Some Reflections on Reform of the United Nations

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The Concept of Reform and the Joint Inspection Unit

The word "reform" is used in the Statute of the Joint Inspection Unit to define the functions of the Inspectors. Article 5, paragraph 5, of the Statute reads as follows: "The Inspectors may propose reforms or make recommendations as they deem necessary to the competent organs of the organization". In the context of the other paragraphs of article 5, this concept of reform has been interpreted by all my colleagues and by myself since the Unit was set up in 1968 as implying changes in methods, practices, procedures, sometimes structures, calculated to improve the functioning of an organization or of the System as a whole. In other words, the professional concept we adopted in this way meant that we felt it our duty to study and propose partial and specific reforms likely to improve the functioning of the various organizations, but we never felt we should undertake the examination of a radical reform of the actual framework of the institutions or of the System as a whole.

Seventeen years of activity appear to have shown that this method has produced some results. A report now being prepared will describe the results obtained in the field of planning, programming, monitoring and evaluation, and in that of personnel. The experience thus acquired would seem nevertheless to indicate that we need to go further. The fortieth anniversary of the United Nations is an invitation to comprehensive reflections. Hence the interpretation given here to the term "reform" is much broader than that given to it in all the previous reports.

"/ Article 5, paragraph 1: "The Inspectors shall have the broadest powers of investigation in all matters having a bearing on the efficiency of the services and the proper use of funds."

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# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CHAPTER</th>
<th>Paragraphs</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I. The Notion and Feasibility of Reform</td>
<td>1 - 9</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. Managerial Shortcomings or Structural Shortcomings</td>
<td>10 - 43</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Convergence in error</td>
<td>10 - 11</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extraordinary complexity</td>
<td>12 - 14</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extreme fragmentation</td>
<td>15 - 20</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The interplay of influence and power</td>
<td>21 - 24</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Impossibility of co-ordination</td>
<td>25 - 32</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quality of the &quot;outputs&quot; and level of qualifications of the staff</td>
<td>33 - 40</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Problems of structure and concept of the World Organization</td>
<td>41 - 43</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III. The Nature and the Role of the World Organization</td>
<td>44 - 75</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intellectual confusion and smokescreens</td>
<td>44 - 47</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of realism and mere talk</td>
<td>48 - 54</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Divergence of views and common errors</td>
<td>55 - 58</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Place of the World Organization in the system of international relations</td>
<td>59 - 64</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nature of the activities of the System and the notion of a &quot;world consensus&quot;</td>
<td>65 - 70</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Management and the search for a consensus</td>
<td>71 - 75</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV. The Pursuit of the Three Main Objectives</td>
<td>76 - 138</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collective security in the search for peace</td>
<td>76 - 88</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Action in favour of development</td>
<td>89 - 91</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zones of influence and fragmentation of bilateral aid</td>
<td>92 - 94</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sectoral approach and doctrinal differences</td>
<td>95 - 98</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The credibility of advice by &quot;remote control&quot;</td>
<td>99 - 103</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The need to change the structures of the System</td>
<td>104 - 106</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The world forum</td>
<td>107 - 113</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some examples of negotiations, Decolonization and international law</td>
<td>114 - 115</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human Rights</td>
<td>116 - 119</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The North-South dialogue</td>
<td>120 - 125</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identification and discussion of some world problems</td>
<td>126 - 128</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Superficial treatment of economic and financial problems</td>
<td>129 - 133</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outline of what a &quot;world political space&quot; could mean</td>
<td>134 - 137</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The type of World Organization we possess today</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
TABLE OF CONTENTS (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CHAPTER</th>
<th>Paragraphs</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>V. The Focus of Reflections with a view to reform</td>
<td>139 - 192</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The technical conditions that apply</td>
<td>139 - 141</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The feasibility of modifying world consensus</td>
<td>142 - 145</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The search for common ground</td>
<td>146 - 148</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The state of the art in regard to a &quot;World Organization&quot;</td>
<td>149 - 153</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The new techniques</td>
<td>154 - 158</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The impossibility of innovation in regard to the direct search for peace</td>
<td>159</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Regional development agencies or enterprises&quot;</td>
<td>160 - 165</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The intergovernmental regional organizations</td>
<td>166 - 169</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The structures for identifying problems and for negotiation: the problem of representation</td>
<td>170 - 177</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>An &quot;economic United Nations&quot;</td>
<td>178 - 180</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The &quot;Council-Commission&quot; formula transposed to world level - the &quot;Economic Security Council&quot;</td>
<td>181 - 185</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transition towards a third generation World Organization</td>
<td>186 - 192</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

VI. Conclusions

Notes

Annexes
CHAPTER I

THE NOTION AND THE FEASIBILITY OF REFORM

1. The thesis to be propounded in this report is essentially as follows:

That 40 years after the establishment of the United Nations, it is not only desirable today but entirely feasible to give serious thought to the reform of the United Nations and its system of organizations;

That these reflections must challenge the concepts underlying the institution;

That they must therefore focus, following the two unfinished experiments of the League of Nations and the United Nations, on a third generation World Organization genuinely in keeping with the needs of the modern world.

2. This thesis does not suggest that the present Organization has failed. On the contrary, the idea of reform is not only compatible with the acknowledge of the historic role played by the United Nations, but it implies an affirmation of its importance and usefulness today. It merely postulates that it is possible to reflect on the establishment of a system that would be still more useful in the present political context.

3. Nor does the thesis mean that we can underrate the extreme difficulty of such an undertaking. It is perfectly true that attempts made so far to amend the Charter of the United Nations have been unsuccessful and that there is a tacit agreement among Governments not to try to resurrect them. On the other hand, those Member States which criticize the management of the organizations within the United Nations System most strongly have not always shown themselves enthusiastic about supporting the various proposals for internal reform put before them.

4. It is a fact of life that getting amendments of any significance to structures, policies and methods accepted and applied in the United Nations and the specialized agencies is difficult. To achieve a consensus of the Member States on a technical recommendation is no easy matter, and even when resolutions deciding to change rules or the practices in force are adopted unanimously, resistance from the secretariats quite frequently succeeds in draining the decisions of their content. The writer has found this on many occasions.

5. However, this situation is in the process of changing. First of all, criticism alleging "mismanagement" of the United Nations and some of the organizations of the United Nations System has reached the status of a political phenomenon. It arises both inside and outside the United Nations, mainly from the Governments of the wealthy Western or socialist countries, and over the last couple of years it has generally gone hand in hand with proposals for financial stringency or threats of withdrawal; while the countries members of the Group of 77...
have raised the question, following the failure of the "global negotiations", of ways and means of escaping from a cul de sac. It is as if North and South were both seeking a new type of dialogue and considering whether the management and the concept of the role of the world organizations could provide the opportunity.

6. At the same time, in a very large number of countries, rich and poor alike, a feeling of frustration is developing. The hope of seeing the world organizations contribute more to peace and to the reduction of armaments dies hard in the collective unconscious. Certain situations involving underdevelopment or violations of human rights seem more and more shocking to a better informed public opinion. Criticisms of the "ineffectiveness" of the United Nations are made in the light of an idealistic and sometimes naive but in any event exigent view of the possible role of the Organization in its various fields of activity.

7. The logical conclusion of this type of frustration and criticism is of course the idea of reform. If public opinion felt that reform calculated to improve the performance of the Organization in relation to peace, development and human rights was feasible, the pressure it exerted on Governments would be such that they would abandon their present hesitation as to the possibility of change. What is more, that would be a very different exercise from past attempts at partial reform, proposed by particular countries merely to improve their own situation within the Organization. The failure of attempts of this type (for example, to find a seat for Japan or the Federal Republic of Germany as permanent members of the Security Council) cannot be cited as proof that a wholesale recasting of the Charter with a view to setting up an entirely new Organization would be even more likely to meet the same fate.

8. No doubt to embark on any serious consideration of so radical a change would imply transformation of the political climate surrounding the problem. To pretend that the present crisis and the trend in public opinion could lead to the introduction of radical reforms may today seem utopian. Yet current criticisms show some awareness of the fact that the role played by the World Organizations is contradictory, uncertain, and poorly adapted to present-day problems (cf. the crisis in UNESCO). The challenge to the very concept of the United Nations has already been issued. It arises not in the direction of an illusory "strengthening" of the powers of the Organization but, on the contrary, in the direction of greater realism. The hope of concerted efforts by all countries calculated to crystallize peaceful and reasonable solutions has not diminished. Thus it is as if public opinion, weary of hollow formulas and exaggerated ambitions, was expressing, clumsily perhaps but clearly, the need for an organization that is more...
efficient and fulfils useful functions. Thus the problem is really at a pragmatic level at the very opposite end of the scale from Utopia.

9. No precise technical response to such hope exists up to the present. The will to change can only develop if clear ideas emerge as to the content of potential reform. Reflections on this matter can only be collective, which means that each and every one can make his own contribution. The object of this report is precisely to contribute to such reflections.
CHAPTER II
MANAGERIAL SHORTCOMINGS OR STRUCTURAL SHORTCOMINGS

Convergence in error

10. The acceptance by a large sector of public opinion and political circles of the criticisms directed at the United Nations and its System constitutes an important and paradoxical political phenomenon. In the present confusion in people's minds as to the nature and functions of the World Organization, some agreement does appear to be emerging between realists and idealists and between Western countries and socialist countries, not only in regard to the schedule of "shortcomings", but concerning the causes of its "ineffectiveness". The criticisms relate essentially to the methods of management, and the simple idea which appears to link many of them is that correcting these shortcomings would help to increase effectiveness.

11. I shall endeavour in this chapter to show that this implies a convergence of error, not of course as to the importance of the shortcomings, since their seriousness is obvious, but as to their causes, which are not methodological but structural, and as to the nature of the functions of the World Organization, which essentially are not managerial but negotiation functions. An examination of the principal shortcomings, while justifying the urgency of reform, will make it easier to understand why the problem is one not of method but of structures.

Extraordinary complexity

12. The most obvious shortcoming, both for the outside observer and for those living and working within the System, is without any doubt the fragmentation of effort or the lack of a definition of priorities and of "co-ordination". It is easy to demonstrate that this situation is bound up with the extraordinary and unnecessary nature of institutional complexity. Familiarity with the phenomenon is such among those acquainted with the Organization that in the end they find the situation normal and regard the "knowledge of the System" as a sort of palpable professional skill.

13. This structural complexity is to be found in Annex I showing the breakdown of budgetary and extrabudgetary resources and staff numbers among the various organizations or bodies depending on each of them. It is to be seen more clearly still in Annex II, which gives a list of legally independent entities attached to each organization: 20 for WHO, 18 for FAO, 10 or so for UNESCO and the ILO, about 15 for the United Nations, and 13 for UNDP. Thus we get more than a 100 legally independent entities. But this impressive list still gives only an approximate idea of the real complexity.

14. To assess it more accurately, we have to realize that the degree of independence of a division (at times involving, The causes of "shortcomings" in the System are not methodological but structural. The question is not one of management but one of negotiation. ... is due to the extraordinary complexity of the structures.
particular in the United Nations, a committee of experts or its own intergovernmental organ) or of a field office, is often at least as great as that of a legally distinct entity. The degree of co-ordination and hierarchical structure varies within each organization, but in most cases it is extremely feeble. In this connection, the situation is roughly the same in the case of activities of the "headquarters" offices of the various organizations, which are described in planning or programming documents as "programmes" or "subprogrammes", 5/ and in the case of operational activities "in the field" as "projects".

The inordinately ambitious content of the various programmes ...

15. With regard to activities at the various headquarters, the most important aspect is the universal nature of the content of programmes. Nothing is outside its scope - in the economic, social and humanitarian fields we find all the questions dealt with by the national administrations in the individual countries: trade, industry, natural resources, food and agriculture, fisheries, forestry, science and technology, education, labour, social security, health, culture, human rights, the rights of peoples, general development problems, nuclear energy and all the subsectors which can be subsumed under each of these fields. The list in Annex III, confined to the titles of the most important major programmes of the six main organizations shows the very broad and very varied interests of the United Nations, UNESCO, and to a lesser extent the ILO and FAO, and the overlapping between their various areas of jurisdiction. But it gives little idea of the full range of the problems dealt with.

16. The extraordinarily ambitious coverage of these lists results in an extreme fragmentation of the resources available. This is reflected in many instances in the secondment of one or two professional-level officers to the study and treatment, from various angles, of a given world problem. In the United Nations, for example, a simple statistical calculation shows in regard to the "subprogrammes" of the regional economic commissions that the average staff strength is 2.4 professionals; for human establishments 2 professionals; and for social development 2.3 professionals. One might also cite the UNCTAD insurance programme, which has 5 professionals, and the environmental programme of the Economic Commission for Latin America, which has 3. 6/

17. With regard to operational activities, the dispersal and fragmentation also derive, first and foremost, from the distribution among various independent bodies. The total amount of these funds was estimated for 1983 at $2,530 million, or 52 per cent of the total expenditure for the United Nations System during that year. This amount was broken down as follows: $380 million for UNICEF, $737 million for the World Food Programme, $135 million for the United Nations Fund for Population Activities, $654 million for the funds received directly by the specialized agencies (part in assessed contributions and the rest in voluntary
contributions), and approximately $630 million for UNDP, which itself redistribute most of the funds it receives among the various "executing agencies".

18. This system of allocation of funds means that in a single country which is a recipient of aid, about 15 different organizations (the 11 organizations of the System plus the Programmes mentioned above) intervene simultaneously to organize their projects there. Added to these will be one or more of the 13 independent bodies directly attached to UNDP, such as the United Nations Volunteers Programme or the United Nations Sudano-Sahelian Office. Projects may also be organized by other independent bodies such as those mentioned in Annex II. The aid channelled through the United Nations System can thus be proposed to one and the same country by some 30 bodies of the most varied types and completely independent.

19. This dispersal is increased still further by the fact that all these bodies operate in the form of "projects", most of them modest in size, whose main component is expert services. Thus the average amount of the projects financed by UNDP (about 1,000) in 1983 was $393,000. Since the average annual cost of employing an expert is about $100,000, the average project involves supplying two to three experts a year, plus a variable figure for equipment. The high degree of independence enjoyed by the proponents of a project, as regards design and method, thus leads to fragmentation of responsibilities.

20. The complexity of intergovernmental machinery and experts reflects the number of bodies and programmes. Moreover, because of the number of member States, the main committees, with a representative on each committee, cannot examine all problems in detail. This has led to the creation of smaller committees, specialized "subsidiary organs", and a system of relationships has been established between them. Then a whole network of co-ordination machinery has been superimposed on this structure. The vagueness of the terms of reference; the similarity of jurisdiction between organs as important as the Economic and Social Council, UNCTAD, the Second and Third Committees of the General Assembly; and the number and repetition of "general debates" preceding the examination of agenda items repeated in committee after committee whose relative status is not clearly defined, have created in the United Nations particularly a state of confusion which in spite of countless efforts it has been found difficult to remedy. The machinery of the specialized agencies, generally limited to an Executive Board and a General Assembly, is no doubt simpler, but its geographical spread does not facilitate the co-ordination either of methods or of programmes. The interplay of influence and power ...

21. This situation involves in turn for each of the member States the obligation:

   To organize a network of representation at the four headquarters of the United Nations and those of each of the agencies, as well as with the regional economic commissions (i.e. in some 15 different cities);
To arrange for co-ordination of its representatives with each of these organizations or headquarters. To earmark for such missions staff varying in strength with the power of the States but invariably numerous and not necessarily all of very high grade.

Furthermore, the complexity and often the relative unimportance of the problems dealt with makes it impossible for a central administration to give instructions on all subjects, and the foreign ministries responsible for this co-ordination do not have all the powers they need to supervise the representatives of technical ministries. The result is that in a very large number of cases, in spite of considerable paperwork, the personality of the representatives has a greater impact on the official position taken up by Governments than the directives sent from the capitals themselves. In these circumstances it is hardly surprising that the representatives of one and the same Government may take different points of view, on administrative or financial problems, for example, according to the organizations to which they are accredited. The credibility of the entire representation and negotiation system clearly suffers somewhat from this.

22. Thus it is also not surprising that the problems of management and functioning of the System as a whole ultimately take up an undue proportion of the work schedule of delegations and secretariats. The way in which the mill operates becomes much more important than the quality of the flour it produces. In order to overcome the difficulties inherent in the complexity of the whole, delegations are forced not only to learn how the machinery conditions the interplay of influence, but also to follow closely the most trivial administrative matters.

23. But the impact of influence and power to initiate on the orientation of the various programmes is very different in the specialized agencies and major Programmes 5/ such as UNICEF, WFP and UNFPA on the one hand and in the United Nations itself on the other. In the above-mentioned agencies and major Programmes, the role of the Director or Secretary-General of the organization and his team, if he has been able to set one up, may be considerable. His personal philosophy in relation to world problems, his attitude towards development, may have a direct impact on the decisions taken by its Executive Board or General Assembly. He may influence the definition of the objectives of the agency (since he is responsible for drawing up programming documents) the apportioning of financial resources to this or that programme, and finally the definition of priorities. The dictatorial power at his disposal in relation to staff and recruitment increase still further his scope for influence. In the United Nations, on the other hand, delegations have organized a measure of parliamentary power which is exerted even in the administrative field. Most of the initiatives come from the delegations themselves, which actually leads to stagnation. Changes of direction in programmes are few and modest, and the creation of new "programmes" is extremely rare. The consequence is that the heads of departments or divisions have the possibility...
of taking the initiative, at least indirectly, in the design of
programmes and in the collection of voluntary funds, thus giving
them greater influence in their particular field than the
Secretary-General.

24. The guidelines given to the organizations at the time of
their establishment, and the historical corpus of decisions which
have gone to confirm or modify their spirit, have given each one
of them an individual character. The philosophies of
international action developed within these micro-climates are
very different in the ILO, UNESCO, WHO, UNICEF and UNDP. The
third world colouring of UNCTAD and UNIDO, the Western philosophy
of the "enlightenment" which continues to inspire UNESCO, the
specifically tripartite nature of the ILO, and the diversity of
the view of development which inspire the action of the agencies
or the various Programmes of the United Nations, force delegations
to take account of all these nuances if they are to have any
effectiveness.

Impossibility of co-ordination

25. It is difficult to see how such a situation could be
rectified by better management methods. An examination of the
failure of all the attempts at "co-ordination" and "planning"
makes it easier to understand the impossibility of the task. It
is certainly not for want of having provided a whole machinery for
this purpose, both at headquarters and in the field. Actually,
the concern for co-ordination which over the years has given rise
to a regular reinforcement and a growing complication has remained
constant since the outset only to the extent that it has always
remained unsatisfied.

26. The organs set up during the early years of the System: the
Administrative Committee on Co-ordination (consisting of the
Secretary-General of the United Nations and the heads of the
secretariats of the specialized agencies), the Advisory Committee
on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (the committee of experts
to examine budgets, including those of the specialized agencies)
and subsidiary bodies such as certain functional commissions of
the Economic and Social Council, which "may through consultation
co-ordinate the activities of the specialized agencies", have been
augmented in particular by the following:

27. During the 1960s: in 1962, the Committee on Programme and
Co-ordination (main subsidiary organ both of the Economic and
Social Council and of the General Assembly for planning,
programming, evaluation and co-ordination); in 1964, the Committee
for Development Planning (a group of experts appointed in their
personal capacity "to consider and evaluate the programmes and
activities of the organs of the United Nations and of the
specialized agencies relating to economic planning and
projections"); in 1968, the Joint Inspection Unit, whose members
have the broadest powers of investigation in all matters having a
bearing on the efficiency of services and the proper use of funds,
and who have also been given the task "of achieving greater
co-ordination between organizations".
28. During the 1970s: in 1970, the institution by UNDP of the "country programme", established for each country in the light of its own development plan, and defining the nature and type of projects financed by UNDP; in 1974, the World Food Council, consisting of 36 members and with instructions "at the ministerial level to establish its own programme of action for co-ordination of relevant United Nations bodies and agencies" in the fields of food and agriculture; in 1975, through the so-called "restructuring" operation, the institution under resolution 32/197 of:

A post of Director-General for Development and International Economic Co-operation,

An office for Programme Planning and Co-ordination, to examine problems of co-ordination at the level of the System, and to propose studies and analyses of intersectoral programmes;

A Consultative Committee on Substantive Questions to enable the organizations and the United Nations to co-ordinate the preparation of their programmes and even to make "joint planning in the medium term at System level";

Resident co-ordinators with responsibility for "co-ordination of operational activities for development carried out at the country level".

