by the Secretary-General. The Inspectors believe that the resident co-ordinator would be the appropriate representative on such a day, due regard being paid to the position of the director, who would also have an important professional role to play on such an occasion;

(g) the resident co-ordinator should use his good offices to encourage more co-operation among the several United Nations system agencies in information where such co-operation would increase the impact of the information.

E. The role of the Director-General for Development and International Economic Co-operation (DIEC)

101. Where governments decide they require the services of a resident co-ordinator to integrate the multiple inputs of the United Nations system with other aid programmes or projects, all the participants of the aid effort would have to agree on synchronizing their plans and programmes. It is one of the Director-General's responsibilities to monitor the effectiveness of the collaboration among the United Nations family of organizations. This is a duty he exercises through the resident co-ordinators, whose practical efforts will supply the results. However, within the framework of meetings now held at the ACC or Director-General level, administrative and logistical issues, such as the desirability of limiting the number of separate premises of United Nations organizations where common premises and shared communications would be more rational and could bring benefits of economy to the system as a whole, could well be discussed.

102. Another administrative area in which the Director-General might strengthen his consultations with United Nations system organizations lies in the selection of resident co-ordinators. Specialized agencies do not now consider they play a meaningful role in the choice of resident co-ordinators: the selection appears almost a fait accompli by the time they are asked to give an opinion. They have only very infrequently raised any objection to the choices. Their view of the selection process, however, indicates some lack of interest or confidence in the method of choice of resident co-ordinators, a fact which does not augur well for their commitment to co-operate.

103. It would therefore seem worthwhile to set up a roster of possible candidates for posts of resident co-ordinator, a roster which would include suitable candidates from the specialized agencies. The roster could be agreed on by the Director-General and UNDP in consultation with the specialized agencies and provision should be made for specialized agency candidates to gain experience of working in UNDP for a suitable period in a senior capacity both in the field and at Headquarters before qualifying for actual selection. Future resident co-ordinators would then be chosen from the agreed roster which would be subject to periodic review.
104. Resident co-ordinators at present submit annual reports to the Director-General to assist his oversight of system-wide operational activities: these reports provide the agencies of the United Nations system with insights on problem areas and on how best the system can plan and programme its activities for the benefit of individual countries. These reports, if analytical, can be useful to the Director-General for his meetings with agency heads.

105. Questions such as whether the resident co-ordinator should have some oversight of refugee or human rights problems (non-developmental activities) will need to be faced in the long run. The Inspectors would prefer to see the resident co-ordinators get to grips with the problem of integrated planning and programming of development co-operation before any major new duties fall on them. The Director-General should continue to monitor the situation.

F. Criteria for the establishment of new field offices

106. The United Nations system in the field over the past eleven years has shown a growth pattern in the numbers of office staff while the number of operations personnel has been diminishing (see chapter II, paragraphs 29 to 47). This finding is confirmed in graph I which shows how the size, in dollar terms, of the operational programmes of United Nations organizations has evolved over time. Some implications of the graph need to be considered:

- United Nations system technical co-operation activities are at best stable if not declining.

- Non-technical co-operation operational activities by UNICEF, WFP and UNHCR have experienced a substantial increase both in relative and absolute terms.

- World Bank technical co-operation activities, whether computed in the restrictive sense (i.e., "training" and "consultants" components in World Bank loans) as shown in UNDP and DIEC documents or in the larger sense (i.e., "training", "consultants" and "feasibility studies" components) as shown in World Bank statistics, have increased ten-fold over the last ten years and are now larger than all the United Nations system technical co-operation activities combined.

- Within the United Nations system, UNDP has lost its dominant position, moving from three-quarters of United Nations system technical co-operation activities in 1968 to roughly half in 1980, and slightly more than one-third in 1983.

