

NOTE ON THE USE OF CONSULTANTS AND EXPERTS IN THE UNITED NATIONS

1. In the course of their study of the use of outside expertise (both individual consultants and Ad Hoc expert groups) in the United Nations the Inspectors identified a number of areas where improved procedures and practices would, in their opinion, contribute to reducing recourse to such expertise and, where such recourse is unavoidable, make it more effective and perhaps less costly. These areas are: (i) budgetary control; (ii) contracting procedures; (iii) the selection of consultants and experts; (iv) fees of consultants and experts; (v) control over the quality of outside expertise and, lastly, (vi) records.

2. Since they believe that it is within the power of the Secretary-General to introduce the necessary arrangements and improvements without any additional authority from the General Assembly, they have mentioned in the body of their report to the Assembly only the more salient features of the "administrative controls" aspect of the problem and the more visible short-comings observed by them in this regard, reserving their more detailed observations and suggestions for this Note.

Administrative controls - General

3. In their report the Inspectors have stressed the need to make a clear distinction between individual consultants and groups of experts (for which they use the generic term "Outside expertise"), on the one hand, and other types of temporary assistance, on the other. Indeed they feel that given the present structure of the Secretariat, with its steadily expanding permanent staff, Member States will wish to control more closely United Nations expenditure on temporary professional staff paralleling this permanent establishment. To this end they have recommended, inter alia, certain basic criteria which in future should govern requests for outside expertise. The services to be performed by or with the help of such expertise:

- (a) should be specifically requested or accepted by governmental bodies;
- (b) should fulfil priority lines of work of the Organization, as specified in the work programmes and/or a legislative or programming decision;
- (c) should not duplicate work or activities already done, being done or about to be done by other offices of the Secretariat, other United Nations bodies or other organizations or agencies of the United Nations system;
- (d) should be of a temporary and/or short-term nature and be capable of being performed within a specified period of time;
- (e) cannot be carried out by the regular staff of the Secretariat for lack of specialized knowledge and/or expertise;

- (f) require advice or information that cannot be obtained otherwise; and
- (g) are of a clearly defined and specific nature, with an identifiable result which would not implicitly commit the Organization to a large or long-range programme which had not been approved or for which funds are not yet and/or unlikely to be available.

4. They have also recommended that the various administrative directives that now govern the use of consultants in the United Nations (e.g. PD/4/63 and Amend.1; ESA - Inter-Office Memorandum, dated 15 January 1970; Office of the United Nations at Geneva - "Administrative procedure for the issuance of special service agreements", dated November 1971; and UNIDO/Adm./PS 28) be replaced by a set of comprehensive rules devoted exclusively to consultants and applicable to all services of the Secretariat. They note that such criteria and special rules exist in several other organizations of the United Nations family^{1/} and suggest that in drafting the new set of rules the Secretariat should take due account of the procedures and practices of these organizations.

5. The Inspectors have recorded their surprise at the occasional excessive time and effort spent on the preliminaries of a project and the frequent length and extempore nature of the correspondence between the Administration (i.e. the Offices of Financial and Personnel Services) on the one hand and substantive offices on the other, which may delay projects involving outside expertise unduly and are quite unnecessarily labour consuming.

6. The Inspectors have likewise noted the large number of different forms (most of them requiring sets of carbon paper) that need to be completed in connexion with each project involving outside expertise. They realize, of course, that an essential consideration in structuring administrative forms should be the main use to which each one is put and that local conditions or different administrative structures may require minor adjustments. At the same time they note that other organizations seem to make much more use of action-oriented questionnaires and of multiple-purpose forms on NCR paper, in which many basic items of information need to be typed in only once, by the originating office, the other services adding whatever additional data they need - at what must surely be a considerable saving in staff time.^{2/}

^{1/} IAEA AM.II/II, Part II, section 11; WHO Manual, II.12, pages 1-10; UNESCO Manual, Item 2435, Consultant Contracts and Administrative Circular No. 614 (PER); FAO Manual, Chapter III - Personnel, Section 317 - Consultants; and "Revised Procedures for the use of consultants' funds", DG/Bulletin, No. 71/14.

^{2/} See WHO form 217 BC, which consists of: (i) the request for appointment of a consultant; (ii) the offer of appointment; (iii) the letter of acceptance; (iv) the notification of acceptance; (v) the travel authorization; and (vi) the travel order, (Annex I); and ILO form 2A (Annex II).

7. They recommend that the United Nations Secretariat do likewise. Apart from saving time and labour, the use of such forms should help to assure more effective control over projects involving outside expertise throughout their various stages - from the request for such services to their evaluation and certification - by dovetailing the various items of information contained therein.

8. Lastly, not all United Nations forms specify the distribution and filing pattern. As a result, depending on the experience of the clerical staff concerned, copies may or may not be placed in the files where they belong. The Inspectors suggest that all United Nations forms should contain precise distribution and filing instructions.

Budgetary control - General

9. Control over the substantive aspects of programmes and projects involving outside expertise can and should be exercised at four levels: (i) within the office which prepares the work programmes or the individual projects; (ii) by the Office of Financial Services when it reviews these work programmes or projects; (iii) by the legislative and programming bodies which approve them; and (iv) again by the Office of Financial Services when it approves individual requests for outside expertise. In their report the Inspectors have dealt exhaustively with the first and third levels of substantive control. Here, therefore, they will deal essentially with the responsibilities of the Office of Financial Services in this regard.

10. As the Inspectors have indicated in their report, they were much impressed by the thoroughness with which the Budget Review Groups used to go into the substance of the various offices' work programmes^{3/} and with which the Office of Financial Services examined each individual request for outside expertise, despite the handicaps both have laboured under, including frequent pressure of time and the uneven quality of the information provided to them.

11. The Inspectors understand that the Office of Financial Services spells out each year in detail what it wants by way of information. Nevertheless, both the contents and the presentation of the programmes have in past years varied, sometimes considerably, from one office to the next. Thus, in some cases they appear to have been detailed and comprehensive (DPFFI, 1971; Population Division, 1970), others were judged "sketchy" (Statistical Office and Public Administration Division, 1971), or to contain "errors" and "omissions" (Population Division and Office of Science and Technology, 1971) or to give "no reliable work-load statistics or other concrete measurements" (RTD, 1970).

^{3/} These groups did not meet in 1972 and 1973.

12. The Inspectors wonder, if this is not already done, whether the Office of Financial Services should not circulate each year a set of standardized requirements in questionnaire form. The information requested should, in the case of projects requiring outside expertise, relate, inter alia to the criteria listed in paragraph 3 above.

13. In addition, they wonder whether at the beginning of the year the Office of Financial Services should not hold a meeting with the officials responsible for the collation of the required data and explain to them verbally exactly what is needed. This might avoid subsequent wasteful correspondence and also save the time of the Budget Review Groups (if these are to be reconvened).