29. This extraordinary perseverance produced no results. This mass of efforts, changes in structure, work on methodology and recommendations, precise though they were and formulated in an imperative way by the General Assembly, have in no way improved co-ordination. "Joint planning" has remained wishful thinking; development strategies applied by each organization have continued to diverge; and "country programming" and "field co-ordination" have never been anything more than meaningless terms. The situation in this respect has remained the one described time after time in various reports of the Joint Inspection Unit: "Lack of intellectual preparation for work of programming, inadequate analysis of the role assigned to United Nations System in the general scheme of technical assistance requirements of the various countries, absence of a unified concept of development, lack of satisfactory machinery at the central or local levels to ensure the preliminary work of co-ordination of contributions by the various agencies, lack of a common methodology for defining types of projects". 10/ The notion of an "integrated approach to development", although adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations and ritually repeated at each General Assembly, 11/ has remained for the United Nations System an empty formula.

30. This useless effort at co-ordination has in fact over the last 15 years gone hand in hand with a parallel effort towards planning, programming, monitoring of the implementation of programmes and evaluation. Progress has certainly been made on paper in these fields, since the principle of the establishment of a planning cycle has been approved in the United Nations and most of the agencies, and instruments to this end have been devised:
six-year medium-term plans and two-year programme-budgets with the
cycles harmonized; the development of monitoring and evaluation
services; reports on the implementation of programmes; regular
evaluation studies; the acceptance of the principle of
consultation between agencies to harmonize the preparation of
plans and programmes; the adoption by the General Assembly of
rules and regulations concerning the planning cycle, etc. 12/
31. These formal exercises have made it possible - and this is
by no means negligible - to provide a better description of
activities. But they have not been used for the purposes for
which they were initially intended, namely a better definition of
priorities; definition of accessible objectives; examination of
alternative solutions; concentration of means of action on a few
prime objectives; better organization and better division of
labour between executants; and utilization of the lessons to be
drawn from failure and success with a view to establishing better
programmes. There have been better descriptions of the existing
activities, but there has been no improvement in either their
design or their implementation. 13/
32. Improvements in method have thus not succeeded in correcting
the structural shortcomings. The extreme decentralization of the
System, deliberate at the outset and then aggravated by the
establishment of dozens of new organs, has not been able to be
made up by "co-ordination" imposed on agents who did not want to
be co-ordinated. It might be thought that this should not be true
of other shortcomings which in most bureaucratic systems are the
result of management methods pure and simple, such as the
inadequate average quality of the "outputs" or the average level
of qualifications of the staff. But in both instances, remedying
the shortcomings existing in the United Nations System is far from
involving only managerial methods.
Quality of the "outputs" and level of qualifications of the staff
33. As regards the quality of the outputs, allegations of serious
shortcomings can be based on precise sources: reports drawn up
by the various secretariats or by outside experts, or opinions
expressed by the delegations of the Member States themselves
in a large number of resolutions or in the regular reports of
certain subsidiary organs. 14/ The findings which anyone can make
of his own accord by examining some of these "outputs" will
readily confirm the overall judgement. By taking as our base of
reference the managerial methods applied in the best national
civil services or in large private firms, we can establish a
strict account without great danger of error.
34. In the case of operational projects, numerous studies
highlight the fact that, in the main, they should be better
planned, with objectives that are better defined and easier to
evaluate, that the experts should be better qualified and better
acquainted with the problems of the countries concerned, that
they should be appointed within the periods scheduled, 15/ etc.
In the case of publications, the sales figures, which are
ridiculously low in most instances, show that as "publishing

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of the
programmes ...
... but the
improvements
in method have
not succeeded
in remedying
the structural
shortcomings
There are too
many mediocre
"outputs",
whether
publications,
documents or
projects.
houses" the organizations in the system are neither profitable nor efficient, and a perusal of some of these books intended for the public at large easily explains why they command such little success. 16/

35. The shortcomings of the countless documents and reports which clutter delegates' desks day after day have often been criticized but never remedied, despite guidelines intended to make them more interesting, less impenetrable and easier to read: the ponderous style, the presentation, with little or no concern for graphs, charts or summaries, the undue space given to descriptions, the paucity or lack of analyses and precise conclusions or recommendations, make them difficult to use for the people for whom they are intended. 17/

36. There are of course exceptions. The quality of the "outputs" depends essentially on the competence and the talents of the heads of departments or services and on the consistency and average standard of qualifications of the teams they have managed to build up around them. But while it may be true that some units have maintained a certain homogeneity in performance from the outset, and some examples of sound documents or interesting publications could be cited, the disparity in abilities is too great to lead to an adequate average calibre.

37. Unquestionably, the explanation for this situation lies in the average inadequacy of qualifications of the personnel. The situation in this field is in fact extremely bad, and far removed from the principles laid down in Article 101, paragraph 3 of the Charter. 18/ The average level of qualifications of staff in the Professional grades (staff engaged in programme design, management, research and drafting) bears no relation to their responsibilities. In the United Nations, for example, 25 per cent of these professionals have had no university training, and 10 per cent have had less than three years of university studies. In the case of UNICEF, the statistics for 1982 show 30 per cent without any university qualifications, 32 per cent with a first degree, and only 38 per cent with a second or higher degree. The situation is comparable in most of the other agencies. 19/

38. It is probably in the higher posts that this situation of unsuitability for the duties actually performed is most serious. In the Director grades (D-1 and D-2) the percentage of staff members who have had no university education is roughly the same. 20/ A sense of responsibility and managerial or analytical ability at the highest levels (Director, Assistant-Secretary-General, Under-Secretary-General) are a matter of chance, depending on appointments which are often made without concern for qualifications or professional and administrative experience. The lack of a definition of the qualifications required for recruitment and promotion to higher grades, the indifference shown towards standards of work and competence, the absence of a system of in-service training, create a deplorable working environment in which the best staff members no longer find the motivation needed to dedicate themselves to their tasks.
39. The only way to reverse this situation would be by shaping and applying a staff policy aimed primarily at enhancing professional competence and a sense of responsibility. The type of tasks entrusted officially to the United Nations system - peace, protection of human rights, development - are some of the most difficult imaginable, and hence it should logically follow that the only chance of making a worthwhile contribution would be to assign staff of exceptional calibre. Yet there is nothing to indicate today that systematic efforts are being made either to require a high level of qualifications or to train professional staff for the specific tasks they will be called upon to perform. On the contrary, the laxness that prevails in this matter would seem to put a premium on mediocrity.

40. In the United Nations, some efforts have been made to begin shaping a recruitment policy (competitive examinations in the junior professional grades) and to establish a career development policy (definition of occupational groups). But these measures, which have not been adopted by the other agencies, have so far remained half-hearted and have not even been properly applied; and nothing has been done either to extend objective recruitment methods to all grades or to guarantee a climate of responsible work, or to institute a system of training, or to develop within this environment where cross-cultural communication is difficult an esprit de corps and a dedication in keeping with the letter and the spirit of the Charter.

Problems of structure and concept of the World Organization

41. Thus in this sphere we find ourselves faced with the same situation as in regard to co-ordination or planning: resistance to any improvement is very strong, and when formal measures are taken, they are implemented in such a way that they do not bring about the results intended by the Member States. Hence it is undoubtedly important that all aspects of "mismanagement" by the organizations within the System should be brought home to public opinion and to political leaders within Governments and parliaments, so that pressure can be exerted to bring about improvement. If this pressure increases, the effort to put the house in order will increase also, and perhaps some additional results will be achieved. But it seems to me that two series of conclusions must be drawn.

42. First of all, if the shortcomings which have just been diagnosed could be corrected, it is by no means certain that the World Organization would be able to carry out its essential mandate very much better. The quality of reports or the proper functioning of secretariats is not what the effectiveness of the Security Council depends on directly for the maintenance of peace. In a very large number of cases, well-produced reports are not likely to bring about satisfactory political decisions. Things might be somewhat different in the economic and social field and in that of development if an improvement in administrative performance led to better results: better studies, reports more to the point, better presented, better written, interesting publications with sales figures worthy of a major publishing
It is the structures that need changing, but most of all the very concept of the World Organization.

43. But the possibility of achieving such results within the framework of the present structures is by no means demonstrated. The main reason for this is that it is not certain that Governments want this in the light of the conception they have of the role of the Organization. The United Nations Secretariat, and to a rather lesser extent the secretariats of the main agencies and programmes, are regarded at present by the member States as areas over which they have to exert political influence so as to gain maximum control over operations and install the largest possible number of their nationals. It is as if the elections for chiefs of secretariats, appointments to higher posts and even lower-level posts, represented a more important type of diplomatic action than that of ensuring the quality of the work to be carried out. This situation demonstrates that Governments attach only secondary importance to the efficiency of the organizations. The mediocrity of the outputs does not strike them, in most cases, as a major concern, since the benefit they derive is negligible. In short, they do not have a clear picture of what purpose a World Organization could serve, even if it were better run. Therefore, the question is that of the very concept of such an institution. Thus the confusion which reigns in this respect calls for close examination.
CHAPTER III
THE NATURE AND THE ROLE OF THE WORLD ORGANIZATION

Intellectual confusion and smokescreens

44. The fact that no one has a clear idea what the United Nations and its System of organizations amounts to is a phenomenon which must be faced. History shows us that on the political scene, intellectual confusion often plays just as important a role as the clash of interests or feelings. This is particularly true of transitional periods, where institutions continue to bear the same names but no longer carry out the same functions and where the definitions found in the documentation no longer correspond to the actual facts. It would certainly be extremely difficult to understand the attitude of the various Governments in regard to the present World Organization if we did not take into account the uncertainty which reigns today on the subject of the nature and role of the United Nations.

45. It is of course not easy to place this relatively recent historical phenomenon, represented by the whole body of world organizations, in the framework of the system of international relations. In the first place, the very list of the component organizations might cause hesitation. Should we confine ourselves to the rule of universality and regard as world organizations only those to which all types of countries, Socialist or Western, accede? In that case we are restricted to a list of 11 organizations; or should we include "financial organizations" such as the IMF, the World Bank, GATT, etc. which although purely Western, are world-wide in scope and at the monetary, financial and international trade levels fill any gaps there may be in the coverage of the United Nations System in the narrow sense? In this report I shall refer only to the System in the more restricted and universal sense which alone can claim the title of World Organization. But even if we limit ourselves in this way, it is still difficult to understand how the System has evolved since the appearance of the League of Nations and the ILO in 1919. The political vocabulary does not furnish terms for defining this. It is neither a federation nor a super-State. It cannot be forced into any of the traditional moulds of political discourse.

46. A perusal of the texts, resolutions or documents can tell us virtually nothing about the real nature of the Organization. The basic instruments - Charters and Constitutions - provide the first examples of the hiatus between hard facts and mere talk, inasmuch as they tend to present as normal functions terms of reference which are totally unrealistic: "To maintain international peace and security"; "to achieve international co-operation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural or humanitarian character ..." (Article 1 of the Charter of the
Its mandates are defined in an unrealistic way. The Organization produces smokescreens. The lack of realism and the long-windedness fulfil two functions:

- By defining its mandate in an unreal fashion;
- By trying to give the impression that the outputs from its activities have a direct effect on the internal realities of States;
- By maintaining a permanent state of confusion between the functions of negotiating or seeking greater consensus on the one hand, and the functions of management on the other.

Lack of realism and mere talk

47. The thousands of resolutions adopted every year, the planning and programming documents describing theoretically the objectives and strategies of organizations, do not supply an appreciably greater amount of correct information. Nor is it possible to refer to documents evaluating the results obtained, for the very good reason that there virtually are none and that those who claim to be performing this task have a limited threshold of credibility because of their lack of criteria and methods. In short, it is as if the System were all the time throwing out a smokescreen to conceal its true nature:

- By defining its mandate in an unreal fashion;
- By trying to give the impression that the outputs from its activities have a direct effect on the internal realities of States;
- By maintaining a permanent state of confusion between the functions of negotiating or seeking greater consensus on the one hand, and the functions of management on the other.

48. Lack of realism and mere talk are not confined to the texts of Charters and Constitutions. They permanently play an essential role in the life of organizations. No doubt a certain amount of idealistic wording is necessary to the extent that a certain vagueness facilitates meetings between the representatives of opposing régimes or ideologies. Thus the artificial climate of theoretical idealism in which the World Organization lives has certain advantages; but if its manifestations are overdone, it ends up preventing the Organization from functioning. Actually, we are very close to this type of situation. Mere talk fulfils two distinct functions, both of them harmful to the image and to the effectiveness of the Organization.

49. The first function is that it conceals the fact that no agreement has been reached, possibly because there were no real negotiations. "Verbal consensus" thus replaces real discussion of the problems and the give-and-take of vested interests. This function is fulfilled by the paragraphs of resolutions that set forth basic principles or truisms to which it is all the easier to subscribe in that there is no follow-up to them. It would be easy to cite large numbers of instances, since declarations of principles and declarations enjoining the Member States to observe...
them represent about one quarter of the number of paragraphs of the sum total of resolutions. 22/ An example of such wording is furnished by paragraph 12 of the latest International Development Strategy, which recommends the Governments of Member countries "to end without delay colonialism, imperialism, neo-colonialism, interference in internal affairs, apartheid, racial discrimination, hegemony, expansionism and all forms of foreign aggression and occupation, which constitute major obstacles to the economic emancipation and development of the developing countries".

50. The second function of verbosity is probably even more harmful: it is that of which numerous illustrations can be found in planning and programming documents. We read, for example, in the United Nations Medium-Term Plan for the period 1984-1989 that the public administration objectives of the major programme in this field are "to strengthen and enlarge mutual co-operation among developing countries at the subregional, regional and interregional levels, focusing on opportunities for mobilizing administrative and institutional resources available in developing countries", and "to develop administrative infrastructure in the various development sectors in developing countries", "to develop and improve the managerial and administrative capabilities of the developing countries to enhance the performance of their public managers". A thorough study of this programme reveals that the "outputs" corresponding to these ambitious tasks consists essentially of a few publications of no great consequence, which do not reach those for whom they are intended and are not sold to any public, of the odd meeting unrelated to the administrative problems of the countries concerned, or of the odd unpretentious and ineffective project. One may wonder, therefore, whether this type of programme has any relationship to the facts of life. 25/

51. Again, we read in chapter 24, para. 2410 of this same Medium-Term Plan that the objectives of the Programme for the Transport Development are "to overcome the bottlenecks and constraints of transport and communications facing the developing countries", "to identify critical issues confronting developing countries and to foster and promote co-operation and co-ordination regarding those issues in the United Nations system of organizations ... to monitor and review the progress ... to provide information on new transport technologies and institutional issues of global interest ... reports in-depth studies ... to examine periodically overall transport requirements of the least developed countries, etc." Yet we find that the administrative unit of the Secretariat entrusted with these tasks has only a single professional-level worker. One may be inclined to wonder what exactly such manifestations of utter unreality can possibly mean.
52. Other examples, from the UNESCO Medium-Term Plan or from the budget of FAO or the programme documentation of other organizations could be cited. The degree of unreality varies with the programmes. Some render precise service. But in a general way, the world-wide scale of all these undertakings; the gulf between the ambitions and the means; the lack of a transmission belt between the offices at headquarters and the responsible national services within each country; the inability to define modest objectives accessible within the stated time-limits, raise doubts whether in the long run most of the activities have any connection with reality.

53. This gives some indication of the extent to which in such circumstances merely descriptive presentations fail to clarify the problem. Descriptions by organization or sector of activity explaining the complex tasks of the United Nations itself (an essentially political organization which also has tasks to perform in the economic, social and humanitarian fields), the more precise tasks of UNESCO in relation to education, science and culture, of the ILO in regard to labour law, of WHO in regard to health, FAO in agriculture, forestry and fisheries, IAEA in regard to atomic energy, UPU, ITU, IMO and ICAO in regard to communications and transport, WIPO in regard to authors' rights, and WMO in regard to meteorology - give an appearance of rationality to the division of labour as if the types of activities to be undertaken were the same in every sector. They also give the impression, which is the very opposite of the truth, that the degree of effectiveness possible in the fields concerned - peace, disarmament, transport or education - is comparable, thus concealing differences in the nature of problems and types of activity.

54. It is all the more difficult to understand the nature of this System in that it has evolved considerably since it was established. It has been given many tasks to perform which were not foreseen at the outset; it has given a new interpretation to the ones that it did receive; it has become considerably more complex and diversified. At the same time an enormous number of other international organizations have been endowed with terms of reference comparable with its own. Finally, there is a tendency at all times for the specialist and the initiate to put forward partial views as if they represented the entire landscape: for example to pretend that the United Nations boils down to its political activities - peace, disarmament, Security Council, peace-keeping. On the other hand, in other instances, the tendency is to exaggerate the part played by humanitarian matters, human rights or operational matters, ignoring the rest and not putting the whole picture into perspective.

Divergence of views and common errors

55. It is hardly surprising, then, that the notion which public opinion gleans of the United Nations and its System should be both highly diversified and very inaccurate. It depends of course not only on the degree of knowledge of the Organization but on cultural concepts and political predilections. Thus there are many viewpoints
on the United Nations System which differ both as to the very nature of the Organization, the assessment of its performance and the reasons for the "inadequacies". In many countries, the portion of public opinion whose level of political sophistication is not very high continues to attribute to the United Nations a potential authority which is not very far removed from the idea of a supra-nationality, and feels that "strengthening its powers" is the only way of enabling it to preserve peace. This ingenuous notion plays a more important role than one might imagine.

56. In the Western countries the preoccupation with the problem of peace is undoubtedly the main yardstick for measuring the "ineffectiveness" of the Organization. More recently, other criticisms have been added charging "mismanagement", exorbitant cost and excessive salaries of international officials, the overlapping of functions and waste. Thus a ratio is established between administrative shortcomings and the lack of results achieved by the Organization, in the realm of peace or in that of human rights. In the area of development, views vary between a relatively favourable assessment of the results of operational activities and irritation at the political or ideological debates, the purpose of which is little understood.

57. In the socialist countries, for obvious philosophical and political reasons, the World Organization does not represent so important a phenomenon as for the West. It appears rather as an institution which should above all serve peace and disarmament and enable support to be given to the claims of the developing countries. The criticisms concerning exaggerated cost and mismanagement, however, are similar to those of the West. For the nationals of the developing countries, again, the Organization is above all a forum where it has been possible to strive successfully for decolonization and which should continue to make it possible to improve the present international economic order. It is also a complex of organizations which can provide a certain amount of technical assistance.

58. In spite of their diversity, these views of the World Organization do meet at certain points. But the convergence, precisely because of the smokescreens and the deliberately inaccurate presentations described in the first part of this chapter, tend to distort the reality of things. They are concerned essentially with:

- The exaggerated importance and position of the Organization today in the system of international relations;

- The belief that whatever the field in question - peace, development, human rights, etc. - the essential functions of the United Nations System are joint managerial functions, sector by sector and organization by organization, in relation to fields coming within the orbit of the various ministries in a national Government (health, labour, agriculture, etc.).

The truth is distinctly different from this.
The present World Organization plays only a very limited role ... 

... in international relations ...

... especially as a very large number of international organizations ...

... compete with the United Nations System ...

**Place of the World Organization in the system of international relations**

59. The illusion that the United Nations still, in spite of its ineffectiveness, occupies a central and important position in the system of international relations dies hard. The criticism of its allegedly exorbitant cost, for example, could lead to the belief that it skims off a considerable proportion of the public revenue from each State, and the regret expressed to the effect that it is not more effective in the realm of peace, suggests that it might have real power. Actually, in the sphere of international relations, the United Nations and its System have very limited functions. The questions dealt with in the United Nations are only exceptionally dealt with at ministerial level, and the sum total of resources is extremely modest.

60. Bilateral diplomacy is still for essential issues - East-West relations, the strategic balance between the United States and the Soviet Union, economic and social relations among all countries, relations between the industrialized countries and the developing countries - the means most used to examine and solve concrete problems. At the same time, the vast network of intergovernmental international organizations, which has been considerably developed and strengthened over the last 40 years, at geographical or ideological levels below the world level, is used by Governments for purposes which are often very close to that of the United Nations System.