- Funds-in-trust have been expanding rapidly but now seem to be tapering off, though they are still at a high level.
It is clear that the proper discharge of agencies' responsibilities could not be achieved without, and has profited from, the presence of agency field staff. In some cases, agency field offices have provided a solid support to countries in need. The emergency situation in Africa has certainly underlined this necessity where the scale and magnitude of the problem and the substantial volume of resources being put in have demanded a full-time agency presence in some areas. But an examination of the total picture does suggest an excess of field establishments. Some of the shortcomings of the present pattern of field representation have been mentioned in chapter II, paragraphs 25 and 27 in particular.

UNDP has consistently provided services to the United Nations family as an integral part of its functions in the field. Only in specific circumstances was even marginal costing considered to be appropriate. In a real sense UNDP is subsidizing other organizations of the United Nations system by providing services to them free or below full cost. The underlying rationale to this mandate was that UNDP's presence in a country did permit a consolidation of the United Nations representation with respect to operational activities and would help to prevent a proliferation of agency representation. While the rationale has in practice undergone some modifications, it remains true that the resource of UNDP field offices is one which the United Nations system should use to the fullest extent possible.

For this reason, the Inspectors believe the following considerations should be taken into account before any new arrangements for the establishment or expansion of field representation are approved:

(a) the scale and complexity of the programme to be delivered should have been established and should be substantial enough to necessitate special field arrangements and full-time occupation by representatives;

(b) the benefits to be derived from field representation should be shown in concrete terms and the costs should be reasonable in the light of these benefits;

(c) there should be consultation with UNDP on the extent of the services required in the field by the agency, the ability of UNDP to provide the services and the terms under which this can be done. Every effort should be made to use UNDP services;
(d) if UNDP cannot supply the services, the agency should first show the possibility of savings from the operation of field offices where its activities have diminished;

(e) when a programme has been delivered or activities have slackened, to the point where field representation is not being employed full-time, the field office should be closed;

(f) there should be consideration of the logistical effect of establishing new field representation. No new separate representation should be established where it would serve unnecessarily to increase a government's burden or add to co-ordination problems without substantial benefits to outweigh the shortcomings. The establishment of separate field representation should be justified on grounds of improved effectiveness;

(g) governing bodies should formulate strict criteria on the bases suggested above.

G. General

111. The Inspectors do not underestimate the difficulties of improving co-ordination among members of the United Nations family nor ignore the varying positions bilateral donors may take from time to time on co-ordinating theirs with multilateral aid. Certainly the major economic problems faced by the less-developed countries of Africa, and particularly those of the Sahel, have focused attention on the need to co-ordinate the complex inputs coming from so many different sources, differently motivated. It is noticeable that DAC members have undertaken to co-operate more closely with multilaterals in trying to ensure that aid brings concrete benefits.

112. Massive programme co-ordination on a total scale within the United Nations system will not be immediately achievable; the work can, however, proceed in smaller groupings, in subsectoral arrangements. Wider co-ordination through intersectoral joint and co-operative effort will profit from this experience. Since it is now clear that individual programmes constructed with a blind eye to their relationship with other programmes of the same system can fall short of providing the positive benefits governments expect, the way may now be a trifle more propitious for attempts at better co-ordination. UNDP has a role to play in this. Its vast global experience and grasp of third world needs through its widespread network of field offices and resident representatives make UNDP a valuable resource for the entire United Nations system. The Inspectors are of the view and recommend that governing bodies should test this resource to the utmost before approving the establishment of new field offices.
V. SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS

A. Structure

113. The field representatives and offices of the United Nations system are a substantial resource, bringing the benefits of specialized expertise closer to the developing countries. The building of this institutional framework, which began very early on and continues, has always had the support of governments since, thereby, the organizations offer a tangible presence to their clients. This network has grown apace in the decade between 1973 and 1983. At paragraphs 24 to 28 the Inspectors have made some observations on what they see as shortcomings in the way field representation has grown.