14. As is known, the approach to programmes in the United Nations was until recently incremental: on the basis of what the individual offices had been allocated in the past, they stated what additional funds they needed and why they needed them. At no point was there any organized review or phasing out of past programmes in the light of their completion or their possible redundancy. In the future, ESA's continuing activities are to be subject to the same careful scrutiny as new proposals. Moreover, reporting machinery for the evaluation of results of programmes was to be instituted in 1973. The Inspectors welcome these innovations, which they hope will be extended to all other departments and offices. In this context, they suggest also that besides checking more carefully the authority for a consultant's assignment, its objective be looked into, since the level of certain studies does not seem to have been appropriate to their intended beneficiaries.

15. The Inspectors, in their report, have expressed misgivings regarding the present procedures for setting up and financing certain Ad Hoc expert groups. They have recommended, inter alia, that:

- Ad Hoc expert groups or panels of experts whose essential function it is to advise the Secretariat on technical matters, should be convened only exceptionally; such groups should be approved individually by the Secretary-General; funds for such groups or panels should be specifically provided in the Budget;
- No report, interim or final, nor any findings of an Ad Hoc expert group or panel should become the starting point for additional activities or expenditure involving recourse to outside expertise without the specific authorization of the competent legislative or programming body.

16. The Inspectors have also stressed the need for providing Member States with comprehensive and realistic information regarding the use of outside expertise by the United Nations. To this effect, they have recommended that:

- Estimates, appropriations and expenditures for "Outside expertise" should continue to figure as separate items in all United Nations budget documents,
- The costing of such expertise should be broken down into its various components and be as realistic as possible;
- United Nations budget documents should include each year a separate table giving, by office, accurate estimates, appropriations and expenditure figures for all outside expertise (i.e. individual experts and consultants and Ad Hoc expert groups or panels, combined), broken down to show fees and travel costs.

17. As they indicated in their report, the Inspectors were struck by the disregard by some offices of deadlines set by the Administration for the submission of programme information. In 1971 the request for individual office programmes was sent out by the Executive Office of ESA on 18 January, the deadline being the 31st of that month. The earliest office programme was dated 18 February, the latest 12 April, the majority being filed during the month of March. The deadline for the mid-year review in 1971 was 18 August; the earliest reply was dated 19 August, the latest 13 September. Even the mandatory quarterly status-of-expenditure reports are often not comparable, the period covered varying from one office to the next. One office explained the delay by stating that the official responsible for these submissions was travelling.

18. In their report on United Nations documentation^{4/} the Inspectors had the occasion to deplore the loss of time - at the beginning of the year and again during the summer months - which was one of the causes of the delayed submission of General Assembly documentation. The Secretary-General responded favourably to their comments and suggestions and has undertaken to tighten up discipline in this connexion. They hope that their comments above will meet with the same positive response. They realize of course, that the rationalization of programming procedures is a major problem in the United Nations system, in view of the staggering of legislative and programming sessions over the larger part of each year. They believe, nevertheless, that continuing projects or those approved during the preceding programming periods represent a sufficiently large proportion of the individual offices' work programmes for greater discipline to be possible.

19. The Inspectors, in their report, have noted the tendency in some offices to over budget the estimates for outside expertise, as well as the occasional failure of projects involving such expertise as a result of rush programming and the last-minute

contracting of consultants. They have suggested, therefore, that no project should be approved for the last quarter of the year if it did not already figure in an office's initial work programme unless specifically called for, meanwhile, by a legislative or programming body. Moreover, in approving such projects their initial priority should be respected, unless very convincing reasons have been advanced to change it.

Budgetary control - Requests for outside expertise

20. As is known, the approval of a substantive office's programme for outside expertise (whether under the main or under the supplementary budget estimates) does not in itself constitute approval of the individual projects contained therein; these require individual clearance by the Office of Financial Services.

21. Chronologically, this first takes the form of a preliminary letter or memorandum from the requesting office, which may give the background of the project, describe the project itself, specify how much time it will approximately take and how it is to be carried out, name the prospective consultant and justify his candidacy by giving his background. It may also suggest a fee and mention projected travel (if any). This letter or memorandum serves as the basis for the discussions and negotiations between the various services concerned, which may be fairly protracted.

22. The Inspectors note, in this connexion, that WHO's Manual lays particular stress on identifying, on an organization-wide basis, consultant services which could be combined and covered by the same consultant, in order to simplify recruitment and reduce travel costs.^{5/}

23. Once the discussions have been completed, the requesting office forwards to the Budget Division of the Office of Financial Services a "Request for Temporary Assistance" or a "Request for short-term contract" (the so-called "P5A"). The latter give: (i) the name of the requesting office (division and section); (ii) the nature of the request (temporary assistance, consultant or replacement post with, in the latter case, additional details); and (iii) "details and justification". Under this latter heading some offices may provide such information as: (a) a description of the report or study to be produced; (b) to which item in the office's consultant work programme the particular assignment relates, and/or its authority; (c) an estimate in man-months of the actual period of full-time work involved - or the full-time equivalent when part-time work is involved; (d) travel (if any). But even this information, which by and large duplicates that given in the preliminary letter or memorandum, is often not sufficient to avoid further time-consuming correspondence.

^{5/} See WHO Manual, II.12, pages 1-10.

24. The Inspectors wonder whether the requesting procedures could not be speeded up by telescoping the two motions: the preliminary letter or memorandum and the dispatch of the P5A. The requesting office would state its request in a restructured P5A that would contain all the basic information needed by the Office of Financial Services to assess the validity of a project, this information being dovetailed with: (i) the basic criteria for projects involving outside expertise referred to in paragraph 3 above; (ii) the restructured SSA form suggested in paragraph 33; and (iii) the far more detailed evaluation certificate which the Inspectors recommend in paragraph 81. The P5A would thus serve later as the yardstick against which to measure the performance of the consultant.

25. Specifically, this restructured P5A should provide for the following information:

- Name of the requesting office;
- Name of official in charge of the project;
- Title and description of the project;
- Its authority;
- Whether the project, if it is a study, is to be an original work or a compendium;
- What questions are to be answered by the project and why it is important that such questions be clarified;
- Proposed form of publication of the project (United Nations publication, article, etc.);
- If publication is not envisaged, what is the reason;
- For whom the project is destined:
 - internal use (if so, which offices)
 - United Nations bodies or meetings (if so, which and when)
 - others (if so specify);
- Is this project dependent on the results of one or more other projects?
If so, specify;
- If already known, name, age, nationality and professional background of the consultant (the P.11 form being appended);
- Estimated duration of the project;
- Estimated travel (each journey being listed separately);
- How the project is to be carried out (by the consultant working alone; with another consultant and if so, with whom; with the regular staff);
- Estimated cost (broken down into fees, travel, and per diem; additional expenditure, such as editing, translation, printing etc., if applicable).

26. Needless to say, this restructured P5A should be considered also in the light of the basic criteria for requesting outside expertise suggested in paragraph 3 above.

27. The Inspectors were much impressed, in this connexion, by the form used for much the same purpose in the ILO, of which they append a copy together, for purposes of comparison, with the present United Nations P5A form.^{6/}

Contracting procedures

28. The Inspectors note that unlike some other organizations of the United Nations family (such as FAO, UNESCO and WHO), the United Nations has no distinctive contract form for consultants. This follows, no doubt, from the fact that no clear-cut distinction is made in the Organization between this and other types of temporary assistance contracted under SSA's.

