REPORT ON UNITED NATIONS ACTIVITIES
IN TURKEY

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1. Variations in contributions of Projects to Development. It was disappointing to find such wide variations in the contribution that each Special Fund and technical assistance project made to the Turkish economy. An attempt was made to identify those ingredients that largely explained why certain projects were unusually successful, and others left much to be desired. Although considerable unevenness is to be expected because the local environment is not equally favourable to different kinds of UN projects, and is subject to unpredictable political changes, at least most of the major shortcomings observed in various projects were matters that should have been corrected long ago through a more alert evaluation system.

2. Recruitment of UN field personnel. The Turkish Government was critical of the caliber of UN experts proposed for posts in that country, and delays in recruitment. Discussion with various UN officials indicated that this is one of the fundamental problems facing the United Nations Specialized Agencies in developing countries. A member of the Joint Inspection Unit will concentrate on this problem for several months.

3. A critical ingredient of successful Special Fund Projects. A review of many Special Fund projects in Turkey indicated that the single greatest weakness was the failure of the Plan of Operation to include all of the things that had to be done to carry the project to the "take off" point. In some cases this means that only a multi-disciplinary project will achieve the results desired. In other cases a Phase II will be necessary. Generally speaking, these findings strongly support a policy of fewer but larger Special Fund Projects. It is recommended that a) every Special
Fund proposal be rigorously tested to ensure that all the things that must be done to achieve the desired objectives are included, and b) that if a Phase II will be necessary to achieve the take-off point, it be approved at the time Phase I is approved.

4. Co-ordination at Country Level. In spite of all of the time and effort spent by various officials trying to improve co-ordination of the UN family at the country level, the situation found in Turkey and several other countries by members of the Joint Inspection Unit left much to be desired. Several members of the Unit will examine this problem in depth during the next six to twelve months.

5. Counterpart training. It is recognized that perhaps the most important single objective of UN technical assistance is to train locals so they can carry on after the experts leave, i.e. it is the task of the expert to "work himself out of a job". It was therefore surprising to find that in a large number of Special Fund Project managers' reports no reference was found to the status of counterpart training for the Project. It is thus clear that the Headquarters of Specialized Agencies are not checking on the progress of the main job of most of their field personnel, and these personnel may not feel pressure to get on with this task and meet scheduled completion dates. It is strongly recommended that a) at the time experts are briefed at their Agency Headquarters they be given firm instructions regarding reporting progress on training counterparts (for both Special Fund and EPTA projects), and b) that appropriate personnel at Headquarters be assigned clear responsibility for monitoring the progress of such training.

6. Forms. At the country level, each Agency and the UNDP has its own series of forms for various administrative purposes such as
application for fellowships, recruitment of local employees, travel authorizations and travel expense claims, and so on. Since at least most of these forms call for the same information in each Agency, it would lead to more administrative efficiency and less confusion among local government officials if the forms could be standardized. It is recommended that the various Agencies and UNDP set up a working group to achieve this objective.

7. Control of Funds for Special Fund Projects. At this time no one appears to be checking to ensure that Special Fund Projects are completed at minimum cost. Instead, there seems to be a strong propensity for the Executing Agency to spend all the money initially approved for the Project plus all the contingency money it can persuade UNDP Headquarters to certify. It is recommended that a) current expenditure data in Special Fund Projects be made available to the Resident Representative, b) the Resident Representative be held responsible for reviewing a Project at regular intervals to ensure that it is being performed at a reasonable cost, and c) that the possibility be explored of returning "savings", defined as the difference between authorized and actual expenditures, to the country programme as an incentive to implement projects economically and terminate those, that are turning out badly, at an early date.
I. Introduction

A visit was made to Turkey from 16th April to 19th June 1968 to evaluate the United Nations activities in that country, particularly in terms of their impact on social and economic development. Since this was the first visit of this Inspector to a developing country as a member of the Joint Inspection Unit, considerable thought was given to the proper scope and approach of such an evaluation.