114. For historical and organizational reasons, the network has developed in a largely unco-ordinated manner. There is little consultation within the system concerning the need to establish new offices and where it would be best, for the system as a whole, to locate these offices. United Nations offices are often scattered within a city, principally because the expanding number of offices has brought pressure to bear on existing facilities but also because of a wish, either of governments or the agencies concerned, to have independent facilities. These arrangements are sometimes inconvenient or uneconomic. For the above-mentioned reasons, the Inspectors make the following recommendations, noting that, because of the identification of WHO's field offices and personnel with the regions they serve, the recommendations will not always apply in their entirety to WHO.

Recommendation 1: The General Assembly should reaffirm its commitment to the coherent development of United Nations system activities for the benefit of Member States and to the role of the resident co-ordinator as the official best suited to promote these aims. The General Assembly should also:

(a) in the light of the substantial aggregate expenditure for field representation and the probability that the further unco-ordinated increase in field representation may not produce benefits commensurate with the cost, seek the support of Member States and the co-operation of all partners in the United Nations system for a stay in the establishment of any new arrangements for field representation until prescribed criteria are met;

(b) approve the criteria proposed in paragraph 110 for steps to be taken before any new arrangements are made for the establishment of field representation;

(c) draw attention to UNDP's substantial investment in office premises and in staff with long experience of serving the United Nations system and urge all its partners to make use of the facilities UNDP offers rather than set up new facilities on their own. The housing of small groups of agencies in UNDP premises should be encouraged where larger concentrations of United Nations system organizations may not be possible.
Recommendation 2: The governing body of each organization represented in the field at regional, subregional or country level should

(a) put a stay on new arrangements for the establishment of field representation to ensure that the criteria proposed in paragraph 110 and any other criteria which may be deemed advisable are met before any such arrangements come into being;

(b) test the cost-effectiveness and efficiency of its field representation by reviewing the following:

(i) whether the cost of field representation in individual cases and in the aggregate is justified by the quantum of services delivered and the benefits accruing to the countries concerned;

(ii) whether, given the need to decentralize operations to the greatest extent possible, representatives have the required authority to take necessary decisions in the field and thus relieve Headquarters of decisions which make for unnecessary increases in cost and impair the effectiveness of representation on the spot;

(iii) whether all representatives have the professional and managerial talents necessary for the successful conduct of their responsibilities;

(iv) whether the lines of authority and of communication between regional, subregional, country offices and Headquarters are clear and contribute to the speedy and economical pursuit of the agency's business;

(v) whether the siting of particular offices is consistent with present-day communications and other requirements;

(vi) the extent to which UNDP offices and services (including premises) are being used and the advisability of encouraging the use of these facilities.

Field representation which upon review does not appear viable should be terminated.

B. Co-ordination

115. A single United Nations system representative, the chief spokesman on programme, emergency and general administrative and security matters, has always been the ideal. By and large, that official, in the person of the UNDP resident representative, has served the system well, perhaps more so in non-programme matters over the years, but to some degree in programme matters as well. Recently, however, with the advent of the "new" function of United Nations resident co-ordinator, the official representative of the Secretary-General, the spokesman's role seems to have been called into question.
Chapters III and IV deal with this topic and suggest some practical ways to improve matters. The Inspectors firmly support the institution of resident co-ordinator. They believe that the institution can be strengthened, in one respect, if the Secretary-General ensures that some proportion of resident co-ordinator posts is open to the most qualified candidates in the United Nations system. Moreover, as the Inspectors state in paragraphs 85 and 100 they see a role for resident co-ordinators in bringing coherence and giving impetus to the information effort in developing countries. Accordingly, the Inspectors make the following two recommendations:

Recommendation 3: The Director-General for Development and International Economic Co-operation (DIEC) should set up a roster of possible candidates for posts of resident co-ordinator, including suitable candidates from the specialized agencies. Opportunities should be devised for such candidates from specialized agencies to gain exposure to UNDP's working methods where this is deemed necessary. Future resident co-ordinators would be chosen from the agreed roster which would be subject to periodic review (see paragraph 103).