29. As a logical corollary to their insistence that such a distinction is necessary and that it be formalized by means of new rules devoted specifically to consultants, they suggest that United Nations SSA forms be revised and that a distinctive form (i.e. of a different colour and marked as such) should be used in all contracts involving consultants.

30. The Inspectors have examined the SSA forms used by the various offices of the United Nations and, by way of comparison, those of other organizations of the United Nations family. In a few respects United Nations forms are superior, but in many others they are inferior.

31. For one thing, United Nations SSA's are not uniform, differing at present in structure and content according to whether they are issued by one office or another; or by the same office for one project or another. Under the stereo-type item "Nature of Services", for instance, some SSA's provide the barest minimum, such as "prepare a paper entitled .."; others give more detailed information, including a reference to the authority of the project, a brief outline, and sometimes even the estimated number of words or pages of a paper (if any). Generally speaking, their structure is less practical than is, say, that of FAO, which includes a check-list of required action.^{7/}

32. Among the main shortcomings of all United Nations SSA forms:

- (a) they contain no penalty clause in the event of unsatisfactory services (unlike ILO and to some extent UNESCO forms);
- (b) No provision is made in the event of conflict (again unlike those of ILO and UNESCO);

^{6/} See Annexes II and III

^{7/} See Annex IV.

- (c) no provision is made in case of a consultant's death, injury or illness while under contract by the United Nations (as in those of FAO, IMCO and UNESCO) if Appendix D is not included (as appears to be often the case at Headquarters) (see paragraph 33, footnote 15, and paragraph 35).

33. In their report and again in this Note the Inspectors have stressed the desirability of bringing the various forms relating to a consultant's assignment (i.e. the P5A, the SSA and the evaluation certificate) into line. Accordingly, they suggest that United Nations SSA forms be restructured and that they provide the following items of information:

- Name and address of consultant;
- Age
- Nationality^{8/};
- Title and description of the assignment. If it is in the form of a study, an outline should be appended to the contract;
- Starting and expiration dates of the contract, with a reference to a new rule regarding the binding nature of the deadline. If the assignment is to be carried out in stages, these should be specified;
- How the assignment is to be carried out (by the consultant alone; together with another consultant, and if so, with whom; with the regular staff) and under whose supervision;
- Fee (with an indication of the currency in which it will be paid)^{9/}.
If instalment payments are envisaged, these should be specified;
- Travel authorized^{10/} and travel expenses (if any)^{11/};
- Other payments (if any)^{12/};
- Proviso for the renegotiation or cancellation of the fee in the event of unsatisfactory services^{13/};

^{8/} See UNIDO SSA form.

^{9/} FAO form, item 8; IAEA form, item 3; IMCO form; UNESCO form, item III.2.

^{10/} UNESCO form, item IV.

^{11/} FAO form, item 10; IAEA form, item 3; WMO form, item 3; UNESCO form, item IV.

^{12/} FAO form, item 11.

^{13/} FAO form, item 18; ILO form, item 4.

- Insurance arrangements^{14/} (wherever required, Appendix "D" to the Staff Rules should be joined or some other appropriate insurance procedure should be foreseen)^{15/};
- Status of the consultant;
- Rights and obligations of the consultant (preferably in the form of an Annex to the contract, which would reproduce the relevant new rules referred to in paragraph 4)^{16/}
- Proviso in the event of conflict^{17/};
- Title rights;
- Unpublished information rights;
- Termination of contract clause;
- Other remarks;
- Place and date of signature of both contracting office and consultant^{18/};
- Distribution pattern.^{19/}

34. The form should be structured, whenever possible, along the lines of a check-list and should specify any additional action required.^{20/} Moreover, to be receivable, it should in all cases be accompanied by the P.11 form. Lastly, consultants' SSA's should be marked accordingly and have a distinctive colour.

35. Whether or not to include Appendix "D" in the SSA has long been a source of concern to the Administration. At present it is mandatory at Headquarters only for missions overseas and which last three months or more. The United Nations Office at Geneva is more strict in this respect; Appendix "D" is included in all cases involving travel. Admittedly, not to do so simplified procedures, since no medical check-up is required. On the other hand, unless the United Nations insures its consultants (as do certain other organizations), the absence of coverage may involve the Organization in costly liability suits. The Inspectors note that in some other organizations of the United Nations family, as at the United Nations Office at Geneva, medical clearance is mandatory for any consultancy involving travel. WHO allows, in an emergency, for a "preliminary certificate" of good health.

^{14/} FAO form items 12, 13, 14, 15; IMCO form; UNESCO form item IV.

^{15/} Appendix "D" to the Staff Rules governs compensation in the event of death, injury or illness attributable to the performance of official duties on behalf of the United Nations.

^{16/} UNESCO

^{17/} ILO form item 5.

^{18/} ILO; UNIDO

^{19/} ILO; UNIDO

^{20/} FAO

36. The Inspectors have observed that although present rules make it clear that SSA's are all-inclusive contracts and that unless otherwise specified, such extra charges as cable and postal fees, etc., are at the expense of the consultant, some substantive offices apparently fail to brief prospective consultants about the exact conditions of their employment; worse, some offices insist that the United Nations pay now for this and now for that - fortunately with little or no success, but again at the cost of time-consuming correspondence. In one case that came to their notice this delayed the start of a project by almost six months.

37. Hence the Inspectors' suggestions that there be appended to every SSA a brief summary of the consultant's rights and obligations, as spelled out in the recommended new rules referred to in paragraph 4. Such guidelines for consultants exist in several organizations of the United Nations family.^{21/}

38. At present, the contracts themselves seem to be viewed all too often by the substantive offices - and the consultants themselves - as a mere formality. Already in 1965 the Internal Auditors found that:

- Letters and documents relating to agreements showed that these had been signed by the interested parties at a date other than the typed date in the heading of the form;
- These signatures were themselves never dated;
- SSA's amending a previous SSA had been issued after the expiry of the latter either by lapse of time or completion of service or both; they thus amended what was in fact a non-existent contract.

39. The Inspectors have stated in their report that they were struck by the number of instances of consultants contracted before an office's programme was approved or even submitted. One contract was signed by the Administration on 19 August 1970 for a period of work extending from 16 July to 31 August; another was signed on 22 December 1970 for the period 28 November through 31 December and returned unsigned by the consultant; a third was signed in May 1970 for the period 1 January through 31 December of that year. The contracts of one consultant have been signed by the United Nations Office at Geneva consistently from one to two weeks after they are supposed to come into force. Due to the haste with which some of the consultants hired by ESA to work for the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment were selected and put to work, many of them started work weeks or even months before their

^{21/} WHO: "Information for Consultants"; UNESCO: "General Conditions applicable to the holders of consultant contracts", which is annexed to each contract; in the IAEA the relevant sections of the Agency's regulations are spelled out on the reverse side of the SSA.

contract became valid. In 1971 the Population Division executed an SSA at a cost of \$8,600 prior to the submission of its programme. One consultant contracted by DPFFI started work four months before his contract was signed. The Public Administration Division, for its part, contracted an expert for service during the last week in January, prior to the approval of its programme and allocation of its funds. The signatures are still hardly ever dated, despite AMS's 1965 recommendation to this effect.