From the standpoint of scope, it was obvious that the United Nations family is engaged in different kinds of activities that may have an important effect on the economic and social development of a country, such as peace keeping, trusteeships, moral pressures on governments, attempts to stabilise world commodity prices and improve the environment for trade between the developed and under-developed world, conferences and meetings on a wide range of subjects, regional economic commissions, capital developments, monetary control and country technical assistance. Upon reflection, however, it seemed clear that at least most of these activities could not be properly evaluated through a visit to one country, and attention was limited on this trip to technical assistance. It was recognized, however, that in limiting the scope of this evaluation to such programmes as UNDP, the "regular" programme of the Agencies, UNICEF, and the World Food Programme, in effect this Inspector may have been "looking only at the top of the iceberg" and in at least some developing countries some of these other activities may be potentially more important to development than e.g. UNDP.

From the standpoint of approach, it quickly became clear that it was inappropriate to attempt to relate the UN development assistance to e.g. the rate of growth of Turkey. The UN input
represents such a small percentage of the total economic effort in that country that any attempt to measure or evaluate its separate impact on the overall growth rate and other economic indicators for Turkey is simply not realistic. Thus the approach had to be limited to an evaluation of the impact of these activities on their particular sub-sectors of the economy.

The objective was not to evaluate UN activities in Turkey per se, but to study the whole spectrum of projects in that country, attempt to determine why some projects turned out much better than others, and identify some major opportunities for improvement which may be applicable to many developing countries. In Parts II and III below the results of reviewing successful and not so successful projects are presented in summary form. In Part IV the key problem areas disclosed by this review and related investigations are discussed.

Detailed observations and comments on the various Projects visited in Turkey were presented orally to the Agencies involved, but were excluded from this Report because they would not have contributed significantly to the more general analysis and conclusions presented below.
II. Review of Successful United Nations Activities

In evaluating UN activities in Turkey, it was considered important to identify reasons for successful projects as well as weaknesses of unsuccessful projects. The following four successful projects are analyzed briefly and then an attempt is made to determine the key factors accounting for their above average contribution to Turkey's development programme.

a) UNESCO Several UN agencies made contributions during the early stages of the development of the Middle East Technical University at Ankara, but UNESCO has been largely responsible for the UN input into the institution since about 1960, when a Special Fund Project was initiated. It is the only government-supported institution of higher learning in which all courses are taught in a world language, and it is a major force in breaking down the language barriers between Turkey and the other countries. The curriculum of the University has been tailored to the needs of a developing country with particular emphasis on engineering and applied science, not on a classical education. There has also been some assistance on a bi-lateral basis, but UNESCO certainly deserves a major share of the credit for outside assistance to this institution. Several government officials expressed the view that this is the best university in Turkey with the most promise for the future, even though it has been in full operation for only a few years.

b) ILO In Istanbul, ILO is the Executing Agency for a Special Fund Project providing for the development of a management training centre which is in effect the "action arm" of the
Turkish Management Association. Several Turks who had studied in the United States and were impressed with the effectiveness of the American Management Association joined forces with a number of forward-looking Turkish businessmen and have given strong support to the Turkish Management Association and to this project. Training courses in modern methods of management, with a useful tie-in with the University of Istanbul, and management consulting work with the assistance of personnel from a leading British management consulting firm, are gradually adding up to a focal point in Istanbul for introducing modern management practices to industry.

The visitor to Turkey is impressed with the high overall rate of industrial development, the ability of the Turk to make things, and the willingness of the Turkish businessman to incur risks and make decisions. However, it is widely recognized that Turkey has a very high cost industrial structure. Turkish businessmen understand this, and it was very stimulating to attend training classes in Accounting for Management and Modern Personnel Methods, and note the caliber of business officials attending these classes and their serious attitude toward their training.