Recommendation 4: The Secretary-General should make provision for a single accreditation to governments which would cover the work of the resident co-ordinator and that of the UNIC director at the same time. The Secretary-General should also give consideration to the guidelines suggested in paragraph 100 for better rationalization of the work of UNIC directors vis-à-vis that of resident co-ordinators.
GRAPH I - Expenditures on operational activities 1968-1985
(in millions of United States dollars)

Sources:
4/39/417
DP/1982/5
World Bank

WFP = data for 1973-1977 are extrapolated
Ex B = technical co-operation activities funded from extrabudgetary funds (other than UNDP and UNFPA)
RB = technical co-operation activities financed from regular budgets
### TABLE 1
**FIELD REPRESENTATION FROM 1973 TO 1983: NUMBER OF OFFICES**

#### A. Offices in developing countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organizations</th>
<th>Number of Offices</th>
<th>Percentage Increase (Decrease) 1973 over 1983</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>UNITED NATIONS</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDP/</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNICEF/</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNICEF/</td>
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<td>ECLA</td>
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<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECOM</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sub-total:</strong></td>
<td>176</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAO 1/</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNESCO</td>
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<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNIDO 2/</td>
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<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total:</strong></td>
<td>309</td>
<td>417</td>
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#### B. Offices in developed countries (excluding Headquarters)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organizations</th>
<th>Number of Offices</th>
<th>Percentage Increase (Decrease) 1973 over 1983</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1973</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNICEF/</td>
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<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECLA</td>
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<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECOM</td>
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<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Sub-total:</strong></td>
<td>32</td>
<td>38</td>
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<tr>
<td>FAO 3/</td>
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<td>UNESCO</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNIDO 2/</td>
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<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total:</strong></td>
<td>51</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GRAND TOTAL:</td>
<td>360</td>
<td>479</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes**

1/ Since the UNDP resident representative is in all cases the representative of WFP, UNFPA and UNIDO, the representatives of these three organizations are not considered as separate "offices". The figures for countries in which there were representatives in 1973, 1978 and 1983 are as follows: WFP: 73, 80, 82; UNFPA: 23, 31; UNIDO: 32, 35, 36.

2/ In 21 countries, the UNDP resident representative also serves as director of the UNIC.

3/ Data extracted from United Nations' budgets.

4/ In addition, 48 senior agricultural advisors, representing FAO presence in the field, were serving in UNDP offices in 1973 and 24 in 1978.

5/ Under WHO, national co-ordinator offices in Africa have been counted as offices, even when no staff has been indicated.

6/ Including offices in Namibia and Kampuchea, currently non-operational.
### Table 2

**Field Representation from 1973 to 1983: Number of Staff**

#### A. Staff in developing countries

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<td>393</td>
<td>2,447</td>
<td>2,577</td>
<td>2,660</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>(3) 10 113</td>
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#### B. Staff in developed countries (excluding headquarters)

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**Notes**

- Figures for UNDP Professionals do not include Junior Professional Officers (JPOs) for the years 1973, 1978 and 1983, the respective numbers of JPOs were 34, 77 and 107. UNIDO had 32 JPOs in 1978 and 34 in 1983.
- Data extracted from United Nations budgets.
- Data for FAO; 48 SAs serving in UNDP offices in 1973, and 22 in 1978, have been added to those figures.
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**Notes**

1/ Includes the cost of 20 Professional and 16 General Service staff at Headquarters.

2/ The amounts shown for ILO correspond to one half of the appropriations for the biennium.

3/ For UNIDO SIDFAs and JPOs not financed by UNDP.

No data for UNFPA, ECA, ESCAP and ECWA.