40. The Inspectors note that UNIDO's Office of Personnel refuses to sign any contract if the expert has already started work and that FAO's contract form contains even a specific proviso to this effect (see Annex IV item 17). They would wish to insist that consultants should not start their assignments unless their contracts are valid, i.e. have been duly signed and dated by themselves and countersigned and dated by the Office of Personnel Services, except where there has been an exchange of telegrams confirming the exact terms of these contracts.

41. In principle, the Administration is supposed to be advised immediately if for one reason or another a consultant is unable to continue or complete a study for which he is under contract. Likewise, if a consultant requests that he be given more time to finish his assignment than had been indicated in his SSA, an amendment postponing the completion date of the SSA should be executed. If, because of such an extension, the SSA is carried into the next financial year, the costs of the corresponding portion of the consultant's service must be charged against the office's consultant allocation for that year.

42. In fact, this is done but rarely. More often than not, until the substantive office files its certification of services "satisfactorily rendered" and requests payment of the consultant, the Administration has no knowledge whether and if so, for what reason, a project has been delayed.

43. Generally speaking, there appears to be a tendency, in cases where even those rules that exist stand in the way of a given assignment, to exercise undue pressure on the Administration through recourse to a higher level of decision. The Inspectors realize that occasionally an emergency situation may require a more flexible interpretation of, or perhaps even an exception to, a given rule, but all such cases should be recorded and an adequate explanation should be provided. The Secretary-General will, no doubt, wish to tighten up discipline in these various regards.

The selection of consultants and experts

44. The Inspectors, in their report, have dwelt at some length on the selection of consultants and experts which, in their opinion, calls for improvement. Among other things, they mention certain "patterns", such as:

- The repeated and sometimes continuous hiring, sometimes at fees that exceeded prescribed rates, of former staff members, especially in the higher brackets;
- The repeated contracting of the same consultant to do work in what, at least to laymen, appear to be very different areas of expertise;
- The occasional contracting of consultants for reasons other than expertise;
- The hiring of experts, and especially of consultants, from a relatively limited number of countries.

45. In their report they have given a number of examples illustrating the last three "patterns". Here they wish to bring to the attention of the Secretary-General some cases relating to the practice of hiring former staff members as consultants which were intentionally not dealt with in the report.

46. For example, one consultant - a former Director of Division at Headquarters - was due to retire in 1959. His contract was extended for three consecutive years. Thereafter, and until 31 December 1971 he was under almost continuing contract (twenty-one SSA's and three ST contracts), mostly with his own former Division, but also with other offices. During this period he totalled under his SSA's alone (i.e. not counting the extensions of his original contract, the ST contracts or travel costs) earnings in addition to his pension of some \$64,500, i.e. over \$5,800 per annum. The Inspectors were informed that there was every intention to continue hiring this "outstanding expert", since he represented far better "value for money" than any other possible candidate, not to mention regular staff member.

47. Another senior staff member was retired at New York Headquarters in October 1966. The very next day, he was given an SSA valid until 30 April 1967 (fee: \$12,423). This was followed by three successive ST contracts in Geneva from 1 June to 31 December 1967; 1 January to 31 March; and 1 May to 31 December 1968; and by two further SSA's - one from 6 January to 31 December 1969 (fee: \$20,000) and the second from 20 February to 30 December 1970 (fee: \$10,000). The consultant's file contains a note from the then Office of Personnel, dated 9 January 1970: "\$2,000 a month plus pension does seem excessive ... especially for less than full-time work, but since this is what he received previously ... we cannot very well change the amount now".

48. A senior staff member of the United Nations Office at Geneva resigned on 1 April 1961. He was that very day rehired through the end of the year as a consulting legal adviser to ECE for a fee of \$6,000. He has been in almost continuous employment as a consultant in various capacities ever since - with ECE, with the Geneva Office and

with UNCTAD. Thus in 1962 he earned \$8,820; in 1963 - \$7,000; in 1964 - \$6,840 (all four years: plus travel and postal expenses); in 1965 - \$10,040; in 1966 - \$10,000; in 1967 - at least \$7,000; in 1968 - \$9,500 plus SF 6,000; in 1969 - \$10,000 plus SF 12,000; in 1970 - SF 42,000; in 1971 - \$7,500 plus SF 10,000. In 1972 he was contracted once more for the whole year for a fee of SF 42,000. Thus his earnings since his resignation have totalled \$82,700 and SF 112,000. The Inspectors learnt that at the time of this official's resignation his post had, by agreement with New York Headquarters, been blocked and a P-5 post was likewise blocked in ECE, the funds being released to retain him as a consultant.

49. A staff member who had retired in February 1966 from his P-5 post with ESA, was contracted the following year to continue his work preparing ESA's contribution to the Repertory of Practices of United Nations Organizations, a publication required under General Assembly resolution 796 (VIII). His contracts and fees were: 1967 - 1 April to 31 December, \$8,775; 1968 - 1 January to 31 December, \$11,700; 1969 - 1 January to 7 October, \$6,000; 1970 - 1 January to 31 December, \$4,300. His earnings over and above his pension have thus averaged some \$7,700 per annum.

50. A former staff member retired as Political Affairs Officer in February 1965, and was immediately re-engaged to continue the work he had been carrying out previously, i.e. preparing and updating various parts of the Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council (authorized by General Assembly resolution 686 (VII)). Between March 1965 and December 1970 he was given nineteen SSA's, many of them overlapping, his earnings for that period, over and above his pension, totalling at least \$42,800, or roughly \$8,500 per annum. His file shows that time and again the Offices of Personnel and Financial Services objected but each time their protests were dismissed because of the alleged "highly complex nature of the work", "the priority attached to it by the Secretary-General" and its alleged "urgency".

51. Without in any way questioning the quality of the contributions of many consultants hired from among former staff members after their retirement, the Inspectors in their report have expressed the hope that existing rules concerning such hiring will be more strictly enforced in the future. Furthermore, they have voiced the opinion that such contracting should be for a "one-time" activity and for strictly proven grounds, and that where former staff members are hired, exceptionally, to work on what is expected to be a continuing activity, their responsibilities should include the training of their replacement. Lastly, their fees should be based on the criteria laid down in paragraph 62 below.

52. They have also expressed the view that, familiar with a candidate and hard-pressed for expertise as a substantive office may be, the Administration should look more closely into the qualifications of the more "versatile" candidates. Needless to say, to make this possible, improved consultant's records (as suggested in paragraphs 88-92 below) are imperative.

53. They have voiced their belief that whatever other implications a project may have, the technical expertise of a consultant in a given field should be the prime consideration for his selection.