61. Indeed, not only has the number of international organizations grown considerably, from 37 in 1910 to 93 in 1951 and amounting today to 330 (280 of them regional organizations and 50 intercontinental organizations), but the functions entrusted to them have led them to compete directly with the World Organization in the most important fields. The bodies thus set up have played a more and more important role in the military field (and consequently in that of a certain attitude towards peace) through the establishment of standing military organizations and the constitution of fairly rigid blocs both in the East and in the West; in the economic organization of the Western countries (OEEC and later OECD), and the socialist countries (Council for Mutual Economic Assistance); in the new organization of Western Europe through the constitution and growth of the European Communities; in the organization of zones of influence of the main great Powers; in the official status of commodity markets; in all technical and commercial relations at world level; and in regional organization through a proliferation of a very wide variety of organizations.

62. The system of international relations has thus been built up in a way which tends to reduce considerably the role of the United Nations and its System. The functions entrusted to the latter have thus with exceptions been confined either to narrow or marginal fields or to partial contributions to tasks carried out by other organizations or by other means; and diplomatic or
organizational relations of this type are far more important to the concerns of Governments than relations at the world-wide level. This is the phenomenon sometimes designated by the term "crisis of multilateralism", although in actual fact multilateralism at world level has never been particularly developed.

63. The relatively secondary place occupied by the United Nations System is also illustrated by the fact that the representatives of Governments on intergovernmental bodies are essentially government officials - diplomats or representatives of technical ministries - but not members of Governments or Chiefs of State. In other international organizations, regular meetings at ministerial level are the rule (e.g. the European Communities, OECD, Council for Mutual Economic Assistance) or there are at least annual meetings at this level. In the United Nations it is difficult to cite anything but informal meetings between Foreign Ministers and sometimes Heads of State during the general debate at the General Assembly in September each year, or meetings of ministers at regional level organized by UNESCO and the regional economic commissions. The World Food Council is the only body which each year brings together ministers and whose deliberations have a real effect on the shape of operations. Meetings of the United Nations at ministerial level are thus the exception and have little impact on the day-to-day life of the Organization.

64. A few figures may give an idea of the relative importance of the World Organization. The annual level of resources earmarked for the United Nations System, in the form of official and voluntary contributions is approximately $5.5 billion (in 1984), rather more than 52 per cent of this being devoted to operational activities, about 13 per cent to humanitarian expenditure on behalf of refugees, 30 per cent to economic, social, functional and technical activities, and only 4.4 per cent to political problems and peace 25/ ($243 million, including expenditure on the maintenance of peace-keeping forces). These resources may usefully be compared:

As regards operational expenditure, with the total amount of official development aid (ODA), including bilateral channels and other multilateral channels such as the World Bank, OECD, the European Communities, etc. The amount of ODA passing through the United Nations System is 6.5 per cent of this total; 26/

As regards expenditure in favour of peace, political problems and security, with total military expenditure throughout the world (and likewise used for the security of individual countries). This constitutes 0.03 per cent of the total, or rather less than one tenth of a day's expenditure on armaments ($243 million as compared with $800 billion);

As regards the total resource figure ($5.5 billion), with the budgets of other international organizations (European Communities: $25 billion) or the budgets of cities or countries: New York, $7 billion; Federal budget of the United States: $800 billion.
Nature of the activities of the System and the notion of a "world consensus"

65. But even more than to exaggerate its real importance, the most serious error in regard to the nature of the activities of the United Nations System is to regard it as involving managerial activities. The confusion - structural in some respects, or at any rate maintained obstinately - between negotiation and managerial functions derives no doubt from the illusion cherished by the founding fathers of the United Nations that the object of an intergovernmental organization was to enable its members to act together. But whatever its causes, they make it impossible to understand the real nature and role of the institution.

66. With the exception of a few specific domains (declarations of principle or drafting of conventions), where it is recognized that the role of the Organization is to facilitate negotiations between Member States, most of the activities described in the programmes of the various organizations are presented (as can be seen clearly in the examples given in paragraphs 46 to 49) as involving joint management in the particular fields. Yet clearly it is impossible to conceive of joint management except in the case of activities where there is agreement as to the objectives, the resources to be earmarked for it, and the method of implementation, and where it is known that there is some possibility of arriving at precise results. Such conditions are seldom forthcoming in regard to the whole body of activities presented as joint management activities within the United Nations System.

67. Hence if we want to understand what the World Organization really is, it is essential to compare its activities with the type and level of consensus existing among the members of the international community. It is a mere cliché to say that the task of international organizations is easy in fields where the degree of consensus is high, and difficult and at times impossible in those where the degree of consensus is virtually nil. But this elementary fact is frequently forgotten in the analysis of world problems and the definition of the functions of the World Organization.

68. Failure to remember this leads to the belief, or to the apparent belief, that because the United Nations System has secretariats and offices organized as a hierarchy, it fulfills functions which can easily be compared to those of national administrations, or it leads to the notion that General Assembly resolutions can grant authority to those services to carry out certain tasks, as if "decisions" were taken in a political arena constituted on the same lines as that of a nation; or again to seek ways and means of achieving "better management" or more effective "decision-making", when in the majority of cases the main concern should be that of increasing the yield of negotiation methods.
69. It is a well-known fact that the United Nations and the main organizations within its System were set up at the end of the Second World War in response to the hope raised by the victory of the Allies of establishing a new order which would stabilize a situation of peace. Everyone is acquainted with the idealistic language in which the Charter and the various Constitutions expressed this vision. But the fact that no one refuses to subscribe to such ideals too frequently conceals the truth that the type of consensus existing in the world is very far removed from these lofty expressions. In democratic countries, the average elector does not confuse electoral promises with the ways and means suggested for fulfilling them; but it would seem as if in the sphere of world organizations a blunted critical sense atrophied this type of distinction.

70. Thus people think, or pretend to think, that the main function of a world organization is to manage activities which would presuppose, if they were to be carried out properly, a level of consensus that is far from existing among the Member States. This basic and ongoing confusion has to be cleared up. It is simply not possible to manage jointly activities on which there is no consensus. The normal function of a World Organization is thus essentially to work with extreme tenacity for a better consensus or a different type of consensus in order to enable some progress to be made in the direction of the distant goals laid down in the Charters and Constitutions.

Management and the search for a consensus

71. We must keep this simple notion constantly in mind if we are to understand what we are trying to do, often in a very strange way, in the United Nations System. As this chapter has shown, the observer will come up against many obstacles in trying to understand what he sees. The extreme decentralization; the complexity of structures of secretariats and intergovernmental and expert machinery; the peculiar features of each body; the complexity of relations between the System and Governments; the difficulties of co-ordination; the undue importance of internal problems; the general mediocrity of the outputs, and the inadequacy of the qualifications of too large a proportion of the personnel; the lack of a system of evaluating performance; the unreal nature of the resolutions and documents describing programmes; and the patchwork nature of activities, all contribute to make a clear picture of what the United Nations System is and does impossible.

72. Thus, what we need is Ariadne's thread that can lead us out of this labyrinth, and it can only be furnished through the relationship existing between these various types of activity and the degree of consensus existing among the Member States in the various fields. This simple notion makes it possible to get away from the traditional descriptions by organization, sector or programme and to perceive that the World Organization we possess is actually an ensemble of four very different types of activity.
73. The first group is the only one really comprising managerial activities, namely the very limited fields in which there is consensus. These could include:

Humanitarian activities, especially those in favour of refugees, managed by UNRWA in the case of Palestine refugees (management of educational, health and social welfare or social security services), or by the Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees in all countries (protection, reception, accommodation, health, assistance); 27/

Statutory activities involving the compilation and distribution of information, functional co-operation and technical standardization in the fields of transport, telecommunications, meteorology, statistics, and certain aspects of health. These occur essentially in the smaller functional agencies (WMO, UPU, ITU, ICAO, IMO, WIPO) and in WHO (international collaboration in the campaign against certain diseases, the establishment of pharmaceutical standards, epidemiological information, and the establishment of international health regulations); some can be found in UNESCO (e.g. the establishment of a world scientific information system); in the United Nations and all the major agencies (compilation of statistical information); and in the Economic Commission for Europe (certain activities concerned with standardization at regional level).

74. A rapid calculation indicates that all this represents approximately 20 per cent of the total expenditure of the system (7 per cent for functional co-operation activities and 13 per cent for assistance to refugees). The boundary line is often difficult to draw between these activities and the whole mass of others, since in fields where consensus is much narrower, there is also some research and dissemination of information, or discussion on feasible norms. However, this difficulty can be surmounted without too much trouble.

75. All the other activities of the World Organization lie within areas where consensus is at a very low level or even at variance with the tasks entrusted to the Organization. These are essentially:

The search for peace and security;

Contributions to development;

The organization of a forum for discussion, research and negotiations concerning specific points (human rights, international law, etc.).

We are no longer concerned here with "management". It is only in connection with the last point that the Organization recognizes clearly that it is responsible for negotiations. But the pursuit of the first two objectives - peace and development - is also nothing more than a difficult search for a common elucidation of problems. In all three cases, analysis of the methods and structures used to attain the objectives is the key to understanding why and how a basic revision of the concepts on which the World Organization is founded is imperative.
CHAPTER IV

THE PURSUIT OF THE THREE MAIN OBJECTIVES

76. Examination of the three main objectives does not always lead to the same conclusions. Each problem is sui generis, and the strategies adopted for resolving them have their own peculiarities. But in all three cases, the outworn and obsolete nature of the institutions and their failure to adapt to the problems of the modern world are not difficult to demonstrate.

Collective security and the search for peace

77. The collective security system and the search for peace certainly offer the clearest example of a hopeless task, inasmuch as the type-of consensus existing in the world has not a chance of being modified by the approaches used in the United Nations. It is well known that the Organization follows two distinct approaches: "maintenance of peace" and negotiations with a view to "disarmament". The devices at its disposal are very meagre:

A Security Council of 15 members (including five permanent members) on which ambassadors - not ministers - sit and which under Article 24 of the Charter has "primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security" and under the provisions of Chapters VI and VII has the powers needed to intervene with a view to the "pacific settlement of disputes" and to act in case of "any threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression". Articles 41 and 42 in particular give it authority to apply economic or military sanctions.

The Secretary-General himself who, under Article 99, "may bring to the attention of the Security Council any matter which in his opinion may threaten the maintenance of international peace and security".

Secretariat services under the political departments of the United Nations, with a very small staff (about 200 professionals).

The Committee on Disarmament and the Disarmament Commission, the General Assembly and its political committees (First Committee and Special Political Committee). 28/

78. However, in these two fields the type of consensus which exists in the world is well known. Each country believes that its security rests on its army, on the level of its armaments, on its determination to defend itself against any aggressor, and on its alliances. Moreover, there is general agreement on the notion that the use of nuclear weapons must be ruled out, but that all other forms of violence are admissible. The institutional consequence of this way of looking at the problems is that military budgets represent approximately 10 to 15 per cent of public expenditure in all countries and that dozens of millions of professional soldiers are maintained permanently under arms.

An examination of the methods used in pursuit of the three main objectives reveals that the structures are outdated.

The search for peace is the clearest example of a hopeless task.

In security matters, the consensus lies in the need for each country to organize its own national defence, with tolerance of any form of...
v...}

violence except the use of nuclear weapons.

79. The analysis of the present risks is based on the historical experience of aggression and war. The spirit of defence of each nation provides it with the cement which binds its national unity. The changes which have occurred since the end of the nineteenth century have not profoundly altered either mental patterns or military policies. In most of the industrialized countries, the development of the scientific spirit and the spread of primary and secondary education have not helped to bring about a rational attitude in political behaviour. Experience has merely shown that as it becomes more scientific, war becomes more frightful. In other words, contrary to the hopes that inspired those who drew up the UNESCO Constitution, the spreading of "Enlightenment" is not calculated to reduce the risk of war. The increase in the number of States since the 1960s has merely multiplied the number of national armies concomitantly.

80. On the other hand, the substantial changes that have come about since 1945 in international relations have profoundly altered the geography of problems of security. Whereas the First and Second World Wars originated in conflicts between European Powers, continuing an age-long tradition, a situation of economic and institutional co-operation has today been set up in Western Europe which is so advanced that the possibility of armed conflict between the countries of this part of the world has become difficult to imagine. Lasting peaceful relations also exist among the Western countries as a whole. The appearance and development of nuclear weapons, by increasing the risks involved in conflict to the point of total destruction of the belligerents, has created a balance of terror which has become institutionalized today in the periodic negotiations between the two super-Powers on arms control. The outcome is peaceful coexistence between East and West. Thus since 1945, armed conflicts have been localized in the less developed parts of the world. They have been of four main types: those due to decolonization, those which are the outcome of insurrection or civil war within a large number of States, military incursions by developed countries into developing countries, and wars between developing countries.

81. Thus the problems which the Security Council has had to face have all been located in countries of the third world: the Middle East, Cyprus, the subcontinent of India and Pakistan, Congo, Korea, Afghanistan, Cambodia, Viet Nam, etc. This is not the place to outline the history of action by the Council. It need only be pointed out that by and large, the notion written into the Charter through the institution of the veto, namely that the maintenance of peace could be ensured by a directing body of great Powers comprising the five permanent members, has not prevented the many wars that have taken place since 1945. This has merely widened the gap in the situation between the inhabitants of developed and developing countries dramatically: lack of security and war have been reserved for the most underprivileged peoples.

82. The provisions of Articles 41 and 42 of the Charter have for practical purposes not been applied. The pacific settlement of disputes and the maintenance of peace have thus been limited to:

...
Efforts by the Secretary-General to find opportunities for proposing his good offices: moral entreaties, appeals to common sense and attempts at preventive negotiations;

The drafting of resolutions by the Security Council, whose best effect is often limited. These results, which demonstrate the existence of a political margin of action for the Organization, are far less negligible than is generally thought, since they are paradoxical. Successive Secretaries-General and their political aides have made clever use of an awkward tool, and they have given much thought to the causes of ineffectiveness and to ways and means of remedying it.

83. It is understandable that in these circumstances people have begun to reflect on the causes of this ineffectiveness and on ways and means of remediing it. The notion that perfecting the methods or the machinery of the Security Council could make it more effective is shared not only by those naively in favour of "strengthening the powers" of the United Nations. Distinguished diplomats too have seriously considered this as a path worth exploring. Thus, for example, it has been found that the Security Council has tended to intervene only after a conflict has broken out, and the idea that its intervention was ineffective because it arrived too late has naturally been felt to deserve serious study.

84. The present Secretary-General of the United Nations, Mr. Pérez de Cuéllar, in his first Report on the Work of the Organization in 1982, drew attention to this problem and propounded the idea that the United Nations could play a preventive role as follows: "There are many ways in which Governments could actively assist in strengthening the system prescribed in the Charter. More systematic, less last-minute use of the Security Council would be one means. If the Council were to keep an active watch on dangerous situations and, if necessary, initiate discussions with the parties before they reach the point of crisis, it might often be possible to defuse them at an early stage before they degenerate into violence."

X/ In his Report on the Work of the Organization in 1982, the Secretary-General of the Organization writes: "There is a tendency in the United Nations for Governments to act as though the passage of a resolution absolved them from further responsibility for the subject in question ... the best resolution in the world will have little practical effect unless Governments of Member States follow it up with the appropriate support and action."
But no encouragement has been given to this suggestion.

The disarmament approach has produced only very meagre results.

385. This suggestion that the United Nations might be given a preventive role, for example by developing a "wider and more systematic capacity for fact finding in potential conflict areas", 30/ as well as other ideas on improving methods or procedures which would enable the Security Council to fulfill its role more effectively, does not seem to have met with any real encouragement. However, the continuation of technical efforts in this direction should certainly not be discouraged, particularly since no-one can predict the evolution of the world political climate, whereas on the other hand it can fairly confidently be imagined that any improvement in it would enable the Security Council to act more effectively.

386. The other approach in the search for peace is that of "disarmament". Although negotiations on this problem had already begun and led to the signature of conventions long before the establishment of the United Nations, 31/ the few achievements we can chalk up on the credit side relate merely to minor limitations, either in types of weapons, 32/ or tests for the manufacture of nuclear weapons, 33/ or relatively protected geographical zones, 34/ or again an attempt by nuclear Powers to maintain their monopoly. 35/ All these efforts, no doubt meritorious, can only be regarded as marginal, in the light of what exists and what is aimed at. The arms race has gone on uninterruptedly since 1945. It has raised military expenditure to the figures indicated in paragraph 23 above. It has raised the total number of nuclear weapons from five in 1945 to 60,000 today, and it will continue to increase the capacity of mankind to destroy itself. In view of the type of consensus described in paragraphs 71 and 72 above, all this hardly seems surprising. In these circumstances, the disarmament approach does not seem to be able to offer a serious hope of a genuine change.

387. Thus, the inference to be drawn from the whole of the activities of the United Nations in the direct search for peace is that the methods used - "maintenance of peace" or "disarmament" - have very little chance of bringing about significant results so long as the political climate and the type of consensus on the maintenance of security by the various States remain as they are. The establishment of peace should therefore be sought mainly by other ways and means, for example through the development of economic co-operation, which in the long term can help to modify the concepts of self-interest and attitudes towards ways and means of maintaining security. This is not a novel conclusion. The Charter itself advocates this line of development of friendly relations and international co-operation. All the thinking on the subject of "functionalism" 36/ and "integration" 37/ points in this direction. On the other hand, what could be more innovative and what should be considered with the utmost care is the notion of inverting at the United Nations the order of priorities existing at the present between the direct and indirect search for peace.
The attention of public opinion, of diplomats, institutions and States today is entirely taken up with the direct approach, i.e. the solution of conflicts actually taking place, in other words with the concrete situation at any given moment. There are good reasons why this should be so. An uprising which causes 50 deaths or a war which causes 500,000 has a greater chance of attracting the attention of the media than the progress of trade negotiations or the development of economic relations between various countries, even though over the long term these contribute more to the establishment of peace than efforts at negotiations which produce no results. Thus the task of bringing into the limelight the ways and means of establishing peace over the long term and the study and solution of economic and social problems through which this can be done and making it a first concern of public opinion, Governments and the World Organization itself, represents a considerable intellectual and institutional transformation. Yet the real hope of maintaining peace, particularly for the developing countries which alone are the direct victims of the present situation, can only be found in this direction. The remainder of this report will endeavour to pinpoint what the necessary methodological and institutional changes might be that would make for the progressive search for another type of consensus in this field. But before determining the direction in which it would apply, it is essential to look closely at the way in which the World Organization works today in its other fields of endeavour.

Action in favour of development

89. The type of consensus that exists in the world in regard to development is more complex in its definition than that in regard to security. As we all know, ideas concerning development strategies are extremely diverse and are still in the throes of confrontation and evolution. The respective virtues of planning, industrialization, priority to agriculture or this or that other sector, food strategies, poles of development or the approach via elitism or general education, integration into the world economy by giving priority to exports or "delinking" and endogenous development, will still be discussed for a long time to come. The very concept of development is understood differently according as we look at it from the point of view of general application of the Western model or concentrate on preserving and enriching existing cultures.

90. But this great methodological debate which occupies the centre of the stage must not conceal the political and sociological framework in which it takes place and which determines the essence of the existing type of consensus. The two basic elements are first of all the principle that each country is responsible for its development, and second the political phenomenon of zones of influence. These two phenomena, different and seemingly contradictory, complement each other to create a situation which is hardly propitious for speeding up the development of the poorer parts of the world.
The zones of influence are the outcome of a number of phenomena.  

91. The individual responsibility of each country for its development is a direct consequence of the notion of national sovereignty. States tend to cling to this principle all the more if they have achieved independence fairly recently, and they feel themselves threatened by any encroachment which might smack of a return to colonialism. But the political counterpart is clearly the feeling of lack of direct responsibility on the part of the wealthy countries in the face of the poverty, wretchedness and social scourges of every kind with which most of the developing countries are confronted. Instead of constituting a problem for the international community, situations of this type are today national problems. The wealthy countries assess the amount of contributions in aid they have to deal out according to the degree of emotion stirred up in their public opinion.

Zones of influence and fragmentation of bilateral aid

92. This situation in no way affects the maintenance or development of the zones of influence which have replaced the colonial empires, even though they do not cover exactly the same geographical area. These zones of influence are the outcome of the piling up of several phenomena:

- The maintenance of political, economic, cultural and sometimes military links between former colonies and their metropolitan countries - links which are often institutionalized in a flexible manner (the Commonwealth, etc.);
- The development of military alliances or allegiances between a few developing countries and each of the two super-Powers, with slight differences depending on the power or importance of the countries concerned;
- The development of economic links between industrialized countries which have not had colonial empires and a number of developing countries through bilateral aid and the development of special economic relationships;
- The superimposition on these bilateral undertakings of multilateral economic aid institutions such as that provided by the European Economic Community through the Lomé Agreements.