c) WHO One of the largest UN activities in Turkey has been the malaria programme of WHO, carried out with major financial support by UNICEF. The programme has had its "ups and downs", due partly to difficulties in penetrating the rugged country in Eastern Turkey, but WHO and Turkish personnel are now concentrating on the last area of stubborn resistance in the east, and this disease should be under control in all parts of Turkey within two or three years. Furthermore, in order to keep it
under control, WHO experts are assisting in developing a National Public Health Service. The gradual absorption of Turkish employees from the Malaria Programme into this Health Service will be the most important task during the next few years. The Turkish Government had been struggling with this disease for many years before WHO came into the picture, and it has taken their combined efforts to finally lick this problem. The importance of Malaria Control to development is too well known to require re-telling here.

d) FAO Turkish planning officials were high in their praise of the usefulness of the FAO Special Fund Project to evaluate the economic potential of the Anatalya area. The Project was well managed, provided the State Planning Office with a starting point for determining the potential of that area and assessing the priorities, and has led to a number of promising development projects. Until very recently, the "forest villager" including perhaps nine million people and a large part of underemployed in Turkey, has received only limited attention in development plans, and this project helped to open the door to expanding economic opportunities for these villagers.

It is not always easy to determine just what were the key ingredients of success in UN projects. There is a great temptation simply to conclude that if a project is well managed you are almost sure to have a successful project. However, what does good management of UN projects include? After careful review of each of these four projects, it was concluded that the following four things common to each project were the principal reasons for their success;

1. Take off The Plan of Operation of each Project included all
of the things that had to be done to carry the project to the stage where the Turks were in a position to follow through without further UN help and the Turkish economy would enjoy the intended benefits from the project; i.e. it was carried to the "take off" point before the project was terminated.

2. Local Support There appears to have been widespread support by important Turkish officials for each project. This did not result just from high pressure selling tactics by visiting Agency officials.

3. Quality of Experts The caliber of international experts assigned to each project was above average.

4. Timing Each project was well timed in terms of the country's stage of development and ability to make effective use of this assistance.

It is not difficult, with the benefit of hindsight, to criticise certain aspects of the handling of each of these projects, particularly their rate of implementation. However, the fundamentals for success were present for each of the four projects, and Turkey is already receiving important benefits from each one. This is the ultimate test.
III. Shortcomings of Selected United Nations Projects

Many UN projects in Turkey fell considerably short of the hopes and expectations of their sponsors. Such shortcomings could usually be explained largely by the absence of one or more of the four ingredients for success outlined above. Let us consider first the importance of planning the work so that the project will be carried to the take off stage.

**Take off**

In Pendik there is a particularly well managed Special Fund Project (FAO) to develop a Sheep and Goat Diseases Laboratory. In most respects this Project easily rates as one of the best UN activities in Turkey. However, after the various diseases have been identified and cures in the form of vaccine, etc., have been developed and field tested during the next few years, the experts are scheduled to go home. No provision has been made in the present Plan of Operations for a "Phase II" anticipated follow-on project for training people in the field to identify these diseases, and to use properly the cures developed at Pendik. Without such follow-on training and development of field instructions, comparatively little benefit may result from the work now underway at Pendik.

Near Izmir is the Poplar Institute, developed through a Special Fund Project which was terminated a couple of years ago. This Project was well managed, and met its objectives of expanding the cultivation of poplar trees, and developing a variety particularly adapted to industrial uses. However, this latter development was not carried to the "take off" point. Businessmen would like to
expand the industrial uses of poplar trees, but are not sure of an adequate future supply of wood. On the other hand, farmers would like to expand their cultivation of poplar for industrial purposes, but are not sure of a future market. FAO is now planning to send two experts to Turkey to explore ways and means to meet this problem.

A somewhat similar problem is arising in connection with the Special Fund Project for developing a Research and Training Centre for the Production, Processing and Marketing of Fruits and Vegetables, with headquarters at Yalova. There is a growing interest in going beyond the present research in 1) developing varieties, 2) improving processing practice, and 3) making economic surveys of the market, to focus on a few crops with the best export prospects and actually "test the Market" with substantial shipments to Western Europe. Again we are confronted with farmers who do not want to expand production unless there is a sure market at profitable prices, and businessmen who not only want the results of testing the market, but are not sure a supply of export quality fruit and vegetables will be available. Unless these further steps necessary to achieve a "take off" are provided for, this project may not lead to substantial increases in exports for many years.