54. They have also recommended that efforts be made to select experts and consultants from a wider and more representative number of countries than is being done at present and that these should include a larger number from the developing countries, whose knowledge of and experience in the processes of development and the practical application of modern technology to widely different local conditions is often invaluable. In this connexion, they note with satisfaction that other organizations of the United Nations family are attaching increasing importance to such expertise.^{22/} This is particularly true of Ad Hoc expert groups, whose raison d'être it is to weigh the work of the Secretariat and/or of individual consultants against the "collective wisdom" of a more representative caucus.

55. Lastly, the Inspectors wonder why some offices must wait until they receive their allotments before starting to look for a consultant or expert. While they condemn the occasional practice of contracting consultants or, worse still, putting them to work without a contract, before a given project has even been approved or the funds for it allocated, they would expect offices planning a project that requires outside expertise to ascertain in advance whether such expertise is or will be available, and on what terms.

Fees of consultants and experts

56. In their report the Inspectors have referred to cases where, contrary to the Financial Rules, prior commitments seem to have been made by some substantive offices to consultants, which the Administration had later either to disavow or to tacitly endorse.

57. For example, in December 1970 a substantive office requested a six months ST contract for a consultant to prepare the "zero issue" (i.e. mock-up) of a new publication which, it said, would result ultimately in the assignment of regular staff.

^{22/} See International Labour Office, Geneva: "Employment, incomes and equality. A strategy for increasing productive employment in Kenya"; 1972; page XIII.

The then Office of the Controller first denied the request, invoking the recruitment "freeze" due to come into force in January 1971, but relented under pressure from the requesting office. It then asked for a costing; this was given as P-5; the Office of the Controller countered with P-3, step IV or V; after what had now become, apparently, "unbearable pressure" by the requesting office, the fee was set at P-4, step I, non-local level, and was finally accepted, though with reservations as to the amount of per diem, by the consultant in April 1971 and only after the then Office of Personnel had made it clear to him that "the only binding offer ... [was that] based on Staff Rules and Regulations".

58. Four points are worth noting in this connexion: (i) the project was delayed almost six months and a time-consuming exchange of correspondence took place because of what can only be described as "horse-trading" by the consultant, backed by the requesting office; (ii) this "horse-trading" could no doubt have been avoided had that office not made, be it even informally, a prior commitment to the consultant; (iii) subsequent correspondence shows that United Nations conditions of employment were not made clear to the consultant prior to hiring him; and (iv) the project turned out to be a failure, having been apparently both poorly formulated and poorly controlled. Cost of this failure - \$12,925, plus the time of the Secretariat staff concerned.

59. The Inspectors, in their report, have stated their surprise at the fees paid, on occasion over the protests of the Administration, to certain former senior officials of the Secretariat recruited as consultants.

60. On 1 May 1969 a retiring UNDP resident representative was approached by New York Headquarters for a consultant's assignment as a management expert in Geneva. The offer by the then Office of Personnel in New York was, oddly enough, at the D-1/VII level - a step non-existent in the United Nations for this type of assignment. Even so the candidate rejected the terms. There followed again sixteen months of "horse-trading" between (a) the candidate; (b) the Office of Personnel at Headquarters, and (c) Geneva, with the latter's Recruitment and Training Section adamantly objecting to what it justly regarded as irregular terms and being just as adamantly pressured by Headquarters. In the end, the contract was signed on New York's explicit orders - and terms - the action being, fortunately, logged in Geneva.

61. The Inspectors, in their report, make a number of suggestions on the subject of consultants' and experts' fees which may, hopefully help prevent such abuses in the future. Specifically, they attach great importance to the principle that all offers to, and negotiations with, consultants in regard to their fees and other financial considerations (expenses, travel costs, etc.) should be conducted by the competent

services of the Administration and not by the substantive offices. This principle should be enshrined in the recommended new rules referred to in paragraph 4. They have also suggested, in this connexion, that the Office of Financial Services issue a warning to all offices that it will henceforth not honour payment claims for fees that were not cleared in accordance with existing rules. This is done in UNIDO - apparently with success.

62. As regards the fees themselves, the Inspectors have suggested that three basic criteria should prevail:

- (i) as a matter of principle, emoluments should be based on present duties, not on former ones;
- (ii) consultants' fees should in no case exceed the equivalent of D-1 (step I);
- (iii) in cases where former staff members are contracted as consultants, their combined earnings (i.e. fee, as calculated on a monthly basis, and pension) should not exceed their total monthly emoluments at the time of retirement.

63. The Inspectors also suggest that the contracting of consultants for longer periods and the clearance of fees above the P-5 level should be the prerogative of the Under-Secretary-General, Department of Administration and Management.

64. The Inspectors have pointed out in their report that they sought to ascertain what United Nations policy was regarding the fees of members of Ad Hoc expert groups. There appears to be none. In practice, most offices "play it by ear"; if they can get a paper from an expert free of cost, so much the better; if not, they try to pay him as little as possible. The Inspectors have noted that some specialized agencies resort extensively to expert groups. Yet they pay no fees as a matter of principle, on the premise that the experts have the advantage of meeting one another and exchanging views under United Nations auspices. The same goes for ECE. Even in ESA at least one office never pays experts a fee - because it hasn't the money.

65. The Inspectors recommend that the new rules referred to in paragraph 4 should include clear instructions on all the above points.

66. PD/4/63 (paragraph 5) specifies that an SSA "... is not ... appropriate for the procurement of services from a corporate body, such as a firm or an institute". This type of subscriber is governed by financial rules 110.16-110.24 relating to contracts, which include advertising and bidding requirements, and under which fees above \$10,000 must be cleared by the Committee on Contracts. True, rule 110.19 (f) allows for an exception to be made to the bidding requirement in the case of "professional services", but it does not dispense with the special clearance. The

Inspectors have come across at least one major contract which was approved four months before the Committee on Contracts had the opportunity to even examine it.

67. On 31 January 1972 three SSA's (130/72, 2/73, 1/74) were requested for a European scientific institute to perform research on the biological control of cannabis and poppy plants. The contract is to extend over three years and to cost a total of \$150,930, paid in annual instalments. The request was approved on that same day by the Head of the Administrative and Financial Services of the office concerned and a first instalment of \$50,310 was approved for 1972 on 2 February 1972 by the Office of the Controller in New York, although the SSA's were signed by the Geneva recruitment service only on 18 February 1972. It was only on 7 June, however, that the Committee on Contracts in Geneva had a chance to examine the dossier of this contract. It "expressed its concern that the [office in question] had gone ahead without prior submission to the Committee for approval". In addition, the Committee requested that the Chief, Personnel Division, United Nations Office at Geneva "ensure that all future requests for services to be rendered by such groups as firms, educational institutions, etc., be submitted to the Committee in the form of contracts, rather than as Special Service Agreements". It referred in this connexion to a response from Headquarters to a query made in 1965 on a similar matter which indicated that where the contractor or supplier was chosen on a unilateral basis, i.e. without resort to competitive bidding, all commitments in excess of \$5,000 should be referred to the Committee on Contracts which, without concerning itself with the form of these contracts, reviews their substance. Needless to say, this procedure cannot obtain where SSA's are entered into, since these are subject merely to clearance by the Office of Personnel Services.