93. These aid systems tend first of all to create political dependence relationships between donor and recipient. Whether they consist of gifts in cash or in kind (supply of weapons, wheat, or payment of salaries of teachers or experts), low-interest loans or bank credits at market rates, aid is first and foremost a means of exerting influence. In the political or economic rivalries between the countries of the North, the countries of the South represent a stake (with the consequences I have mentioned in regard to the problems of security in this Hemisphere). But these methods also have serious drawbacks from the economic point of view. Fragmentation and competition between bilateral aid schemes (which can involve up to a score, including one, two, three or four which are predominant and 15 or so of lesser importance) create for the beneficiary countries difficult problems of co-ordinating the whole mass of external aid and project-by-project negotiations. The
"tied" nature of this aid brings with it unfavourable economic conditions because of the requirement that supplies or manpower must be purchased in the donor countries.

94. Even for the poorest countries - for example the 25 least developed countries identified by the United Nations - it has never been suggested that a coherent collective system of long-term aid should be set up which would enable them to draw up long-term plans and policies. The machinery of the Lomé Agreements between EEC and the ACP countries 38/ provides the only example of a trend in the direction of collective and institutional negotiation of aid, which for the time being has not been followed outside the European framework. For the more advanced developing countries, the methods of granting bank loans have been completely unplanned: they are granted simply with a view to the conquest of markets by producers in the industrialized countries, and they have ended in the accumulation of a volume of debts which has become intolerable for the economies of many debtor countries.

Sectoral approach and doctrinal differences

95. In the face of such a situation, it might be thought that the role of the United Nations and its System should have concentrated first and foremost on problems of co-ordination. But what has happened is exactly the opposite: the United Nations System has developed a sectoral approach which has aggravated the fragmentation of aid and has added to the existing complexity. By so acting that, as mentioned in the previous chapter, between 15 and 30 additional bodies take a hand in the beneficiary countries, it has in almost every instance complicated the task of the developing countries instead of simplifying it.

96. Moreover this fragmentation of activities is not offset by any real co-ordination either at the intellectual level or at the methodological and institutional level. Each organization has not only its methods but also its theory on development and on the goals which should be pursued by the recipient countries. UNDP is the only exception: the "Consensus" of 1970 39/ decided to make the Governments of the countries concerned responsible for the establishment of a "country programme" and as far as possible the implementation of the projects themselves. But this theoretical framework has not genuinely changed the practices by which each of the "executing agencies" submits its ideas for projects to the technical ministries with which they deal and competes with the others to obtain the lion's share of the credits earmarked for each country (i.e. the "indicative planning figure"). The system thus relieves UNDP of the need to have its own concept of development.

97. On the other hand, all the other bodies within the United Nations System which are in charge of operational activities have their own particular outlook. In general it means enhancing the importance of the sector for which they are responsible: industry in the case of UNIDO, agriculture in the case of FAO, health in the case of WHO, birth control in the case of the Population Fund. But over and above this sectoral cleavage there is a doctrinal cleavage. Thus, for example, the philosophy of UNICEF, which for a long time was based on the so-called
"basic services" approach, tried to define social policies for the poorer zones, has now concentrated on a number of health goals for infants (vaccination, breast feeding, etc.), whereas the World Health Organization still continues to put forward more comprehensive policies within the framework of the "primary health care" approach.

98. Each agency tries to justify the importance of its sector, without any of these approaches forming part of an overall economic and financial analysis or suggesting criteria for determining priorities. Thus the industrialization goals of UNIDO, that of increasing agricultural production in FAO, the food strategies of the World Food Council or the World Food Programme, the ILO programmes on employment or the development of social security, and UNESCO's plans for the development of education, are not integrated into a coherent system of analysis.

The credibility of "advice by remote control"

99. Differences in doctrinal approach, which have disastrous effects in regard to the selection of field projects, are perhaps even more sensitive at the level of "headquarters activities". They involve mostly studies and researches culminating in the drafting of documents, reports or publications. They deal sector by sector with the identification of problems, the definition of principles and criteria, the compilation and distribution of information, etc., and they are often difficult to separate from activities supporting field projects or discussions and negotiations. They represent the most important part of the work of the secretariats, and most of them are intended for intergovernmental or expert committees. Their "outputs" are the background material for "programmes" described in programme budgets or medium-term plans, where such exist.

100. The variable but always important part of these programmes relating to development problems essentially consists, as does the public administration programme whose objectives are mentioned in paragraph 57 above, of advice to developing countries on certain specific technical problems:

"To advise and assist the Member States on the most economic of ways of increasing crop production using isotopes and radiation techniques" (IAEA budget); (F. Food and agriculture – Subprogramme 1)

"To assist Member States in improving the food and nutritional status of their peoples" (FAO budget); (Programme 2.1.6 Nutrition)

"To help Member States to mobilize the financial and human resources needed for the execution of development projects" (UNESCO Medium-Term Plan, para. 8033);

"To develop and promote the use of effective settlements planning methods and institutional structures and procedures for urban and rural areas" (United Nations: Medium-Term Plan 1984-1989, para. 1417).
To describe the essence of the activities of the various headquarters, the budgets and plans of all the organizations use in almost every case formulations of this type, and this monotonous litany seems to imply that the services dealing with these problems all have an exceptionally high level of expertise and competence in the fields in question.

101. What this actually means is that in offices situated in New York, Geneva, Vienna, Paris, Rome or certain other great capitals, two or three professional level workers (whose levels of qualifications and competence are as a rule those described in the preceding chapter) will draw up for each of these budget lines reports which will be distributed to each of the intergovernmental body, and in exceptional circumstances to a list of correspondents in the national public services concerned. Or else it means that they will organize sporadically one or two training courses for a few dozen individuals. In a few cases, these activities will help to prepare the ground for a large conference for which bulky documentation will be produced and which will be attended by representatives of national services.

102. In the absence of a precise system of evaluation, it is impossible to determine whether these thousands of sectoral activities of every kind exert any real influence on the harmonization of rules, the definition of policies of the Member States. The threshold of credibility of these undertakings is only crossed where certain conditions prevail, including the following: the degree of real and recognized competence of the administrative units in charge of the programmes; the sales figures for publications; the fact that the information distributed reaches the competent national circles responsible; the direct participation of the latter in intergovernmental operations; and the real interest which the Member States have in the problems under consideration. The degree of effectiveness depends, of course, also on the nature of the problems dealt with: advice on matters of social policy, recognition of the rights of workers or women, agrarian reform or population policy, has less chance of being genuinely taken into consideration than that relating to technical norms in forestry. In this connection, one of the most important factors is the functioning of the intergovernmental machinery itself. When, for example, in this or that Commission where experts representing the technical ministries should be sitting there are in actual fact members of delegations in New York or Geneva, obviously the impact on national policies will tend to decline, however vigorously the resolutions adopted have been formulated.

103. But as we have seen in chapter II (paras. 25 to 27), there is no co-ordination here. This situation is all the more paradoxical in that while at the time when the specialized agencies were set up, they had as their essential goal the confrontation of methods, harmonization of viewpoints and
is 70 per cent of the total.

The decentralized, sectoralized and fragmented structures are not suited to the problems of development.

Development is an integrated problem.

It is the actual structures of the System that have to be altered.

definition of common standards in a given sector, the role given nowadays to this type of international co-operation has been gradually whittled down in favour of technical co-operation activities with the developing countries. It can be estimated that the bulk of the resources of the System, nearly 70 per cent, are today devoted to development.

The need to change the structures of the System

104. In short, it is the sectoralized, decentralized and fragmented structures of the System that are the reason for its failure to adapt to the solution of development problems. The reason why in 1945 the United Nations System was given this sectoral structure was because it was felt at the time that problems of international co-operation would be solved better between technicians specializing in particular fields than by diplomats with instructions to deal with political problems. The idea was not a bad one, but it reflected a situation different from that of today. The question at the time was to achieve co-operation among about 50 Member States, some of them in charge of great colonial empires and intending themselves to deal with the problems of development of those empires. Today the problem is that of the development of more than 120 independent countries, representing three quarters of the world's population, and of efforts to help them to overcome their historical handicap and close the gap between them and the countries of the North.

105. Development is an integrated problem. It means helping to solve in each country problems which often differ according to their size, their nature or their character but which all have the following points in common:

They are tangible questions requiring a profound knowledge of local, national or regional situations and an interdisciplinary analysis of all their aspects;

They call for long-term political decisions and hence the determination of priorities;

They come up against the problem of inadequate resources of every kind and a multiplicity of needs and difficulties.

106. The countries concerned need a World Organization capable of facilitating syntheses, organizing co-ordination, helping to find long-term financial arrangements, and granting many-sided aid to solve the most urgent problems. What the United Nations System offers them is a series of divergent and contradictory recommendations, some 30 bodies whose action has to be co-ordinated with that of some 20 sources of bilateral aid, but it does not help them to solve their medium and long-term financial problems. Thus it seems evident that what we are obliged willy-nilly to reconsider today is the very structure of the United Nations System.
The world forum

107. The problems relating to the "world forum" are different in nature from those of peace and development. Here the question no longer arises of assessing the value of methods applied to the pursuit of ambitious and almost unattainable goals. The problem now is to examine whether the framework in which the Organization endeavours to broaden or to modify the nature of world consensus is indeed the right one. In other words, since the Organization here is confronting the essential mission it should fulfil, we have to ask ourselves whether it is properly equipped to do so; whether the results obtained so far are satisfactory or negligible; and whether the Organization really does possess the organs capable of reflecting upon and identifying the problems and the framework of negotiations which the modern world needs.

108. The replies to these questions are inevitably negative; the machinery of negotiation is not easily identifiable and separable from the rest of the activities under the various sectoral programmes and does not constitute a coherent system. The results achieved relate only to a few limited fields and do not represent solid progress in the direction of changing world consensus. This situation has its political reasons, which are well known, but they do not explain everything. Actually, it is the structure of negotiations offered by the World Organization that is ill-adapted to solving the problems of the modern world.

109. No doubt it should be pointed out that any multilateral negotiations, and a fortiori negotiations at world level, have their own peculiarities and inherent constraints, and that in particular:

- They almost inevitably put a premium on the ideological approach at the expense of a more technological approach. Since one of the functions of the "world forum" is to enable the various "world concepts" to confront each other and perhaps to begin to find common ground, this is not surprising. But the importance of this factor sometimes leads astray not only the lay observer but the negotiators themselves;

- They call for considerable preliminary efforts to identify the problems which are susceptible to negotiation before any negotiations can begin. This work of identification is complex, and it comes up against difficulties of a cultural, technical, ideological and semantic kind; it can often only be concluded when a preliminary agreement is beginning to take shape on a given concept; so that it is no longer surprising that it implies attempt after attempt at formulation, often clumsily done, and that it is a source of endless talk;

- Negotiation among 160 parties presents specific technical difficulties other than those of the size of the meeting chamber or the organization of simultaneous interpretation. It involves the definition of interest groups whose composition and dimensions vary according to the subjects dealt with, and the method of representation of these groups.

The structure for negotiations afforded by the present world forum is unsuited to the problems of the modern world ...
If we bear these features in mind, we can distinguish three categories of activities within the United Nations System in relation to the identification of world problems, exchanges of views and negotiations:

110. Negotiation work as such, with a view to the adoption of conventions or treaties. This "juridical" aspect includes among other things the development of international law, the law of outer space and the law of the sea, human rights, labour law etc. The negotiating mechanisms, mostly located within the United Nations, are here very varied: they include specialized commissions and committees whose numbers may vary from 30 to 50 in general: Commission on Human Rights; Commission on Transnationals; (subsidiary organs of the Economic and Social Council); International Law Commission, Commission on International Trade Law (subsidiary organs of the General Assembly); ad hoc bodies set up by the General Assembly; Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space; Committee on the Peaceful Uses of the Sea Bed (1969); ad hoc Committee on the Taking of Hostages; or recourse to large international conferences such as that on the Law of the Sea which sat from 1973 to 1982. Outside the United Nations, mention should be made of the ILO Conference in regard to labour conventions.

111. Economic, political and social discussions on the relations between industrialized countries and developing countries, which could be bracketed under the title of "North-South dialogue". This dialogue, concerned mainly with political philosophy, is carried on in virtually all the inter-governmental organs of the System, but mainly in the Trade and Development Board, at UNCTAD sessions, in the Economic and Social Council and in the General Assembly.

112. The task of identifying world problems when the time has not yet come for negotiating but only for recognizing as a whole the existence of elements of a "problématique"/ common to all countries, but without any suggestion of going beyond the analysis stage.

These problems are dealt with at all levels. In virtually all programmes of all organizations there is a research and identification component of this type. However, only a few problems gradually emerge from all this corpus and its universal conspectus as described in Chapter II, and they are gradually identified as suitable for possible discussion on the convergence of national policies or the negotiation of common standards. Thus the questions of the environment, population, certain social problems, economic and monetary problems are at various stages of identification within the world forum.

113. An examination of the results obtained after 40 years by this complex of mechanisms makes it clear that they provide some of the components of what one might call a "world problématique" and make it possible to outline the potential framework of a "world

/* "Problématique" is used to convey the French term "problématique" which signifies a whole range of interrelated problems; see also note 41.
But they refer only to some of the problems arising today at world level. What they do mainly is make it possible to measure how far the world still has to go and to identify the difficulties which still have to be overcome.

Some examples of negotiations. Decolonization and International law

Between the end of the 1950s and the beginning of the 1970s, the world underwent an important political transformation. The political map of the world was completely transformed by the appearance of about a hundred new States, in Africa, Asia, the Caribbean and the Pacific. The United Nations made a positive contribution to this operation, and while it was not able to prevent a number of serious armed conflicts, it certainly reduced them in number. The success of the anti-colonialist offensive which took place within the framework of the World Organization is due to two phenomena:

The fact that the two major world Powers were in favour of it;

The fact that the interests of the colonized peoples coincided with the main principles relating to human rights and the rights of peoples to self-determination, as recognized by the West and already used politically in Europe and other parts of the world in the 19th century to set up new nation States.

In point of fact the efforts of the Organization went hand in hand with a transformation in world consensus which reflected the new power relationships, marked in particular by the economic and political decline of the former great European Powers.

This major achievement was supplemented by that of the negotiations on the law of the sea, which made it possible to complete the definition of the territorial limits of State sovereignty and began to give a concrete meaning to the notion of the "common heritage of mankind". Apart from that, the conventions whose adoption has been advocated by the United Nations in the field of international law are rather a part of what might be called the "consolidation of past gains": for example, the work of the International Law Commission (Vienna conventions, Law of Treaties, Succession of States, etc.) and those of the Commission on International Trade Law (international sales of goods, international payments, arbitration in regard to international trade law, convention on seaborne transport, etc.). The Statute of the International Law Commission refers to the "codification and development" of this branch of law. But it would seem that the two commissions of lawyers have preferred on the whole to codify or at most to itemize rules already recognized rather than actually to develop the law.

Human rights

On the other hand, the efforts made in the fields of human rights and the right to work represent a preliminary attempt to provide a general framework for world "problématique". It is an attempt, Western and liberal in origin, involving essentially a legal approach. As we know, in the early years of the United Nations it culminated on 10 December 1948 in the
The efforts in connection with human rights are on two fronts, one being civil and political rights, and the other being economic, social and cultural rights.

Some moral constraints have been exerted on governments in regard to civil and political rights ...

... in the case of economic and social rights, the situation is still one of long-winded talk.

Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which was rounded off subsequently by two covenants, one on economic, social and cultural rights and the other on civil and political rights (the latter supplemented by an optional protocol), these being adopted by the General Assembly in 1966. The set of rules proposed consists of two distinct parts corresponding to the titles of each of the two protocols:

The one dealing with the freedom and security of persons, the outlawing of slavery, torture and all inhuman or degrading treatment, a ban on arbitrary arrest, the right to be recognized by the law, the right to a fair and public hearing, the right to a nationality, the right to own property, freedom of conscience, freedom of assembly and association, etc.;

The other relating to social, economic and cultural rights.

117. The latter are described in the Universal Declaration as the right to social security, work, rest and leisure, to a standard of living adequate for health and well-being, education, and participation in the cultural life of the community. The rights of workers which are the subject of the many ILO conventions form part both of the civil and political aspect and of the economic and social aspect of human rights. This legal apparatus is rounded-off by a number of conventions and declarations concerning such matters as the elimination of all forms of racial discrimination (Declaration of 1963 and Convention of 1965), the suppression and punishment of the crime of apartheid, the specific rights of women (elimination of all forms of discrimination against women), the rights of the child, the protection of women and children in emergency and armed conflict, the elimination of all forms of religious intolerance, etc. Finally, research is going on into measures relating to the protection of minorities, the right to development, and the impact of science and technology on human rights.

118. All this work of definition, formulation, design and establishment of a legal apparatus is supplemented by procedures to control violations of human rights. The Commission on Human Rights and its Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities have had recourse to many working groups to examine and even observe the situation of human rights in a number of countries. Some moral constraints, exclusively relating to civil and political rights, have thus been exerted on various Governments, and these constraints have been developed by the constant pressure of a large number of non-governmental organizations.

119. The concrete results have been fairly limited. The situation is, however, distinctly different in relation to each of the two main aspects. With regard to civil and political rights, the principles proclaimed have been given official recognition by virtually all Governments. Systematic violations of these rights have been made more difficult in certain cases. A margin of hypocrisy has of course subsisted on the part both of Governments whose régime were at variance with the recognition of these rights and of countries which apply the principles within their own territory but prefer to close their eyes to what is happening in countries which do not respect them, so as to protect commercial interests or political alliances. With regard to economic and
social rights, the recognition in the Declaration or the Covenants of the right to education, employment, recreation, and social security have not borne any practical fruits. In the absence of a sufficiently strong feeling of solidarity at world level enabling economic and social measures to be taken to secure respect for these rights, the situation in this regard remains one of hypocrisy and longwindedness. There is precious little chance that the mere repetition of the existence of this category of rights will lead to a modification of the type of world consensus existing on the subject. The ILO has, however, succeeded through the adaption of various convention and recommendations in giving substance to a limited range of economic and social rights.

The North-South dialogue

120. The efforts to build up the New International Economic Order have represented the other major attempt, this time originating with the Group of 77, to provide another overall framework for a world "problématique". The approach here is more economic than that of human rights, but remains essentially normative. What is known as the North-South dialogue, the continuation of the offensive on decolonization, has been shifted since the time when the large majority of the colonized peoples obtained their independence from the realm of purely political problems to that of economic relations. As we know, it derives from the claims of the developing countries based mainly on an analysis of the responsibility of the developed countries in general and the colonial Powers in particular for the impoverishment of the third world and on criticisms of the relationships of domination which through the mechanism of the markets ultimately place the developing countries at a disadvantage in the share-out of economic wealth. We are all aware of the analyses made of the need to stabilize the prices of commodities and to organize a better division of labour at the international level so as to facilitate industrialization of the developing countries; of the transfer of technology; of the need to re-direct monetary and financial flows and in particular to establish at a precise figure the amount of official aid for development due from the industrialized countries; of the conditions governing the use of the common heritage of mankind; of the establishment of a code of conduct for transnational corporations; of the organization of economic and technical co-operation between developing countries, etc.

121. This philosophical and political structure has been reflected in the definition of a legal framework in the many declarations and resolutions, some of them well known. All this has been analysed from the legal point of view by Professor Abi-Saab as being based on two of the most fundamental principles of contemporary international law: the sovereign equality of States and the duty to co-operate, the former including the right of States to choose their own economic system, permanent sovereignty over natural resources, the principle of equal participation by developing countries in international economic relations; and the second including the five principles of preferential treatment, stability of export resources for the developing countries, the right of all States to enjoy the benefits of science and technology, the right of developing countries to development assistance, and the principle of the common heritage of mankind.

The New International Economic Order represents a second attempt at an overall framework for a world problématique...
122. The undertaking has come up against the same difficulties as human rights: first of all the gulf between the formulation of principles and the possibility of applying them, and secondly the same type of difference of influence as between the first and the second aspect. While the sovereign equality of States is a recognized principle of long standing (actually since the Peace of Westphalia) in international law, and while the consequences which flow from it are given universal recognition, admittedly with many reservations, on the other hand the normative structure founded on the principle of the duty to co-operate has remained more fragile and has not yet found its full legal justification, let alone universal acceptance. 44/ This difficulty of acceptance of the norms relating to this second category of principles is compounded by a similar difficulty in respect of economic theory.