UNICEF data not exploitable (office costs cannot be separated from programming costs).
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*Code: 1 = owned; 2 = rented from government; 3 = rented from private owner; 4 = obtained free from government; 5 = obtained free from UNDP (or other organization).*
Annex

Examples of functions performed by field offices
of United Nations system organizations

1. FAO

FAO country representatives' offices perform the following functions:

- maintain close and regular contacts with government ministries, agencies and institutions involved in agriculture, forestry, fisheries and related fields and thus ensure the consistency of FAO's activities with governments' priorities and objectives;

- report to Headquarters on countries' food and agricultural situation, and the needs for external emergency assistance;

- provide assistance to governments in project identification and formulation, including support to programming and investment missions;

- ensure, through constant contacts with FAO Headquarters units, that programme development is consistent with national policies and programmes;

- collaborate with other United Nations system agencies, as well as with representatives of bilateral agencies of donor countries and of financial institutions located in their country of assignment;

- monitor the implementation of FAO-executed projects and provide advice and assistance to project staff. For selected projects in certain countries, FAO representatives also provide administrative support and ensure financial operations;

- perform other basic functions such as attending meetings, roundtables and technical seminars, assisting with arrangements for visiting fellows and for the participation of national staff in external training, and maintaining reference libraries to make FAO's technical publications more readily available to government officials and the general public in their countries of assignment.

2. UNICEF

(a) Regional offices

The regional directors function as a "senior professional colleague" in relation to the UNICEF representatives in the region, providing leadership, advice, co-ordination, supervision of major matters, performance appraisal, and through his office, various advisory services. They also function in the region as the Executive Director's representative in a broad general sense. They review the annual plan of work of the representatives in his region and visit offices in the region when they or the representative concerned consider it to be necessary. The regional directors also perform the function of a UNICEF representative in countries directly served by his office.
Annex
page 2

(b) Offices of UNICEF representatives

Throughout the area served by their offices, the UNICEF representatives apply UNICEF policies of programme co-operation and advisory services, and arrange the delivery of UNICEF inputs. They are accountable for their overall performance to the Executive Director through the regional directors. They receive advice and guidance from the regional directors. The representatives communicate directly with the relevant divisions at Headquarters as necessary for operations and follow their functional guidance.

The UNICEF representatives' offices are the key field units for advocacy, advice, programming, and implementation including logistics and evaluation, this places authority as close as possible to the point where co-operation is provided. In connection with direct programme co-operation, the UNICEF representatives are responsible for the preparation of recommendations for assistance, preparation of plans of operation, supply lists, call-forwards of supply and non-supply assistance, arranging for local procurement, reviews of programme implementation and results, etc. The UNICEF representatives maintain close contact with various ministries in relation to promotion and planning of services benefiting children. The representatives' offices are also responsible for information and project support communications, for seeking contributions to UNICEF from the countries served by the office, and for other forms of country/UNICEF co-operation.

(c) Sub-offices

In some countries where UNICEF does not have a representative, national sub-offices or national liaison offices have been established. These offices are closely supervised by the UNICEF representative, who is normally located in a neighbouring country. In some larger countries, district sub-offices have been established within the country in provincial or district centres (e.g. in Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, the Sudan, or Zaire).

3. WHO

WHO Programme Co-ordinators (WPC) or National Programme Co-ordinators (NWC) are appointed by WHO at the request of the government to act as the main link between WHO and the government health authorities, national co-ordinating bodies and the representatives of other agencies and funds in the country. The main functions performed by the WPC/NWC are the following:

- provide the government with information and explanations concerning the policies of the governing bodies of the Organization, including the regional and global Strategies for Health for All with a view to ensuring that these policies will be taken fully into account in national policy and programme reviews;

- support the government in the planning and further management of national health programmes;
- collaborate with the government in identifying those national programmes in which WHO could profitably have more specific functions, and in the planning and further management of joint activities for their implementation;

- help the government to identify and co-ordinate available or potentially available external resources for the implementation of approved national health programmes.

Formal authority is delegated to the WPC or NWC to negotiate with the government WHO's co-operative programme activities in the country, in accordance with the policies adopted by the Member States collectively in the governing bodies of WHO, and in accordance with the Regional Director's directives on them. This includes negotiations with respect to programme formulation and subsequent modification and implementation related to WHO's resources at country level.