68. The Inspectors would wish to endorse the above comments of the Committee on Contracts. Indeed, they believe that financial rules 110.16-110.24, as at present drafted, require tightening up. Specifically, the concept of "professional services" under rule 110.19 is too vague, since any service performed by a corporate body could, presumably, qualify as such.

Control over the quality of outside expertise

(a) Project formulation and control

69. As they indicated in their report, the Inspectors found that the quality of a project involving outside expertise depended, inter alia, on (i) the proper conception and formulation of the project, and (ii) continuous control over its implementation. They mention, for example, the case of a consultant who, for lack of staff travel funds, was sent to Mexico at a cost of some \$5,000 to undertake a series of

field studies on "The Socio-Economic Aspects of Rural Industrialization". According to the responsible office, the project turned out to be "not practicable", i.e. a failure, having been apparently "poorly conceived".

70. In 1971 UNCTAD commissioned of a lecturer in a European university an unprogrammed study on "Adjustment Assistance Measures", which involved first the devising of a methodology and then its field testing in the same country - cost: \$2,000. Once the theoretical work had been completed, it was learnt that the field test could not be carried out owing to different "digit levels", i.e. standards of measurement at UNCTAD and in the country concerned. Though the fee was adjusted accordingly, the project is in a state of suspension and the initial investment is, therefore, at least for the time being, wasted. The Inspectors wonder whether it was not possible to ascertain whether the field test could be carried out before assigning the project to this particular consultant.

71. Other unsuccessful projects were found to be due to inadequate mid-project control, as well as - in some cases - poor conception or formulation: the Inspectors were told about a consultant contracted to do a feasibility study regarding the possibility for certain developing countries to exploit their mineral resources. The completed study was, they were assured, of high quality but its conclusions were of no practical use because the expert had based them on the wrong selection of minerals and the responsible office did not notice this until the study was completed.

72. In another case a consultant was paid \$5,000 to write a paper for the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment. The paper turned out to be unusable for various reasons - style, presentation, even policy (because the responsible office decided ex post facto to alter the outline). Thereupon a second consultant had to be hired, at an additional cost of \$400, to rewrite it.

73. The Inspectors believe that one way to avoid such situations would be to break down, wherever possible, the contract into components: (i) outline; (ii) first draft; and (iii) final draft, with mid-stream spot checks, each component (if judged satisfactory) being remunerated against an appropriate proportion of the fee. This might help identify errors or shortcomings in a consultant's work - which may be due to his having misunderstood his assignment - and also provide an opportunity for correcting them before it is too late.

(b) Evaluation and certification of services rendered

74. The Inspectors, in their report, state their misgivings about the present evaluation and certification procedures in the United Nations of services rendered by consultants, which in all too many cases seem to be a strictly pro forma exercise. Once

an assignment has been completed, the certifying officer (who, in most cases, is the person who designed the project and contracted the consultant in the first place) requests payment of his fee for "services satisfactorily rendered" either via his executive officer or directly to the Office of Financial Services. There exists again no standardized form for such requests. Some offices submit a detailed itemized statement giving the name and address of the consultant; the numbers of the SSA's accounts and MOD; the period covered by the assignment; a brief description of service performed; indication of fee and amount due (whether in instalment or final payment) and instructions for payment. Other offices resort to extensive but often less specific memos. Others still confine this exercise to a brief statement of satisfaction with services rendered. ESA's requests from the Executive Office to the Office of Financial Services are briefer still, merely requesting payment of such and such an amount for "work satisfactorily completed in accordance with the terms of the consultant's SSA". Both executive officers and the Office of Financial Services acknowledge that in most cases they have no means of telling whether an assignment has in fact been "satisfactorily completed" and that they must take the word of the substantive office concerned. Indeed only rarely is the "product", if any, appended to the request for payment.

75. That this procedure requires improvement can be seen from the fact that the Inspectors came across a number of requests for payment for "work satisfactorily completed" when this was apparently not the case. In one instance the responsible director admitted to the Inspectors that a \$2,400 project was "of very little value"; nevertheless his signature appears under a certification of "obligations satisfactorily discharged".

76. Earlier in this Note the Inspectors mentioned a project which took almost six months to get started on account of "horse-trading" between the consultant and the requesting office, on the one hand, and the Administration on the other. The project failed at a cost of £12,925. Nevertheless the office concerned requested that the consultant be paid the fee that had been originally agreed, saying by way of extenuating circumstances that the consultant "not being a staff member, was not aware of United Nations requirements". The Inspectors would suggest in this connexion that no consultant is, by definition, a staff member, and that one of the duties of the substantive office which contracts him is precisely to ensure that he understands his assignment and performs it according to the terms of his contract.

77. They have also mentioned the case of a poorly formulated and controlled and hence unsuccessful \$5,000 study for the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment,

which had to be rewritten for another \$400. In due course, the substantive office filed a routine memorandum requesting payment of the full amount to the original consultant for services "satisfactorily rendered" and at its insistence this sum was eventually paid, but only under protest from the Administration, "to save the image of the Organization".

78. In 1970 a consultant, who is described in the original request for his services as "an eminent writer on socio-economic subjects" was contracted to prepare (i) a 150-page reference work on United Nations strategy for the Second Development Decade, and (ii) a short popularized version of the same in booklet form. Agreed cost of three months' work: \$10,000 plus some \$2,500 in travel. The then Office of Personnel protested what it judged to be an excessive fee. It was thereupon decided that the consultant would produce only the larger work - for \$6,000. Shortly before the SSA expired, however, he announced that although he had written the short summary after all, he was unable to complete the main assignment. Meanwhile, he had been paid \$2,000 for a preliminary outline and had spent some \$2,500 in travel. The sole return for the United Nations from this \$4,500 investment in what was likewise duly certified as "work satisfactorily completed", was thus a 27-page booklet - at \$155 a page.

79. In UNIDO the Inspectors identified a consultant's contribution which had been costed as an original study and which was virtually completed when the editors, in checking the references, discovered that it consisted to a large extent of excerpts extracted from various available publications. The responsible division insisted nevertheless that the study was still valuable to its main audience, the developing countries, and in due course the consultant was paid his full due.

80. The Inspectors have examined a number of suggestions in this connexion: a Certification Committee, made up of representatives of the substantive office in charge, of the Chief Editor and of the Publications Board; dual certification, etc. None of them appear to be really satisfactory. Nevertheless they feel that the substantive offices should be required to provide a far more explicit and meaningful evaluation certificate than is now the case. This, incidentally, should make it harder for an unsuccessful consultant to find employment with another United Nations body.