123. The North-South dialogue which the Group of 77 has tried to place in a normative context by repeating the same principles year after year at every opportunity is also pursued at other levels in discussions of every kind inside and outside the United Nations. The tenets of the New International Economic Order are challenged by theoreticians of the right and the left, the former maintaining that its planned economy and protectionist aspects contain nothing new and merely attempt to prevent the laws of the market from functioning properly, and the latter arguing that the machinery proposed merely tends to increase the dependence of the developing countries and benefits only an infinitesimal fraction of the population of their countries, and suggesting as an alternative the delinking of the economies of the developing countries and the industrialized countries. In turn, the champions of the New International Economic Order do not appear as yet to have fully explored the economic theory which would make it possible to erect in this way a structure as coherent as that proposed at the normative level.

124. The Western and socialist countries have presented a variety of responses to the proposals of the Group of 77. These include:

Acceptance, in spite of some reservations in regard to nationalization, of the notion of sovereignty and independence;

Refusal to observe the percentage rate of official aid to development, although accepted in principle;

Acceptance of certain minor concessions in regard to international trade;

Contradictory recommendations on the strategies which should be adopted by the developing countries, the rigorous conditions imposed by the International Monetary Fund, (advice on social policies, etc.);

Various proposals designed to establish a typology of countries and problems in the third world;

Liberal policies for bank loans followed by restrictions the moment the question of insolvency of the debtors appears to arise.
125. The coherence of these various attitudes is not entirely evident, and it could be said that while today the North-South dialogue is being pursued in a variety of ways, it seems to have little chance of making much further headway unless its economic bases can be better crystallized.

Identification and discussion of some world problems

126. The World Organization also adopts another approach to world problems, that of identifying relatively specific problems, stressing their importance for all countries, whatever their level of wealth or their political régime, e.g. in relation to subjects identified within the framework of the New International Economic Order: the establishment of a code of conduct for transnational corporations or the search for devices to stabilise commodity prices (particularly the Common Fund), or in relation to subjects of more particular concern to the industrialized countries, such as the growth of the world's population or environmental problems.

127. The United Nations System does not possess precise criteria for defining problems which have some chance of being taken seriously by the international community as a whole. The identification of problems which should be the subject of "major conferences", for example, is done mainly on the basis of the existing sectoral schedule of problems: industrialization science and technology, agrarian reform, population, women, environment, water resources, etc. But frequently the subjects chosen do not represent really new problems, or they are only repetitive devices for driving home the claims of the Group of 77 (increased aid from the industrialized countries, etc.). Hence major conferences of this type often culminate in "action programmes" which in spite of their title do not embody anything concrete and do not contribute to any change in the respective attitudes of the participants.

128. The rare instances where problems identified have had an influence on the existing consensus are due to the importance and the quality of the thinking that has gone into the subject and to the recognition of palpable risks for the international community as a whole. Thus, for example, the progress made on environmental questions or that now being made in regard to population policies, population growth in the third world being felt by the industrialized countries as involving a danger of political destabilization, and in the developing countries as an obstacle to their development. These beginnings of positive changes in regard to certain problems are reflected in a modification of the perception of phenomena which prior to the efforts at research and negotiations had not been highlighted in the same way. Here then is a possible key to changing the type of world consensus.
... but economic and financial problems have only been dealt with superficially.

The United Nations System does not deal with the complementarity of economic strategies, a subject of concern to the major countries. Study of medium-term and long-term problems is neglected.

Superficial treatment of economic and financial problems

129. On the other hand, no such progress has been made in fields where outside the United Nations System important theoretical changes actually have taken place. Economic, financial and monetary problems have only been dealt with very superficially in the discussion and negotiating bodies belonging to the United Nations System. They have only been approached descriptively or ideologically, which has led either to bemoaning the crises and difficulties that exist, or to discussing the claims of the developing countries. The forums provided by UNCTAD, the Economic and Social Council or the General Assembly have served only to debate the role which the Group of 77 would like to play in the discussions between industrialized countries or to criticize the policy of the International Monetary Fund.

130. In the industrialized countries, the idea that the growth of either side is necessary to that of the other has become a commonplace. People know that the existing interdependence prohibits a given country from adopting an unorthodox economic policy and not taking into account the methods applied in other countries. In international economics, bad luck for some does not mean good luck for the others. The complementarity of economic strategies has thus become a subject of concern, research and constant negotiation between the major economic poles represented by the United States, Europe and Japan. But the United Nations System provides no analysis of the place which could or should be occupied in these matters of concern by the developing countries and puts forward no theory of economic complementarity which they could find useful. For want of serious studies to provide food for thought, the developing countries confine themselves to protesting against the methods by which the International Monetary Fund forces them to align themselves, regardless of their social or specific problems, their economic policy, etc., with the industrialized countries. But these protests do not take the place of concrete proposals, which are cruelly lacking.

131. These gaps are all the more difficult to fill in that prospective studies, after raising great hopes 10 years or so ago, have been virtually abandoned. Economists and politicians, who have had their fingers burnt as a result of sudden changes of outlook imposed by upheavals in oil prices and exchange rates have tended to be over-cautious and no longer to believe in forecasting or models. The economic services of the United Nations have not been encouraged to resist this change in trend. Yet the World Organization should be the place par excellence for the study of medium-term and long-term problems. Governments which have to face pressure from the world as it is today, have great difficulty in giving the problems of tomorrow the necessary attention. The World Organization should help to fill at least part of this gap; its mission includes pointing out the dangers for the future inherent in the trends of the present and proposing ways and means of preventing those dangers.
132. Such forecasting is feasible, even if it necessitates perfecting the methods of doing so. The evolutionary trends of world population, for example, are sufficiently well known, and whatever the national policies applied, forecasts of orders of magnitude remain possible. They furnish enough information to make it possible to indicate at once that the problem of migration at world level will become one of the major problems by the end of the twentieth century. Yet a thorough-going examination of this phenomenon, with all its consequences by way of political risk, has not been undertaken in the United Nations because the secretariats do not dispose of the necessary resources to do this and because the intergovernmental organs have not asked for it.

133. Major policy documents such as the International Development Strategies, to which a great deal of time and effort is devoted, reflect in their superficial character the inadequate equipment of the United Nations in the sphere of economic and sociological thought. No doubt the apathy of the Member States towards any serious discussion of these problems in the United Nations is explained largely by the fact that the industrialized countries prefer to discuss among themselves what they regard as the vital problems, namely balance of external trade flows, currency, credit, investment, etc. and to keep the developing countries out of these discussions. This situation, prejudicial to the developing countries, is likewise prejudicial to the international community as a whole, since it robs it of a dimension in economic and political thinking which it ought very much to have if it is to anticipate future risks. To fill this gap, there would need to be an "economic United Nations" adequately equipped to deal with such problems; but this involves a very radical transformation of the concept of the World Organization as it has prevailed up to now.

Outline of what a "world political space" could mean

134. The difficulties of devising a common view of world problems are bound up with those of establishing a "world political space". Yet the World Organization today furnishes the outline of a global system. The fact that the United Nations and its System has virtually attained universality tends to be underestimated nowadays precisely because this universality is being achieved at a time when the World Organization no longer deals with important problems. Yet this conquest has been a long and difficult road from the admission to the United Nations of the adversaries of the Allies in the Second World War to the recognition of the Government of the People's Republic of China in 1972, via the admission of all the new States emerging of the decolonization process. If we add to this achievement, which today we take for granted, all the other positive achievements, even though entirely inadequate, already mentioned in the realms of peace, development or the institution of a forum for negotiation, we find ourselves faced with a political phenomenon which in the final analysis is more important than the sum of its constituent parts.

135. Universality; the existence of a political margin of action for the Organization in the realm of peace; the construction of an
... but the ingenious negotiating mechanisms have not compensated for the failure to secure acceptance of the world forum by all the participants. The structures of the present World Organization are based on three fallacies:

1. The invention of the most varied formulas has not succeeded in getting the world forum accepted by the majority of participants as the normal place for discussing the most vital problems. In an attempt to give validity to negotiations among 160 parties involved and very different in size and importance, recourse has been made either to the preparation of common positions in country groupings (the system of Groups A, B, C and D in UNCTAD and the equivalent in the General Assembly), or to the definition of ad hoc groups by topics (for example, land-locked countries at the Conference on the Law of the Sea), or again to the establishment of subsidiary organs (all the executive boards of agencies or programmes, subsidiary organs of the Economic and Social Council, etc.), and to the organization of a reporting system from these restricted groups to the Plenary organs.

2. But it is precisely the inadequacy of these types of solutions that have prevented the world forum from being taken seriously. In other words, the problem of meeting at a table by partners each having sufficient weight in terms of economic power and coherence in the interests it represents, has not yet been solved. Whether this coherence, non-existent at the present stage of political organization in the world, can be given an artificial boost by negotiation, or whether the organization of a genuine world political space is one of the most important tasks which the World Organization should be able to tackle, but negotiation on the framework of participation remains to be organized.

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The type of World Organization we possess today can be defined as follows: It is an institution:

Whose general goals - peace, development, human rights, search for a more satisfactory level of world consensus - fit in well with the notion one has of the mission of an organization of this type, and are incidentally mobilizing public opinion.

The structures of the present world organization are based on the notion one has of the mission of an organization of this type, and are incidentally mobilizing public opinion.
Whose overall achievements are far less negligible than is generally supposed, in that they have succeeded in building up the beginnings of a "world political space" and outlining some elements of a "world problématique";

Whose structures and means of taking action are nevertheless ill-adapted to the pursuit of the main goals, since they are conceived on the basis of three fallacies, which might be stated as follows:

Fallacy No. 1: that the "maintenance of peace" can be brought about in the modern world through an institution;

Fallacy No. 2: that the development of the poorer zones in the world can be brought about by a sectoral and therefore non-integrated approach;

Fallacy No. 3: that negotiations to improve or alter world consensus can be conducted without prior definition of negotiation structures accepted by all the participants.

Thus reflections focusing on reform of the World Organization imply a challenge to the basic notions on which the present institution is founded and their replacement by notions more in keeping with reality.
CHAPTER V
THE FOCUS OF REFLECTIONS WITH A VIEW TO REFORM

The technical conditions that apply

139. If we accept the hypothesis that the conditions are now met for developing the notion of reform, it is all the more important to stress the difficulty of the undertaking. It is not simply a matter of covering over a few superficial defects. An inadequate analysis of the problem, even if it mustered a consensus, could well lead to failure. The experience gained some 10 years ago through the work on "restructuring" demonstrated clearly that the initiation and organization of a process of reflection on possible reform were tough technical problems which if poorly handled led to serious failure. Hence the technical difficulties arising can only be overcome if certain conditions are fulfilled.

140. The first of these is undoubtedly the recognition of the need to raise the issue of the very basic concepts and structures of the present System as a whole if we are to devise others and to construct a World Organization of an entirely new type. This first condition implies a second, namely that the process of reflection and comparative analysis will inevitably be a lengthy one. Assuming that reform of the World Organization is at least as important and as complex as that of the law of the sea, for example, it would not seem unreasonable to reckon that research, discussion and negotiation on this subject could take 10 years. It would also make it easier to accept:

That a thorough-going preparatory effort, calculated to stimulate contributions from those best qualified to make them, must be organized;

That the task of devising machinery for a conspectus of analyses and the gradual achievement of a solution deserves special attention.

141. On the supposition that these conditions are met, I propose to devote this final chapter to the topics for reflection which I feel must be tackled. The first should be discussion of the very possibility of changing the type of world consensus on the basic concepts underlying the World Organization. This means examining not only the philosophical conflicts, but most of all the possible common ground. The second topic for reflection has to do with the structures which can be envisaged for seeking the main goal, which means exploring the possibility of innovation in a sphere which hitherto has remained extremely traditional and stereotyped. The third topic is that of the type of World Organization to which all these reflections could lead, implying the need to define both an ambitious undertaking for reform will call for thorough work, and hence time.

This chapter will tackle three topics for reflection.
The work done in universities on the international organizations has reflected a long-standing debate but, since 1945, has had no effect on the evolution of these institutions.

The feasibility of modifying world consensus

142. The debate between idealists and realists on the subject of the feasibility of modifying world consensus has been going on ever since the idea of bringing about world peace began to be debated. The debate itself is merely the reflection of the antagonism between those who believe only in power relationships and those who believe in the virtues of ideals, concepts and propaganda, or again between those who feel that the technical and economic infrastructure alone explains the ideas, beliefs and behaviour and those who believe that concepts and ideas are what condition the very manner in which each individual conceives his own interests. The debate is as old as political reflection itself.

143. The work done in universities on the international organizations and the United Nations has reflected this debate, sometimes adopting a descriptive and pessimistic attitude, others at other times, in contrast, trying to provide a scientific response to the passionate interest in peace shown by a large sector of public opinion. The transition has thus been made from studies on "peace through law" to the work of the functionalists, then the neo-functionalists, then their studies on the phenomena of integration, and finally today, to the many monographs produced on "régimes". 49/

144. This work has in a variety of ways thrown light on the difficult problems involved and has made for a better understanding of the development of the international organizations as a whole. It should nevertheless be noted:

That such studies have never, since the United Nations was established, had any impact on the evolution of the World Organization, whose structures have remained those suggested by the state of thinking prior to 1945, in other words ideas on "peace through law" and "sectoral" functionalism;

That on the whole they have been inspired by idealism and the search for peace, and then more recently have tried to appear "realistic" by focusing on régimes geared rather to the convergence of interests between industrialized countries than towards the "rules, norms, principles and of decision-making procedures" applied to coexistence between East and West or between North and South. 50/

In short, it would be difficult to maintain that we have available today an instrument for theoretical analysis making it possible to comprehend the trend in ideas and practices in the field of international relations, particularly in regard to the problems of security and peace.
145. On the other hand, it must be recognized that over and above the idealogical opposition which occupies the centre of the stage, the balance of terror situation between East and West does actually lead to a search for convergence both at the military level (negotiations between the two super-Powers on arms control) and at the economic level, particularly in relation to the continuation and development of trade relations (for example the sales of American grain to the Soviet Union or the sale of Siberian gas to Europe). It is therefore fairly logical to assume that the role of a World Organization whose main task is to help to maintain peace should be that of contributing as much as possible to identifying and developing areas of common ground, as being the only serious way of gradually transforming the state of coexistence into a state of peace.

The search for common ground

146. We live in a world of tough opposition of both vested interests and beliefs, a world in which economic competition is often described as ruthless, where opposing idealogies justify, because of the fear they inspire, extremely costly armaments policies, rivalries between zones of influence, struggles between secret services, and where the most abject poverty and wretchedness provoke only ephemeral reactions of solidarity. In this "tough" world, the existence of the World Organization endeavours to translate into fact the deep-seated desire on the part of public opinion for a "better world", in other words for a more rational organization of international relations in which the edifice of peace can be built up. This effort to achieve rationality has all the greater chance of success in that irrationality is triumphing to the point of absurdity in the development of nuclear weapons which leads to a steady growth in the number and power of rockets and bombs precisely in order not to make use of them. Under the lee of this willy-nilly co-existence between antagonistic idealogies and political régimes, the rational search for common ground imposes itself in a de facto sort of way.

147. But the contribution which the present World Organization has made to this research has up to the present remained very slight, because of shortcomings which are both theoretical and structural. The fact that the Organization built up on the basis of already outmoded ideas of "peace through law", "general and complete disarmament" and sectoral development has not changed its views or its methods largely explains, as we have seen, the frustration of public opinion throughout the world in respect of it. Thus an effort to renew the basic concepts is particularly urgent in the direction of the search for common ground. The earlier chapters have tried to indicate where the gaps are which this effort at a conceptual approach should help to fill.

148. The problem is essentially:

To define how it is possible to replace the direct search for peace, doomed to failure for all the reasons I have discussed by indirect machinery for the gradual construction of peace, for example through the development at world level of genuine joint
The problem of the structure of a World Organization is technical in character. The "technology" of the "functional" organizations was the one applied to the World Organization.

- progress in institutions for solidarity
- an "economic United Nations"

action or joint ventures, however modest in scope, in which the commitment of Governments might demonstrate their will to peace much more surely to public opinion than speeches advocating disarmament;

Systematically to explore ways and means of seeking complementarity between national economic strategies, not merely between Western industrialized countries but between East and West or between North and South;

To seek how it might be possible to crystallize institutionally, over and above national sovereignties, the notion of human solidarity in the face of destitution, and the right to food, education, social security and development;

To translate into more precise concepts the notion of an "economic United Nations" as a complement to the present notion of a "political United Nations", and to explore in greater depth the way in which public opinion, which has grown used to the idea of a world institution entrusted with "maintaining peace", might adopt in a more realistic way the notion of a World Organization which ought to be more than anything else a centre for negotiations designed to identify and develop zones of convergence.

Obviously this radical search is inseparable from a thorough-going revision of ideas on the possible structures of the future World Organization.

The state of the art in regard to a "World Organization"

149. The definition of the structures of a World Organization in keeping with the needs of the contemporary world raises a technical problem. Yet the "technology" applied in building up the present World Organization came about historically in an "amateurish" manner on the basis of theories and situations which have since evolved. If the tool available today does not suit the needs of the contemporary world, the reason is that technical invention in this field is slow and cumbersome, and invariably lags behind as it were.

150. The phenomenon of "intergovernmental international organization" only made its appearance in the second half of the nineteenth century. The technique of international relations built up mainly from 1865 onwards took the form of an "intergovernmental organization functional in nature". It involved a simple and efficacious instrument for technical collaboration between Governments or national services to help to solve specific problems. The establishment of the International Telecommunication Union in 1865, the World Meteorological Organization in 1873, the Universal Postal Union in 1874, and a score of organizations of this type, most of them regional in character, before the First World War, showed clearly how the new technique met a need. The novelty consisted essentially in the permanent status of the organ for direct contact established between national services of several countries, abandonment of the monopoly of the traditional diplomatic services on such matters, and recourse to multilateralism. The
representatives of the technical services concerned - posts, transport, telecommunications, etc. - thus grew accustomed to working together, and the form of the instrument, with its three main organs - a permanent secretariat, a general assembly with almost invariably annual meetings, and a more restricted council or board meeting more frequently - very rapidly became crystallized and general. 51/

151. On the other hand, technical research into the form of an international organization of a universal and political nature, after over a century of trial and error, has by no means found a definitive formula. Thought was given at the outset to the method of compulsory arbitration, or the International Court of Justice, which would settle disputes between States before armed conflict broke out. The Hague Peace Conferences were in the process of perfecting the formula just before the First World War broke out. 52/ But in 1919, when the question arose of establishing permanent relations at world level under the pressure of the deeply-felt need for a lasting peace that exercised public opinion, the Covenant of the League of Nations was content merely to adopt the formula devised for the functional organizations, and a permanent secretariat, a council and an assembly were set up (while preserving, at a secondary level so to speak, the Court of Justice formula). Thus a state of confusion tended to arise between two different phenomena, that of the "intergovernmental functional organization" and that of the "universal and political international organization", and for want of something better, the technique devised for the former was used for the latter.

152. In 1945, the experiment was taken up again and amended; but the stock formula continued to be used (Secretariat, Council, Assembly), complicated somewhat in the light of five main considerations:

A desire for "realism", reflected in the fact that the main responsibility for peace and security was entrusted to the greatest and most powerful States through the institution of the Security Council and the right of veto;

A "sectoral functionalist" philosophy which consisted in deliberately and systematically organizing co-operation at world level among specialists, sector by sector - whence the integration in the System of the specialized agencies which already existed and the creation of new agencies to cover the whole range of national ministries (education, health, agriculture, etc.);

The concern in the economic and financial field to prevent a repetition of the phenomena which had led to the Great Depression of the 1930s, and hence an effort to organize world free trade, control of exchange fluctuations and credit problems by setting up "financial" institutions such as IMF, the World Bank and GATT;
The techniques used in 1945 did not involve any major innovation and have led to a complex, decentralized system.

The new techniques

Innovations have come from the European Communities, with the "Council-Commission-Joint Ventures" formula, and with "Summits" in the Western world.