In Ankara a United Nations mission in public administration, financed by EPTA, carried on for fourteen years, from May 1952 to December 1966. Total UN expenditures during this period approached 1,000,000 U.S.$. Attention was focused on development of an Institute for Public Administration. The Institute carried on some training activities for civil servants, and did a considerable amount of research, but always resisted being tied closely enough with the administration to really become a powerful
force in helping to achieve improved administration of the Turkish Government. The net impact of their whole effort on the administration of the Government appears to have been minimal. From the standpoint of getting action on some of the more important aspects of Turkish administration, it may be that the timing was wrong - that the Government was not yet ready to consider such reform. However, it is difficult to escape the conclusion that the UN experts were remiss in not pressing for an action arm of the Prime Minister's office or some ministry that could take advantage of the research of the Institute and follow through effectively.

In Western Anatolia is a Geothermal Energy Survey Project that brought in its first well a few weeks ago. It was very exciting to see the big geyser of hot steam with some water blowing high into the air, which when harnessed to a steam turbine would generate very substantial amounts of electricity (based on preliminary estimates). There were many indications that his Project had been very well managed and had the strong support of the Turkish Government. However, as far as this Inspector could determine, there has been no provision so far for careful economic studies to determine the comparative cost of this kind of energy vis-a-vis hydroelectric and conventional thermal power, and then to furnish guidance on how intensely this and other fields under consideration should be developed. Also, if further testing is favourable, the alternative forms of energy available to Turkey suggest the need for developing a National Energy Policy in the near future. Such further steps would appear to be necessary to reach the "take off" point in development of sources of energy.
Timing
An Institute was launched in Istanbul in the late 1950's on a regional basis primarily to promote industrial health and safety standards. Turkey was not ready for it, and the situation was complicated by Turkish insistence on emphasizing regionalism before an institute was firmly established on a national basis. The project was poorly managed and the laboratory work for example never really got under way. After the ILO experts left around 1960 the Institute went downhill, and has only recently been revived by a very energetic Turkish official, but largely for different purposes than originally intended. Observations by this Inspector (e.g.) in a number of State-owned enterprises near Ankara, indicated that health and safety standards still do not have a sufficiently high priority. It is also noted that administrative regulations to implement a law regarding industrial safeguards have not yet been issued.

Management
The Crop Research and Introduction Centre at Izmir is a good example of a project that has been in deep trouble due particularly to poor project leadership and lack of proper communication with Turkish officials. There is little evidence of a realistic work programme limited to a manageable number of crops. FAO officials state that this project was originally proposed by Turkish officials because of concern over pressure on rangelands due to expansion of cultivated land. This original concept of dealing only with fodder and forage crops was later expanded by UN officials to native grasses and legumes, cereals, vegetables, fruits and other crops in the region. FAO officials go on to point out that the project's ultimate aim is to "collect, protect and store for the future the genetic material of local varieties of various plants found in Turkey", an objective which bears little resemblance to the original objective of the Turks. A close look at this project in Izmir suggested that it either ought to be closed out soon, or reoriented to more limited objectives desired by those Turkish officials who make the decisions on development projects.
IV. General Problem Areas

A close look at a country like Turkey rather quickly reveals certain limitations on the effectiveness of UN assistance activities for which no practical solutions are possible at this time. However, the review of projects discussed above plus activities of the UN "country team" in action did reveal certain major problem areas probably common to many countries for which solutions appeared to be feasible now. These are discussed below.

Caliber of Experts

Turkish officials have been openly critical of the caliber of foreign experts assigned to Turkey. They feel that the average quality of such experts for both multilateral and bilateral programmes leaves much to be desired. In private talks with Turkish officials they frequently raised this matter on their own initiative and occasionally cited specific names.