81. This evaluation certificate should be brought into line with the original request for the services of the consultant, i.e. the restructured P5A form referred to in paragraph 25; it should be appended, whenever the nature of the "product" allows it, to the latter, when the request for payment is made and should, lastly, be in the consultant's file. This certificate should include the following information:

- Whether the completed assignment corresponds to its description in the FPA;
- Whether it is judged to be an outstanding, or useful, or unsatisfactory contribution (in the latter case, explanations being attached);
- Whether it has been or is to be used as planned (again, according to the FPA), and if not, why not and to what other use it is to be put;
- Whether the agreed deadline was observed, and if not, why not;
- Whether it was performed as originally intended (i.e. by the consultant alone, or working with another consultant, with the regular staff), and if not, why not.

The certificate should be signed by the official in charge of the project and by the responsible head of the office or division.

82. Earlier (see paragraph 33), the Inspectors suggested that as in FAO and ILO, consultants' SSA's should contain a penalty clause providing for a reduced fee or its cancellation altogether in the event of unsatisfactory performance.

83. Thought might be given, lastly, to the establishment of a library of consultants' contributions, to which access could be had by means of a computerized reference catalogue along the lines of UNIDO's "Industrial development abstracts", which the Inspectors describe in greater detail in their report. Apart from making such contributions available to a larger audience than seems to be the case at present, this would constitute an additional commitment on the part of the substantive office concerned to the quality of the "product".

Records

84. The Inspectors, in their report, have pointed out that both they and the various officials who kindly provided them with statistical data and information, were greatly handicapped by the shortcomings of the present record-keeping system in the United Nations which, with the single exception of UNCTAD (in the case of consultants), is simply not geared to modern management controls.^{23/}

85. As a result, their main source of information until they started to compile their own records, were the lists of consultants prepared by the various offices external in response to a request from the delegate of Poland in the Fifth Committee at the General Assembly's twenty-sixth session. But these lists provide only very scant information: moreover in some cases they are inaccurate.

^{23/} UNIDO's record-keeping system, largely on account of non-computerization and understaffing, compares in many respects unfavourably with that of UNCTAD, but even so is far better than that of the United Nations Secretariat in New York and Geneva.

86. The Inspectors were told that it might be difficult to assemble even this scanty information for earlier years, since "it was not standard practice in the United Nations to keep such comprehensive records". At least two offices informed the Inspectors that they "did not have readily available" the cost breakdown, in terms of man-months, even of their regular Professional and General Service Staff.

87. In principle, copies of all SAA's issued to consultants are supposed to be filed with the Data Unit of the Office of Personnel Services. In fact, the Inspectors found these files unreliable. For instance, there are differences between the total number of consultants' SSA's contracted by ESA contained therein and those provided to be Inspectors directly by ESA, no doubt due to the fact that there seems to be no agreed criteria on the basis of which such statistics should be kept. Nor are the SSA's always comprehensively costed; thus many of them contain reference to travel expenses for which no figures are mentioned and on which the required data must be sought elsewhere. Furthermore, consultants may be given not SSA's, but ST contracts, which again may be filed away elsewhere. Lastly, the personal files of the consultants are not always well kept (papers in the wrong order, others missing, inadequate cross-references, etc.).

88. The Inspectors recommend that a basic standard consultants' records system should be worked out for all departments and offices, and for the Organization as a whole. To this effect they suggest that in the future each office which employs individual experts and consultants should institute, or in those cases where it already has them, restructure its consultants' records somewhat along the lines of UNCTAD's "Consultants Register", which is almost satisfactory. Such records should include in tabular form the following information:

- Name and age of consultant;
- Nationality;
- Qualifications (indicating, if former staff member, date of retirement and last grade and step);
- Title of project;
- Its authority;
- Its exact relationship to an office's work programme and its priority;
- Its duration (both programmed and actual);
- Proposed and actual use made of the project;
- Detailed breakdown (SSA's, ST's, MOD's, TR, others) of all fees:
 - (i) authorized; and (ii) paid;
- Source of funds.

89. As is done in UNCTAD, the information about the cost of outside expertise (consultants and Ad Hoc expert groups) should then be consolidated by office and department and for the Secretariat as a whole, giving; (i) expenditures in the two preceding years; (ii) those of the current year, broken down into: (a) total SSA expenditure (broken down into salary and travel); (b) total ST expenditure (salary and travel); (c) other; (d) total of all expenditures (salary and travel); (e) the amount of the annual appropriation; and (f) the outstanding balance.

90. This consolidated information would serve as a basis for the tables which, in their report, the Inspectors have recommended to be appended to the Budget Estimates.

91. Furthermore, the Office of Personnel Services should keep its own central card index file of all consultants contracted by the United Nations, enabling it to see at a glance when each consultant was employed, by which office, for what purpose, what his fee was on each occasion and how his services were evaluated.^{24/}

92. In addition, each consultant's personal file should include all relevant correspondence, memoranda, etc., providing a complete record of all transactions relating to the consultant concerned. Important decisions made verbally should also be briefly recorded. If, for technical reasons, some papers have to be filed separately (e.g. documents relating to financial, as distinct from administrative controls), photocopies should be provided. The file should include a copy of the more detailed evaluation certificate suggested in paragraph 81, and, where applicable, of the consultant's study or report.

93. Lastly, the cost of each project involving outside expertise, i.e. all payments to individual consultants and the total cost of each Ad Hoc expert group meeting (i.e. travel costs, per diem and, where applicable, fees of experts; fees of consultants and, if applicable, their travel costs and per diem; other related costs) should be communicated to the responsible substantive office and kept on file there for easily available reference.

By: S. Ilic, C.S. Jha,
J.A. Sawe and A.F. Sokirkin
Joint Inspection Unit

Geneva
September 1973

^{24/} The Inspectors were informed that partly because of the difficulties it had encountered in providing them with the data required for this report, the United Nations Office at Geneva has recently introduced a card index file. The Inspectors commend this initiative and hope that the file contains all the information listed above.

ANNEX I

ILO PROGRAMME PLANNING AND CONTROL SYSTEM - FORM 2A		RESEARCH OR REPORT PROPOSAL	
1	Biennium 19 _____ 19 _____	Programme No. _____ and Abbreviation _____	
2	Proposed Project Title _____		
3	Estimated cost	<u>Prof. M-Y's/M's</u>	<u>Missions</u>
	This biennium	\$ _____	\$ _____
	Next biennium	\$ _____	\$ _____
* explain here _____			
4	Purpose of Project (Check)		<input type="checkbox"/> Preparation of International Standards
	<input type="checkbox"/> Increasing effectiveness of field projects		<input type="checkbox"/> Preparation of a conference or meeting
	<input type="checkbox"/> Identifying needs and opportunities for future ILO action		<input type="checkbox"/> Implementing decision of an ILO Body Which?
5	What questions are to be answered by this Project?		
6	Why is it important that these questions be clarified? (Refer to Long-Term Plan, if possible)		
7	What are the Department's intentions as regards dissemination of the findings of the Project? (<u>Review</u> article, non-periodical printed publication, mimeographed production, Offset, Superior Offset)		
8	If large-scale publication outside the Office is not envisaged, what is the reason?		
9	For whom are the results intended? (Check and state)		
	<input type="checkbox"/> Other ILO Units titles _____		
	<input type="checkbox"/> Field Experts category _____		
	<input type="checkbox"/> Specialised Research Bodies which? _____		
	<input type="checkbox"/> National Administrations which? _____		
	<input type="checkbox"/> National Private Organisations which? _____		
	<input type="checkbox"/> Members of the General Public which? _____		
10	Will the results be used for meetings <input type="checkbox"/> No, <input type="checkbox"/> Yes, If yes, state title and year		
11	Is this project a continuation of previous, or related to future ILO work? which? Is implementation of the Project dependent on the results of one or more other Projects? which?		
12	Names of other contributors to this Project and nature of contribution		
NOTE If individual spaces are not sufficiently large continue on a blank page			

WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION

REQUEST FOR APPOINTMENT OF CONSULTANT

Allotment No.