154. Thus we find ourselves today in possession of an Organization which is largely out of date and which has grown old without taking account of the progress made over the last 40 years in international organization "technology". But techniques have evolved. In response to new needs, types of structures have been devised which are different from those we knew in 1945. It is therefore essential, when the time comes to reflect on a third generation type of World Organization, to give some thought to the present state of the art.

155. A new approach has come about mainly through the European Communities, which did not adopt the "Assembly-Executive board - Secretary-General" structure but a different system which might be referred to as the "Council-Commission plus launching of joint ventures". Under this formula, the Council of Ministers makes it possible to convene the incumbent ministers of each Government to discuss the views of each country and to defend their interests, while the Commission, composed of distinguished persons chosen by Governments on the basis of their competence, providing strong guarantees of independence and carrying out their functions in the interests of the organization, has the responsibility for seeking out the Community view, studying compromise solutions, making recommendations and executing the budget. Furthermore, either within the Community system (cf. the Common Agricultural Policy, European Development Fund) or outside it (CERN, Ariane Espace, Airbus Industry, Esprit, Eureka, etc), joint ventures common to all the States members of the Community or only to a few of them, and at time in association with non-member States, are launched more and more frequently, strengthening the Community's cohesion in respect of precise objectives.
156. Another international co-operation formula, much more flexible but embracing a larger geographical area, is that of the Western "Summits" - a council without a permanent secretariat but holding regular meetings - which as we know was broadened on one occasion, that of the CanoSummit Meeting, to include representation of the developing countries, thus covering both West and South.

157. There is no doubt that in the case of the European Communities in particular, the adopted structures function within a framework very different from that of the World Organization. There can be no question of transposing institutions conceived for a regional context with the aim of integrating the economies of countries which have reached a very similar level of development - and incidentally few in number - into a world context where conditions are very different. But there is no reason why one should not be able to take over certain technical formulas, or why, in examining the problems to be solved and the goals to be sought, such attempts at transposition should not help to throw light on the specific technical problems of the World Organization and find appropriate structural solutions for them.

158. Any reflection on the type of structure which can be envisaged must inevitably bear in mind the goals to be sought by a World Organization by the end of the 20th century or the beginning of the 21st century. The foregoing analyses have endeavoured to show that it is hardly possible to conceive of others than those to which the present World Organization is doing its best to contribute - without notable success - namely peace, development and the establishment of a world forum for identifying problems and negotiations. An examination of these three spheres from the point of view of the structures that can be envisaged brings out clearly the fact that important new approaches are both possible and desirable in regard to the last two objectives. With regard to peace, on the other hand, it would seem difficult, at any rate for the time being, to bring about any major transformation in the existing system.

The impossibility of innovation in regard to the direct search for peace

159. It seems paradoxical, but it is not really so, to state that there is no serious hope that the present structures making for the direct search for peace can be improved. The thesis propounded in this report is that only indirect search through the development of economic and social co-operation has any chance of success. 55/ I have already pointed out in paragraphs 77 to 82 above that the technical efforts envisaged with a view to strengthening the effectiveness of the Security Council should not be discouraged, inasmuch as any improvement in the general political climate would help to bring about some progress. But nobody today envisages the possibility of modifying the structures or the composition of the Security Council. The fact is that in the present political climate it would be unreasonable to suggest it; it is on this very point that past attempts at reform have failed, and there is...
In the development field, the alternative to the present structure ... cannot be centralization, but integration at the regional level.

The situations are so serious that bold reform is justified.

In the development field, the alternative to the present structure ... cannot be centralization, but integration at the regional level.

160. Development is the area in which the reconversion of the present structures should be most systematic and most thorough-going. I think I have demonstrated sufficiently clearly in the above pages that:

The sectoral approach is altogether inappropriate for a problem which calls for an integrated approach and organic co-operation by all the parties concerned;

Any action in respect of development at world level means ignoring regional or national peculiarities and makes for a superficial view of the problems, generalities and ultimately to mere talk.

This being so, the only possible structural response lies in the organization of integrated systems of co-operation at regional level.

161. The alternative to the present decentralization of the System is not to be found in a type of centralization which would produce a bureaucratic monster and would in no way represent a response to the present shortcomings. What must be got rid of is the approach to the problem of development at world level and "remote control" over concrete problems arising in the poorer parts of the earth by staff members living in the great capitals of the developed world. What is needed is a comprehensive view and a precise programme on a reasonable geographic scale, and the handling of problems must be done on the spot, in close collaboration with the peoples concerned. This is why the solution can only be regional or subregional and integrated, which means that all those having to do with development must be sent "into the field"; in other words the headquarters of the bodies concerned must be located in the regional or subregional capitals, and all the organizations decentralized today by sectors (whether situated at headquarters or in the regions) must be centralized and transferred to each region, as part of a single, interdisciplinary development agency or enterprise responsible at once for health, agriculture, industry, education, etc.

162. The idea that so ambitious a reconversion might be possible will inevitably give rise to passionate reactions in defence of the status quo, and scepticism on the part of those who are only too well aware of the capacity of bureaucracy to resist any suggestion of change. It will therefore take time to accustom
people to the very idea. The urgency of problems still unsolved—indeed insoluble in the present context of confusion and fragmentation of effort—such as those posed today in the countries of the Sahel, should on the other hand bring people round to the notion that the seriousness of certain situations fully justifies a bolder attitude towards the search for solutions.

163. At the level of the United Nations System, this can only mean a total reconversion of all the operational structures, that is the structures of all the main programmes such as UNDP, WFP, UNFPA, UNICEF, etc., and most of the technical co-operation services of the main agencies such as the regional economic commissions of the United Nations (with the exception of the Economic Commission for Europe) and the regional services of the other main agencies, with a view to constituting, by region or subregion, "regional development agencies or enterprises". 57/

164. The first step should be to define the problems for which a response is needed. Obviously those of the Sahel are not the same as those of the Andean countries or those of the Caribbean area. A diagnosis of the problems to which regional co-operation supplemented by external aid could respond should be a prerequisite to any re-organizing or restructuring effort. Such a diagnosis should concentrate on the definition of precise action plans over the medium term, together with a description of the financing needs and the possibility for co-operation by the countries of the region and the countries furnishing aid for the implementation of these plans.

165. The creation of "Regional development agencies or enterprises" should amount to a concentration of the means available on clearly identified problems: concentration of finances, manpower, fusion and restructuring of existing organs wherever possible. The structures to be envisaged to make this large-scale reconversion possible cannot be looked at in a stereotyped way; but while bearing in mind the need for adapting them to specific situations, it can also be argued that in a general way they should include an organ representing the Governments of the countries of the region, another body on which outside countries contributing to the development of the region would be represented, and finally a joint council or commission to carry out the plan negotiated and adopted.

The intergovernmental regional organizations

166. A complete reconversion at regional level of all the development activities of the United Nations System could also provide an opportunity for examining region by region the existing "intergovernmental regional organizations". Their proliferation is often a cause for astonishment and occasionally for congratulations: the figure of 280 organizations of this type mentioned above (para. 61) illustrates the success of the formula. It demonstrates that regional co-operation meets specific needs. On the other hand it is by no means certain that the number and diversity of existing organizations is the right answer to these needs. Indeed there is every reason to think that in this field also, the technology used to define intervention structures is
It would be useful to re-examine the situation of the intergovernmental regional organizations. It is ill-suited and out of date, and that the present situation represents an historical congeries reflecting ideas or problems identified one by one rather than a coherent view of the overall problem.

167. Thus according to the regions, whose geographical area varies greatly, there are political and economic organizations set up to organize zones of influence or to consolidate historical ties (the Organization of American States, the Commonwealth, etc.); political organizations of the countries of a region (Organization of African Unity, Arab League, etc.); regional banks; regional or subregional organizations endeavouring to organize "common markets" or to cope with specific technical spheres such as fishing, transport, etc.; offshoots of the United Nations (regional economic commissions) or other specialized agencies (e.g. the WHO regions, whose geographical area is not the same as that of the United Nations regions); regional offices of various programmes, etc. The structure of these organizations is in most instances similar in type. Thus they mainly provide the occasion for large numbers of meetings, either at ministerial level or at that of officials, but because of the poverty of their means of action, the limitation of their level of jurisdiction and the failure of the models used to adapt to local problems, they frequently do no more than increase the complexity of the handling of national problems without helping either to identify or to take over the specific problems of the region. It might therefore be the right time to look into the possibility of an overall review, region by region, of the existing intergovernmental regional co-operation structures. This broadening of the field for reflection, even if it revealed obstacles which are difficult to overcome, would help to give a better picture of the problems as a whole.

168. Finally, the World Bank and its two affiliates - the International Finance Corporation and the International Development Association - should be associated with reflections on the problem and be able to consider whether they themselves could be concerned reforms of this type. The projects launched by these three great organizations are different in kind and in size from those referred to in the present report. But any critical reflections on the need for a programme approach affects them too. Their participation in the Regional development agencies or enterprises could have a decisive impact and help to facilitate joint action with the other aid systems, multilateral (e.g. the European Development Fund) or bilateral.

169. In any event, the development aspect of reform of the United Nations System should be situated at regional level. It calls for in-depth studies on diagnosis; on structures; on budgets; on the methods most likely to bring about over the long term the financing of development of the countries of the region (or subregion); on public and private types of investment which should be encouraged as a priority measure; on formulas for association between aid donor countries and countries of the region concerned; and on many other administrative and technical problems. Such a list could help to explain why in paragraph 134 above I spoke of an inevitably long and difficult road, for which the organization must be done systematically. Very detailed technical preparation
for negotiations in this field is all the more essential in that reform of the United Nations System in respect of development at regional level can only be envisaged in close relationship with that of the negotiation system at world level.

The structures for identifying problems and for negotiation: the problem of representation

170. The problem of setting up a better world forum cannot be solved, or even tackled, without an intellectual reconversion process which should be even more downright than the one just suggested in connection with the problem of development. I have tried in the preceding pages to explain what constitute the shortcomings of this approach:

First of all, the fact that as a result of collective delusion or hypocrisy, people had appeared to regard the World Organization as one that could and should enable its Members to settle questions, even major questions, in common rather than merely furnish a framework for negotiations;

Secondly the fact that, once the possibility of negotiating in that forum was admitted, it was used with few exceptions for tackling either the most difficult or simply insoluble problems such as disarmament and peace, or minor problems such as the codification of past gains but not, for example, economic and financial problems calculated to develop a convergence of views.

171. Clearly it is not sufficient merely to state the problem for it to be taken into consideration. The imperfect and complex system of bilateral and multilateral negotiations at present used tallies more or less with the analysis of power relationships and world problems made by the great Powers. While certain actors on the diplomatic scene may be aware that this method of tackling problems in large numbers of small forums, without a real picture of the whole, is prejudicial to all countries, they consider that it is possible to come to terms with this. To attempt to modify these complex mechanisms would mean taking unnecessary risks and giving other actors more importance than they really possess. At the same time, the countries of the third world, in spite of the illusion of unity created by the Group of 77, do not sit down at the negotiating table with any great coherence, either at world level or at regional level.

172. There would thus be very little chance of the problem getting a hearing if a number of signs did not indicate that the situation is beginning to evolve: the present crisis in the United Nations System; the greater and greater frustration in public opinion; the disarray of representatives of countries members of the Group of 77 in the face of the failure of "global negotiations"; and the growing suspicion that the problem of North-South relations should be stated in different terms. Nor is it certain that in the industrialized countries people can
Theoretical exploration is all the more indispensable in that the problem is in actual fact stated, but badly stated.

173. It will take time to come to realize fully that the establishment of a better system of negotiations at world level is an indispensable prerequisite to the solution of many world problems. But the moment we begin to raise the question, it would be worth while exploring the theoretical solutions that might be found. The discussion of a "blue print" might speed up reflection. A clear-cut theoretical definition is all the more indispensable in that the problem is in actual fact already stated, but badly stated. More and more, the industrialized countries are beginning to raise the question of the decision-making powers within the international organizations. Thus the idea that the absolute sovereignty of States requires that each one, whatever its importance, shall have one vote, is countered by the notion of weighting the votes on the basis of various criteria such as economic power or population. 60/ This debate is reflected in the insistent demands of the industrialized countries for the adoption of a system of weighted voting, which has in actual fact been met to some extent in the form of the special provisions inserted recently into the Constitution of UNIDO or the adoption of weighted voting in the constituent instrument of the Common Fund. 61/ These signs are important in so far as they indicate an awakening of one basic question. But this discussion has nothing to do with the problem which ought really to be asked, namely that of the establishment of a viable system of negotiations at world level.

174. The present discussions are the outcome of the erroneous notion that a World Organization is, can be or should be an organ where Member States take decisions in common. Thus the discussion goes on as to how a decision-making organ should function, for example, in voting on budgets or adopting changes in programmes. In the framework of such reasoning, the problem of weighted voting has some significance. But if the question is to define a negotiating body, the problem arises in a different way. We then have to determine how 160 countries could be really represented by 20 persons, or at most 24, certainly not more, each participant representing either one large country or a group of countries sufficiently coherent and important to be taken seriously by the rest.

175. If the question is put in this way, it is then no paradox to say that it no longer arises for the industrialized countries, but for the developing countries. The problem is indeed the following:
That the majority enjoyed in the United Nations by the countries of the Group of 77 has no real importance inasmuch as it affects only the adoption of resolutions which have no practical consequences;

That on the contrary, access to a table for discussion and negotiation where their problems would be taken into account and where they could influence really important decisions affecting their economies and their future has up to the present been denied them.

176. The developing countries have never yet stated the problem in those terms. On the contrary, they have tried to increase the number of members of all the United Nations bodies so as to increase the opportunities for direct representation by each individual country and to obtain a majority. This inflationary movement has thus become propagated among all the executive boards of organizations or programmes and in a great many subsidiary organs. The only amendments it has been found possible to make to the Charter of the United Nations have been made in this direction. In 1965, the number of members of the Security Council was increased from 11 to 15, that of the Economic and Social Council from 18 to 27 at the same date, and then from 27 to 54 in 1973. While it is easy to understand the reasons for the pressure thus exerted, the results are well known: the forums where it would have been possible to negotiate on important problems have been drained of all content, the industrialized countries refusing to use them to deal with any question likely to have any follow-up.

177. In the context of reform, the consideration of technical problems becomes really important. "Technology" can indeed play an essential role by helping to bring about a solution taking into account all the elements of a complex problem: the number of parties involved; their inequality in importance and power; their regional coherence or lack of coherence in the economic or ideological field; methods of identifying the problems to be studied and negotiated; the possible structures of intergovernmental organs; the structure of secretaries; the types of relationship between national administrations and the "world forum". The questions to be examined are:

The system for identifying problems that can be negotiated;

The structure of political negotiating bodies;

The structure of the delegations of Member States.

An "economic United Nations"

178. Sectoralization and fragmentation, inimical as they are to the integrated approach to development, today prevent the United Nations and its System from identifying world problems...
properly. The present forum, exaggeratedly ideological, seldom makes it possible to organize genuine negotiations - the only noteworthy exception being the law of the sea - and only makes for exchanges of views and the convergence of policies in relation to questions which do not have a direct bearing on fundamental issues - the only noteworthy exception being population. However, a genuine system of identification should make it possible:

To present in depth analyses in "convergence" fields and in particular in the economic field, and to raise questions of importance for Member States, especially the ways and means of finding long-term financing for development and the various aspects of complementarity of national economic strategies;

To explore as systematically as possible the medium-term and long-term trends and to determine the social and political risks that might upset national relations;

To suggest solutions, reflections and constructive ideas on the subject of methods of co-operation between Member States to cope with these risks, to combat social scourges, etc.

179. To achieve this, the new World Organization would have to be essentially what we shall call, in the interests of simplicity, a genuine "economic United Nations", i.e. a World Organization in which purely political problems would certainly not be ruled out but where economic problems would take first place. This would mean that in order to deal with such problems, there would be:

A secretariat capable of providing all the necessary interdisciplinary studies needed in this field;

An intergovernmental body at least as important and prestigious as the Security Council is today in regard to political questions.

180. The secretariat needed should have a structure almost the exact opposite of those we have today: instead of sectoral secretariats dispersed over the United Nations and the main agencies, what would be needed would be:

An interdisciplinary central secretariat with a large team of economists, sociologists and specialists in various disciplines, with very high qualifications;

Smaller sectoral secretariats at the level of each of the agencies.

The central secretariat should be equipped to deal with economic information at world level and to draw up diagnoses (possibly with arguments pro and con) on national economic strategies; it should possess all the most up-to-date ways and means of defining future trends; and it should study specific
problems thoroughly. Its statutes should enable it to work in a critical spirit and with acknowledged independence. It should be specified that the studies it produced would not hide differences in views or analyses, so that the negotiators would be given a clear picture of the problems they would be faced with. The sectoral secretariats in the agencies would work in direct contact with the central secretariat.

The "Council-Commission" formula transposed to world level - the "Economic Security Council"

181. In any event, the definition of the structure of secretariats is inseparable from the structure of the main intergovernmental organ. Thus a transposition to world level, mutatis mutandis, of the "Council-Commission" structure referred to in paragraph 153 above could usefully supply inspiration for the reformer. The combination of a negotiating table where Governments were represented and a group of independent persons chosen by the international community for their competence would be highly appropriate for the proper functioning of a world forum. This would mean that sitting at the negotiating table as such (Council) would be the competent ministers according to the problems to be dealt with, and the secretariat would be directed by a group of independent personalities, members of the Commission, chosen in an entirely different way from that used today for the election of the chiefs of the main agencies or for the appointment of Secretaries-General or Under-Secretaries-General in the United Nations. Their appointment (and the appointment of their Chairman or President) would be done collectively with a term of office of several years - say five years) by the whole body of States concerned. Some of these eminent persons would head the secretariat services of the United Nations and the main agencies and would work together in the "Commission" regularly - which would make it possible to do away with the present formula of the Administrative Committee on Co-ordination (ACC). 62/

182. The number of members an international negotiating body could have in order to function properly would obviously have to be as small as possible if the more important Member States were to agree to participate. The data concerning the problem of representation in a Council or Commission of this type can be outlined as follows:

There are 10 countries whose gross national product (GNP) is more than 2.5 per cent of the gross world product. These 10 countries together represent 72 per cent of this gross world product;

There are seven countries whose population is more than 100 million inhabitants (and the seven of them together represent not much less than half the world population). Two of them have a gross national product under 2.5 per cent of the gross world product.
If we combine these two criteria, we get a list of 12 countries. If we reduce the GNP criteria to 0.8 per cent of the gross world product, we have to add 10 countries to the original list, and if we reduce the population criterion to 60 million inhabitants, four countries will be added to the previous list. Combining the criteria at this second level, we obtain 26 countries. Of the 159 countries Members of the United Nations, 133 countries do not meet either of these two criteria, although this does not prevent a large number of them from playing an important part on the world scene.

183. Bearing in mind the population figures and the GNP levels of the countries of various regions in the world not included in the list of 12 countries resulting from the application of the first two criteria, it can be envisaged that they ought to be able to be represented by the allotment of about 11 additional places at the negotiating table, e.g. two for Latin America, one for the Caribbean, one for the Arab countries, two for Africa south of the Sahara, one for Eastern Europe, two for South-East Asia, one for Oceania, and one for the small and medium Western countries. This would give a figure of 25. If we envisaged a larger body and wished to include the 14 countries resulting from the application of less rigorous criteria, we would get a figure of 37.

184. These calculations give a clearer picture of the problem of the number of members possible for the two types of body to be set up. The main question in regard to the intergovernmental organ proper (Council) is to maintain the number of its members with the utmost rigour. It might be called "Economic Security Council" so as to endow it with at least as much prestige as the Security Council. On the other hand, with regard to the independent persons who would be placed in charge of the various branches of the secretariat and would deliberate together, greater flexibility might possibly be achieved by setting up either two or even three Commissions (e.g. one for short-term, one for long-term measures, and possibly one for launching joint ventures), or specialist working groups to deal with specific problems.

185. Finally, if an "economic United Nations" of this type were to be set up, the make-up of the delegations of Member States to it would have to include, side-by-side with a political representative of ambassador status, an economist of similar status representing the Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs of each country. A direct link between the new World Organization and the national economic and financial services would in fact seem to be an essential precondition of its credibility.

Transition towards a third generation World Organization

186. Reform implies setting up new institutions but also transforming and suppressing. The focus of reform of the World Organization will only be clear if it includes a means of transition between what exists today and what we would like to see.
More precisely, the problem is to determine what we propose to keep, what should be transformed, what should be suppressed, and to establish a transformation plan complete with deadlines and details related to transfers of resources and personnel. It is only when a reform plan has reached this degree of precision that there will be any change of overcoming the resistance that would inevitably be applied by all those who have an interest in preserving the status quo.