UN officials in Ankara emphasized that Turkey is more developed than many other recipients of foreign assistance, and is now at the stage where only first class foreign experts can be of much help in most fields. Turkish officials resent Agency nominations of what they regard as second class experts, particularly when only one name is submitted for consideration.

Almost every UN official in the field and Agency headquarters contacted on this recruitment problem emphasized the same point, namely, that you cannot expect a really first class expert to accept temporary employment for as long as two years in the UN, particularly if he would not have re-employment rights at home. This observation would then lead to a discussion of problems faced in developing a career service for UN experts and officials.
in the field, and conversation usually ends with the query as to how you can expect Specialized Agencies to give a career status to the field employees who are paid for by UNDP for only a temporary period. Some officials think an expanded use of contracting for technical assistance is part of the answer. However, the one Turkish Special Fund Project being implemented on a contract basis was in such deep trouble that there was talk of cancelling the contract. Other factors such as financial aspects of the terms of employment may be mentioned, but the primary emphasis is usually centered on the lack of a career system.

There has been a lot of discussion recently about "capacity" and "ability to deliver" regarding UN commitments to provide experts to developing countries, particularly because of the possibility of doubling the size of the UN programme in a few years. Unless a more effective recruitment programme is developed, however, the prospects for greatly expanding the UN assistance programme are dim indeed. The Joint Inspection Unit has put this problem on its agenda for further study.

Take off
Experience in Turkey certainly points the finger to the importance of carrying projects to the point where the local country can follow through by itself and get some real benefit from the expenditure made. This does not mean you let a project drag on and on for years. What it does mean is that at the initial planning stage you identify all the items involved in carrying the project to the operational stage and cover them either in the original project or in an anticipated "Phase II". Otherwise the chances are that after the experts leave the project simply withers on the vine.
The crux of the problem seems to be this. Suppose Turkey wants help in developing an export market for peaches. A study shows that fourteen things must be done to achieve this result, ranging all the way from improving varieties of peaches grown, to reducing the price of the tin cans to competitive levels. Of these fourteen items only part are within the responsibilities of the Ministry of Agriculture, and not all of them are within the competence of the unit in FAO that would backstop this project. The project is finally written up without covering some of the fourteen items that are outside the competence of the Ministry and the FAO backstopping unit.

Recently Turkey launched what many consider its most successful agricultural project involving a great expansion in the cultivation of Mexican wheat. It was clear to the State Planning office that this project could not reach the "take off" point without involving more than the Ministry of Agriculture, so they set up a steering committee with representatives from all the different parts of the Turkish Government who were concerned with one or more of the items involved in reaching the "take off" point. It worked. FAO is now working on an integrated livestock programme that may be handled in the same way.

Co-ordination
In spite of the endless debates, and sincere efforts of many UN officials during the past 15 years to achieve proper co-ordination between the different members of the UN family at the country level, the situation found in Turkey left much to be desired. In attempting to appraise this situation, the following items were examined:

1. Provision of common services by the UNDP mission.
2. Co-ordination of various administrative matters other than common services.
3. Programme co-ordination.
4. Implementation and evaluation.

**Common Services**
The oldest and most fully accepted role of the UNDP Resident Representative since the early 1950's is to provide such common services as a post office for personal mail of UN personnel, clearance of items through customs, renewal of passports, handling the pouch, taking care of visitors and putting them in touch with Turkish officials or UN experts, as appropriate, etc. These activities were being handled satisfactorily by an experienced and able UNDP administrative officer.

**Administrative Co-ordination**
UN activities in Ankara were largely centralized in one building, including the mission of the UNDP Resident Representative, the World Food Programme, and the UN High Commissioner for Refugees. It would have been helpful if the UNICEF office were not on the other side of Ankara, and the ILO office were not located in Istanbul. (This latter matter is the subject of a separate note to ILO). This dispersion adds to administrative costs and problems of communication.

Communications between different parts of the UN family in Ankara and with their headquarters was not satisfactory and was an important contributing factor to the lack of a desirable degree of co-ordination within the UN family.