Preliminary itinerary		Purpose of travel	
From			
To			
To			
To			
To			
To		Orig unit/Date	
To		Proj. No.	
To		Techn. field	
To		Ins No	
To	Nat /Yr of birth		

(insert in this box only information to the consultant) →	Title	
	Salary	
	Salary deduction	1% for Accident and S Insurance
	Duration of appointment	
	Special instructions and remarks	
Date and place of reporting for duty (= target date)		

Originating unit	Authorized by		BUD	PERS
------------------	---------------	--	-----	------

ANNEX III

P. 5 A/Rev. 2

To: Administrative and Financial Services

Attention: Budget Division

+ Authorization No. _____
(for use of Budget Division)

REQUEST FOR TEMPORARY ASSISTANCE OR REPLACEMENT POSTS

1. Requesting Office: _____ R. O. No. _____
(Division) (Section)
2. Nature of request :
☐ Temporary Assistance
☐ Consultant
☐ Replacement Post (including maternity or sick leave replacement requests)
3. If request is for replacement complete the following:
 - (i) In replacement of _____ Grade _____
 - (ii) Reason _____
(e.g., detailed, seconded, on extended sick leave, etc.)
 From _____ (Date) To _____ (Date)
 - (iii) Replacement Grade _____ Period _____
4. If request is for more than one replacement give details below.
5. If request is for an extension or amendment of a current authorization, give present authorization No.

Details and Justification

(Date)	Requesting Officer
<u>Distribution</u>	<u>Administrative and Financial Services</u>
1. Personnel Services	+ Authorization No. _____ as above
2. Requesting Office	<u>Details of authorization</u>
3.) Budget Division	
4.)	
5. To be retained by requesting office	
Date _____	Approved _____ For Head, Administrative and Financial Services



FOOD AND AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATION
OF THE UNITED NATIONS
Via delle Terme di Caracalla, 00100 - ROME

ANNEX IV

TERMS OF EMPLOYMENT
Consultant

1. NAME		2. INDEX	3. DIVISION
4. PROPOSED STARTING DATE AND DURATION		5. DUTY STATION	
6. DUTIES			
7. HONORARIUM equivalent of US \$ <input type="checkbox"/> monthly <input type="checkbox"/> daily, for days actually employed (based on a seven-day working week) MS 317.3		8. CURRENCY MS 317.33	9. DAILY SUBSISTENCE ALLOWANCE, payable in the currency of the duty station and subject to revision, at present for first 60 days: ... per day, thereafter ... Elsewhere: DSA will be payable in accordance with the established UN rates MS 317.34
10. TRAVEL Tickets are purchased by FAO. For actual travel time, per diem is payable (in local currency) up to a maximum of 3 days, at the rate of US\$... MS 317.7	11. EXCESS BAGGAGE ALLOWANCE In addition to the airline allowance for economy/ tourist class travel, FAO will pay up to 10 kg air accompanied upon submission of a claim by the consultant MS 317.74		12. ACCOMPANIED BAGGAGE INSURANCE US \$1,000 If more is required, the extra premium must be paid by the consultant through FAO. MS 317.75
13. Compulsory MEDICAL INSURANCE, and COMPENSATION COVERAGE for illness, injury or death is provided for by the Organization. Deductions (in the amount of 1%) and benefits under this coverage will be based on the honorarium as stated above. For details see attached Manual Section 343. MS 317.8			
14. GROUP LIFE INSURANCE, for appointments exceeding two months, and GROUP ACCIDENT INSURANCE are available on voluntary basis. For details see attached Manual Sections 344 and 345			
15. MEDICAL CLEARANCE Appointment will be subject to the satisfactory passing of a prescribed medical examination. <input type="checkbox"/> Please have the enclosed medical forms completed by a qualified physician (preferably one connected with the UN, or a university hospital), or by one of the following medical practitioners: and immediately return them, together with the chest X-ray, sealed in the pre-addressed envelope enclosed, <input type="checkbox"/> Please submit to the undersigned a certificate, released by a qualified physician (e.g. your family doctor) stating that you are in good health and fit for the work considered and for travel. MS 317.4			

16. GOVERNMENT CLEARANCES

This offer of appointment is furthermore subject to:

- | | | | |
|--|---|--|---|
| <input type="checkbox"/> Clearance from the Government
of country of assignment | <input type="checkbox"/> Received | <input type="checkbox"/> Clearance/release from
your Government | <input type="checkbox"/> Received |
| | <input type="checkbox"/> Not yet received | | <input type="checkbox"/> Not yet received |

17. CONFIRMATION OF OFFER OF APPOINTMENT

Appointment will be confirmed only after satisfactory Medical Clearance and after Government and other internal clearances. Therefore, do not commence travel to the duty station nor take any other action which may result in financial loss or personal inconvenience until you have received from us the confirmation of this offer of appointment.

18. NOTICE PERIOD ON TERMINATION

The employment may be terminated by the consultant or by the Organization upon written notice of two weeks (appointments of two months and more) or five days (appointments of less than two months)

MS 317.62

19. DATE

20. ACCEPTANCE

I hereby accept these TERMS OF EMPLOYMENT with the entitlements herein specified, it being understood that such entitlements are subject to the Organization's rules governing employment of Consultants, and to any modifications made hereto. I have received a copy of Manual Section 317.

.....
Date

.....
Signature

ENCLOSURES:

- | | |
|--|---|
| <input type="checkbox"/> Application for UN travel documents
The attached forms are to be completed (typewritten) and returned to the undersigned immediately, together with the indicated number of passport-size photographs signed on back | <input type="checkbox"/> Declaration (oath of office) |
| | <input type="checkbox"/> Manual Sections 317; 343 part; 344; 345 |
| | <input type="checkbox"/> Emergency notification form |
| | <input type="checkbox"/> FAO Designation of Beneficiary form |
| <input type="checkbox"/> International Inoculation Booklet
You are required to comply with the regulations of your own health authorities and information given by the airlines. Prior to entry into the country of assignment the following inoculation must be entered in this book | <input type="checkbox"/> Salary Allotment Instructions form |

REQUIRED

RECOMMENDED

- | | | |
|--------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|
| Smallpox | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| Cholera | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| Yellow fever | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> |

NOTE: Please return one signed copy, and the enclosures as appropriate, to the undersigned.