187. Thus the length of the period of transition will have to be added to the length of the negotiations themselves. During this time, the institutions would have to continue to function. It is indispensable that they function better as rapidly as possible, without waiting for the completion of the operation as a whole. If an agreement were reached on measures designed to bring about better management, it should be possible to put them into application without delay, while keeping a check to ensure that they do not interfere with subsequent reforms. This suggests a process of reform in several phases, comprising:

A blueprint furnishing a clear picture of the type of third generation World Organization one would like to see;

A preliminary series of reforms of management capable of being applied immediately;

A transition plan.

188. The blueprint would have to provide a simple picture of the type of World Organization we are seeking and a precise legal outline of the new institutions. An image based on a few easily understandable concepts is all the more essential in that we have to destroy the erroneous notions that the vocabulary used up to the present has left in people's minds. The terms "maintenance of peace", "disarmament", "strengthening of the powers of the Organization", "sectoral approach to problems" etc. must be replaced by other concepts. This report has attempted to suggest some: "gradual build-up of peace", "search for complementary strategies", "economic United Nations", "regional development agencies or enterprises", "Economic Security Council", etc. Others, and better ones, could be found. But it is essential that they reflect as simply as possible the concrete improvements and transformations it is hoped to obtain. The indispensable translation of this blueprint into draft legal instruments can obviously only undertaken once agreement on the main focus has been reached.

189. The chain of managerial reforms immediately applicable to the present System would have to be based on an agreement as to the unacceptable nature of the shortcomings described in chapter II of this report. They could be corrected without profound structural reforms as long as a general process of reform was forthcoming. I have mentioned: the inadequate level...
of average qualifications of staff members - the main cause of the poor quality of many of the outputs; the present disorder in the budgetary and programme practices of the various organizations; the lack of clarity, modesty and realism in the formulation of objectives; and the absence of an evaluation system. A few simple measures would make it possible to put some order into this. The main such measures have been advocated for a long time:

By the Joint Inspection Unit, in numerous reports concerning in particular methods of recruitment and personnel management; the detailed methodology of the planning, programming, monitoring and evaluation cycle; the publications policy; the methods to be applied in the field of technical co-operation, etc.; 65/

By the Capacity Study carried out in 1969 by Sir Robert Jackson, from which let us single out in particular his recommendation that a "Staff college" be set up. If this were applied to all the professional officers of the System, it would be possible to constitute a genuine international secretariat; 66/

Or again in the report of the Group of Experts in 1975 on "A New United Nations Structure for Global Economic Co-operation" (E/AC.62/9), many of the recommendations of which, not included in the resolution on restructuring, might be usefully reconsidered (particularly those in chapter II, paragraphs C and E).

A transition plan should arrange for transfers and reorganization.

190. Producing a "transition plan" is without doubt the most complex exercise and the one most subject to controversy, since the power of resistance of the existing institutions is a well-known phenomenon. The general slant of the transformations required should therefore be clearly established. The approach proposed in this report would mean that there would be no attempt to modify the sector concerned with the direct search for peace, but there would be a profound transformation of the entire concept of operational aid and hence of its structures, and a wholesale reorganization of the system of identification of world problems and negotiations. The most important transformations to be studied would therefore be:

Transfer of the resources, duties and staff of the present operational aid structures - in other words of all programmes such as UNDP, WFP, UNFPA, UNICEF, etc. and most of the technical co-operation services of the main agencies - to the "regional development agencies". This is the most substantial reconversion operation, but it would make it possible to endow the new regional development agencies from the outset with substantial resources, since the reconversion would apply to nearly three quarters of the activities of the United Nations System, or about $4 billion a year;

Reorganization of the secretariats of the United Nations and the larger agencies (UNESCO, FAO, ILO, WHO) so as to concentrate and develop the economic and interdisciplinary services in the United Nations and to organize the relations of this central service with the sectoral secretariats;
Reorganization of the intergovernmental machinery, the most important questions to be resolved here being the decisions to be taken in regard to the Economic and Social Council, UNCTAD and the intergovernmental organs of the main agencies, if an economic negotiation table of the type advocated in paragraphs 178 to 181 above were to be established;

Reorganization of the interagency machinery, since the present mechanisms of ACC, which deals only with administrative problems, would no longer make sense in the framework of the reform envisaged here;

Finally, reorganization of the relations with the non-governmental organizations and the committees and commissions which support the various organizations.

The measures listed above would in no way affect either the General Assembly or the Secretary-General or the machinery of the Security Council or the smaller functional agencies of the System. They would leave all the main agencies in being, but with a very considerable reduction of their activities and staff numbers, thus taking them back as it were to their original status as centres for reflection and co-ordination.

191. A transition and reform plan should likewise include detailed financial and personnel measures and propose a legal framework. It would therefore have to be decided whether an attempt should be made to consider amending Articles of the Charter of the United Nations, the constitutions of the specialized agencies and the agreements existing between the United Nations and the specialized agencies. Only in the light of the way in which the negotiations evolved would it be possible to say whether the taboo in regard to the inviolability of the Charter would or would not give way to a deep-seated desire for reform. In order to reorganize the intergovernmental machinery, there is no doubt that it would be better if we could undertake a revision of chapter IX and chapter X on the Economic and Social Council. But it might be possible at a pinch merely to set up new bodies, to reorganize the secretariats and to alter the content of budgets to bring about results which would already be promising. 67/

192. The outline reform presented here has certainly omitted to mention many problems and has dealt too sketchily with many others. The author's only excuse is that within the framework of a report of this type it is impossible to deal with everything. 68/ One of the aspects which certainly would have deserved lengthier treatment was that of opening up the World Organization to the "peoples of the United Nations". In other words, in the interests of effectiveness and realism, I felt that the World Organization over the next few decades should...
remain an intergovernmental organization. I felt that the time had not yet come to think in terms of a "World Parliament", but on the contrary that it was appropriate first and foremost to try to perfect the system of multilateral negotiations among sovereign Governments. It is nevertheless true that any approach which would make it possible to open up the World Organization still more to representatives of public opinion in different areas should certainly be studied. A thorough examination of the various methods feasible is a line of research which needs to be explored.
CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSIONS

This report is not an admission of defeat. The author hopes he has shown that the United Nations and its System have succeeded, by fashioning for the first time in history the beginnings of a "world political space", in demonstrating that a World Organization was indispensable. It is no contradiction to state in the same breath that the institution as it is today must be modernized, and indeed radically reformed, so as to make it more responsive to the hopes which a large proportion of the peoples of the United Nations continue to place in it.

The thesis propounded here can be summed up as follows:

1. A reform of the United Nations and its System is urgent, and in spite of deep-seated prejudice existing on the subject, it is feasible to envisage this seriously.

2. The time has come to begin to reflect in a serious and ambitious way on the definition of a third-generation World Organization. The introduction of reforms will be a lengthy process and will call for difficult searchings and negotiations.

3. The structures of the present System rest on three fallacious notions, false from the outset or gradually distorted - to the effect that the "maintenance of peace" can be achieved through an institution, that the development of the poor countries can be achieved through a sectoral approach, and that negotiations among 159 States are possible without a prior definition of agreed negotiation structures.

4. In the present political context it is unrealistic to believe that sovereign States can deal in common with activities outside the limited sphere where a broad consensus exists. The basic role of a World Organization can only be the determined search for a better or a different type of consensus which will lead towards the far-off ideals set forth in the Charter.

5. In the present political context, reform cannot be focussed on modifying the structures for the maintenance of peace or more generally the structures of a political United Nations. The successes achieved using an instrument ill suited for the purpose already constitute a paradox. We must continue, as the Secretary-General did in a recent report, to encourage the Member States to make the most of it. But it is impossible today to propose other structures which would be an improvement on the Security Council.

6. On the contrary, the reform should focus on the transformation of the structures that support development and on the institution of a genuine world economic forum. The aim would be to build up an "economic United Nations" side by side with the political United Nations.

7. On one front, the reform should be a total recasting at System level of all structures concerned with development in order to constitute regional or subregional development agencies or enterprises. It might be hoped that the drive resulting from so radical a transformation of this part of the System would lead to a re-examination of the other regional or subregional intergovernmental structures. It would obviously be desirable for the World Bank to consider the possibility of taking a hand in the thinking and in the reform, and for joint efforts to be developed in this connection between the other aid systems, multilateral or bilateral.
On the other front, the reform should be to set up a genuine world forum to deal essentially with economic problems. The developing countries should not continue to be left out of the discussion at the negotiation tables where economic and financial problems are concretely discussed. This situation does harm to the international community as a whole. Hence we must give some thought to the replacement of the present dual forum: Economic and Social Council UNCTAD, by a more restricted Council of the type envisaged in the original Charter, which set at 18 the membership of the Economic and Social Council. Calculations indicate that if this "Economic Security Council" had 23 members, the main major States and the main regions of the world could be represented on it. It should be possible for the secretariats of the United Nations and the major agencies to be reorganized under the authority of one or more "Commissions" made up of independent persons of distinction.

The sole purpose of the thesis as thus propounded is to try to make a contribution to a body of reflections inspired by the fortieth anniversary of the United Nations. To bring home the need for this, the author has been led to formulate critical judgements whose severity may at times be calculated to surprise or even to shock. The light thus thrown on the scene should on the contrary help towards a better understanding of the many qualities - ability, analytical skill, perseverance and devotion - on the part of all those who, in spite of a political climate which is often difficult or unfavourable, in spite of the ill-adapted structures within which they have to work, and in spite of the internal constraints brought about by bureaucratic shortcomings, have nevertheless been able to achieve genuine results. A schedule of these could only be made here in outline. Both within the secretariats and within the delegations, it is individual effort by stalward individuals, few of them well known, that had made it possible, starting out from utopian ideas, to make the World Organization fit into the hard facts of political life. The author would like here to state how much he himself has been able to appreciate the endeavours and the courage of a large number of actors on the scene, anonymous and keeping a low profile, who have been able to produce practical results in a large number of fields, both at the various headquarters and in the field. The basic premise of this report is that these same men and women could have achieved more (and could achieve more in the future) if they had been working (or if they could be made to work from now on) within structures better suited to the purpose.

This raises the question of the responsibility of those who have the wherewithal to achieve wholesale reform. The author does not believe the theory, widely held today, that Machiavellian designs on the part of States - and in particular the great Powers - are what keep the United Nations in a state of helplessness and impotence. He feels rather that there is a great deal of misunderstanding concerning the possible role of a World Organization and that the confusion in people's minds on this subject is itself a political phenomenon whose harmful effects could be mitigated by reflection and clarification.

The seriousness and the urgency of the problems justify focusing the search in directions little explored up to now. A proposal to devise and install entirely new structures at least in the development area and in that of the system of negotiation at world level may strike some people as rash or utopian and others as mealy-mouthed. The author has been anxious here to confine himself to the universal United Nations System, without including the Bretton Woods organizations. It is obvious, however, that the construction of an economic United Nations is not conceivable without them, and it is desirable that the thinking on the subject should be broadened to include them.
The search should be able to be carried on and developed both inside and outside the System. The extraordinary difficulty of such an undertaking must not be underestimated. A certain political climate is a *sine qua non* before even a start can be made. But the political environment of a problem is conditioned by the way in which the problem is conceived. The deep-seated longing for peace which led to the creation of the United Nations has not abated today; but it is now possible to explore other paths than those followed 40 years ago.
NOTES

1/ The term "United Nations System" generally has two different meanings:

- the first designating all the organizations, including the "financial"
  organizations represented in the Administrative Committee on Co-ordination (ACC),
  which brings together the heads of the agencies under the chairmanship of the
  Secretary-General of the United Nations;

- the second one designating only the non-financial organizations.

In actual fact, the System, in the broad sense includes three types of global
or near-global organizations, with very different functions and types of
activities, namely:

(a) The organizations with overall competence, the United Nations
  itself and some major agencies, which, although theoretically in charge of a
  particular economic or social sector, have in fact a tendency to deal with
  all aspects of economic and social problems. It is possible to include in
  this group:

- the United Nations, which alone constitutes a complex system including
  the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO, now being turned
  into a specialized agency), the United Nations Conference on Trade and
  Development (UNCTAD), the major operational and humanitarian Programmes like the
  United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the United Nations Children's Fund
  (UNICEF), the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR),
  the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA), the
  World Food Programme (WFP), and some 30 juridically independent funds, institutes,
  centres or councils;

(b) The "functional" or "technical" organizations, intended essentially
  to establish rules and ensure co-operation among national services in fields
  of common interest such as postal services, telecommunications or transport.
  In this category are the Universal Postal Union (UPU), the International
  Telecommunication Union (ITU), the International Maritime Organization (IMO),
  the World Meteorological Organization (WMO), the World Intellectual Property
  Organization (WIPO) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). With
  few exceptions, all countries, including the USSR and the socialist countries,
  are members of these organizations;

(c) The "financial" organizations, also called the Bretton Woods
  Organizations (indicating the place of the negotiations which led to the
  establishment of most of them). The USSR is not a member; they use a
  weighted voting system, do not accept the common rules adopted by all the
  other agencies for staff management and salaries and their object is
  essentially to provide a framework for monetary and trade relations, and
  also for granting development loans. They are the International Monetary
  Fund (IMF), the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the
  International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) or World Bank,
  and its affiliates: the International Development Association (IDA) and the
  International Finance Corporation (IFC).
Lastly, IFAD, the International Fund for Agricultural Development, established in 1974, has functions comparable to those of the financial organizations.

In this report, the term "United Nations System" (and sometimes "World Organization") is used to designate the organizations described in (a) and (b) above.

2/ A report being prepared on the findings of the Joint Inspection Unit in regard to staffing, planning and programming will set out the various methods used by the secretariats to delay or not to implement the decisions of intergovernmental organs. Examples may already be found in report JIU/REP/84/11 on competitive examinations in the United Nations.

3/ Application by the "major contributor" Western States of the "zero growth" doctrine to the regular budgets; reduction of voluntary contributions for operational activities.

4/ Withdrawal of the United States from UNESCO on 1 January 1985; threats of withdrawal of the same type by other Governments; examination of the participation of the United States in UNCTAD, etc.

5/ The presentation and the classification of the activities of the headquarters of the organizations by "major programmes", "programmes", "sub-programmes" and "programme elements" were decided on by the Administrative Committee on Co-ordination in 1975:

   Level 1: "major programme" corresponds to a major purpose or function of the organization for which objectives may be set (example: population - United Nations; education - UNESCO; environmental health - WHO);

   Level 3: "sub-programme" is a coherent collection of several activities directed at the attainment of one objective and which is capable of being evaluated in terms of output indicators (example: demographic projections - United Nations; industrial vocational training - ILO);

   Level 2: "programme", is ill-defined as a grouping of related sub-programmes directed at the attainment of one or more objectives that contribute to the broader objectives of the major programmes at level 1 (example: population in the ECA region - United Nations; vocational training - ILO);

   Level 4: "programme element" is either a project directed at a precise objective in terms of output over a prescribed period of time, the achievement of which can be verified, or it is a continuing activity with a measured output. A programme element may correspond to a particular "output": publication, meeting, etc. or a number of "outputs" (for more details see the Joint Inspection Unit report JIU/REP/78/1 on programming and evaluation in the United Nations).

In this report, the word "programme" corresponds to the definition for level 3. It should not be confused with the word "Programme" with a capital letter, which designates an organization that is allied to the United Nations and is financed out of voluntary funds, such as UNDP, UNICEF, UNFPA, etc.
Annex IV gives a breakdown for the Professional and higher category posts in the United Nations for all programmes and sub-programmes. The table shows that the number of Professionals per sub-programme ranges from 2.5 to 7 for most services, with the notable exception of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and the Department of Public Information (where the situation is special because of the number of field posts).

7/ See annex II.

8/ In the case of some specialized agencies, the machinery of subsidiary organs is also very complex.

9/ See in this regard the analysis in "La crise de l'UNESCO", by Pierre de Senarclens (Commentaires, No. 30, Summer 1985). The author, looking into the historical causes of the crisis, shows the inherent contradictions in the initial postulate that led to the establishment of the organization, namely that "it would be possible to reach agreement within the international community on the conditions and aims of peace, on the terms of international understanding between governments and peoples, on human rights and the ways and means of realizing them".


12/ General Assembly resolution 36/228 A, section I, paragraph 2 (a).

13/ See in this regard Joint Inspection Unit reports JIU/REP/69/7, 74/1, 76/10, 79/5, 81/7, 83/6 and 84/7. Generally speaking, reports from internal and external auditors have been of no extra assistance in these problems. See document A/6343, paras. 60-67. The situation has changed little since 1966, the date of that document.

14/ See in particular the annual reports of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions and those of the Committee of Programme Co-ordination (Supplement No. 38 of the official records of each session of the General Assembly).

15/ See on this point various reports by the Joint Inspection Unit, more particularly JIU/REP/76/10 on country programming, 78/3 on the role of experts in development co-operation, and 85/1 on the Transport Decade in Africa.


17/ Cf. report JIU/REP/84/7, entitled "Reporting to the Economic and Social Council", particularly paras. 15-21 and 27-37, and recommendations 2, 7, 9, 10 and 12.

18/ Article 101, paragraph 3, of the Charter: "The paramount consideration in the employment of the staff and in the determination of the conditions of service shall be the necessity of securing the highest standards of efficiency, competence and integrity. Due regard shall be paid to the importance of recruiting the staff on as wide a geographical basis as possible."
19/ Cf. Joint Inspection Unit reports JIU/REP/71/7; 76/6; 78/4; 80/9; 81/11; 82/3; 84/8 and 84/11. See also document E/AC.62/9, para. 22 and paras. 92-96. Cf. also Can the common system be maintained? The role of the International Civil Service Commission, by John P. Renninger, UNITAR study, 1985.

20/ The figures given in report JIU/REP/71/7 have changed little since 1971. United Nations now has computerized data in this regard; unfortunately, the amount of "non-available" information is such that, for the moment, the real percentages are not known; but the data available confirm the percentages for 1971.

21/ Cf. note 1 above.

22/ Cf. report JIU/REP/84/7, entitled "Reporting to the Economic and Social Council". The analysis of the contents of the paragraphs of resolutions for the year 1983 appears in the graph annexed to the report.


24/ On the network of intergovernmental organizations, see the book by Harold K. Jacobson: Networks of Interdependence. International Organizations and the Global Political System, Alfred A. Knopf, New York, Cf. also Yearbook of International Organizations, prepared by the Union of International Associations, Brussels (Robert Fenaux, Secretary General; Anthony Judge, Assistant Secretary General).

25/ Cf. annex I. Calculations of percentages vary, depending on the sources used, but the orders of magnitude remain the same. For the year 1983, for example, statistics concerning operational and humanitarian activities are presented in various ways according to the source: United Nations (Report on operational activities, A/39/417, of 18 September 1984; Report of ACC on expenditures of the United Nations System, E/1984/70), the World Bank (annual report) or OECD (1984 Development Co-operation Report). The figures differ, depending on whether they give annual contributions by Member States or actual expenditures. Figures for expenditures do not always include administrative expenses (programme support costs). Operational and humanitarian expenditures by the United Nations system are estimated by the Director-General for Development at $2,685.2 million for 1983 (i.e. $2,092.2 million for operational activities and $593 million for humanitarian activities). This amount represents 55 per cent of the total amount of the United Nations System's expenditures (non-financial organizations only), which stood at $4,880.5 million for 1983. When support costs are taken into account, the total should be increased by $328 million for operational activities. What is more, humanitarian expenditures for 1983 are estimated at $710 million for the United Nations alone in the ACC document, which would mean $117 million more than the above figures. The total amount thus obtained, namely $3,130 million, accounts for 61.4 per cent of the above-mentioned total of the System's expenditures, i.e. 71 per cent of the expenditures of the economic and social sector.

These management activities are set in a political environment that is often complex. UNRWA is a particularly clear case: the fact that consensus is difficult means that the organization's financial equilibrium is placed in question every year. Nevertheless, minimum funding is assured in order to cover education and health expenditures for Palestine refugees.

For information, it may also be pointed out that there is a division in UNESCO's Department of Social Sciences which deals with "Peace research".