For example, this Inspector was shown the most extreme case of failure to get an answer from headquarters. The Resident Representative had sent several letters and eight cables to a Specialized Agency, for which he is also the country representative,
regarding a request from the Turkish Government, but still had not received a single reply. This Inspector followed up on this matter at the Agency headquarters and found that the responsible office had corresponded directly with the office of the Turkish Government that was requesting the project and settled the matter, but no one informed the Resident Representative.

The country representative of another Specialized Agency was corresponding direct with individuals and Turkish Government offices, without advising or sending copies of correspondence to the Resident Representative or the State Planning Office. On two or three occasions the Agency representative ran into difficulties and called on the Resident Representative for help on an emergency basis, but the latter was unable to respond promptly because he did not have any background on the matter in question. The State Planning Office finally protested formally to the Resident Representative. This Inspector raised this matter with the country representative's Agency headquarters, and was advised that their country representative was acting contrary to instructions and would be so advised.

Other examples could be cited, but the major difficulty appears to be simply a lack of discipline — a failure to follow instructions.

Programme Co-ordination
Turkey established a central office for planning about six years ago, and fully recognizes the Resident Representative as its key contact point for UNDP projects. There was much evidence that the Resident Representative was aggressively reviewing all new proposals for UNDP assistance, and keeping his headquarters fully informed. He was doing a particularly thorough job of checking on the administrative feasibility of proposals, ascertaining the attitude of the Turkish Government, and maintaining pressure on the UN family to respond promptly. The question can be raised,
however, as to whether the programming role of the Resident Representative should go further.

For example there were nearly 150 UN experts and officials in Turkey. The collection of first-hand experience of these employees in Turkey could provide valuable guidance for further programming of UN activities in terms of priorities, co-ordination between programmes, new opportunities for assistance, etc. There was no specific evidence that the Resident Representative was proceeding in an organized way to get experts in related fields acquainted with each other, and through group discussion tap the best thinking of these individuals on future programming for forwarding to Agency and UNDP headquarters, perhaps after informal discussion with Turkish officials.

It was quite evident that the UNICEF, WHO and ILO representatives in Turkey were not discussing their "regular" programmes (i.e., non-UNDP financed programmes) with the Office of the Resident Representative. However, in view of the present rather limited role assumed by the Resident Representative it is not clear just what he would do if he were fully informed in advance on these other programmes, beyond checking for duplication.

Implementation

The Resident Representative had fully assumed the leadership in getting out in the field and evaluating UNDP projects. Even during the few months he had been in Turkey he had examined all UNDP activities on the spot at least once.

The periodic reports of experts and Special Fund project managers could be more helpful to the Resident Representative in evaluation activities if they were modified in two respects:

1. **Timing**: Although the Resident Representative is required to submit periodic confidential reports to UNDP headquarters reflecting his personal views, he draws
heavily on experts' and project managers' reports for various facts and figures. Unfortunately the timing of submission of at least some of these latter reports was not properly co-ordinated with the Resident Representative's reporting dates.

2. Content

A review of a substantial sampling of reports of project managers in Turkey did not disclose any discussion or evaluation whatsoever of the status of training of Turkish counterparts. Discussions at Agency headquarters confirmed the impression gained at Ankara that the Agencies are not requiring or checking on how well the counterparts are doing, even though this is supposed to be the end-product of a large part of UN assistance activities. Perhaps the failure of Headquarters to hold the field accountable for progress in counterpart training is a major reason why training activities often move so slowly and result in repeated extensions of the expert's tour until the local counterpart is able finally to carry on alone.

There was evidence in Turkey of problems encountered in implementing programmes because various UN Agencies have overlapping authorities. The most serious problem at the time of this Inspector's visit involved a new Special Fund Project for a Small Industries Development Centre and Industrial Estates at Gazientep. UNIDO was designated the Executing Agency, with the assistance of ILO. So far, attempts by staff of these two Agencies to agree on their respective roles in this Project have failed. Part of the work involved in the Project clearly falls within the authorized activities of UNIDO. One third of the work is of the type carried on for many years by ILO, but also is included in the authorized
activities of the newly established UNIDO. The document approved by the Governing Council provided no guidance on this matter, and UNDP officials are reluctant to "get into the middle" and attempt to settle it. In the meantime, the months go by and some Turkish officials are beginning to ask whether UNDP funds involved could be transferred to another project. The identical problem arises in connection with a Special Fund Project for an In-Plant Training Centre for Graduate Engineers, involving UNIDO as Executing Agent, with the assistance of both ILO and UNESCO, but six months after approval of the Project by the Governing Council negotiations have not even started between the three Agencies.

There is a lack of long term planning and evaluation in Turkey by UN Agencies and UNDP headquarters. Over a dozen new Special Fund Projects, which, if approved during the next two or three years, would extend to 1975 or beyond, are currently under active consideration. They appear to have been chosen on the basis of a series of Ad Hoc judgements without specific recognition that Turkey is widely acclaimed as one of the developing countries nearest to "take off" point. What should be the future strategy under such circumstances? Instead of sending relatively junior officers to discuss technical points of projects, would it not be better to send some representatives to discuss the broad strategy of aid with high Turkish officials?

The strategy certainly should include identification of the three or four priority areas for further assistance to Turkey during the next few years, developed in collaboration with Turkish officials. Presumably part of the strategy would also be to help Turkey keep in touch with new technological developments taking place abroad after UN advisors go home. For example, FAO made the necessary
arrangements for the Poplar Institute, which it helped to establish in Turkey, to become associated with an international organization that did a good job in keeping its members up to date on the latest developments in its field. The strategy might also include greater emphasis on rigorous screening of all UN fellowships for training in other countries. Fragmentary data indicates that a comparatively high proportion of these Turkish fellowships were not tied to any particular project, and in any event were not adequately reviewed from the standpoint of availability of training facilities in Turkey (particularly Special Fund fellowships). In view of the amount of money and effort expended through various assistance programmes on educational institutions in Turkey during the past 15 years, it is only reasonable to expect the Turks to make maximum use of these facilities.

Forms
One specific opportunity for improving co-ordination in the field is through the standardization of forms. Over the years each Specialized Agency and the UNDP have developed separately their forms for travel authorizations, travel claims, application for employment, fellowship nomination forms, periodic reporting to headquarters, etc. The lack of standardization of these forms is unnecessarily confusing to local governments, and an added burden to centralized common services in the field, increases the total cost of printing forms, and inhibits further mechanization of administrative activities. The standardized form for medical examinations now in use for all UN Agencies in Geneva is an excellent example of co-operation in standardizing forms. It is recommended that the various UN Agencies set up a working group to standardize other forms, such as those identified above, that are used in the field.
In making the above recommendations, it is recognized that some minor differences in terms of employment between Agencies may prevent complete standardization of one or two of the forms. (Perhaps this is one additional argument for uniformity of terms of employment).

Control of Funds for Special Fund Projects

There has been a tendency over the years to spend all of the money approved by the Governing Council for a project as well as all of the additional contingency funds the Agency can get New York to approve. When pressed for a reason for extending a project, the key answer frequently is "there is still some money left".

Experts in the field who do not know if they will be discharged or not when the project is finished (see discussion of "caliber of experts" above) have an understandable tendency not to be in a hurry. Officials in Agency headquarters want to build up the total of their expenditure in the field as justification for a maximum number of projects for their department in the future. Under the present system no one is going to be criticised for extravagant expenditures provided expenditures do not exceed authorized amounts. Experience shows it is most difficult to terminate a project, that has not turned out well, at an early stage.

In order to correct this situation, someone must be firmly assigned the task of watching and reporting on this situation — presumably the UN Resident Representative. He should receive reasonably current expenditure data from New York, and be asked to report at regular intervals on any problems faced in holding down expenditure to reasonable levels. "Savings" realized through this
process might revert back to the country just as under the rules for EFTA. Such funds might be used for fellowship or other projects without prejudice to those then under review for approval by New York headquarters.

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