Apart from the United Nations intervention in Korea, the only example that can be cited of application of these Articles is sanctions in connection with the prohibition of the sale of arms to South Africa and Rhodesia.

Report by Secretary-General on the work of the Organization, 1982 (A/37/1, 7 September 1982).

The Geneva Protocol was signed 1925.


Non-Proliferation Treaty, 1968.

It is not possible here to give a bibliography on functionalism. The work by David Matrany: A Working Peace System, The Royal Institute of International Affairs, Oxford University Press, London, June 1943, is the most widely known text. Connected with this school of thought are, among others, precursors such as Leonard Woolf, Norman Angell, Robert Cecil, G.D.H. Cole and some contemporaries: Ernst Haas, (Beyond the Nation State, Stanford University Press, 1964), A.R. Groom. Joseph Nye, Patrick Sewell and Paul Taylor.

The theories concerning "integration" have been developed chiefly by Karl W. Deutsch. See in particular The Analyses of International Relations, 1968, Prentice Hall Inc., and Political Immunity at the International Level, Problems of Definition and Measurement, Foreign Policy Analyses Project, Princeton University, 1953. See also a number of works by Ernst Haas, Joseph Nye, Johan Galtung.

The ACP countries (Africa, Caribbean, Pacific) are 65 in number. The third Lomé Convention was signed on 8 December 1984. It follows up the two Yaoundé Conventions (1963 and 1969) and the first two Lomé Conventions (1975 and 1979). It provides for a volume of financial resources totalling 8.5 billion ECUs.

The "Consensus" of 1970 was approved by General Assembly resolutions 2268 (XXV) and 3405 (XXX), the latter relating to the "new dimensions" in technical co-operation.

Example: United Nations Environment Programme. 1982 United Nations Budget: "Organization of three training courses in various regions, on selected topics of toxicology".
41/ The term "problématique" is a neologism which signifies a range of interrelated problems, or more properly speaking, a philosophical and political approach to a range of problems. Obviously, there are as many "world problématiques" as there are views of the world. The expression "world political space" is proposed by the author to signify the fact that institutionalized political relations are starting to form in a hitherto anarchical international world.

42/ The most important are the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States (resolution 2625 (XXV)), the Declaration and Programme of Action on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order (resolutions 3201 (S-VI) and 3202 (S-VI)), the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States (resolution 3281 (XXIX)), General Assembly resolution 3362 (S-VII) of 16 September 1972 on development and international economic co-operation.

43/ General Assembly document A/39/504/Add.1 of 23 October 1984, "Progressive development of the principles and norms of international law relating to the New International Economic Order".

44/ Paragraphs 121 and 122 of a report by Mr. Abi-Saab highlights this fundamental problem:

"121. By contrast with sovereign equality, the duty to co-operate, though constituting one of the basic principles of the Charter of the United Nations, occupies an awkward corner in the traditional system of international law. As was mentioned above, this traditional system, which has been called by Wolfgang Friedman 'the international law of co-existence', emerged in the wake of the wars of religion in Europe and endeavoured to organize the conditions of co-existence between antagonistic States, by recognizing them as sovereign and equal and by imposing on them essentially passive obligations of abstention (from interfering in each other's sphere or with each other's activities).

"122. In other words, the primary aim of the traditional system was to keep States apart rather than bring them together. This left very little room, if at all, for positive obligations to co-operate which go against the ethos and rationale of such a system. And even where the material conditions of the situation did call for them (e.g. in relations between neighbouring States or States partaking in the same international watercourse), interminable controversies arose and are still with us as to whether such positive obligations to co-operate exist, and if so to what effect".

45/ The book by Edgar Pisani, La main et l'outil, Editions Robert Laffont, argues in pages 79 to 103 and 166 to 170 for the complementarity of economic policies between the industrialized world and the third world.

46/ United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. This semi-independent organization (its budget is included in the United Nations budget) was created in 1965 at the initiative of developing countries in order to defend the positions of these countries on commodity prices stabilization and international trade. It has 168 Member States - the 159 Members of the United Nations plus the Holy See, the two Koreas, Liechtenstein, Monaco, Namibia (United Nations Council for), San Marino, Switzerland and Tonga. The four groups comprise: A. African and Asian States and Yugoslavia (95 members); B. Western European and other States (30 members); C. Latin American States (33 members); D. States of Eastern Europe (10 members). The Conference meets every four years. It has established a
permanent organ, the Trade and Development Board, which holds two regular
sessions in Geneva each year and has 127 members. The Board has six main
committees and a number of subsidiary bodies. UNCTAD organizes negotiations
on the chief commodities (bananas, bauxite, cocoa, coffee, copper, cotton, hard
fibres, iron ore, jute, manganese, meat, phosphates, rubber, sugar, tea, tropical
timber, tin and vegetable oils).

47/ The changes in the political situation since 1945 have simply made
these notions even more fallacious than they were at the outset. The
"maintenance of peace" by a Directoire of the major allied Powers was conceivable
in 1945, but East-West conflict has made it utopian and impracticable. The
sectoral approach to dialogue on ideas and policies might have seemed reasonable
before the integrated problem of development became the chief task of the
majority of the organizations. Lastly, economic negotiations between the
18 members of the original Economic and Social Council was more conceivable than
between the 54 members of the present Council representing 159 States.

economic co-operation, and General Assembly resolution 32/197.

49/ Cf. in the matter of régimes, the special issue of the review
International Organization, Spring 1982, with articles by Stephen D. Krasner,
Ernst B. Haas, Donald J. Puchala, Raymond F. Hopkins, Oran R. Young, Arthur A. Stein,
Robert O. Keohane, Robert Jervis, John Gerard Ruggie, Charles Lipson,
Benjamin J. Cohen and Susan Strange. The definition of the word "régime" given in
the review is "a set of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and decision­
making procedures around which actors' expectations converge in a given area of
international relations".

50/ See in this regard Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony (Co-operation and


52/ Cf. in particular Hans Wehberg, La contribution des Conférences de la
paix de la Haye au progrès du droit international. The preparation of a third
Hague peace conference started in Brussels in 1910 (at the Inter-Parliamentary
Union Conference). The preparatory committee was to meet on 1 June 1915. In
this connection, in his book Les conditions de la paix Léon Bourgeois wrote in
1910: "Why then does such a powerful, such a universal movement still not seem
to have produced the results expected?" Cf. also Société des Nations et Organisation
des Nations Unies, by Pierre Gerbet, Victor-Yves Ghebala and Marie-René Mouton,

53/ The most important organs of the European Communities (besides the
Parliament and the Court of Justice) are the "Council" and the "Commission",
each with its own secretariat, i.e. 9,200 staff members for the Commission
(among them 3,700 Professionals) and 2,100 staff members for the Council (among
them 660 Professionals). The Council (articles 115 to 123 of the Treaty of Rome
and articles 1 to 8 of the Treaty of "fusion" of 1965) is composed of
representatives of the 10 Member States, each Government delegating one of its
members. The Commission (articles 124 to 135 of the Treaty of Rome and
articles 9 to 19 of the Treaty of "fusion") is composed of 14 members appointed
(for four years) in full agreement by the Member States and chosen for their
general competence, offering all guarantees of independence and fulfilling
their functions in the general interest of the Communities (the entry of Spain
and Portugal will lead to some change in these figures).
At world level there is little chance in most cases of developing a "community" view. For this reason, if the United Nations was to draw on the model of the European Commission, the model would have to be adapted. The Commission or Commissions should instead endeavour to identify the problems, analyse all the aspects and the differing interpretations and pinpoint the possibilities for convergence and common ground to be developed by negotiation.

The author of this report therefore shares the idea underlying functionalism inasmuch as he believes that the development of economic, technical and cultural relations is the best way to build up peace in the long run. Conversely, he does not share in the much narrower theory of "sectoral" functions which advocates collaboration between specialists in each sector and which is at variance with the integrated and interdisciplinary nature of the problems of development and international economic co-operation.

The Secretary-General, in his report of September 1985 on the work of the Organization, proposes better use, rather than change in, the present structure. In particular, he writes: "The question is how to enhance the role of the Council and bring it closer to the position prescribed for it in the Charter. It would obviously be extremely desirable to see a change in the relationships between the permanent members that above all might restore the Council to the position it was originally intended to occupy. But surely, in the meanwhile, there are ways in which the Council could improve its capacity along the lines on which it has been working for many years. (...) Firstly, I would suggest that a determined and conscious effort be made by members of the Security Council, and especially the permanent members, to use their membership to make the Council more the guardian of peace it was set up to be and less the battleground on which to fight out political and ideological differences which are not directly relevant to the issue under discussion - in other words, to give matters of international peace and security priority over bilateral differences".

On these problems, see also Thomas M. Franck; Nation against Nation, Oxford University Press, 1985, particularly chapters 7 and 9.

It is not possible, in the context of this report, to elaborate further on the idea of Regional development agencies or enterprises. It none the less seems necessary to point out that:

(a) To the author's mind, reconversion of the major Programmes and technical co-operation services of the large agencies should be total. In other words, they should disappear and be replaced by the new structures proposed. In this way, $4 billion each year could be assigned to the new "Agencies" or "Enterprises", thereby reaching sufficient critical mass to create a new dynamic;

(b) The choice between the "Agency" or "Enterprise" formulas may depend on the problems to be solved. The "Enterprise" formula seems more attractive in that it implies the idea of profitability. Within the context of an appropriate system of long-term financing now missing in the developing countries, it would be possible to define for these "Enterprises", alongside the classic notion of financial profitability, a type of "social" profitability which deserves to be explored.

The formulas used are often ill-suited to the problems of the region or subregion concerned. For example, the idea of setting-up "common markets" on the Western European model does not sometimes correspond to any need or real
possibility, for in many instances the problems of co-operation at the regional level are not primarily trade problems.

The organizations in this group provide either soft long-term loans (IDA) or loans at market rate (World Bank). The majority of their projects are of varying orders of magnitude but generally between $10 and 40 million. They include a large proportion of equipment. The World Bank co-operates with UNDP as the executing agency for various technical assistance projects, but itself finances a large number of projects of this type which are very often feasibility studies. A comparison by volume of the activities of the United Nations system and the activities of World Bank group can be made either by the figures for contributions or the figures for expenditures. They give different data regarding the size of the two groups. The figures for government contributions (table VII.5 of the OECD document "1984 Development Co-operation Report") show:

| Contributions to United Nations Funds and Programmes (UNDP, UNFPA, UNICEF, etc.) | 1,300 |
| Contributions to specialized agencies and other organs, including WFP | 1,165.1 |
| Sub-total | 2,465.1 |
| Contributions to the World Bank group and to IFAD | 3,586.4 |
| Total: | 6,051.5 |

The proportion from these figures is 59 per cent for the World Bank group and 41 per cent for the non-financial organizations.

The figures for expenditures supplied by the Director-General for Development (United Nations document A/39/417) show:

| United Nations group's operational expenditures (excluding humanitarian expenditures) | 2,092 |
| World Bank group | |
| Gross disbursements | 9,700 |
| Net disbursements | 7,200 |
| Net transfers | 4,200 |
| (of which concessional IDA: 1,232 | |
| Non-concessional World Bank: 2,968) | |
In this case, the concessional proportion for the World Bank group is lower than for the United Nations System (62.5 per cent for the non-financial system and 37.5 per cent for the World Bank group).


61/ Article 10 of the Constitution of UNIDO provides for a 27-member Programme and Budget Committee, in which seats are allocated in such a way that the industrialized countries have a veto power if they vote together. The Common Fund for Commodities has a quite complex system of mixed votes, akin to the IMF system. Another example is that of the provisions concerning the International Sea-Bed Authority (Convention on the Law of the Sea) where very many decisions have to be taken by two-thirds majority.

62/ Unlike the present system, where no arrangements are made for consultation and dialogue on substantive problems by the heads of the various agencies, the "Commission" system proposed here would lead to constant dialogue in identifying and studying the problems (for the most part interdisciplinary) to be submitted to the "Council". Accordingly, it is quite conceivable that some Commission members would be placed at the head of secretariat services and that others would have only a team consisting of a few persons to help them in their researches.

63/ The 10 countries with a GNP higher than 2.5 per cent of the gross world product are the United States of America, the USSR, Japan, the Federal Republic of Germany, France, the United Kingdom, Italy, Canada, Brazil and China. The seven countries with a population of over 100 million are China, India, the USSR, the United States, Indonesia, Brazil and Japan. Only two of them - India and Indonesia - have a GNP lower than 2.5 per cent of the gross world product. Hence these two countries would have to be added to the first 10 if one or other criterion of size was used.

64/ The Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Ministries of Finance in all countries are represented in two different networks of international organizations. The other technical ministries (health, transport, labour, agriculture, industry, etc.) also have direct links with the international organizations in their sector. However, while the technical ministries are to some extent politically supervised by the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, the Ministries of Finance enjoy greater independence. Consequently, there is a regrettable split in the representation of States in the international organizations and an absence of relations between the financial organizations (IMF, World Bank, GATT) and the organizations of the United Nations System, within the meaning of this report. The creation of an "economic United Nations" would fill a gap (the financial organizations do not deal with the complementarity of economic strategies at world level) and at the same time establish closer links between the representatives of the Ministries of Finance and the Ministries of Foreign Affairs. This would make for better co-ordination at the national level. The proposal to introduce an "economic ambassador" alongside the political ambassador is a response to this concern.

65/ Cf. notes 7, 10, 12, 14 and 16.
66/ Document DP 5, volumes I and II, Geneva 1969 (Sales No.: E.70.1.10). Extract from volume I, page (iii), in connection with the United Nations system: "The question must be asked 'Who controls this "Machine"?'. So far, the evidence suggests that governments do not, and also that the machine is incapable of intelligently controlling itself. This is not because it lacks intelligent and capable officials, but because it is so organized that managerial direction is impossible. In other words, the machine as a whole has become unmanageable in the strictest sense of the word. As a result, it is becoming slower and more unwieldy, like some prehistoric monster".

67/ The taboo about revising the Charter of the United Nations does not apply to the number of members of the Economic and Social Council since Article 61 has been amended twice, in 1965 and in 1976, so as to increase the number from 18 to 27 and then 27 to 54. Hence it might well be enough to amend it a third time.

See also the work of the Special Committee on the Charter of the United Nations and on the Strengthening of the Role of the Organization, established by the General Assembly in 1975.


It should also be noted that annex VI has been drawn up with the help of an article by Mr. André Lewin, ... "La coordination au sein des Nations Unies, mission impossible", published by the French Yearbook of International Law, 1983.
## ANNEX I

**DISTRIBUTION OF BUDGETARY RESOURCES AND MANNING TABLES OF THE MAIN ENTITIES AND ORGANIZATIONS OF THE UNITED NATIONS SYSTEM**

(1984)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organizations and entities</th>
<th>Regular budget (millions of dollars)</th>
<th>Extra-budget-ress (millions of dollars)</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>GS</th>
<th>P</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>A. UNTOTAL</strong></td>
<td>800.6</td>
<td>1 817.7</td>
<td>2 618.4</td>
<td>34.7</td>
<td>964</td>
<td>714</td>
<td>1 738</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>B. Partial total four large agencies</strong></td>
<td>802.2</td>
<td>784</td>
<td>1 592.4</td>
<td>28.9</td>
<td>4 529</td>
<td>10 735</td>
<td>3 182</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>C. Partial total</strong></td>
<td>238.4</td>
<td>174.2</td>
<td>412.7</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>1 578</td>
<td>2 744</td>
<td>556</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>D. Total operational progs.</strong></td>
<td>3 671.9</td>
<td>2 077</td>
<td>5 748</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>833</td>
<td>1 350</td>
<td>767</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>D. (b) Total humanitarian progs. (UNHCR + UNRWA)</strong></td>
<td>380.5</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>476</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1 735</td>
<td>1 009</td>
<td>543</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>E. WFP</strong></td>
<td>736.8</td>
<td>736.8</td>
<td>1 473.6</td>
<td>15.3</td>
<td>456</td>
<td>664</td>
<td>570</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>F. Miscellaneous</strong></td>
<td>190</td>
<td>262</td>
<td>452</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>182</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Notes

- Figures taken from the United Nations programme budget for 1984-1985 (doc. A/38/8). The "regular budget" column also includes the apportioned costs for the corresponding entity.
- For staff numbers: doc. ACC/1985/PER/8.34 (unless otherwise indicated).
- Including the staff of the UN, UNICEF, UNDP, UNFPA, UNHCR, UNRWA.
- N.B. The GS column comprises staff in the general service category working at headquarters, regional offices and in technical co-operation projects.

### Sources

- For expenditures: doc. E/1984/70, table 1 (unless otherwise indicated). The figures for the 1984-1985 biennium have been divided by two so as to obtain the annual expenditures.
- For staff numbers: doc. ACC/1985/PER/8.34 (unless otherwise indicated).

### Notes and Exclusions

- In 1984, WFP staff are included in the FAO figures, in 1984, WFP had about 7/ This entry covers the staff of UNITAR, ICSC, the International Court of Justice and IATTC, for which the corresponding figures on expenditures were not available.
- Expenditures (estimates) (millions of dollars) for the corresponding entity.
- Notes
- (2) Approximately 350 military observers are not included in the total.
- (3) Approximately 18,000 local UNRWA staff members are excluded from this total.
- (4) WFP staff are included in the PAO figures, in 1984, WFP had about 354 professionals and 788 GS.
- (5) Including the staff of the Turin Centre.
- (6) Including FAO staff.
- (7) This entry covers the staff of UNITAR, ICSC, the International Court of Justice and IATTC, for which the corresponding figures on expenditures were not available.
ANNEX II

List of some juridically separate entities attached to various organizations


WHO: International Agency for Research on Cancer, Onchocerosis Fund, Sasakawa Trust Fund for Health, Voluntary Fund for the Promotion of Health, special allocations (blindness, diarrhoeal diseases, medical research, leprosy, malaria, smallpox eradication, yaws, zoonoses, sexually transmitted diseases, public water supply, mental health, expanded immunization programme, research on human reproduction, etc.). Moreover, nine special programmes are implemented by the Pan American Health Organization in Latin America and Central America.

FAO: The following special action programme: fertilizers, fertilizer supply, food security assistance, prevention of food losses, seed improvement and development, development of the meat sector, co-ordination of dairy products development, African animal trypanosomiasis control, locust control, development of agricultural credit, fishing in exclusive economic zones, forestry for development of local communities, agrarian reform and rural development, nitrogen, rinderpest and swine-fever control, foot and mouth disease, special emergency operations, emergency international food reserve, etc.

UNESCO: International Fund for the Promotion of Culture, Intergovernmental Programme for the Development of Communication, programmes to preserve monuments or exceptional sites (Nubian temples, Venice, etc.).

ILO: International Centre for Advanced Technical and Vocational Training in Turin, International Institute for Labour Studies, worker’s education and trade union training activities programmes, etc.

ANNEX III

List of the "Major Programmes" of the six largest organizations

United Nations: Co-ordination of disaster relief; international narcotics control; energy; the environment; food and agriculture; human settlements; industrial development; international trade; natural resources; population; public administration and finance; science and technology; social development; transnational corporations; transport; development problems and policies.

UNESCO: Critical examination of world problems and studies on the future; education for all; communication in the service of mankind; formulation and application of education policies; the sciences and their application to development; information systems and access to knowledge; development methods and strategies; the human environment and land and marine resources; culture; elimination of prejudice, intolerance, racism and apartheid; peace; human rights and the rights of peoples; the situation of women.

ILO: International labour standards and human rights; promotion of equality; employment and development; training; industrial relations; working conditions and the environment; social security.

FAO: Natural resources; agricultural production; cattle; rural development; nutrition; agricultural and food policies; fisheries policies; forestry resources; forestry industries.

WHO: The development of health systems; primary health care; health personnel; health information and education; promotion of scientific research in health; health protection and promotion; the health environment; technology of medical care and rehabilitation; disease prevention and control.

IAEA: Nuclear energy; nuclear security; nuclear explosions for peaceful uses; food and agriculture; life sciences; physical sciences.
### ANNEX IV

Breakdown of United Nations "Major programmes" into "programmes" and "sub-programmes"

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Major programmes</th>
<th>Central progs.</th>
<th>Central Sub-progs.</th>
<th>Regional progs.</th>
<th>Regional Sub-progs.</th>
<th>Total progs.</th>
<th>Total Sub-progs.</th>
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**TOTAL** | 50 | 194 | 65 | 293 | 115 | 387 | 2141 | 827 | 2988 | 7.7 |